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A b stra ct
This is a study of the impact of international political relations on the domestic 
economic policy choices of an oil-exporting developing country with special reference 
to the case of Iran during 1973-1978. These years began with the four-fold increase in 
oil prices and ended in revolution with the overthrow of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the 
Shah. The analysis is centered on the inter-relationship between the political and the 
economic to find an explanation for the Shah’s decision to adopt a big push 
industrialisation strategy in 1974, against the advice of his technocrats, and the 
reasons for its failure. It is concentrated on two inter-related themes, the nature of the 
state and its role in the country’s industrial development and the relationship between 
international political factors and domestic economic policy choices. It is argued that 
the international political dimension played a crucial part in the Shah’s decision to 
adopt a big-push strategy hut has usually been ignored. The Shah was an ambitious 
man who sought to purge the country’s humiliations at the hands of the great powers -  
Britain, the former Soviet Union and the USA -  by building up the country’s military 
and economy through import substitution industrialisation, in the hope of propelling it 
into the league of top five world powers. Import-substitution industrialisation has 
fallen out of favour but we believe it can be a valid development strategy. Its 
shortcomings in Iran’s case were mainly due to the form of its implementation. The 
economy was unable to absorb over-accumulated funds caused by the sudden increase 
in oil prices in late 1973. It was in this rush to industrialise, and the desire to impress 
the outside world, that the roots of the failure of the Shah’s big push industrialisation 
policy lay.
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Introduction
This is a study of the impact of international political relations on the domestic 
economic policy choices of an oil-exporting developing country with special 
reference to the case of Iran during 1973-1978. These years began with the 
four-fold increase in oil prices and ended in Iran’s revolution which saw the 
overthrow of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah. The analysis is centered on 
the inter-relationship between the political and the economic to find an 
explanation for the Shah’s decision to adopt a ‘big push’ industrialisation 
strategy in 1974 and the reasons for its failure. It is argued that international 
political factors have in this process often been ignored and played a much 
bigger part in the Shah’s decision to adopt a big push strategy than hitherto 
recognized.
Although it is not within the scope of the thesis to examine the causes of 
the revolution, it is hoped that, in the process, the analysis helps explode the 
myth that the Shah’s demise was precipitated because he modernised too 
quickly for his ‘backward’ people. It is instead argued that the Shah promised 
much but that his policies were badly implemented with results that fell far 
short of expectations, leading to economic dislocation and disappointment. 
Iran’s big push industrialisation needed a strong infrastructure and human 
resources which were lacking at the time but the Shah ignored these constraints 
because the industrial growth policy was pursued more for geo-strategic reasons 
than for its economic feasibility.
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The analysis is concentrated on two inter-related themes, the nature of the 
state and its role in the country’s industrial development and the relationship 
between international political factors and domestic economic policy choices. 
Although the analysis is concentrated on Iran, it is aimed at making a 
contribution to the comparative literature through its discussion of the role of 
geo-political factors in economic policy choices, particularly in developing 
countries with plentiful resources such as oil-exporters. This is in addition to 
the more conventional analysis of the problems and obstacles faced in trying to 
engineer rapid industrial growth. It has become fashionable in recent years to 
regard plentiful oil revenues as an obstacle to development but that is not the 
view adopted here. While oil revenues can certainly be a mixed blessing, it is 
believed that they can facilitate economic development through 
industrialisation subject to good government and appropriate economic 
policies.
The thesis is divided into six Chapters. In Chapter 1, we discuss the 
political economy framework adopted for the analysis and argue that the main 
literature on the subject of Iran’s industrialisation has tended to fall into two 
broad camps, both primarily focused on domestic factors. One camp has tended 
to provide an economic framework while the other has tended to concentrate on 
a broader political-economic analysis by considering the impact of the state, as 
an autocratic monarchy and its impact on the country’s socio-economic 
development. In Chapter 2 we examine the debate on industrial growth 
strategies and the problems faced by oil-exporting countries and the role of the
state in economic development. We argue that although import-substitution 
industrialisation has fallen out of favour, it can be a valid development strategy 
and its shortcomings in Iran’s case were mainly due to the form of its 
implementation. Chapter 3 analyses the economic results of the Fifth Plan 
period (1973-77). It argues that despite the big push, Iran’s manufacturing 
development fell well short not only of its stated objectives but also of 
internationally accepted norms.
Industrialisation in Iran was carried out through five-year plans. In Chapter 
4, we discuss the planning process and how it came to be politicised and 
dominated by the Shah during the Fifth Plan period to the frustration of the 
technocratic planners. We argue that this rush for industrial growth by the Shah 
lay in geo-strategic reasons rather than economic feasibility. In Chapter 5 we 
seek to explain why this was. It is not disputed that the Shah was strategically 
allied to the West and regarded as a client or ‘stooge’ of the US, although 
ironically this was not how he appeared to regard himself. Instead he sought to 
exorcise the earlier humiliations endured as a client through an attempt to 
strengthen the country’s industrial base and thereby achieve economic and 
eventually, political independence. Chapter 6 provides a summary of the 
argument and conclusion.
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Chapter 1. Political Economy and Industrialisation: The Case of Iran
1.1 Introduction
I am inclined to believe that the extent of opposition to the Shah was 
not primarily because of his repressive treatment of the opposition, 
but because of the outrageous simplemindedness of his modernisation 
programs which attacked the quiescent and made political activists of 
them.1
This thesis will examine Iran’s industrialisation record in the 1970s against its 
political and international background. It will analyse the inter-relationship 
between the economic and the political to find an explanation for the adoption 
and continuation of a big push industrialisation strategy in 1974, a strategy that 
had profound economic, social and political consequences for the country. For 
the purposes of this thesis, political economy will be taken to mean the role of 
political factors in economic affairs. Therefore, we will seek to identify the 
political issues in play and the manner in which they affected the conduct of 
Iran’s industrialisation policy during the period under study, 1973-78. This 
period began with the four-fold increase in oil prices and ended in a revolution 
that overthrew Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah. The period also coincided 
with the country’s Fifth Five-Year Development Plan.
Economic development was, as in many authoritarian countries, to be in 
the form of a revolution from above. However, the Shah’s system finally 
collapsed in the face of a genuine social revolution from below. It would be 
tempting to link the extensive shortcomings in the economy to the revolution. 
While the social dislocations and mismanagement of the economy caused by 
the implementation of the Fifth Plan undoubtedly contributed to the revolution, 
it is not the purpose of this thesis to enquire into the totality of the forces 
leading to revolution. Some explanations have been put forward by various
13
writers, but it would not be unfair to say that a definitive analysis of the 
revolution has yet to be written. Instead, as mentioned, the thesis will confine 
itself to an analysis of the political economy of Iran’s attempt at 
industrialisation from 1973, the year that oil prices quadrupled, until the 
revolution. It will be argued that the forces behind the economic programme 
cannot be understood without reference both to the domestic political system 
and structure and Iran’s place in the international system. The latter is a much- 
neglected factor in studies of Iran’s drive towards industrial growth. However, 
international political influences and Iran’s own view of its role within that 
system were crucially important to the decision to embark on such an ambitious 
programme.
1.2 The meaning o f political economy
Economics is a social ‘science’ yet economists disagree over fundamentals, 
such as how inflation should be controlled or the way in which full employment 
can be best generated. This disagreement usually stems from different ideas 
about how society should be governed. Economics grew out of what Adam 
Smith in The Wealth o f Nations called the political economy, which he defined 
as that which caused nations to grow wealthy. The meaning of the term has 
changed through the centuries into a subject distinct from economics. At its 
root, political economy recognizes that government action can alter economic 
variables such as patterns of consumption, supply and demand and prices. In his 
book, The Political Economy o f International Relations, Robert Gilpin writes 
of political economy as ‘the role of economic factors in the affairs of nations’3 
and defines it as a set of questions arising out of ‘the interaction of the state and 
the market as the embodiment of politics and economics in the modem world’.4
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The politics of international economic relations can be further broken down 
into a domestic-international divide. Some scholars have emphasized the 
relationship between international and domestic economies while others put 
greater emphasis on the relationship between the state and society.5 Frieden and 
Lake break down these two views into four different perspectives. Following 
their definition, the argument adopted here combines an international political 
view with a domestic institutional view.6 Thus we argue that Iran’s domestic 
economic policies were caused by its international geo-political experience and 
that the state, operating as an unaccountable dictatorship, moulded the form and 
implementation of the big push industrialisation drive. However, the policy ran 
up against domestic economic limits which ultimately resulted in failure.
1.3 The nature o f the Pahlavi state
Iran during this period was a monarchical dictatorship, functioning as a 
capitalist economy, though one in which the state played a very large role. The 
structure of the economy will be discussed in Chapter 3. Politically, power 
become increasingly concentrated in the hands of the Shah, Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi, as he grew in strength during his 37-year reign, reaching its apex in the 
years under discussion. The state functioned in what Gholam Afkhami has 
called a ‘personalised power’ structure7 in which major political and economic 
decisions were made by the Shah, while the institutions of the state were 
organised in such a way that information had to pass through the Shah before
o
decisions could be made. In such a personalised power structure, the character 
of the central player becomes important. Thus, the Shah’s own experiences and 
psychology had a bearing on the policies he decided to pursue. Fred Halliday 
writes:
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The Shah’s personality helped weaken not only the army but also the 
state. . . . The Shah’s grandiose distance from the realities of Iran 
helped introduce those development programmes which created the 
socio-economic context of the revolution; his ignorance of conditions 
in the country, together with his tendency to withdraw into silent 
meditation and his paralysis of will, were ill-suited to his coping with 
the crisis of 1978. He seems to have known from about 1974 that he 
had cancer, and this may account both for the recklessness of some of 
his projects and for the fatalism he displayed in his final months of 
power. If such speculation is possible, one could argue that no 
monarch could have saved the regime in the last few months of its 
existence, but that an autocrat of a different stamp might have been 
able to prolong its existence or take corrective measures early in 
1978. Whatever importance this personal factor has, it certainly 
seems to have contributed to the unexpectedly rapid disintegration of 
the regime.9
In fact, the rapidity with which the monarchy fell apart has led to a re­
examination of the Pahlavi state to see how strong it really was. For example, 
Mehran Kamrava saw ‘systemic difficulties’ accounting for the state’s 
weakness at the time of the revolution:
At the same time as it was reaching the height of power, the Pahlavi 
state underwent atrophy. After 1975 the state structure began to fall 
apart from within, and whatever the Shah did in order to save his 
regime met with disapproval and condemnation from abroad.10
The unusual unity of opposition groups in the revolution, which ranged from 
Islamic fundamentalists through to liberals and communists, underlined the 
Shah’s overwhelming lack of legitimacy in the eyes of his people. The Pahlavis, 
father and son, were both regarded as having been brought to power and then 
kept there, first by the British and second by the Americans for their own 
interests. This issue will be examined further in Chapter 5, which deals with 
Iran’s international relations.
Under the Pahlavis, the character of the state changed. Reza Khan came to 
power in 1921, he later decided Iran should remain a monarchy and crowned
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himself Shah in 1925.11 His consolidation of power involved successfully 
destroying the power of the land-owning classes. During the reign of his son, 
Mohammad Reza, many of the former landowning families and the well-to-do 
merchants entered government service, whether in the Plan Organisation, the 
oil ministry or the foreign office. Others embarked on entrepreneurial activities 
provided by the new oil wealth and the beginnings of an industrial 
infrastructure. These people could be termed the upper end of the Iranian 
middle class but it is arguable whether they formed an independent middle class 
since they were so dependent on the state. Writing in 1970, Ahmad Ashraf 
concludes:
the Persian bourgeoisie is still in its formative period. Though it has 
gained functional significance, wealth, prestige and power in the past 
decade, it is not an independent powerful force in this country and is 
still dependent on the bureaucratic machinery which carries the 
burden of the centuries of ‘Asiatic’ tradition of total power.12
In the countryside, major changes resulted from the land reform 
programme of the 1960s. Although power was redistributed due to land reform, 
the poor performance of agriculture during the Shah’s reign pushed many 
people out of the countryside and towards the towns into which they were 
further lured due to the large amounts of construction and consumption fuelled 
by oil wealth. The children of this first generation of urban immigrants were to 
feel the brunt of the economic downturn in the mid-70s and formed the 
backbone of the popular protest to the Shah in the form of the huge
1 'Xdemonstrations which so characterised the Iranian revolution.
It is not within the scope of this thesis to examine these issues much 
further, though reference will be made to them in subsequent chapters. It is 
important to note, however, that whatever the reality, the Pahlavi state seemed
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all-powerful at the time, that there was no suggestion of democracy and that an 
efficient secret police helped spread fear and rumour. All these factors helped 
the concentration of power in the Shah’s hands.14 The hallmarks of this system 
were centralisation of political power under the Shah, a politicised bureaucracy 
and a weak legislature. Popular participation in the political process was 
severely limited, underlined by the creation of a totalitarian system in 1975 with 
the establishment of a single party, the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) Party, adherence 
to which the Shah regarded as a necessary demonstration of loyalty not only to 
him as head of state but also to Iran itself.15 One former bureaucrat and 
supporter of the old regime has described how democracy was envisaged:
Political participation, on the other hand, was seen primarily as an 
education program by which the virtues of the political system, the 
sanctity of its symbols, and the correctness of the socioeconomic 
philosophy underlying the Shah-People Revolution were to be 
imparted to the people. The monarch represented the basic symbol of 
the educational process and was, therefore, a referent in all popular 
expressions of gratitude for the newly achieved stability, security, and 
progress under his benevolent leadership.16
The same paternalistic view of the Shah as teacher is clearly delineated in the 
Rastakhiz party’s handbook, The Philosophy o f Iran’s Revolution: ‘The Shah- 
in-Shah of Iran is not just the political leader of Iran. He is also in the first 
instance teacher and spiritual leader, an individual who not only builds his 
nation roads, bridges, dams and qanats [waterways], but also guides the spirit 
and thought and hearts of his people’.17
In his rule of the country, the Shah took care to incorporate symbols and 
terminology designed to deflect the discontent of would-be dissenters. Thus, the 
development of the country was described in terms of the ‘Shah-People 
Revolution’, or the ‘White Revolution’ in order to appropriate Marxist
18
terminology. The Shah regarded the threat from the left as one of the most 
important challenges to his power, a legacy of the strength of the Iranian Tudeh 
(‘masses’ or communist) Party in the 1950s. In addition, most aspects of 
development were couched in nationalistic terms of the highest order. This 
process culminated in the celebration of 2,500 years of monarchy at Persepolis, 
southern Iran, in October 1971, where the Shah invoked the glories of the 
Persian empire and implied that the Pahlavis formed part of this great tradition. 
The nationalism was therefore distinct from that of Dr Mohammad Mossadeq, 
who had nationalised the Anglo-Iranian oil company in 1951 and had prompted 
the exile of the Shah for a brief period. It was nevertheless a form of 
nationalism designed to neutralise the threat from that quarter.
1.4 The drive towards industrialisation
The Shah’s strategy for economic development favoured government-planned 
large-scale industrialisation, a policy which increased in importance in the 
1960s and 1970s with the growth of oil wealth. The Plan and Budget 
Organisation (PBO) was established in 1947 and was in charge of administering 
the seven- and five-year plans introduced from 1948. During the Fourth Plan 
period (1968-72), Iran enjoyed one of the highest growth rates in terms of Gross 
National Product in the world, stimulated by oil revenues and reflecting the 
importance of economies of scale.18 The relative success of this Plan, together 
with political developments in the region, prompted the Shah to develop his 
aspiration of bringing about what he termed the ‘great civilisation’ in Iran, by 
which the country was overtake France as the fifth most industrialised nation by 
the turn of the century. The material means by which this was to be brought 
about was to be massive state expenditure in the economy, facilitated by the 
four-fold rise in oil prices at the end of 1973. To this end, the already ambitious
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Fifth Plan (1973-77) was revised in 1974 and public expenditure was doubled. 
However, structural imbalances in the economy, especially in terms of supply 
rigidities, were exacerbated and rampant inflation from 1974 led the Shah to 
declare a series of politically unpopular measures in an attempt to bring the 
economy under control. Pesaran writes:
The rate of increase of retail prices rose from 3.7 per cent per annum 
during the Fourth Plan to 15.5 per cent in 1974 . . . consumer prices 
started accelerating from 9.9 per cent in 1975 to 16.6 per cent in 1976 
and finally to 25.1 per cent in 1977, while at the same time the 
growth of domestic value added started declining.19
Before the economy could recover, the country became politically unstable 
from early 1978 and a year later the Shah was overthrown by a coalition of 
popular forces. Many of the problems which Iran experienced in its attempt to 
develop, such as excessive centralisation, an extended bureaucracy, inefficient 
industrial production, a lagging agricultural sector, a shortage of skilled labour 
and high inflation are ones shared by other developing countries. For example, 
Turkey pursued an import-substitution industrialisation programme in many 
ways not dissimilar to Iran’s.20 From the 1920s, the leaders of both countries, 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and Reza Shah in Iran, took a conscious 
decision to ‘modernise’ on a secular, Westernising, path. Great emphasis was 
placed on the modernisation taking place within a nationalist context, where the 
state was to be the main engine of development and the clergy’s role was to be 
severely circumscribed. As in Iran, a privileged Westernised elite emerged in 
Turkey, while the majority of the people remained close to their religious 
heritage and, in economic terms, drew startlingly uneven benefits from the 
rewards of the development process underway in the country.
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But there are also major differences in the experience of the two countries. 
Despite its growing pains, modem Turkey had the confidence of having been 
the core of a recently-dismantled empire while Iran had suffered humiliating 
foreign interference in its domestic affairs throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Another core difference was that Iran had capital in the 
form of oil-wealth while Turkey fell prey to international debt in order to 
finance its development projects. The difference in form of capital 
accumulation seems to have dictated the course of development in economic 
and social terms for both countries. While the public sector remained dominant 
in Iran (because oil revenues accmed directly to the government), in Turkey, the 
private sector began to play the majority role from the late 1940s onwards. 
Despite Iran’s advantage in having what amounted to a private source of 
income, the Shah’s dream ended in revolution, the creation of an Islamic 
Republic and international ostracism, particularly during the first 10 years of 
the revolution, whereas Turkey’s aspirations have resulted in a credible 
application for membership of the European Union.
It would not be wise to draw too many conclusions between the 
development experience of the two countries without more detailed analysis. 
However, it is clear that what differentiates Iran very sharply from what might 
otherwise be a fruitful comparative exercise are two unusual features of Iran’s 
development process. One is the revolution, which came soon after the effects 
of the deterioration in the economy began to hit all sections of society apart 
from the very wealthy; the other is oil revenue.
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1.5 Oil income and the rentier economy
For most countries, the main barrier to development is usually posed by the 
need to generate financial resources and to break through a cycle of poverty and 
stagnation. As far as the development experience goes, the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was a new phenomenon in this respect. 
Oil wealth gave rise to the notion of the ‘rentier’ economy in which the sale of 
oil can be seen as a form of rent accruing to the government. However, it has 
become clear that the rentier economy has its disadvantages, most notably in the 
economic distortions it can produce. The consequences of the sudden rise in oil 
prices in 1973, and again in 1979, have also underlined the significance of an 
economically interdependent world, in which the OPEC states were not in the 
end able to ‘get away’ with commanding high prices for oil. Some of the 
deleterious consequences of this move finally rebounded on to their own 
economies, in the form of more expensive imports, imported inflation and a
91drop in demand for petroleum.
Most Middle Eastern OPEC countries are limited in terms of their 
domestic population and surface area. As such, their development model has 
been outside the usual experience of a less developed country, characterised by
99a burgeoning population and dependent on the export of agricultural products. 
This is not true of Iran, however. It is the most populated of the Middle Eastern 
OPEC countries and, as such, is able to overcome two of the main difficulties 
facing the small Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, such as Kuwait, or even 
Saudi Arabia itself, by having a potentially large domestic market and a large 
indigenous labour force. And, unlike some of the smaller overpopulated states 
of south-east Asia or the city-states of the Arab OPEC countries, its resources 
offer the possibility of a self-sustaining economy within a viable state structure.
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However, freedom from capital constraints has not proved to be the 
development panacea for which the oil-rich states hoped. The existence of 
capital cannot in itself allow the domestic economy to bypass the usual 
production processes, including the development of an industrial infrastructure, 
though it can mask the difficulties for a period. In addition, the oil industry 
itself operates as an ‘enclave’ industry since it has very little input as far as the 
production process goes. No significant linkages are made with the rest of the 
economy; backward linkages are low because of the need to import advanced 
technology from abroad and forward linkages are similarly weak, since oil 
products tend to be exported. Indeed, according to one pioneering writer 
looking back at the Iranian experience in the 1950s and 60s:
If the economic performance of most Rentier states is found to be as 
unimpressive as that of Iran during the period 1954-65, there would 
appear to be sufficient justification for doubting whether the 
availability of capital and foreign exchange are as crucial as they are 
sometimes assumed to be in the process of economic development.24
The contradictory impact of dramatically increased oil revenues on the 
economy is therefore crucial to any understanding of Iran’s development policy. 
This thesis will argue that the policy must also be set in its political and 
international context, since these played a crucial role in the Shah’s decision­
making process. The policy also contributed to an idiosyncratic political system 
within whose constraints the economy had to operate.
1.6 Competing theoretical explanations o f Iran’s industrialisation
Studies of Iran’s development process in the 1970s fall into two broad camps. 
The first focuses on the suitability or otherwise of the economic mechanisms
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employed by the government and the planners. The second provides an analysis 
within a broader socio-economic framework by considering too the nature of 
the Iranian state, the political context of economic decision-making and the 
interaction between economic policy and the political system. Some have gone 
on to link this with the revolution. None, however, has supplemented such an 
analysis in any detail with a consideration of Iran’s industrial drive within its 
regional and international context. While there have been many studies of Iran’s 
foreign policy, this has usually been a separate field of enquiry not linked with 
the development process. Such an analysis is therefore long overdue. Before 
elaborating on this, it would be useful to summarise briefly the arguments and 
approach of six other writers. We shall begin with those who follow 
predominantly an economic analysis of the development and planning process 
in the 1970s.
In his book, Economic Origins o f the Iranian Revolution, Robert Looney 
provides a detailed analysis of the Iranian economy in the last decade under the 
Shah and links developments within the economy to the collapse of the 
government.25 He argues that the Shah’s downfall was due to a set of 
economics-related factors, namely, the lack of an agricultural strategy, runaway 
public spending leading to inflation and a widening income gap. Looney 
identifies a set of economic problems, elements of which had already begun to 
make their appearance during the last years of the Fourth Plan (1968-72), and 
links these to shortcomings in the government’s economic strategy. He terms 
the government’s policy a technocratic one, whereby the main economic 
objective was to increase output. Looney believes that most of Iran’s economic 
woes in the late 1970s can be put down to the ‘mindless implementation of 
technocratic strategy’. By contrast, a reformist approach would have placed
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increased emphasis on redistributing income, he argues, while reconciling
77greater equity with faster growth through institutional change.
Institutional weakness is a recurring problem and a considerable hindrance 
to the formulation of appropriate economic policy. Looney believes that the 
reason that the government endorsed a policy of industrial controls and 
licensing, which had the effect of assuring monopoly profits to a tiny industrial 
class, was not necessarily to benefit the Shah’s own family but was a 
consequence of the institutional weakness of the government. This meant that 
planners relied on helping industry indirectly through credit programmes based 
on the banking system.28 Furthermore, though the economy was ostensibly 
liberal capitalist, in fact, property ownership was very concentrated. Looney 
asserts that the inequality of income fostered by this system, was not regarded 
as a problem by the government. On the contrary, it was welcomed because it 
was believed that the savings of the rich would contribute to faster 
accumulation and growth.29
The main features of Iran’s manufacturing sector by the mid-1970s were 
heavily geared towards the production of consumer goods; weak linkages with 
other sectors with a tendency for the linkages to become weaker over time; 
growing reliance on imports for sustaining production; and declining export
-JA
capacity. Looney puts most of the blame for the disappointing performance of 
industry and imbalances in the economy on the government’s import- 
substitution policy. He also cites shortcomings in market planning of such 
magnitude that ‘one is drawn to conclude that little or no economic 
considerations underlay the industrial selection process’.31
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According to Looney the incentives of the government to the 
manufacturing sector in the form of import-substitution industrialisation (1ST) 
were ill-conceived for three main reasons. Firstly, the industries that were 
established, such as the motor vehicle industry, tended to be those that made 
Iran dependent on the outside world in terms of imports of foreign technology, 
skilled manpower and capital goods. Iran’s vulnerability to international market 
movements and pressures therefore increased with this strategy. Secondly, the 
strategy concentrated on productivity was effectively a wasted effort, according 
to Looney, since the internal market was too small for many of the planned 
products. Thirdly, the industrialisation process did not generate enough foreign 
exchange to finance its own requirements. This, combined with a high level of 
protection, increased the dependence on oil revenues so that the whole 
industrial process became isolated from competitive checks. This also resulted 
in lack of constraints on the cycle of wage and price increases.32
While the productivity of capital fell in the post-1973 period, Looney 
believes the main reason for industry’s loss of dynamism was the impossibility 
of sustaining the momentum built up in the 1960s and after the oil price rises of
1973-74. Moreover, oil-induced economic development meant that production 
and trade had evolved in an artificial environment in which distortions came to 
be built. These distortions then impeded diversified economic development and 
actually created a stagnant-prone productive structure. By 1977, the economy 
was decelerating towards stagnation:
the authorities should have realized that, even though oil revenues 
transformed the economy into a capital surplus position, this was only 
a temporary and transient state. The government received ample 
warning at the time that Iran was not a true capital surplus economy 
as perhaps Saudi Arabia was.
It appears that the post-1973 growth strategy was based on the 
premise of capital abundance, and therefore economized on labor by
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increasing the capital intensity investment projects. The strategy 
further was predicated on the notion that labor both in quantity and 
quality would soon catch up so that, by the time capital inflows from 
the oil sector began to diminish, the process of capital generation 
would have become internalized and the country’s growth momentum 
self-sustaining . . . there is little historical precedent or empirical 
evidence for accepting the momentum thesis. The economic solution 
would have instead been to base the strategy on long-term scarcities 
rather than short-term abundances, i.e., the government should have 
aimed at maximizing the long-run return per unit of capital.33
While being critical of ISI in Iran, Looney also states: ‘A careful reading of 
the industrial history of this period shows that in many respects Iran’s import 
substitution strategy was similar to that taking place in a number of other 
countries’.34 Does this therefore mean that ISI has inherent weaknesses that 
prevent it being successful no matter what its form of implementation? If this is 
case, the thrust of Looney’s criticism should be against ISI as a strategy rather 
than Iran’s implementation of it. Or does it indicate that, as in several other 
countries, ISI was not correctly implemented in Iran?
Unfortunately, Looney does not deal explicitly with this subject. However, 
it seems that his argument is a combination of both. He appears critical of ISI as 
a development strategy when he states that ‘the consequences of import 
substitution industrialisation were the high costs of production, a decrease in 
quality of products because of heavily protected domestic industry, and 
perpetual dependence on world markets’.35 It is reinforced by Looney’s 
approval of George Baldwin’s assertion that ISI in Iran evolved out of necessity 
as a reaction to the economic crises of the early 1960s rather than as a planned 
strategy, and later developed in a whimsical fashion by emulating other 
countries.36
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On the other hand, Looney does make reference to ISI as it developed 
specifically in the Iranian context. He discusses how ISI as implemented in Iran 
created a number of structural imbalances, unemployment and 
underemployment of resources. He does not, however, discuss countries in 
which ISI has successfully been developed or describe the conditions under 
which it might succeed. Looney writes that though Iran’s strategy of ISI was 
similar to that adopted by a number of other developing countries:
there was one major difference: many of the newly-industrializing 
countries, in addition to relying on primary exports and foreign loans, 
also promoted their manufacturing exports to pay for a proportion of 
their imports of capital and intermediate goods. However, Iran 
continued instead to rely heavily and almost exclusively on oil 
exports.37
Looney’s overall argument regarding industrialisation in Iran during this 
period can now be summed up. The form of ISI implemented in Iran produced 
severe distortions which the government was then unable to deal with. These 
distortions were a result of ISI itself, government policy (or, in some cases, lack 
of it) and the loss of momentum to the economy once oil revenues dropped in 
the late 1970s. There is little reference to the country’s political system other 
than mention of the weakness of government institutions, which had some 
impact on the formulation of policy. But overall, Looney considers the Shah’s 
downfall to have been the result of almost entirely economics-related factors 
and his work does not put these into a political or international context.
Parvin Alizadeh studied ISI in Iran during the 1960s and 1970s with 
particular reference to the motor vehicle industry.38 Alizadeh’s main objective 
was to examine government industrial policies to see whether these were 
appropriate to the declared aim of transforming the Iranian economy from one
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'X Qbased on oil into one based on industrial production. The motor vehicle 
industry was chosen as a case study because of the emphasis placed on its 
development by the government which intended to transform Iran into one of 
the top automotive producers in the world market. A combined study of the 
petrochemical industry, another priority industry, could not be pursued because 
of lack of information, according to Alizadeh.
Alizadeh finds that by 1977, manufactured exports accounted for only 0.3 
per cent of GDP, as compared with 7.1 per cent which is considered the normal 
figure for countries with a similar level of income. The government’s avowed 
objective was to develop manufactured exports, Alizadeh maintains that such 
exports declined in absolute terms in the post-1973 era.40 The reasons for this 
decline, argues Alizadeh, were the direct result of government policy over the 
period and comprised three underlying factors: the expansion of the domestic 
market, the lack of consistent policy regarding the development of non-oil 
exports and a deterioration in the competitiveness of locally-produced 
products 41
Alizadeh uses the case study of the automotive industry to illustrate some 
of these points and to examine the development of the industry in relation to the 
generation of backward linkages and to examine the effectiveness of 
government policies towards vertical integration. Some of her findings will 
be discussed at greater length in Chapter 3. Alizadeh shows that heavy 
promotion and protection of the automotive industry led to growth within the 
industry, but that the government was far less successful than it had hoped to be 
in transforming the industry from assembly status to a nearly wholly vertically- 
integrated industry. Alizadeh finds several reasons for this. Firstly, basic
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industries, particularly the metallurgical and producers goods industries, 
remained undeveloped. While 80 per cent of the weight of a finished vehicle 
consists of steel parts, 90 per cent of the raw material requirement of the 
industry was imported.42 Secondly, the industry is highly susceptible to 
economies of scale, which usually concern the size of the plant and the range of 
output over which unit cost savings are greatest. The level of output over which 
unit cost savings are greatest is known as the ‘critical minimum level’.
Of the five automobile plants operating in 1978, none was producing 
enough units for an optimal scale of output. The largest plant, which was four 
times the size of the second largest was producing 125,000 units per annum. 
This is substantially below the 200,000-250,000 units considered as the ‘critical 
minimum’ level of output for integration into the production of parts and 
components43 In addition, the lack of a developed supplier industry to 
specialise in the production of parts and components meant that these were 
mainly in-plant manufactures by the automobile plants:
In other words, the disadvantage of small-scale automobile plants, 
which is a well-known feature of the structure of industry in most 
underdeveloped countries, is compounded by the lack of a developed 
part supplier industry to specialise in production of parts and 
components.44
The consequence was uneconomical and costly production. At the largest plant, 
the domestic ex-factory price of a car was 23 per cent above the CIF (cost, 
insurance and freight) price of similar vehicles. For the other plants, which were 
essentially assembly operations with limited local content, the divergence 
between the two prices was far more substantial, ranging from 41 to 63 per 
cent.45 Thirdly, Alizadeh believes that the government lacked a coherent policy 
to regulate the operation of international automotive firms. The industry was
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not dominated by foreign capital in terms of ownership but substantial control 
was nevertheless exercised by multinational companies as licensors or minority 
shareholders. The Iranian government, unlike Brazil or Mexico, was either 
unable or unwilling to implement appropriate policies towards these 
companies.46
Finally, despite substantial state intervention in industry, Alizadeh believes 
Iran’s record is poor when compared with government policies in Brazil, 
Argentina and Japan where rationalisation (reorganisation of the industry to 
achieve greater efficiency) took place. In Iran there were no plans for 
rationalisation, either by preventing the emergence of several firms in industries 
highly susceptible to scale economies, or by encouraging mergers between 
firms:
In this respect, it can be argued that the irrational structure of 
production in certain industries in LDCs does not reflect excessive 
state intervention but the lack of such intervention to restructure the 
organization of production to ensure viability.47
Does this mean that ISI was inappropriate for Iran? A detailed discussion 
of ISI and other industrialisation strategies is given in the next chapter, and 
Alizadeh also considers the question at length. She acknowledges that:
ISI in Iran bears substantial similarities to that of several other LDCs.
For instance, import-substituting industries not only did not play any 
significant role in the development of manufactured exports but also 
remained highly dependent on imported parts and components, as the 
case study of the Iranian automotive industry clearly indicated.
Indeed, if it were not for the growing availability of oil income, ISI in 
Iran would have faced a severe foreign exchange crisis 49
However, Alizadeh concludes that the fault lies not so much with ISI as a 
strategy than with the content and design of the strategy. She concedes that ‘it
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is very difficult to envisage which type of state is best capable of formulating 
and implementing a rational viable industrial strategy’.50 Alizadeh writes that 
industrially successful countries, such as China, have relied heavily on 
socialism while non-socialist countries such as Brazil, India, and South Korea 
have also pursued industrialisation with success. This has taken place:
under a variety of different economic regimes. A country like Brazil 
has relied on a relatively open policy with regard to foreign 
investment by MNCs and achieved rapid industrial progress. On the 
other hand, India has followed the path of strict control on foreign 
capital in building up its industrial base, which includes the most 
sophisticated capital goods industry in the Third World.51
Reluctant, therefore, to generalise on the elements needed for successful state 
intervention and while noting that the duration of ISI in Iran was short when 
compared with South American countries or India, Alizadeh does identify three 
specific ‘mistakes’ made by the Iranian government in its implementation of 
ISI:
Not only was the duration of IS strategy in the Iranian case relatively 
short and the industrialist class relatively young, but also the design 
and content of IS strategy had certain serious limitations. These 
included: inappropriate choice of the industry; the inability or 
unwillingness of the State to promote a rational production structure; 
and lack of a coherent policy vis-a-vis the import of technology.52
Like Looney, Alizadeh has identified a set of problems with the 
industrialisation process in Iran and has rooted these within a critique of 
government economic policies. The study is firmly grounded in the economics 
sphere and is not concerned with political aspects, whether domestic or 
international.
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Massoud Karshenas has studied Iran’s industrialisation in the context of 
the challenges faced by an oil-producing state. He dismisses the thesis that oil 
revenues are a hindrance rather than a help to economic development, arguing 
instead that oil income, while not an unmixed blessing, can contribute greatly to 
industrial growth as long as the government adopts appropriate policies. 
Karshenas adopts a structuralist framework in which to examine the economy, 
arguing that there are constraints to growth which are fashioned by social and 
technical conditions of production and which cannot be resolved by market 
forces or price adjustments because of social pressures which arise and resist 
the distributional effects of relative price changes.54 He defines a structural 
bottleneck in terms of: ‘the social and technical conditions of production in 
particular sectors of the economy, or the overall economic institutions of a 
country which limit and condition both effective economic intervention by the 
government and the operation of the market mechanism.’55 The cause of a 
structural bottleneck depends on the historical development experience of the 
country; thus his study of Iran begins in 1800 with most of the analysis 
concentrated on 1953-77.
As the main recipient of oil income, the state’s role in capital accumulation 
was transformed radically. In post-1953 Iran - after the oil industry was 
nationalised by Mohammad Mossadeq, the prime minister who was later 
overthrown in a coup d ’etat instigated by British and US intelligence - ‘the 
clientelistic form of representation of the state, based on the exchange of 
political support in return for the allocation of state resources had an important 
impact on the nature of capital accumulation and its distributional implications 
without being consciously intended by the government.’56
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In the 1920s, the state adopted a caretaker role by providing basic politico- 
legal and infrastructural requirements. Government expenditure was primarily 
financed through indirect taxes - a burden which fell mainly on lower income 
groups - or deficit financing. But foreign capital was not forthcoming and 
exports stagnated. As the main recipient of oil income, particularly after the 
1953 oil nationalisation, the role of the state in the process of accumulation was 
transformed, according to Karshenas. Instead of mobilising resources for 
investment in a predominantly agricultural economy, the state’s role became 
that of distributing and allocating an already centralised economic surplus. 
Demand for products far outweighed supply, partly due to the lack of 
industrialisation and low productivity in established industries. Given the low 
productivity and the impressive results that an import-substitution 
industrialisation would be bound to show, at least in the medium-term, the 
government opted for an ISI strategy. The size of its development plan was 
largely determined by the expected oil revenues. This skewed the development 
process since it was not balanced by the imposition of taxes:
Considering the cumulative effect of high rates of growth of fixed 
investment on government recurrent expenditures as well as the 
growing requirements of government expenditure on social overheads 
in support of accumulation, in order to sustain such high elasticity 
values in the long run it was clearly necessary to take effective 
measures to increase revenues through taxation.... failing to take such 
measures, the government was faced with chronic fiscal problems
which constantly threatened the stability of the accumulation
>58process.
This is a characteristic of the oil-based economy, argues Karshenas. Easy access 
to foreign exchange can allow reasonable growth without the need for structural 
change to the economy but only in the short-term. In the long-run, it can lead to 
‘perverse growth’ - a phrase originally coined by Kalecki59 - and periodic 
balance of payments crises. But this can be avoided if the oil exporting
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economy adopts a pattern of structural change which ensures the feasibility of 
the growth path.60 However, this did not happen in Iran. Despite a fourfold 
increase in per capita incomes, between 1963 and 1977, Karshenas shows the 
total tax burden rose just 33 per cent, from 8 per cent of GNP to 10.6 per cent.61 
The government chose not to use taxation to play a part in redistributing income 
even though it would have been easy, he argues, to have increased modestly the 
tax on the highest earners without any burden on the lowest 80 per cent of the 
wage-earning population. A household in the wealthiest 20 per cent income 
bracket benefitted six times more from government expenditure than those in 
the lowest 60 per cent.62
Moreover aspects of government policy militated against the growth of 
medium-sized manufacturing even though this would have been ideal for 
generating employment in Iran’s labour surplus economy. A worsemng 
distribution of income in the agricultural sector contributed to the rapid growth 
of rural migrant labourers into the towns, which could only be marginally 
absorbed by the modem industrial sector. 64
Instead, the relatively few large-scale enterprises, which were the recipient 
of more than 95 per cent of loans from the Industrial and Mining Development 
Bank of Iran (IMDBI), ‘formed technological enclaves within the 
manufacturing sector depending for their raw material supplies and technology 
largely on imports. This not only prevented the large-scale enterprises from 
acting as a vehicle for the diffusion of modem technology into the rest of the 
manufacturing sector but also prevented the generation of demand for the rest 
of the sector through inter-industry linkages.’65 The pattern of investment in the
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private manufacturing sector was left to the profit motives of the individual 
industrialists.
The government’s policies towards industrialisation led to a duality in the 
manufacturing sector which was expressed in a widening gap between 
productivity and wages in small-scale enterprises and the rest of the sector. The 
absence of a policy aimed at alleviating income inequalities resulted in the 
pattern of consumption being dominated by the relatively narrow section of the 
population in whose hands income was concentrated. In turn this led to rapid 
growth in the market for new durable consumer goods favoured by these 
groups. Karshenas argues that this lopsided consumption pattern in turn had a 
significant effect on the structure of manufacturing growth and the nature of the 
industries which developed during this period:
The growth of final consumer demand, specifically for the new 
products which formed the market of the modem dynamic subsector 
of manufacturing production, was dominated by the consumption of a 
relatively small section of urban households. This meant that to 
sustain the growth of consumption it was necessary to continuously 
introduce new varieties of consumer goods to cater for the higher 
wants of the rich consumers, as the limited degree of diffusion of the 
new products amongst the majority of low income groups implied a 
relatively rapid satiation of the market for each new type of good. In 
other words the characteristics of income distribution never allowed 
the market for new manufacturing products to become a mass 
consumption market... This would imply a tendency towards 
fragmentation of the market instead of the strengthening of the mass 
consumer goods market.66
The small size of the market made it difficult for these plants to go beyond the 
assembly plant stage and develop into integrated production processes which 
could benefit from economies of scale, argues Karshenas. The growth of 
exports of the modem manufacturing sector was slowed down and created a 
high degree of dependence on imports.
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Industrial output rose from 17 per cent of GNP in 1959 to 23 per cent in 
1972. Agriculture declined by 11 percentage points over the same period but 
still accounted for 43 per cent of total employment. According to Karshenas, 
these figures illustrate the continued immaturity of the Iranian economy and the 
existence of a large pool of labour with much lower productivity rates, upon
c*7
which the industrial and services sector could draw. Nevertheless, by 
international standards the growth performance of Iran’s economy between 
1959-72 was impressive. It was sustained by the growth of oil exports that 
provided the necessary foreign exchange for investment. However, Karshenas 
argues that from 1963-72, the rate of investment was close to the economy’s 
absorptive capacity. The investment was heavily financed by oil revenues and 
foreign borrowing and, as such, the rate of growth was not sustainable in the
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long run, hence the chronic short-term balance of payments problems.
Karshenas poses the question of why Iran’s production structure had evolved 
in such a way and what alternative patterns of structural change could have 
been implemented:
Had the ease of access to external resources played any part in 
shaping the process of structural change, or had the inevitability of 
this particular path of structural change necessitated increasing resort 
to external resources?69
He finds that a large part of the services deficit was composed of interest 
payments on long-term foreign debts which had arisen to finance the 
commodity trade deficits. The trade balance was in deficit because the value of 
imports was far higher than non-oil exports. Despite a 10 per cent average 
annual rate of growth of private consumption, the rate of growth of consumer
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goods imports was no more than 1.7 per cent, implying that ISI was working in 
this sector. However, there was a rapid growth of intermediate and capital 
goods destined for the industrial sector. ‘It appears that the industrial trade 
balance was the main culprit in the balance of payments problems during this
H(\period,’ concludes Karshenas.
Oil surpluses financed an ever-widening manufacturing trade deficit. 
Measured against international trade indicators for the different branches of 
manufacturing, the development of manufacturing exports in Iran was poor.71 
Given the government’s ISI strategy, low export rations may not seem 
surprising when various manufacturing lines are at early stages of development 
but:
It is at the later stages of import substitution industrialization, when 
the manufacturing sector has achieved the necessary maturity to 
compete in the international markets, that the export ratios are 
expected to rise rapidly. With the continuation of the trends observed 
over the period under investigation, however, it is clear that the long­
term viability of the growth path after the exhaustion of oil resources 
could not be ensured. Though in the long run the success of import 
substitution industrialisation depends on the ability to export, the 
medium-term viability of the strategy depends on the possibility to 
bring about the necessary adjustments in the import ratios.72
The process of import substitution led to an increased import penetration and it 
is in this phenomenon, argues Karshenas, that the rapid expansion of 
manufactured imports led to the recurrent balance of payments problems. For 
Karshenas, Iran’s industrialisation process was an example of ‘perverse 
growth’, characterised by growing income inequalities and increasing 
lopsidedness of the structure of industry. What was needed was a policy 
framework that would have taken into account the interconnection between the
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demand side effects of government policy and its capacity generating impact. 
The remedy would have been a more equal distribution of income which :
through its impact on the pattern of structural change, would have 
allowed to maintain the overall rate of economic growth with a lower 
degree of reliance on oil income or foreign borrowing to finance 
investment - an outcome which is contrary to the conventional 
wisdom about the inverse relationship between the degree of income 
inequality and the rate of growth.73
The implication, according to Karshenas, is that a more democratic form of 
government and broader political participation may have allowed more 
egalitarian income distribution and a more stable and balanced industrialisation 
to take place.74
Another study concerned primarily with the economic aspects of 
industrialisation, but which contains elements of a political critique, is Kamran
75Mofid’s Iran: Oil Revenues, Development Planning and Industrialisation. 
Written as a textbook, it spans a wide period extending from Reza Shah down 
to the Islamic Republic in 1982. Unlike Alizadeh, Mofid believes that Iran’s IS 
strategy had been in force long enough for positive results to begin showing by 
the early 1970s. In a section on the Fourth Plan (1968-72), Mofid writes:
The increase in imports of intermediate and capital goods during 
these years was justified in terms of building an industrial base 
leading to self-sufficiency and the diversification of exports. But by 
1972, many years after the adoption of an IS strategy, more than 72 
per cent of Iran's non-energy exports were traditional and agricultural 
goods.76
Mofid is extremely critical of the government’s big push strategy as 
exemplified by what he calls the ‘tragic mistake’ of abandoning the original
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Fifth Plan in favour of the revised plan. He cites the warning issued in 1972 by 
the Plan and Budget Organisation of the dangers of overspending, particularly 
in view of the country’s manpower shortages, while noting that these 
reservations were overruled by the Shah and his prime minister, Amir Abbas 
Hoveida.77 The two major consequences of the decision to implement the 
revised Fifth Plan, according to Mofid, were accelerated inflation and a marked 
decline in the country’s absorptive capacity leading to a substantial degree of 
waste. The Shah’s decree of a ‘War against Waste’ in an attempt to curb 
inflation was bound to be ineffective, according to Mofid, because this 
presupposed a case of cost-push inflation, whereas Iran displayed a classic case 
of demand-pull and structural inflation.78 The Shah’s refusal to reduce spending 
and his attacks on the bazaar simply led to rising inflation. Mofid demonstrates 
absorptive capacity constraints in various industries, including steel and 
electricity generation, and concludes that:
If the share of domestically-produced items in total consumption 
keeps falling - while all attempts were made to increase it - this is a 
clear sign that, given the constraints, the production could not have 
increased fast enough. We do not expect that the share of 
domestically-produced items should have increased; it would have 
been a success if the shares had remained constant or at least not 
fallen so rapidly.79
The consequence of this inefficient absorption of new capital, according to 
Mofid, was the soaring costs of industrialisation. An inadequate infrastructure, 
shortages of complementary inputs, planning and implementation inadequacies, 
as well as political and institutional restrictions all put constraints on the 
country’s absorptive capacity.
Iran’s trade pattern during this period fared little better, according to 
Mofid. The government’s professed commitment to export-diversification and
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self-sufficiency are not borne out by the results. Mofid shows that imports of 
consumer goods increased on average by an annual 21.5 per cent from 1968-72 
and again by an average of 51 per cent per annum from 1973-77. Mofid uses a 
concentration index to show that Iran’s exports, far from succeeding in
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becoming diversified after 1973, actually became less diversified. Mofid sums 
up the government’s aspirations thus:
Industrialisation, based on achieving diversification in exports and 
becoming the fifth industrialised nation by the turn of the century, 
was the ‘crown-jeweP of this period’s economic policies. Industrial 
development was regarded as the basic measure in laying the 
groundwork of an advanced economy which would pave the way for 
the “Great Civilisation”.81
He concludes, instead, that the Shah’s modernisation programmes led to oil 
revenues being wasted, growth halted, inflation accelerated and social tensions 
heightened.82
Five main reasons accounted for what Mofid terms the failure of 
industrialisation in Iran.83 The first was the question of the choice of ISI as a 
strategy of development. Unlike Looney, Alizadeh and Karshenas, Mofid 
believes the implementation of ISI was a mistake in Iran’s case. The reliance on 
the country’s oil and gas resources meant that the constraints to development, 
such as the shortage of labour and the lack of infrastructure, were masked while 
oil funds allowed the government to operate with no regard for efficiency. 
Secondly, the case of inappropriate technology also appears to have arisen. Iran 
was, in most cases, not able to assimilate advanced technology, which meant 
that it could not be used efficiently. Thirdly, the exchange rate was kept 
artificially overvalued in order to encourage the import of capital and 
intermediate goods for manufacturing. However, the drawback was that this
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worked against exports and so Iran showed a continuous decline in the index of 
competitiveness. Fourthly, Mofid argues that commercial relationships were 
adversely affected by certain cultural traits, such as fatalism, the desire for 
quick profits and nepotism:
Maybe the origin of such behaviour could be traced to the ‘despotic’ 
nature of the many Persian kings, especially the last two and those of 
the Qajars. If the head of the ‘household’ is corrupt and incompetent, 
then what could be expected from the rank and file?84
Finally, Mofid considers briefly the legacy of outside interference in the 
country’s internal affairs. He argues that, superpower politics deprived Iran of 
an opportunity to build strong and coherent socio-political and economic 
institutions which are so vital for a successful drive towards development and
o r
modernisation’. Moreover, since Iran was never formally a colony it was 
deprived of any of the putative benefits of that status. Instead foreign firms 
came to the country in search of easy money, while some of the multi-national 
corporations actively discouraged the training of local staff and the export of
o r
Iranian-made goods. Mofid concludes, therefore, that:
the inefficiencies present in Iran are the result of underdeveloped 
institutions which themselves are the result of economic and socio­
political factors, caused both internally and externally. Unless these 
issues are honestly understood, discussed and addressed accordingly, 
simply to have financial resources to buy the most expensive, 
complicated and advanced technology is not a substitute for or a 
guarantee of development.87
For Mofid, industrialisation in Iran was a function not only of an economic 
strategy for development, but also of the country’s political system and 
historical legacy. While recognizing this, Mofid’s work falls firmly within one 
discipline, that of economics, and does not devote much space to these wider
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issues which he acknowledges are of fundamental importance as a context for 
economic analysis.
Another writer who considers both economic and political themes, but in
o o
roughly equal measure, is Homa Katouzian. As its name suggests, The 
Political Economy o f Modem Iran is an intermeshing of domestic politics and 
the economy. It is a wide-ranging book whose theme is summed up in the 
subtitle: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism. Katouzian argues that oil revenues 
led to Iran’s Pahlavi kings becoming ‘petrolic despots’ who cultivated the 
trappings of modernisation and industrialisation, the consequence of their lip- 
service being a people’s revolution. Analogies are drawn with Iran’s 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909 and the common theme of a fight 
against despotism. However, the difference, Katouzian maintains, was that the 
1979 revolution was against despotism and pseudo-modernism, while the 
constitutionalists were fighting against despotism and traditionalism. 
Katouzian builds up a social and political framework in which to discuss the 
impact of the oil economy. He outlines certain characteristics of the means of 
production in Iran, maintaining that Iran has never had a feudal economy 
because private property ownership was always weak and tenuous. This was 
due to the nature of the state. It dominated Iran’s classes through its monopoly 
of power - a power characterised not so much by its absolute nature in laying 
down the law, as in its ability to exercise arbitrary power in the face of which
OQ
all citizens, whether landlords or peasants, were equally vulnerable.
When the state’s financial position began to weaken in the nineteenth 
century, it tried to supplement its income through the sale of concessions to 
foreigners. However, a combination of religious and merchant opposition to
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these moves culminated in the Constitutional Revolution and the downfall of 
the Qajar dynasty. The discovery of oil in 1908 developed into a reliable source 
of state income by 1933. Combined with Reza Shah’s ‘pseudo-modernism’ and 
‘pseudo-nationalism’, the ‘despotic’ system was extended into the religious 
leadership and community:
The growth of oil revenues added to the quantity and quality of the 
financial independence and political power of the state relative to the 
propertied classes and religious institutions; the growth of state 
bureaucracy (on which it was partly dependent) increased the demand 
and supply for European-type education, which became the most 
important channel for higher bureaucratic positions; and the 
interdependence of these changes with other material and ideological 
factors pushed religion, and the religious community, to the periphery 
of the socio-economic complex.90
Oil revenues allowed the state a good deal of financial and political autonomy 
from the country’s productive forces; unlike taxpayer’s money, the state is not 
accountable to its citizens for its expenditure choices. Katouzian argues, 
however, that oil wealth intensified existing relations between the state and its 
various groups:
The petrolic system of stratification turns the state into the patron of a 
growing clientele; the patrimonial guardian of life and labour for the 
urban masses; and the agent of social excommunication for the 
peasantry. If, as in the case of Iran, there already exist historical 
forces and institutions of despotism, and a traditional domination of 
urban over rural society, the petrolic system merely serves to reshape 
and reinforce the already existing, or surviving, relations and 
tendencies.91
Katouzian then outlines certain features of the ‘pseudo-modernist’ 
economy, characteristics of which appear to be exacerbated by oil revenues. 
The most important elements concern, firstly, state expenditure. Consumption 
expenditure increases, resulting in an expansion of bureaucratic and modem 
services, while state investment expenditure, by emphasising the urban sector,
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results in the promotion of construction, heavy industries and capital-intensive 
technology, and discriminates against agriculture.
Secondly, in a criticism of capital-intensive technology, Katouzian argues 
that the usual justification in terms of an ‘abundance’ of finance capital and 
foreign exchange is invalid because economic resources can only be abundant if 
they cannot otherwise be gainfully employed. An oil economy does not have 
excess capital because the surplus can always be invested abroad or 
circumscribed by leaving the oil underground. Moreover, capital-intensive 
technology is of many forms, only one of which is the importation of foreign 
equipment with specific technological characteristics. This form of technology 
tends to result in the shortage of modem skilled labour while wasting traditional 
skilled labour.
Thirdly, Katouzian believes that structural inflation resulting from 
monetary expansion and real income increases is exacerbated by consumption 
expenditure. This is because in a developing economy consumption goods, 
urban land and property are status symbols which people will want to acquire:
Further, because of the general atmosphere of insecurity arising from 
the politico-economic system, as a whole, they will speculate, but 
their speculation, the type of assets which they purchase, will itself 
fan the inflationary fire.93
In addition, increasing imports of food, raw materials, manufactured goods and 
machines, will lead to the creation of bottlenecks. This model of the state’s 
strategy of expenditure under the influence of oil revenues can be summed up 
as resulting in:
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the creation of excess liquidity; high aggregate consumption; 
emphasis on imported high industrial technology - which not only 
jams the ports but also, more significantly, inflates the purse of 
modem skilled labour out of all proportion; and a feverish race for 
higher incomes, increased consumption, greater ostentation and the 
rest.94
On another level, Katouzian sees the growth of oil revenues since 1964 as 
the most important factor behind what he terms the success of despotism, as 
well as the cause of the separation of the state from society. He also underlines 
the political role of the disbursement of oil revenues in the form of grants and 
credits, as a means of bestowing privileges to a certain class which used the 
money to purchase land or invest abroad.95
Furthermore, though import-substitution was left to the private sector this, 
according to Katouzian, was private only in name. The degree of financial aid 
given by the state meant that the private sector was more or less employed by 
the state as agents to use public funds. In this way, individuals were able to 
receive substantial profits from the use of capital that was not even their own.96 
Katouzian is critical too of the way in which industrialisation programmes were 
carried out and argues there was no strategy worthy of the name. He cites the 
example of Iran’s commitment to build a $700m gas pipeline from the west of 
the country to the former Soviet Union as a useless project. This formed part of 
the 1963 deal with the Soviet Union for the supply of a steel plant in exchange 
for natural gas, hence the pipeline. The plant was expected to earn the country
07$600m of exports by 1969-70, but in that [Iranian] year, it only earned $4m. 
Similarly, results fell far short of targets in foreign trade:
At the ‘gates of the Great Civilisation’, exports of Iranian industrial 
and agricultural goods amounted to only 2 per cent of the country’s 
total exports. This means that, if the country were to rely on her own 
production and exportation of goods, without the bonus of oil and gas
46
revenues, she could only purchase less than 3 per cent of the goods 
which she is now buying.98
Of this 2 per cent, and despite the state’s emphasis on ‘forward’ 
industries such as petrochemicals, machine tools and motor cars, agriculture 
contributed 51 per cent of total non-oil exports, traditional products, such as 
carpets and handicrafts, a further 28 per cent, while the ‘pseudo-modernist’ 
industries made up the remaining 21 per cent."
Within the context of foreign trade, Katouzian considers Iran’s foreign 
relations. The US, according to Katouzian, had little financial leverage, or 
indeed, financial interest in Iran but knew that: ‘the Shah’s militarism, pseudo- 
modernism and anti-communism automatically ensured that a great deal of the 
revenues would be spent on weapons, food, consumer products, and 
technological equipment, in Western markets’.100 To this extent, the US did not 
mind the Shah responding to Soviet gestures, which were essentially of a 
politically symbolic nature. According to Katouzian:
The Shah’s politiconomic relations with the superpowers, as well as 
other global and regional powers, were determined by his despotic 
pseudo-modernism within, and cynical realism outside, the country: 
he monopolised absolute and arbitrary power inside the country, 
dreamed of turning Iran into a major industrial and military power, 
needed as much money as he could think of for realising his obsessive 
desires, and wanted peace with foreign (especially super-) powers so 
as to be able to follow his obsessive aims without any major external 
or internal disturbance. His cynical realism in foreign diplomacy 
completely paid off; it was his psychopathic designs inside the 
country which alone spelled his final and complete doom, both 
economically and politically.101
As the above extract shows, Katouzian provides a highly critical and 
passionate critique of Iran’s political and economic system under the Pahlavis, 
emphasising the superficial nature of reform carried out in the name of
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modernism. He argues that the rise in oil revenues produced no major changes 
in policy but intensified existing difficulties. His book serves to demonstrate 
that the development process was, for better or for worse, inexorably 
intertwined with the political system. The analysis is not systematic, however, 
and relatively little space is devoted to the international context.
Another book which explores the effect of the political on the economic, 
but confines itself to the planning process, is The Political Environment o f 
Planning in Iran by Hossein Razavi and Firouz Vakil.102 Both were involved in 
the planning system: Razavi was bureau director at the Plan and Budget 
Organisation (PBO) from 1976 to 1981, while Vakil served as secretary for 
informatics there from 1973 to 1979. Material from their book is incorporated 
into Chapter 4 and, therefore, only a brief appraisal of their contribution to the 
debate is necessary here.
Originally the PBO was established as a mechanism to co-ordinate the 
government’s involvement in public projects. But by the mid-70s economic 
planning had turned into a formality for spending the allocation - ‘This 
relaxation of the role of economic planning was one of the fundamental 
problems of the Shah’s regime’.103 Much of Razavi and Vakil’s book is 
dedicated to explaining this transformation which appears to have come about 
as a direct result of increased involvement by the Shah in the PBO’s activities. 
In a section on the preparation of development plans, Hossein and Razavi write 
that one of the stages involved the submission of the plan to the High Economic 
Council which was attended by the Shah:
In the early years, a meeting of this council was viewed as a 
ceremonial gathering in which the development plan was explained to 
the shah. In the later years, however, the meeting of the High
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E c o n o m i c  C o u n c i l  t u r n e d  i n t o  t h e  m o s t  c r u c i a l  s t e p  o f  p l a n  
p r e p a r a t i o n .  D u r i n g  t h i s  m e e t i n g ,  t h e  s h a h  a c t u a l l y  d i c t a t e d  t h e  b a s i c  
g o a l s  a n d  t a r g e t s  o f  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  p l a n .  T h i s  c h a n g e d  t h e  l o g i c  o f  
t h e  w h o l e  p r o c e s s ,  a n d  t h e  p l a n n i n g  e f f o r t  w a s  r e d u c e d  t o  a  f u t i l e
104e x e r c i s e .
The increased personal role of the Shah appears to have affected all 
branches of the planning system with detrimental effects for development. One 
stage in the implementation of the plans involved field inspection, an area in 
which the PBO, for a time, had a good record:
I n  t h e  l a t e  1 9 6 0 s  a n d  e a r l y  1 9 7 0 s ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  i n s p e c t i o n s  l o s t  t h e i r  
i m p o r t a n c e  a n d  w e r e  n o t  t a k e n  t o  b e  a  s e r i o u s  d u t y  o f  t h e  P B O .  T h e r e  
w e r e  t w o  b a s i c  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h i s  c h a n g e .  F i r s t ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  
r e g a r d i n g  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  p r o j e c t s  b e c a m e  m o r e  p e r s o n a l .  T h e  
P B O ’ s  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  t h e  d e t a i l e d  t e c h n i c a l  m a t t e r s  o f  t h e  
d e v e l o p m e n t  p r o j e c t s  h a d  c o m e  t o  b e  v i e w e d  a s  a n  o b s t a c l e  t o  t h e i r  
c o m p l e t i o n  .  .  .  T h e  s e c o n d  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  d e c l i n e  o f  t h e s e  i n s p e c t i o n s  
w a s  t h e  s h o r t a g e  o f  q u a l i f i e d  p e r s o n n e l  t o  i n s p e c t  t h e  l a r g e  n u m b e r  o f  
p r o j e c t s  t h a t  c a m e  o n  s t r e a m  i n  t h e  1 9 7 0 s . 1 0 5
Like Katouzian, Razavi and Vakil place emphasis on the tendency towards 
token modernisation. For example, an expensive network of computers was 
installed in the informatics division of the PBO, but it did not promote efficient 
working patterns, nor did it create its own demand, as hoped. According to 
Razavi and Vakil, the reason was that a good understanding of the planning 
process would have been far more conducive to efficiency than new computers. 
The planning process in Iran was not well understood by many of the division’s 
personnel, in part because the process itself was uncertain and continually 
subject to revision. The computers, therefore, were inappropriate other than 
serving as a symbol of westernisation.106
While Razavi and Vakil acknowledge the successes of the Fourth Plan 
(1968-72), they argue that it nonetheless laid down a set of development
patterns responsible for later economic trends. These included the sectoral 
imbalances of economic growth, the widening urban-rural gap, increased 
dependence on foreign imports and deterioration in the balance of payments. By
1972, the economy represented that of a consumption-oriented, largely urban,
1 (\1society with an explosive deficit in the balance of payments. Nevertheless, 
after 1973 the Shah pressed for big push industrialisation financed by oil 
revenues. Commissioned advice from the PBO was swept aside as being too 
pessimistic and in March 1974, the Shah summoned a number of PBO officials 
to whom he gave directives calling for a big push in investment, interspersed by 
a few key targets. This was a shock for the PBO officials:
instead of the presentations being given by the PBO officials, the 
government representatives were lectured by the Shah on his 
expectations for a modem Iran. The end result was not the hoped for 
dialogue backed up by prior research, but a compendium of 
directives, in various sectors, devoid of a time horizon. In a sense, the 
Shah dismissed the views of his technocrats and called for a Big 
Push. The question of feasibility did not enter the equation.108
Razavi and Vakil delineate clearly some of the trickier political issues with 
ramifications beyond the domestic economy. At the meeting between the prime 
minister and PBO officials in July 1974, held at the northern ski resort of 
Gajereh, to discuss the type of revisions necessary given the Shah’s directives, 
the prime minister settled on an investment allocation far above that desired by 
the PBO but also below that requested by the government ministries. However, 
there was no discussion as to where to place those financial resources not to be 
used for domestic consumption or investment: ‘The lowering of oil production 
may, in retrospect, be judged as the best “might have been” policy, but it was 
never viewed as a politically feasible decision’.109
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The PBO believed that funds beyond absorptive capacity should be placed 
abroad. However, public pronouncements regarding instant wealth and a 
propitious economic future, inhibited the policy-makers in following a large- 
scale foreign investment programme, according to Razavi and Vakil:
It would have been difficult to justify domestically the export of 
financial resources when there was still such a crying need at home. 
Moreover, the industrialized countries themselves, still reeling from 
the OPEC oil-price victory, did not look kindly on attempts by Third 
World countries to buy out some of their major industrial enterprises.
Thus, although the PBO seemed to have convinced the cabinet to 
reduce domestic investments in favour of foreign investments, the 
political pressures, internal and external, were already mounting for a 
reversal in direction.110
Razavi and Vakil hold the view that the excessive spending sanctioned by 
the government as the foremost cause of Iran’s rampant inflation in the mid- 
70s. The 1974 budget, drawn up by the prime minister and other ministers in 
the absence of PBO officials, became a ‘carte blanche’ for spending:
The net result was, of course, an overinflated budget, designed with 
total disregard for the plan, and a strong blueprint for underwriting 
inflation . . .  It seems hard to believe that the policymakers did not 
know what they were doing. Rather, one must conclude that under the 
political conditions in mid-1974, their only choice, other then 
resignation, was to underwrite an excessive spending programme and 
a large inflation.111
In addition to inflation and supply bottlenecks, oil prices ceased to increase at 
the rate at which they had been forecast. The government was caught short and 
resorted to the international market for borrowing. By October 1976, the Shah 
ordered the government to economise in all areas, to finish off existing projects 
but to leave others until the Sixth Plan. Finally, Razavi and Vakil conclude that 
the high expectations of the early 1970s coalesced with the failures of the Fifth 
Plan - inflation, power shortages - and the Shah’s attempts to distance himself
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from these failures by cracking down on industrialists and the bureaucracy as 
the perpetrators of inflation to form a movement of public discontent which 
finally overthrew the Shah.
The importance of Razavi and Vakil’s book lies in its first-hand experience 
of the practical limitations on formulating and implementing economic policy 
in an uncongenial political environment. Although in theory there may appear 
to be little conflict between a dictatorship and planning - the dictator can 
determine the appropriate strategy without having to be accountable to the 
electorate - in practice:
The advisors and technical counsellors of the dictator, instead of 
providing technical advice, have to make feasible the wishes of the 
dictator. . . Effective economic planning cannot take place in a such 
an environment. What results is a rigid top-down administration with 
little room for bottom-up corrective and innovative signals.112
The nature of Iran’s power structure, along with the character of the state,
1 1
are considered by Hossein Bashiriyeh and Farrokh Moshiri. In The State and 
Revolution, Bashiriyeh describes the traditional Iranian state as being based on 
a patrimonial and absolutist power structure characterised by the absence of 
legal private property. The absolutist state began to crumble under the Qajar 
kings (1796-1925) partly due to lack of money. The reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi 
saw a return to authoritarianism but not traditional absolutism. According to 
Bashiriyeh, Reza Shah presided over a new social formation based on 
capitalism which incorporated the idea of freedom and rights within a civil 
society. This process continued under Mohammad Reza Shah with power 
relatively decentralised and the Majlis (parliament) enjoying some authority. 
Despite challenges to the Shah’s authority from 1941, the system continued
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until 1962, which Bashiriyeh marks as a turning point in relations between the 
state and society.
The 1962 challenge was complicated by external factors such as pressure 
from the US to reform and so the Shah embarked on the White Revolution with 
certain aims in mind. Through the White Revolution, the Shah hoped to obtain 
a rural base of support and to effect a shift in the existing power bloc through a 
new economic policy. Instead of relying on the support of the landed and 
mercantile middle class, the Shah engineered a new alliance between the state 
and the modem bourgeoisie. The aim was to consolidate power through a 
corporatist political structure which was relatively independent from the 
dominant classes. The policy led to the rise of a new authoritarianism, 
according to Bashiriyeh, increased intervention in the economy and the 
protection of the industrial upper bourgeoisie at the expense of landed and 
commercial interests.114 At the same time, there was a drive towards 
incorporating the Iranian economy with the central capitalist economies.
In 1963, the New Iran Party was established and the Shah used it as a 
means of controlling all classes through a single state ideology. Bashiriyeh 
identifies five foundations on which the Shah had decided to base his regime. 
These were: state control of oil wealth; the success of the economic 
stabilisation policy; the creation of an equilibrium of classes through their 
economic control and through intervention in the economy; an alliance with the 
upper bourgeoisie as well as control of private enterprise; and an expansion of 
the coercive forces of the state coupled with a reliance on the US and the West 
for support.115
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Increased oil revenues in the 1960s also meant increased independence 
such that the Shah decided to establish trade relations with the former Soviet 
Union as well. On the domestic front, Bashiriyeh emphasises the importance of 
the benefits of oil wealth to the political system - ‘The maintenance of 
economic stability was to be a major foundation of royal power’.116 By the 
same token, the sharp decline in the economy acted as a catalyst to the 
revolution. Bashiriyeh quotes James Davies’ view of revolution with approval:
Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of 
objective economic and social development is followed by a short 
period of sharp reversal.117
In the two years after the oil price rises, argues Bashiriyeh, all sections of the 
public benefitted financially amid expectations that the affluence would 
continue. However, the inflation that set in from the end of 1974 ate into the 
large wage rises of the early 1970s, with the result that economic benefits began 
to be neutralised and social inequalities began to grow.
The reactive measures taken by the Shah, including the victimisation of the 
industrial class, the establishment of a one-party state and the sale of shares in 
industrial enterprises to workers only served to weaken the government’s base:
In the mid-1970s, although the court was the only hegemonic power, 
the deeper economic crisis [than the early 1960s] which was affecting 
the foundations of the regime prompted the emergence of a short­
lived fascist phenomenon. . . The court attempted to extend the 
apparatus of class control by the imposition of a single new political 
party to mobilise the lower classes. . . The court was thus cultivating 
the image of being autonomous from the social classes. . . Previously 
the working class had had no political weight in the state ideology; it 
had been neutralised rather than antagonised. The new party was to 
increase this political weight and the previous party was denounced 
for not having given the working class sufficient attention. Thus, 
what emerged was a populist attempt, in the sense of the controlled 
activation of the lower classes on the basis of economic concessions 
in the form of some redistributive measures to transfer property from
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one social class to another. As a result of these populist moves the 
clientelist relations which had obtained between government and 
opposition began to weaken.118
The moves did little to check inflation and the worsening balance of 
payments situation. From 1977, according to Bashiriyeh, the government began 
to backslide on its populist policies to try to regain the support of the industrial 
classes. Thus, incentives were given to entrepreneurs to increase domestic 
investment and some important businessmen were given cabinet posts. This 
policy meant that the government fell between two stools, according to 
Bashiriyeh:
It became clear that the regime was launching a contradictory 
venture, seeking to fulfil fundamentally incompatible commitments.
On the one hand it wanted to remove controls on free enterprise and 
to reserve the role of the bourgeoisie in the economy, and on the other 
it sought to interfere in the economy to prevent public dissatisfaction.
In the end the regime satisfied neither the entrepreneurs nor the lower 
classes.119
Bashiriyeh argues too that the attempts at economic liberalisation from 
1977 were accompanied by a policy of political liberalisation largely induced by 
external pressures. While the Pentagon and the arms industries supported the 
Shah’s policies, there was increasing criticism of US-Iranian relations as forged 
under the Nixon Administration, by the State Department and the oil 
companies.
Bashiriyeh therefore subscribes to the view that US policy towards Iran 
under Jimmy Carter departed from the stance adopted by the previous
1 70Republican Administrations. However, the differences between the two 
countries were patched up, argues Bashiriyeh, when the Shah visited the US in
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November 1977. Carter praised the Shah’s leadership and promised to consider 
Iranian arms requests:
In return the Shah agreed not to press for higher oil prices, and 
although their discussion on the liberalisation policy was not made 
public, the Shah implicitly agreed to adopt a more liberal policy.
After the visit, the Shah remarked that the ‘small differences’ which 
had existed between the two countries had been resolved and that his 
‘heart feels lighter’.121
The economic policies of the 1970s also served to erode the five 
foundations of support, mentioned above, on which the regime had been based 
for over a decade. Oil revenues no longer afforded the state the same kind of 
freedom as before, when prices had been higher; economic stability no longer 
existed, while populist measures and punishment of the industrial classes 
signaled a dramatic change in policy as well as affecting established class 
patterns of access to the economy. Bashiriyeh, therefore, paints the picture of a 
state whose authoritarianism extended to bringing about its own downfall. 
While there were several causes behind the weakness of the government, he 
argues that the catalyst for its overthrow was largely a sharp economic decline 
following a period of relative economic and political stability.
Farrokh Moshiri also sees an understanding of the nature of the state as 
essential for an explanation of the revolution. He argues that mass discontent 
was created in the end by a contradiction in the goals of the state. On the one 
hand the Shah appeared to desire a progressive social system with a 
modernising economic system which would seem to be modelled on the 
Western liberal state. On the other hand, the political policies of the state were 
authoritarian and backward. This argument is similar to Abrahamian’s 
analysis of the long-term causes of the revolution:
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the revolution came because the shah modernized on the 
socioeconomic level and thus expanded the ranks of the modem 
middle class and the industrial working class, but failed to modernize 
on another level - the political level; and this failure inevitably 
strained the links between the government and the social structure, 
blocked the channels of communication between the political system 
and the general population, widened the gap between the ruling 
circles and the new social forces, and, most serious of all, cut down 
the few bridges that had in the past connected the political 
establishment with the traditional social forces, especially with the 
bazaars and the religious authorities. Thus by 1977 the gulf between 
the developing socioeconomic system and the underdeveloped 
political system was so wide that an economic crisis was able to bring 
down the whole regime.123
Writing well after the revolution, Moshiri concentrates on the roots of 
religious power and influence in Iran and the relationship of the clergy to the 
state. The Pahlavis used Shi’ism, argues Moshiri, as part of an anti-communist, 
unifying design. Iranian opposition to foreigners meant that the clergy became 
identified with Iranian nationalism, which gave them popularity and 
influence.124 The impact of the West, both in terms of physical presence in Iran 
and value systems, also played an important role in delineating the nature of 
clerical opposition to the Shah. Moshiri argues that though the clergy was 
opposed to Westernisation, it was not opposed to modernisation or 
industrialisation. The last two concepts are Western-oriented but they do not
1 9 Saffect the value system of a country as much as Westernisation. Since foreign 
influence stemmed from a government-encouraged Westernisation programme 
and since that government became more authoritarian after 1963, Moshiri 
believes that as in the nineteenth-century, the roots of clerical opposition lay in 
antipathy towards foreigners and absolutism.
Finally, Moshiri considers Ted Gurr’s concept of relative deprivation (the 
actors’ perception of the discrepancy between their value expectations and their
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1value capabilities) and concludes that by the mid-late 1970s, relative 
deprivation existed for all the anti-monarchical forces, such as the migrant
1 *77peasantry, the merchant and commercial classes and the intellectuals.
He also considers Theda Skocpol’s theory of revolution which he believes 
does not apply to the Iranian case.128 Moshiri argues that an essential part of 
Skocpol’s theory is the collapse of state power within society but in Iran this 
was not the case as the state was becoming more powerful and more efficient. 
From this it is clear that Moshiri takes a different view of the relative strength 
of the Iranian state from that put forward by Kamrava and discussed earlier.
Skocpol herself also believes that her theory of revolution does not apply
1 7Qwell to the Iranian case. She may be a little too hard on herself in this 
respect. One of the theories put forward in her book is that revolutions are not 
caused by an ideological leadership mobilising a mass movement, i.e., 
revolutions are not made; they come. But in her afterthoughts on the Iranian 
case she sees a difference - ‘Their revolution did not just come; it was 
deliberately and coherently made, specifically in its opening phase, the 
overthrow of the old regime’. This seems highly questionable. The revolution is 
thought to have ‘begun’ in January 1978 with the deaths of 70 theological 
students in Qom in riots protesting at a newspaper article slandering Ayatollah 
Khomeini. Did these people then decide to ‘organise’ a revolution? They had 
been opponents of the Shah since the 1960s so why did a revolution not occur 
earlier if they were the revolutionary vanguard? Moreover, the revolution, like 
that of France, was a negative one in that the only clear desire was for the Shah 
to go. Beyond this, there was only the idea that a more just and democratic
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society would emerge and little conception of what an Islamic republic meant. 
Each of the groups participating in the revolution followed their own leader, 
hence the accusation later that Khomeini ‘hi-jacked’ the revolution. To this 
extent, SkocpoTs rush to rectify matters by putting Iran aside as a special 
cultural case because of the seemingly abstruse element of Shi’a Islam is a 
shame. The second reason why Skocpol believes she is ‘wrong’ where Iran is 
concerned is that there was no obvious weakening of the state through a war or 
outside pressure. Here, she is on firmer ground but it is the case that the US 
president, Jimmy Carter, did put specific pressure on Iran to improve its human 
rights record from January 1977. In June 1977, a group of politicians of the 
National Front wrote an open letter of protest to the Shah, itself an 
extraordinarily bold move at the time. Moreover, the economy was performing 
badly with inflation hitting the poorest hardest and weakening the state to the 
extent that it no longer seemed in control of the economy by 1977 and appeared 
under pressure from its main supporter.
The originality of SkocpoTs theory of revolution lies in its emphasis on the 
need to adopt a structural perspective when discussing social revolutions. 
Special attention should be devoted to the international context and those 
developments at home and abroad that affect the breakdown of the state 
organisations of old regimes and the build-up of new, revolutionary state 
organisations. Furthermore:
All modem social revolutions must be seen as closely related in their 
causes and accomplishments to the international uneven spread of 
capitalist economic development and nation-state formation on a 
world scale.130
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The approach taken by Skocpol in emphasising the importance of the 
international context is a welcome one. Similarly, in this thesis, the big push 
phase of Iran’s industrialisation attempt will be placed in a geo-political context 
to see whether it might produce a more rounded analysis of the subject. As the 
above summaries suggest, such an approach has not been undertaken in respect 
of Iran’s industrialisation and an attempt will be made to rectify the balance in 
Chapter 5.
1.7 Summary
As we will see, the period under study was a crucially important phase not only 
in Iran’s attempt to industrialise but also in the country’s broader economic and 
political development. A four-fold increase in oil prices ushered in fundamental 
economic changes which helped contribute to severe imbalances in the 
economy ultimately culminating in revolution and the end of the 70-year reign 
of the two Pahlavi Shahs. The review of the literature has shown that most 
analyses of Iran’s attempt at industrialisation during this period have tended to 
explain those economic distortions in terms of economic consequences and 
constraints or have adopted primarily domestic political economy arguments for 
the failure of the industrialisation drive. We will argue that the main motivation 
behind big push industrialisation was international in origin, stemming from 
Iran’s political relations with the West. This has been a neglected factor. But it 
was Iran’s domestic political structure, as an oil-rich dictatorship, which led to 
the manner of its implementation and to its disappointing results.
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Chapter 2. The Process of Industrialisation
2.1 Introduction
‘The industrially more developed country presents to the less developed
country a picture of its own future’ - Karl Marx, Das Kapital
The implied inevitability of a universal industrialisation in Marx’s now famous 
dictum understates the efforts and undertakings of the less developed countries in 
their struggle to industrialise. The difficulties of successfully establishing an 
industrial base and manufacturing industries to contribute significantly to a 
country’s economic growth and development have, at various intervals, given rise 
to disillusionment and even a scepticism regarding the utility of the 
industrialisation process.
This reaction is bom partly of a slowdown in industrial production growth 
rates since the 1980s and partly of an increased recognition of the complicated 
make-up of the factors which promote development.1 Between 1963-1973 the 
annual average rate of growth of manufacturing output in the South was 7.8 per 
cent compared to 6.6 per cent for the North. The differential was even higher for 
manufacturing value added which grew by 6.7 per cent in the South between 1963- 
1979 compared to 5 per cent in the North. Between 1973-1979, manufacturing 
output in the South grew at 5.6 per cent per annum - twice the rate of the North. 
But, since 1980, the results have been disappointing and growth has been uneven. 
Hence the palpable sense of despondency in the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization’s annual global report of 1985. As a process
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industrialisation, ‘has not been automatic nor has it been free of crises, setbacks and 
conflicts. Industrializing is not an easy, natural process of just stepping on to an 
escalator going upwards. It has sometimes been rapid and sometimes painfully 
slow.’3 Despite its importance in raising living standards, the stresses and strains on 
society brought about by industrialisation as well as continued poverty or lop-sided 
development have raised many questions about the process. 4 For some, the 
reaction against industrialisation is a reaction also against a Western, or 
Eurocentric, development model.5
In 1987 the World Bank devoted its World Development Report to 
industrialisation. ‘Practically all societies at early stages of their development have 
viewed industrialization as the main vehicle for improving living standards,’ it 
wrote.6 Thirteen years later, the World Bank no longer accorded industrialisation 
the same place in the development process. According to its 1999/2000 report, 
industrialisation is no longer the main spur to growth. ‘No one policy will trigger 
development,’ it argues. The process of development has instead metamorphosised 
into a complex bundle of social goals. Achieving them is possible but is neither 
inevitable nor easy, according to the World Bank. ‘Development thinking has 
evolved into a broad pragmatism, realizing that development must move beyond 
economic growth to encompass important social goals - reduced poverty, improved 
quality of life, enhanced opportunities for better education and health, and more.’ 
Past development experience ‘emphasises the need to reach beyond economics to 
address societal issues in a holistic fashion.’8
The disillusionment is based on empirical results. Though economic growth
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was an objective both in itself and in its effect on the economy - in W.W. Rostow’s 
words, ‘a powerful and essential engine of economic transformation’9 - it was also 
deemed desirable because even if it did not contribute directly to an increase in 
living standards for all, its fruits would eventually ‘trickle down’ to the poor. This 
though has not taken place10 and growth, in many less developed countries 
(henceforward LDCs) has remained concentrated on an enclave of organised urban 
industry - an enclave with relatively limited links with the surrounding economy. It 
is this same enclave nature of industrialisation that has also been, in part, the cause 
of its failure to create employment on the scale that had been hoped for, of which 
more later in this chapter.
In the 1970s when Iran was gearing up to its big industrialisation push, there 
was no question that industrialisation, as in many other developing countries, was 
the policy pillar on which the modernisation and development of the country 
would rest. In this context it will be useful to attempt to reassess the objectives 
set by policy-makers for industrialisation. If industrialisation has failed to meet 
these goals, is it because these were either too ambitious or inappropriate? 
Secondly, a distinction has to be drawn between the failure of a successful 
industrialisation policy to achieve these objectives and an inherently unsuccessful 
industrialisation attempt. In other words, a failure to industrialise must be 
distinguished from a failure to achieve the aims set for it.
We will consider first the concept of industrialisation and ways of measuring 
it. It will then be necessary to discuss the goals of industrialisation, primarily within 
the terms posed by a distinction between industrialisation and development. This
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will also include reviewing arguments regarding the possibility of a less developed 
country being able to industrialise at all, as dependency theorists maintained. The 
final part of the chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the different strategies 
involved to achieve industrialisation, including import-substitution, export- 
orientation, theories of the ‘big push’ and balanced growth, all of which are 
especially pertinent to the case of Iran. We shall also consider the role of the state 
in the industrialisation process and the special case of oil-exporters.
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to introduce some of the concepts used in 
later chapters when discussing Iran’s industrialisation efforts. It may be noted that 
some issues relevant to a general discussion on industrialisation will not be fully 
treated (for example, strategies of combating shortages of capital), if they are not 
relevant to the case of Iran.
2.2 The meaning o f industrialisation
At the simplest level, industrialisation has, as its central characteristic, machine 
production. Historically, it has shifted the balance of productive activity from 
agriculture to industry. Industrialisation represents a form of productive technique 
based on improved methods of producing wealth not only in manufactures but also 
in agriculture and mining. It is closely associated with an increase in the scale of 
production, with the development of capitalistic methods of manufacturing and 
marketing and with the employment of wage labour - though both capitalism and 
wage employment predate industrialisation.
When it first emerged in Europe in the middle of the eighteenth century,
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industrialisation was the outcome of a long and complicated historical development 
which began to replace commerce as the main force of economic life. The main 
advantage, and objective, of an industrially-based economy is that it reduces the 
real cost per unit of producing goods and sevices. This is the opposite of handicraft 
production, which obeys the law of ‘constant cost’, whereby producers are unable 
to produce more cheaply in the face of rising demand because the need for 
additional workers to meet demand would not necessarily lead to reduced overall 
cost.
Industrial development can be recognised not only in the volume of output but 
also in a country’s system of economic organisation. In an ‘industrial society’ all 
aspects of the social structure have some degree of standardisation, while the 
workforce comprises so many specialised areas which result in a varied set of final 
products. Much has been written about the social effects of industrialisation but the 
point to note here is the Industrial Revolution was the outcome of social as well as 
economic and technological forces.11 This contrasts with industrialisation as 
embarked upon by LDCs, which apply primarily economic inputs to a given social 
situation. To this extent, the process of industrialisation now signifies a very 
different form of development from that which took place at the end of the 
nineteenth century.12
2.3 Measuring industrialisation
Indicators of industrial development may be represented in the form of statistics, 
while others are nonquantifiable. The importance of the social context, as well as 
the structure of economic organisation, has been mentioned above. These play an
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important part in determining not only the degree, but also the form, of 
industrialisation. They also provide the context for statistical indicators, which in 
themselves, may not prove consistently meaningful.
The difficulties of producing standardised data on statistical indicators of 
industrial development have been discussed by Simon Kuznets, Bela Balassa,
1 "X •Helen Hughes and Vinod Prakash, amongst others. It is not the purpose of this 
analysis to enter the discussion, but merely to draw attention to the shortcomings of 
relying solely on quantitative methods to determine industrial development. 
Nevertheless, statistical data will be used to determine levels of output and to 
provide a comparative basis for the years under study but it will be bome in mind 
that they do not, on their own, measure fully the degree of industrialisation. Non- 
statistical indicators pertaining to Iran, which include the political and economic 
environment will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. It is necessary now to determine 
the statistical indicators that will be used in this study.
The term ‘industry’ will be used to cover manufacturing activities only (unless 
otherwise indicated); this is in line with the definition given by the United Nations’ 
International Standard Industrial Classification (Rev. 2) Major Division 3.14 
Economic activities such as mining, construction, electricity, gas and water will not 
be included. Most indicators of industrial development signify some aspects of 
manufacturing production or trade in manufactures. The products are usually 
classified by major sectors of production and the breakdown of manufacturing into 
light and heavy industry or capital and consumer goods. Though growth and output 
can be measured in this way, it becomes difficult to distinguish different activities
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within a given branch of industry. For this, activities need to be examined 
according to their stage of processing, that is, in terms of primary, semi-finished 
and finished goods.
The Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies of the UN 
Secretariat takes the share of manufacturing activity in the total gross domestic 
product (GDP) as the indicator of the relative stage of industrialisation.15 The same 
study characterises the industrially more advanced countries as those in which the 
manufacturing sector accounts for roughly 17 per cent or more of GDP. Other 
studies calculate the ratio of value added in manufacturing to GDP or gross 
national product (GNP) - indeed this is the standard measurement. It is applied by 
the UN in a well-known study using H.B. Chenery’s multiple regression technique 
to determine a set of indicators regarding the level and composition of 
manufacturing industry in relation to the general level of economic development of 
an LDC.16 Similarly, UNIDO uses the composition of manufacturing value added 
as the main indicator of manufacturing output in order to estimate the relative 
degree of industrialisation in various countries.17
Vinod Prakash following the study for the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development by Helen Hughes and Bela Balassa uses the ratio 
of value added in manufacturing to value added in commodity production as an 
indicator of industrialisation.18 Recent trends in outsourcing have led to some 
activities previously classified as manufacturing to be designated as services. But 
this is of relevance to mature economies and not to Iran in the period under study.
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Commodity production is defined as the sum of agriculture, fishing and 
forestry, manufacturing, mining, electricity, gas and water and construction. This 
measure is preferred by Hughes because:
Typically, the share of manufacturing output in total output first rises and 
then declines because the traditional service sector, high at early levels of 
development, falls in importance as industrialization and overall 
development proceed. Then, as high levels of per capita income are 
reached, new services such as advertising and tourism become 
important.19
There are drawbacks with expressing manufacturing in terms of commodity 
production. For example, in countries with a large agricultural sector, 
manufacturing sectors will be under-represented even when they are substantial. 
Conversely, it will be exaggerated in countries which protect the industrial sector, 
since this tends to be valued above international price levels in national accounts 
systems whilst most primary production is usually priced at international levels. It 
does, however, ‘provide convenient cut-off points for ordering countries according 
to four levels or categories of industrial development’.20 These are listed as the 
industrialised; semi-industrialised; industrialising, and non-industrial countries, in 
which the share of manufacturing in relation to value added in commodity 
production is defined, respectively, as more than 60 per cent; 40-60 per cent; 20-40 
per cent, and less than 20 per cent.21
Though this is a fair measure for use in comparative analyses, it is not the best 
indicator of industrialisation within a single country. It is particularly not suited to 
Iran, where industry was heavily protected and the agricultural sector was 
shrinking. Therefore, the main indicator used by this study will be the conventional
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one, that is, the share of value added in manufacturing in GDP. In addition, where 
figures are available, the level of industrial development will be represented also by 
the annual per capita level of value added in manufacturing. This measure is the 
conventional one for representing labour productivity and, taken with various 
inputs, such as levels of investment, it can be used to indicate the efficiency of 
industry. Finally, the gross output of manufacturing is also useful, since it can be 
used to estimate the supply of manufactures to determine effective protection (if 
nominal protection is known) by calculating the ratio of value added to gross output 
in manufacturing.22
These, then, will be the three indicators used to determine quantitatively the 
level of industrialisation in Iran during this period: the share of value added in 
manufacturing in GDP; the annual per capita level of value added in 
manufacturing, and the gross output of manufacturing.
In conclusion, it should be mentioned that Iranian industrialisation will not be 
measured against some arbitrary (or objective) criterion whose conditions need to 
be fulfilled in order to determine whether the country is industrialised or not. 
Instead, Iran’s industrial sector will have to be measured both against the objectives 
that the government sought to attain and against reasonable expectations of 
performance for such an economy.
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2.4 The role o f growth
Can we measure the success of industrialisation in terms of manufacturing growth 
rates? The objectives of industrialisation will be examined in the next section but 
one motivating force for LDCs is the hope that industrialisation will lead to more 
rapid rates of economic growth which will eventually lead to a higher standard of 
living for the population. This was certainly the main view when many of the LDCs 
started their plans for industrial expansion in the early 1960s.
The statistics for growth rates during the 60s and 70s for the LDCs are 
impressive; by the 50s, the LDCs had overtaken the developed capitalist world in 
growth of manufacturing and, in the three decades after the end of the Second 
World War, manufacturing grew at an average of 7 per cent a year in comparison 
with 5 per cent for the industrialised countries.24 The share of the GDP of low- 
income countries arising in the industrial sector rose from 25 per cent in 1960 to 34 
per cent in 1981, and for manufacturing the rise was more modest, though still 
large, from 11 per cent to 16 per cent.25
Iran, in particular, experienced high growth rates. The annual average GDP 
growth rate rose from 5.6 per cent (1959-63) to 11.5 per cent (1963-72) and then to 
12.6 per cent (1973-77).26 For the period 1951-69, Iran’s annual average rate of 
growth of manufacturing was 11.2 per cent.27 These growth rates exceeded the 
expectations of many economists and led some writers to see this development as 
past of a process leading to the lessening of dependence of the LDCs on the 
developed world and consequently, to a more egalitarian distribution of power 
internationally at a much faster rate than was ever thought possible. Nevertheless,
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by the mid- to late-70s, it was clear that the high growth rates did not, for many 
countries, signify the hoped-for prosperity.29
The main reason is that growth rates only measure production which is simply 
one aspect of economic development. Dr Ali Attiga, secretary-general of the 
Organisation of Oil-Exporting Countries (OPEC), emphasised the dangers inherent 
in equating rapid growth with rapid development, particularly when it is caused by 
the export of a valuable commodity:
A rapid increase in oil income tends to accelerate internal socio-economic 
conflicts in all directions. It also gives rise to rapid economic growth 
which is easily mistaken for real economic development. Perhaps this 
illusion is the most serious obstacle facing economic planners in the oil- 
exporting countries.30
As Gunnar Myrdal has argued, GNP as a measure of production is often 
calculated in an arbitrary way and can give a misleading idea of what is being 
presented.31 Some income items, for example, represent expenditure that is caused 
by an undesirable social situation, such as the costs and losses arising from the 
existence of slums or, in the case of the US, a high crime rate. 32 For Myrdal, the 
attempt to be precise can only be deceptive, because of the deficiencies in statistical 
measurements: ‘The very idea that it should be possible, even if only for one set of 
factors in development, viz., production, to characterize the situation in a country 
and its change by an index is logically invalid’.33
The attempt is made more valid, though, when examining particular items 
under the level of GNP, ‘if the items have been defined properly . . .  It is the 
aggregation into a total figure for production we have to watch against’. 34 What
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Gunnar Myrdal has highlighted is the distinction between growth and development 
- the one does not necessarily reflect the other.
UNIDO has also drawn attention to the dangers of equating the two. In World 
Industry since 1960, it states: ‘economic growth is an imperfect indicator of social 
well-being for a number of reasons. The growth rate of GDP is based on market 
prices, which studies have shown to be poor indices of social value’. This is 
mainly because of distortions in market prices which can, for example, exaggerate 
the contribution of an import-substitution industry when the goods are measured 
in domestic market prices instead of world market prices: ‘In some instances such 
industries may even contribute negative value added, in the sense that measured in 
world prices the value of imported inputs used by an industry may exceed the value 
of that industry’s outputs’.36 Since Iran chose a policy of import-substitution to 
implement industrialisation, this point is relevant.
Rapid growth will not always indicate increased well-being for the population. 
Arthur Lewis noted it was possible for output to grow yet for the mass of the people
'xnto become poorer. Similarly, a high rate of manufacturing output in an LDC can 
reflect a small industrial base, a fact which has to be bome in mind when 
considering the country’s industrial achievement. The ambivalent nature of growth 
was well-noted by Lewis:
Economic growth is only one thing among many, and we can take it to 
excess. Excessive growth may result in, or be the result of, excessive 
materialism, excessive individualism, excessive mobility of population, 
excessive inequality of income or the like . . .  It is because economic 
growth has both its gains and losses that we are all almost without 
exception ambivalent in our attitudes towards economic growth.38
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Mancur Olson has argued that rapid economic growth can imply a worsening 
situation in income distribution which could lead to disruption. Economic growth 
comes about not through simple capital accumulation, but through innovation and 
technical change. This involves great changes in methods of production and, in a 
rapidly growing economy, in the distribution of income:
... economic growth increases the number of nouveaux riches, who 
may use their economic power to change the social and political order in 
their interest and . . . economic growth may paradoxically also create a 
surprisingly large number of ‘nouveaux pauvres’ who will be much more 
resentful of their poverty than those who have known nothing else.’ 39
The ‘losers’ in such an economy, for example, those unskilled labourers made 
redundant by the introduction of modem technology, are a potentially destabilising 
social force but the ‘gainers’ can be equally disruptive. Olson argues that because 
many of them have had to uproot themselves from their community to find work in 
the towns, they may feel alienated from society. In addition, individuals who gain 
can find themselves in an economic position at variance with their position in the 
old social hierarchy. Such social dislocation can be very dismptive especially since 
it involves the growth of cities which are, in effect, a unit of organisation in which 
new ideas can spread rapidly and revolts can be led.
Olson concludes: ‘there is no necessary connection between rapid economic 
growth and short-run increases in the incomes of the mass of the people. And even 
when the incomes of the mass of the people are increasing, it does not follow that 
their standards of living are increasing, for the increased rate of saving concomitant 
with economic growth may reduce the level of consumption’.40 It should be
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emphasised that Olson’s discussion is on the short-run effects of rapid economic 
growth; he concurs with the view that, in the long-run, high rates of growth are 
beneficial and can provide a higher standard of living.
None of this is to deny that economic growth can play an important role in a 
country’s economy but to highlight that high rates of growth should not 
immediately be equated with greater prosperity or development. The causes of the 
growth, or the costs incurred in achieving high growth, should be examined first 
before such a conclusion can be drawn. The discussion is particularly relevant to 
the case of Iran which enjoyed rapid rates of growth followed after a relatively 
short period of time by political destabilisation. Some economists point to the 
impressive growth rates achieved under the Shah as evidence of the economy’s 
strength41 but as discussed above, high growth rates cannot be taken at face value. 
When examining Iran’s growth rate, whether in GNP or manufacturing, we shall 
have to consider the extent to which that growth reveals real progress as well as its 
impact on society.
2.5 The objectives o f industrialisation: economic development
As we have seen, industrialisation has to be distinguished from the idea of 
economic development. The term ‘development’ signifies primarily qualitative 
change in the society, economy and institutions of a country; ‘economic 
development’ denotes similar progress in the economy alone. Since industry refers 
to one sector of the economy, industrialisation is one contributor to economic 
development - it cannot be expected to bring about the desired changes in isolation. 
The processes involved in achieving economic development are complicated, as
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mentioned above, depending not only on economic inputs, such as natural 
resources, capital and labour but also on the social structure and attitudes of people.
Industrialisation was given pride of place in early development literature. 
When the less developed countries gained their independence in the 1930s and 
1940s, they tended to assume the main reason for the underdevelopment of their 
economies was the low proportion of national income derived from manufacturing 
and service industries compared to wealthier countries. Thus industrialisation came 
to be regarded as the main impetus to development. Bela Balassa wrote in 1980: 
‘the development of manufacturing industries is part and parcel of overall 
economic development’.42 A prosperous and diverse economy is likely to have a 
strong industrial sector but it has long been recognised too that there are exceptions 
to the pattern. Simon Kuznets, the Nobel prize-winning economist for his work on 
measuring the growth of national incomes in developed countries, found a high 
positive correlation between the size of per capita income and the contribution of 
manufacturing to total income but noted some important exceptions.43 Yugoslavia, 
for example, which derived 42 per cent of its income in 1961 from manufacturing 
and mining, was one of the poorest countries in Europe. By contrast, New Zealand 
had the sixth highest level of per capita income in the world in 1961, though it 
derived 22 per cent of its income in almost equal parts from agriculture and 
industry.
Jacob Viner, in an attack on those whom he saw as identifying agriculture 
with poverty also cited the examples of New Zealand, Australia, Italy and Spain as 
refutation of these ‘mischievous fantasies’ 44 He thought it was a fallacy to
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suppose that agriculture and poverty went hand in hand and that industrialisation 
would necessarily lead to wealth. The most promising field for rapid economic 
development, he believed, lay in agriculture. Writing in 1953, before Kuznets’ 
study, Viner was scathing about an article using similar methodology to show that 
the higher the proportion of the population in secondary and tertiary industry 
manufacturing services and professions, the higher per capita incomes.45 He 
questioned in particular the use of per capita incomes as a measure of the effects of 
income derived from industry:
I feel confident that if the data were available, it could be demonstrated 
that the positive correlation between the percentages of the national 
populations who were dentists or hairdressers and the national per capita 
incomes was even higher than Bean's correlations. If we followed his 
logic, we would take this as a demonstration that the way to cure poverty 
is to increase the number of dentists and beauty parlours.
Agriculture may be the way forward for some countries but notwithstanding 
Viner’s scepticism, industrialisation is still held to be the important element to aid 
economic development. There is however, a greater appreciation that the manner in 
which it is implemented is important to its ultimate efficacy and that it no longer is 
the key to development but one of a number of important factors, as noted by the 
World Bank, above.
2.6 The objectives o f industrialisation: labour absorption
A second objective of industrialisation was the belief that it would provide 
employment for the growing populations of the less developed countries. This was 
due to the notion that the marginal rate of return in agriculture was low due mainly 
to the ‘stagnant’ nature of agricultural production and the problem of land shortage
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in the face of population pressure. Agriculture would then be unable to absorb 
excess labour but the industrial sector, as a dynamic and growing force, would be 
able to relieve the problem of under-employment. In fact, manufacturing has 
provided little scope as a significant employer of labour, though mining and 
construction offer more in terms of employment opportunities.47 The reason is 
usually cast in terms of an attack on the techniques of production used by the LDCs 
for using capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive methods. But,
even in the relatively labour-intensive and rapidly growing industrial 
sectors, manufacturing has provided for only a small proportion of total 
employment, at a far slower rate of growth than that of industrial output.
Much of the impact of industrial growth on employment has been 
indirect, through activities that serve industry.48
Helen Hughes nevertheless noted that the industrial sector could have a direct 
impact on employment through the establishment of small-scale enterprises using 
labour intensive methods and the production of mass consumption goods. The 
drawback of an excessive reliance on these methods though is that they could affect 
growth adversely and become a source of inefficiency by ignoring economies of 
scale. A trade-off is therefore required between the predominantly capital- and 
labour-intensive industries, or else agriculture has to be re-examined as a source of 
employment49 We will examine the role of agriculture in industrialisation later in 
this chapter.
In some ways, the assumption that industry would be able to use the same 
labour that worked on the land was unrealistic. This is not simply because of the 
need for skilled labour in some parts of industry but also because industrial labour 
in the sense of what Alexander Gerschenkron called a ‘stable, reliable and
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disciplined group’ is scarce in the LDCs and the creation of such an industrial 
labour force is a difficult and protracted process.
2.7 The objectives o f industrialisation: political independence 
The political arguments in favour of industrialisation have always been at least as 
important as the economic ones, particularly the desire for economic independence 
as a means of asserting national independence or importance. For Iran, 
industrialisation was to be the main driving force behind the establishment of what 
the Shah termed the ‘Great Civilization’;50 the Shah repeatedly stated his aim was 
for Iran to become the world’s fifth most industrialised nation before the end of the 
century. By implication, that would also make it the fifth most powerful.
The pursuit of this aim included great emphasis on defence and on military 
power. A similar motivation to industrialise can be seen in many other LDCs, for 
example, in Brazil and Argentina where the military have played an important role 
in the political system. The same drive lay behind the major industrialisation efforts 
of Russia, Japan and Germany with the concomitant characteristic that the state 
played a leading role, or at least provided the impetus for the industrial process.51 
In W.W. Rostow’s phrase, this can be seen as a form of ‘reactive nationalism’ 
whereby states react to international political competition to achieve industrial 
transformation. This similarity in motivation has caused at least one writer to 
assert: ‘Thus, at bottom, the motivation for rapid industrial change is almost
c i
invariably of a military nature’.
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Following Gautam Sen’s argument, the industries which are then established in 
an industrialising country tend to be more or less the same. These ‘industrialising 
industries’ are often pursued because of their complementarity - the products of 
each can serve as an input for the others. They are also inputs for the final products 
in the consumer goods sector. So, although they can be considered strategic for 
achieving economic independence, Sen notes that they are of strategic significance 
too, for the production of military goods. Six industries form this strategic set, 
according to Sen. These are iron and steel, chemicals, textiles, machinery, paper 
and paper products and transport equipment. Successful implementation of these 
industries is necessary to economic growth to such a degree that: ‘industrialisation 
can be interpreted as the process by which these industries become established in 
an economy’.54 This argument has relevance for Iran and will be reconsidered 
later.
Fear of industrial backwardness in a world of industrially and militarily 
advanced nations prompts the state to intervene. For Gerschenkron, successful 
industrialisation required a strong state. The role of the state was crucial if 
‘backward’ economies were to catch up with industrially advanced countries. In 
Russia, ‘the state, moved by its military interest, assumed the role of primary agent 
propelling the economic progress of the country’.55 The rate of economic 
development increased when military necessities were pressing and subsided at 
other times, according to Gerschenkron, thus underlining both the role of the state 
and the power of military motivation. We shall consider the role of the state in 
fostering industrialisation later in this chapter under section 2.9 Contending 
strategies of industrialisation.
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2.8 Industrialisation: the political context
For structuralists such as Rostow, Lewis and Chenery, successful industrial 
development lay in embarking upon a process which included achieving the correct 
mix of financial and economic conditions. Dependency theorists, however, 
recognised the importance of the political context in - mostly - hindering economic 
development. Dependency theory is mainly the search for an explanation as to the 
continuing state of poverty in the LDCs and their poor development record. But it 
also makes a contribution to the debate on industrialisation and offers an 
explanation regarding the political motivations of government by separating the 
interests of the government in an LDC from that of the population as a whole. 
Dependency theory attributes the inability of LDCs to become economically and 
nationally independent to features in the international political system instead of 
the implementation of an inappropriate strategy of industrialisation.
What, then, is it to be dependent?
By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain 
countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another 
economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of 
interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and 
world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the 
dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other 
countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that 
expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their 
immediate development.56
The slowness of countries to develop or modernise themselves is seen as a 
consequence of the expansion of capitalism in the world. The theory is 
diametrically opposed to that of Peter Bauer’s, for example, which seeks to explain
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underdevelopment in terms of deficiencies in the indigenous characteristics of the 
LDCs.57 Dependence existed during three different eras: colonial, financial- 
industrial and, since the Second World War, technological-industrial, to use Dos
c o
Santos’ terminology. It is this last which is of interest here. This new dependence, 
according to Dos Santos, is still part of a system of international economic relations 
based on monopolistic control of large-scale capital and on a monopoly of complex 
technology, leading to unequal development at a national and international level. 
There are three important characteristics of this new dependence. The following is 
a paraphrase of Dos Santos’ argument. Firstly, industrial development is dependent 
on an export sector for the foreign currency necessary for the purchase of the inputs 
needed by the industrial sector. This means that the traditional export sector has to 
be preserved even though it means the perpetuation of backward relations of 
production. (This would be of greater relevance to Iran if her export earnings had 
been predominantly from the traditional exports of dried fruit and carpets.)
Secondly, this means that industrial development becomes strongly 
conditioned by fluctuations in the balance of payments. The relations of 
dependence continually cause the LDC to be in deficit due to deteriorating terms of 
trade,59 the repatriation of capital derived from foreign investment60 and the 
consequent need for even more foreign capital to cover the deficit and to finance 
industry through loans. Thirdly, industrial development in the LDCs is strongly 
influenced by the monopoly that the imperialist centres have over technology. The 
goods and machinery needed by the LDCs are usually patented by the big 
companies and are sent to the LDCs in the form of investment rather than sold to 
them outright: ‘This is how machinery which is replaced in the hegemonic centers
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by more advanced technology is sent to dependent countries as capital for the 
installation of affiliates.’61
This ‘dependent structure’ obviously has effects on the productive structure 
within the LDCs. According to Dos Santos these are the need to conserve the 
agrarian or mining export sector, which results in the main centres of the country 
exploiting the backward areas such that: ‘the unequal and combined character of 
capitalist development at the international level is reproduced internally in an acute 
form’62; the industrial and technological structure that does emerge in the LDC is 
more responsive to the interests of the multinational corporations (MNCs) than the 
internal needs of the country63 and finally, the wholesale transfer of the 
technological and financial methods of the developed countries to the LDCs does 
not take into account their very different economies and causes a highly unequal 
productive structure to develop, with a high concentration of incomes and the 
under-utilisation of installed capacity.
Such a productive structure leads to a highly unequal distribution of income 
and high prices for industrial products which have been protected and subsidised by 
the government. It also limits the growth of the internal market. This is because the 
exploited labour force’s purchasing power has been reduced, few jobs are created 
in relation to the growth of the population because of the use of capital intensive 
methods in industrialisation, thereby limiting the generation of new sources of 
income. The profits which are sent abroad, carry away with them part of the 
economic surplus generated within the country. For all these reasons, the creation 
of basic national industries to establish markets for capital goods is limited.
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For Dos Santos, as for most other dependency theorists, dependency came 
about because of the way capitalism developed. Arguments that the development of 
the LDCs are stimulated by contact with foreign capital are, therefore, held to be 
erroneous. Indeed, Andre Gunder Frank termed the phrase ‘the development of 
underdevelopment’ to reinforce the idea that the LDCs became underdeveloped 
through their participation in the process of world capitalist development.64 
The structural influences generated by such contact have to be understood in terms 
of a metropolis-satellite relationship, according to Frank.65 The satellite state sucks 
economic surplus out of its own satellites and channels part of it to the world 
metropolis, of which they are all satellites. The national metropolis maintains the 
structure of monopoly and exploitation of the whole system. For Frank, it follows 
that the greatest economic development of the LDCs takes place when their ties to 
the metropolis are at their weakest such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico during the 
Depression and the Second World War. Conversely, the most underdeveloped 
nations are those that have had the strongest links with the metropolis in the past.
The language of ‘structure’ is used to show just how embedded this system of 
unequal exchange is, as well as to emphasise the impossibility of changing it 
through conventional measures, since the rulers of the LDCs share interests closer 
to those of the metropolis than their own populations. According to Baran, this is 
because the ‘bourgeoisie’ in the LDCs is underdeveloped having not been part of a 
capitalist structure; poor and fearful of socialist revolution: ‘they sought nothing 
but accommodation to the prevailing order’.66 The fear prompts such governments 
to ask for aid from abroad ‘in order to stave off the impending disaster’ and though
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such aid promotes some economic progress, it cannot bring about real development 
since that would require domestic changes at odds with the interests of the ruling 
classes. In effect, such aid reinforces those social and political systems which are 
hostile to development.
For Frank, development within the system has little meaning, while for Baran 
a certain, though basically ineffectual, measure is possible. Wallerstein regards 
development as a zero-sum game: ‘Of course some countries can develop. But the
(\* 7some that rise are at the expense of the others that decline’. All these writers share 
an extremely pessimistic view of the possibility of capitalist industrialisation in the 
LDCs. 68 Even the seemingly successful industrialising countries such as Japan and 
the south-east Asian ‘tigers’ are dependent on foreign markets for their exports.
Neo-classicists would find it hard to regard free trade as sinister. For them, 
dependence on market forces is not ‘bad’. A successfully industrialised country 
may ultimately achieve some form of self-reliance in the long-run but a certain 
degree of dependence is inevitable in the short-run; the extent of this dependency is 
determined, amongst other things, by the policy of the government and the 
relationship that it has with the economically advanced nations. Even the 
industrialised countries of the West began their industrialisation through a measure 
of dependent development. Gilpin writes: ‘Every developed country, including the 
United States and Japan is an example of dependent development and Japan 
remains a highly dependent country on foreign markets and raw material.’69 He 
argues further that a clear distinction must be made between dependence and 
underdevelopment and that it is a common mistake to assume the first causes the
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latter:
The less developed countries have a high degree of dependence and 
continue to be vulnerable precisely because they are underdeveloped. The 
lack of an effective and appropriate development strategy to overcome 
this situation is most important in holding them back. Their foremost 
problem is not external dependence but internal inefficiency.70
But for dependency theorists neither political nor economic independence 
can be gained through a process of capitalist industrialisation. Instead the LDCs 
need to cut themselves off from the industrialised world and pursue a non-capitalist 
road to industrialisation that would, of necessity, be autarkic. R.B. Sutcliffe, who 
advocated a similar strategy in his book, Industry and Underdevelopment, later 
dissented for two main reasons.71 Firstly, the example of Soviet industrialisation 
regarded by most dependency theorists as the model to be emulated by the LDCs, 
was based on certain political realities, namely, Stalinism:
I have always believed that in some sense Stalinism held back rather 
than advanced the development of the Soviet Union by imprisoning the 
creative endeavour of the majority of its citizens. But I do not think that 
means that economically the same process would have been possible in a 
more humane environment. The kind of nationalist industrialisation 
which took place in the Soviet Union in some ways required the politics 
which went with it.72
Hence, Sutcliffe argues, dependency theorists use socialism to bring about the 
separation of states from the international capitalist economy rather than as a means 
to establishing social justice. In this way, socialism as a euphemism for nationalism 
is debased. Secondly, the evidence of the 1960s and 70s showed that: ‘a form of 
industrialisation has been taking place in quite a widespread manner. But in many 
countries it is composed of different elements which are not homogenous and do
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not unambiguously represent economic modernisation’.73 Instead:
what seems to be happening is that modem industry is growing at high 
and rising productivity levels and at the same time small-scale, more 
primitive industry survives at low, possibly declining productivity levels, 
but provides a meagre living for a growing share of the people. What 
may be occurring therefore is a process of internal polarisation, one 
which is more complex and more extreme than I envisaged when writing 
Industry and Underdevelopment and one which is very different from 
what took place in the successful industrialisations of the past.74
What is important to note here is that industrialisation takes different forms 
and produces different results or effects. Dependency theorists, perhaps more than 
anyone else, have measured industrialisation in terms of their definition of 
economic development. But this is not helpful to an assessment of the degree of 
industrialisation in a country for two reasons.
Firstly, industry is only one (non-qualitative) input towards the search for 
economic development. Secondly, the characteristics of an economically 
developed society are not universally agreed upon, except in a very general sense. 
For dependency theorists, however, an economically developed society is a socialist 
one in which the distribution of income is fairly equal; for others it is the 
establishment of an extensive welfare state, for yet others it is a flourishing free 
market and ‘equal opportunities’ that count. The relative merits of each of these 
societies is not at issue here. What is at issue is that if industrialisation does not 
conform to one definition of economic development, then the proponents of that 
definition may discount completely what industrialisation has taken place. The 
extracts from Sutcliffe illustrate this; industrialisation in the LDCs has not resulted 
in a fairer distribution of wealth and therefore (since industrialisation is being
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measured in these terms), that which has taken place has not been recognised by the 
dependency theorists. This is the danger, then, of judging a value-free concept such 
as industrialisation, in terms of qualitative results. In a nutshell, industrialisation 
without development is possible.
Is it really the case, though, that industrialisation can be regarded as a value- 
free concept? It is necessary here to distinguish between industrialisation as a 
means to an end and industrialisation as an end in itself. The lesson of dependency 
theory is that when measuring the degree to which a country is industrialised or the 
success of a certain industrialisation strategy, the industrial sector needs to be 
judged solely on its achievement of the quantitative objectives set for it. For this 
purpose industrialisation has to be seen as an end in itself. It is here too, that the 
strategy adopted needs to be considered since this determines the form that the 
industrialisation process takes.
It is clearly the case, though, that when a country decides to industrialise, it is 
not industrialising for industrialisation’s sake, but because there are certain goals it 
assumes industry will help to attain. It is at this point that industrialisation becomes 
a means to an end. But to what end is industry to be the sole means?
From what has been said about the goals of industrialisation, the ends in 
question are both economic and social. The attainment of the economic ends 
depends not only on the industrial sector but also on the other sectors of the 
economy and the strategy adopted. By itself, industry cannot achieve economic 
growth and industrial progress depends on all-round progress in the economy.75
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According to UNIDO:
It is essential to recognize that, while the industrial sector may be the 
most dynamic sector in the economy, the way to industrialisation and thus 
to the transformation of society and the fulfilment of social and economic 
objectives is very long indeed and involves a highly complex process. 
Furthermore, industry does not operate in a vacuum. If development is to 
entail the transformation of a present economic structure into another 
characterized by higher efficiency, diversification of output and social 
justice, the role of industry, although certainly central, is just one of many 
complementary roles to be played by all sectors. This is a crucial point to 
remember, since industrialization has been regarded so far by many 
developing countries as a separate effort.. .76
In broad terms, the economic ends of industrialisation are the means by 
which a country acquires wealth. What a country then does with this wealth is 
usually seen as the social objective of industrialisation. Put in this way, it should be 
clear that industrialisation has little to do with social equality, well-balanced 
regional development or even higher levels of employment. It is government policy 
which, over and above everything else, affects these things. Therefore, the success 
or failure of realising social objectives cannot be a reflection of the strength of 
industry in a country.
The policy of the government towards industrialisation might affect these 
things but this is different from saying that industrialisation has caused this or that 
social phenomenon. For example, a government may decide to build a factory in 
the countryside in order to increase employment opportunities there and to stem the 
flow of workers to overcrowded cities. It may also hope that this will also bring 
about a better distribution of wealth in the country. But the factory’s success would 
have to be measured as an end in itself, i.e., in quantitative terms. It would be 
incorrect to base its success on the numbers of workers it employed (output might
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be just as high with half the number of workers intended for it by the government), 
or on the continued tide of workers to the cities (population growth could be at ever 
increasing rates). Similarly its success cannot be gauged in terms of the living 
standards of those resident in the same area (managers of the factory might be 
living well at the expense of the workers).
The attainment of the social objectives is a byproduct of a successful 
industrialisation strategy. If the social objectives are of over-riding concern, it may 
be the case that industrialisation is not the best way of attaining these. Or it may be 
that the establishment of heavy industry or a rapid pace of industrialisation are not 
suitable and that a policy of small-scale industrialisation implemented gradually 
might be more successful. The strategy adopted, then, is of overwhelming 
importance to the success or failure of industrialisation policy and must always be 
considered regardless of whether industrialisation is being considered as an end in 
itself or as a means to an end. As noted by Paul Streeten:
The disenchantment with industrialization in recent writings and speech 
is based on a confusion: it is a disenchantment with the form that 
economic growth has taken in some developing countries and with the 
distribution of its benefits...Much of the recent criticism of inefficient, 
high-cost industrialization behind high walls of protection and 
quantitative restrictions should be directed at the types of product and of 
technique which cater for a highly unequal income distribution and reflect 
entrenched vested interests. It is in no way a criticism of industrialization 
for the needs of the people.77
To conclude, dependency theory holds that many developing countries have 
found that to arrive at some form of self-reliance through industrialisation, they 
need the help of the economically wealthy countries. Such assistance can take the 
form of economic aid, technical assistance and training and foreign investment.
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This has led to a situation in which the process of industrialisation creates new 
forms of dependency on the industrially-developed world - instead of being 
suppliers of raw materials, the LDCs become consumers of imported technology. 
While remaining economically dependent, an industrialising LDC often develops 
cultural dependencies too which may be at variance with its indigenous culture. 
Even if a country pursues a successful industrialising policy, it will be dependent 
on the world economy through the need to trade, the argument goes. Only countries 
such as the US, the former Soviet Union and China, which have a resource base 
large enough for a basically autarkic manufacturing sector, can hope to be properly 
self-reliant. The south east Asian newly-industrialising countries, which are 
export-oriented, are dependent on foreign markets for their goods.
The broader political context is of crucial importance in understanding the 
forces operating behind a development strategy and may provide the reason for the 
success or failure of the same strategy operating in countries under similar 
economic but different political conditions. As we shall see in Iran’s case, political 
considerations, chiefly of a geo-strategic nature, distorted the pattern of 
development and were of extreme importance in hastening not only economic but 
also, political disaster. First, however, we must consider the processes by
which industrialisation is achieved.
2.9 Contending strategies o f industrialisation: import-substitution and export- 
orientation
In 1960, Hollis Chenery published what became a very influential paper in which
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he sought to establish patterns of industrial growth through the use of multiple 
regression techniques.78 Chenery focused on the similarities in the pattern of 
growth while also revealing ‘the substantial variation that exists and the need to 
separate particular from universal factors’.79 Chenery found a fairly uniform pattern 
in the change of production and imports of industrial products as income rises. 
Most importantly, Chenery reversed the assumption that changes in demand were 
the main cause of industrial growth, showing instead that supply changes were far 
more crucial:
Changes in supply conditions resulting in relative factor costs as income 
rises, cause a substitution of domestic production for imports and, to a 
lesser extent, of factory goods for handicraft goods and services. These 
supply changes are more important in explaining the growth of industry 
than are the changes in demand.80
Chenery identified three causes of industrial growth. The most important was 
the substitution of domestic production for imports, which Chenery claimed 
accounted for 50 per cent of industrialisation. The other two causes were the 
growth in final use of industrial products and the growth in intermediate demand 
stemming from the above two causes. Import substitution (IS) was defined as the 
difference between growth in output with no change in the import ratio and the 
actual growth. Thus:
leading sectors are likely to be industries in which import substitution 
becomes profitable as markets expand and capital and skills are acquired. 
Even in Japan, the most successful of the low-income countries in 
increasing industrial exports, import substitution accounted for nearly 40 
per cent of the rise of industry (from 23 per cent of GNP to 33 per cent 
between 1914 and 1954) as compared to less than 10 per cent for 
exports.81
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Chenery’s results confirmed what many LDCs had experienced - high rates of 
growth while choosing ISI. His work unleashed a debate that continues to this day 
about the merits or otherwise of IS as an industrialisation strategy compared to 
export-oriented industrialisation. Some writers believed Chenery was wrong to
89assume that IS was a cause of such growth, rather than simpler a concomitant 
while others disagreed with Chenery’s definition of IS and questioned the validity 
of the results of the multiple regression analysis as a whole.83
Certainly some of the debate on the success of ISI has hinged on its definition. 
In broad terms, import substitution can be defined as the domestic production of 
that which would otherwise have been imported. Countries close their market to 
imports of manufactured capital and consumer goods through a range of 
protectionist measures and through investment supported by tariffs and subsidies to 
substitute domestically-manufactured goods for those which would have been 
imported. The difficulty arises in trying to assess what would otherwise have been 
imported. If the same composition and level of goods would have been imported, 
then IS becomes a measure for the decline in quantity of imports. But there is no 
reason why a country should not produce some of the goods which it would 
otherwise have imported while importing an increased number of other goods 
instead.
Another definition used by Chenery was that import substitution had occurred 
when there was an increased share of domestic production relative to total supply. 
The drawback with this measure is that since it seeks to aggregate, it cannot 
describe very accurately the effect of IS policies on specific industries, nor the
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efficacy of individual IS policies, such as the level of investment. One way of 
measuring the success of an IS policy is to take into account the aims of that policy 
and, if possible, to make a selection of the industries concerned and take a relative 
measure for each of these.
IS was the dominant form of industrialisation until the mid-60s when growth 
rates began to decline in ISI countries.85 The central criticism of import 
substitution, about which so much has been written, is that it encourages industrial 
growth up to a point but then the danger of fostering infant industries through 
protection emerges - they never grow up because the lack of competition renders 
them inefficient and costly. The success of export-oriented policies, particularly of 
the south-east Asian countries have provided an alternative model, although recent 
debate has tended to focus on the interdependence of the two seemingly distinct 
policies. In their attempt to explain the slowdown, development economists split 
the ISI process into different stages and argued that the longer ISI continued, the 
more inefficient it became.
Writing about Latin America in 1966, Celso Furtado observed, ‘there is a 
general consciousness of living through a period of decline. The phase of “easy” 
development, through increasing exports of primary products or through import 
substitution has everywhere been exhausted’.86 The phase of ‘easy’ development 
refers to the primary stage of IS, which is the replacement of an existing market for 
(usually non-durable) consumption goods, such as textiles, shoes and household 
goods by domestic production. It is called ‘easy’ because cutting down on imports 
is not difficult, especially if there is a balance of payments deficit.87 In fact, a
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necessary course of action can later be described as a strategy for growth. This led 
Albert Hirschman to draw a distinction between the reasons behind the 
implementation of IS:
It is useful to keep in mind these distinct origins of ISI - wars, balance- 
of-payments difficulties, growth of the domestic market (as a result of 
export growth) and official development policy - in focusing on the 
distinctive characteristics of the process.88
Whatever the initial impulse behind IS, a fairly uniform pattern is followed in 
the initial stages whereby, if necessary, the materials for the consumer goods are 
imported and manufactured at home, while the finished good itself is no longer 
imported. The changes in factor supply and the increase in demand89 then lead to a 
boom period (as many LDCs experienced in the 1950s) but after a while, it 
becomes difficult to sustain the same rate of momentum so that the growth rate of 
output declines to that of consumption.
Another stimulus is then needed, and if the IS strategy is to be continued, it 
involves extending production backwards to durable consumer goods, intermediate 
goods and, eventually, capital goods. This is known as second-stage IS and it has 
proved far more difficult to implement, causing, at least in part, the general 
disillusionment with IS.
The more general reasons for the difficulties of forming such backward 
linkages are fairly well-established. Unlike primary stage IS, the production of 
intermediate goods is far more capital-intensive and requires a greater amount of 
skilled labour. The whole enterprise is therefore more expensive than in the ‘easy’
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stage, since the cost of producing intermediate goods domestically is higher relative 
to their import costs than with consumer goods. Economies of scale, market size 
and the degree of horizontal and vertical specialisation all have a greater part to 
play in second-stage IS. For some writers, the distortions caused by primary-stage 
IS are so great that it becomes almost impossible to implement the second stage.90
The World Bank in the late 1970s recognised that the process of ISI gave rise 
to vested interests which would resist change. The trick was to get the timing right 
by nimbly jumping from ISI to export-orientation before it was too late:
The Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Singapore switched to 
export promotion relatively early in the industrialization process....Many 
other countries, recognizing the limitations of prolonged reliance on 
import substitution, have also redressed, at least partially, a bias against 
exports. Their experience suggests that the transition to more outward- 
looking trade policies increases in difficulty with the duration and extent 
of import-substitution policies. Countries that are in the preliminary 
phases of import-substitution are well advised to initiate their policy 
transition before the emergence of politically vocal and strongly 
entrenched vested interests.91
The importance of the political context was also recognised by Hirschman who 
argued that the loss of momentum towards the end of the import-substitution of 
consumer goods was not so much due to the size of the market and of economic 
plants, as many critics of IS argue, but rather: ‘it appears instead that the difficulties 
that may well dog the backward linkage process are to a considerable extent a 
matter of economic environments and policies, instead of being determined 
exclusively by objective quantities’.92
If, for example, an industry’s output is heavily protected and its inputs subject to
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low tariffs, profits will be fairly high. Any attempt to manufacture domestically 
rather then import the inputs will mean a reduction in profits. In this way, 
industrialists can oppose further industrialisation. Similar socio-political constraints 
exist when considering how to encourage exports during the IS phase. Hirschman 
asks:
why not tax the export sector, subsidize the new industries and do away 
with the overvalued exchange rate so that industrial exports are 
encouraged? To ask this question is to answer it: in most Latin American 
countries such a course would have been politically impossible. . .
Viewed in this way, the inability to export manufactures appears as the 
price which had to be paid for building up an industrial sector under 
adverse sociopolitical conditions.93
As we shall see in Iran, ISI benefited a privileged industrialist class which the 
Shah co-opted for political reasons. We will argue that the political economy of 
implementing ISI in Iran contributed to the disappointing results. For advocates of 
free trade, however, issues of government intervention and protectionism vindicate 
their scepticism about ISI. The argument was put succinctly by Little, Scott and 
Scitovsky, writing in 1970:
Given the disadvantages of present policies, including the distortions 
caused by import restrictions, the inefficiency of government intervention 
and controls, and the bias against agriculture and exports, we believe that 
developing countries would benefit from adopting, in general, a more 
decentralized approach with greater use of the price mechanism; and, in 
particular, given that there are good prospects for exports, a more open 
approach to foreign trade with less protection and use of controls. We 
believe that such an approach is both consistent with sufficient 
industrialization, and conducive to much more efficient 
industrialization.94
But the free rein of market forces and liberal trade policies have proved too 
simplistic an explanation of the success of the export-oriented economies. Debate
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on the strategy of industrialisation has centered firstly, on the fact that many export- 
oriented countries initially underwent a period of import-substitution, which raises 
the question of whether it is possible to separate the two processes. Secondly, the 
experience of the most successful export-oriented countries, including South 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore showed that government intervention was 
instrumental in fostering the process, which has led some economists to try to 
distinguish between ‘good’ forms of intervention and ‘bad’.95 Let us briefly 
examine these points.
Alice Amsden has argued there has been a tendency to understate the 
importance of import-substitution by measuring incorrectly the division of output 
between import substitution and domestic demand and exports.96 If:
exporting of a particular industry or product does not begin at once but, 
instead, begins after a time-lag, the length of which varies with 
technology and other factors and the policy supports of which appear 
indistinguishable from those associated with ‘import-substitution’, the 
policy regime necessary to stimulate exports is more complex than 
market-oriented economists would allow.97
The East Asians fared better than Latin America possibly because they had 
emphasised for a longer period both import-substitution and exports and not one or 
the other which the Latin Americans tended to do. The East Asian case (both North 
and South) supports the view that export-led growth and import-substitution are not 
two separate strategies but rather an organic, inseparable whole. Many East Asian 
countries had a long gestation period under state promotion; exporting did not 
begin immediately after the industry was established, argues Amsden. Moreover, 
given the reputation of ISI as encouraging inefficiency, how was it that Thailand
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became export-oriented so readily? This was mainly because government subsidies 
were allocated in exchange for performance, which encouraged business discipline. 
A policy of ISI does not have to result in inefficiency if well implemented, she says.
The lesson for other countries from East Asia’s trade and industrial policy 
is not necessarily to abandon subsidized import-substitution - otherwise 
exports may fail to become more diversified and knowledge-and capital- 
intensive. Instead the lesson is to subject every import-substitution 
industry to various forms of discipline, including possibly some export 
target, however modest.98
Singer and Alizadeh have also argued that the two seemingly opposed 
industrialisation theories go hand-in-hand: ‘IS was often needed to provide the 
necessary volume basis for competitive export promotion. Seen in this light, IS and 
export-promotion are complementary rather than alternative strategies.’99 But they 
also argue that there are lessons to be learnt from past mistakes:
Any new domestically-oriented industrialisation strategy must pay more 
attention to monetary, price and balance of trade and payments 
implications than the old ISI did. It must also encourage exports more. In 
other words, it must be a synthesis of the old ISI and the more recent EOI, 
both of which have proved to be flawed, at least in the case of Latin 
America; more a move forward to something new than a return to the old.
In this sense also, the debate between the proposals of ISI and EOI as 
exclusive alternatives is dangerously misleading. We need ISIEOI, a 
strategy which combines the best elements of both and utilises the 
complementarities of the two.100
Indeed the experience of South Korea, the country routinely held up as the 
most spectacular success story in the region, shows the process was not to stop 
import-substitution and then begin export-orientation, as had previously been 
thought. According to Eprime Eshag, the effect of presenting Korea’s industrial 
development after 1960 as growth through export promotion after a period of
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import-substitution gives: ‘the somewhat misleading impression that after 1960, the 
government consciously abandoned the policy of import substitution in favour of 
export promotion.’ Instead, the authorities were far more pragmatic:
within their overall strategy of rapid industrial development through 
industrialisation, seems to have been one of industrial diversification.
This resulted in a significant degree of import substitution but also 
necessitated a high rate of growth of exports primarily due to the relative 
size of the internal market and the lack of natural resources in Korea. In 
other words, the success of the above strategy depended on the growth of 
exports, or on the adoption of an outward-looking strategy, because of the 
need to finance the inevitable growth of imports and exploit the 
economies of scale in some industries.101
Recent literature on industrialisation has been more sympathetic then to 
import-substitution, which had fallen sharply out of fashion with the resurgence of 
neo-liberal free trade economics. Import-substitution is as valid a development 
strategy as export-orientation - indeed it can be regarded as part of the same 
strategy. It was appropriate to Iran, which unlike South Korea and Taiwan, had a 
large population and enjoyed adequate raw materials and energy resources. Size, 
according to the World Bank, does matter in ISI: ‘At a given level of average 
income, large countries such as Brazil and Turkey, which rely predominantly on 
domestic markets, have tended to attain higher levels of industrialization than small
109nations, which rely more on international trade for their development.’
2.10 The role o f government: intervention and economic planning
The experience of the export-oriented countries has shown that government in 
south-east Asia did not leave industrialisation to market forces and free trade but 
intervened, often extensively. To have succeeded otherwise would have been 
remarkable. All the major industrial powers, with the exception of Britain adopted
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protectionist policies in the early stages of their industrialisation. This includes 
France, Germany, the US and Japan. Britain was the first country to industrialise in 
the late eighteenth century and, since it enjoyed a comparative advantage in 
manufacturing, did not need to adopt a protectionist policy.
In trying to explain the reasons for the success of south-east Asia, neo- 
classicists - who have always acknowledged that government intervention is 
justified when free markets fail - have tended to focus on the extent of intervention 
and types of intervention.103 In general, the more limited the intervention and the 
more transparent the controls, the better, they argue.104 However, recent debate has 
recognised the importance of socio-political factors in explaining why some 
governments have a better record of intervention than others. In their attempt to 
explain why the fastest-growing economies of recent decades are concentrated in 
East Asia, Leipziger and Thomas conclude that:
it was not more government that had a positive effect, it was better 
government. East Asia makes a case neither for a laissez-faire approach to 
economic policymaking nor a heavy hand on the tiller. The crucial factor 
was the way that governments supported markets in helping to unleash 
entrepreneurship.10
The authors, however, appear perplexed as to why some governments are good and 
some bad: ‘Development economics lacks an adequate theory of why good 
government policy, combining economics, political organization, and technocratic 
decision making, is pursued by some countries and not others.’106 To which the 
answer, were it not presumptuous, would have to be - to invert the quotation - ‘It’s 
politics, stupid.’
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The government in many LDCs represents or conditions the interests of groups 
on whose support it depends. Policy-makers, the administration and industrialists 
come to represent a certain class and seek to further the interests of that class by 
drawing from their own members for employment in the administration. Where 
there is lack of political accountability, corruption and venality, governments will 
pay lip service to the goals of industrialisation and the broader aims of development 
but subjugate these objectives to that of remaining in power. Iran’s industrialisation 
process was fashioned by the internal politics and geopolitical obsessions of an 
unaccountable and autocratic government. This, as we shall see, distorted the 
industrialisation process and ended eventually in political upheaval and revolution. 
As the World Bank acknowledged in 1997: ‘Good government is not a luxury - it is 
a vital necessity for development.’107 Bad government will always be the greatest 
obstacle to the implementation of, if not good, at least appropriate policies. It is as 
much, if not more, responsible for the success of a strategy of industrialisation as 
the soundness of the economic doctrine underlying it. This was clearly recognised 
by Eshag:
.... we nevertheless believe that in most LDCs the policies pursued by 
governments themselves are to a large extent responsible for their slow 
rate of development, as indicated by their growth of production and the 
pattern of investment. In other words, we maintain that the failure of the 
authorities to give the development objective the high priority it deserves, 
has played an important part in their low rate of development in relation 
to their potential.108
One important role for government in fostering industrialisation has been 
through national economic planning. When Soviet-style centralised planning 
appeared successful, it influenced the uptake of development planning in LDCs. In 
the post-colonial era, many governments of newly-independent states regarded a
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development plan as a sign of national prestige, in much the same way as an airline 
or national flag. It was also thought that the government was best placed to provide 
the co-ordinating function and drive necessary for economic development.
Typically, planning took the form of drawing up a strategy and targets for the 
development of the economy, usually over a five-year period. Such planning also 
met with the approval of the World Bank. In the post-Second World War period 
international lending agencies were happier to provide loans to countries with 
economic plans. According to the World Bank’s 1949-50 Annual Report, member 
countries: ‘know too, that if they formulate a well-balanced economic development 
program based on the [Bank] Mission’s recommendations, the Bank will stand 
ready to help them carry out the programme by financing appropriate 
projections.’109 But national economic planning, like import-substitution 
industrialisation, has fallen out of fashion. This is partly due to the collapse of the 
centrally-planned economies of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. The demise 
of the Soviet Union revealed an economy more akin to that of a developing country 
than a superpower. The poor economic record of many state-dominated economies, 
whether capitalist or socialist, in the developing world has also contributed to the 
fall from grace of economic planning. Economists are divided, however, over 
whether it is ineffectual or corrupt governments which are at fault or the planning 
mechanism itself.
In a review of planning in developing countries during the post-War period, 
Balassa found that planning failed to have favourable economic effects and this 
contributed to its demise in the 1980s. ‘This decline may be explained by the lack
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of success of planning and by the growing understanding of the importance of 
incentives and markets. An important aspect of increased reliance on incentives and 
markets is participation in the international division of labor that conflicts with 
planning. At the same time, participation in the international division of labor 
brings important benefits in increasing total factor productivity and thereby 
contributing to economic growth.’110 Balassa, who believes in the superiority of 
private enterprise over public enterprise, argues the state’s planning role should be 
confined to public sector investment in infrastructure as an aid to the private sector.
Ramgopal Agarwala is also sceptical about the role of planning, but notes that 
the degree of success achieved by planning is difficult to assess:
The lack of adherence to targets is not necessarily an indicator of failure 
because change in circumstances might have made the departure from 
targets desirable, hi fact, in the successful cases of development, such as 
Japan, plans were neither detailed nor rigorously adhered to. Strictly 
speaking, the only valid criterion for judging the impact of plans is 
whether the performance would have been better or worse in the absence 
of plans, and that is obviously difficult to assess.111
Nevertheless he concludes that in most developing countries, planning failed to live 
up to expectations. Typical problems are a weak database, a shortage of trained 
staff, inadequate co-operation between the planning agency and other ministries 
and poor links with the budgeting and evaluation process. More serious are 
technical, political and administrative problems.112
Agarwala believes that the experience of those countries with the best 
planning record - in east Asia and south east Asia - shows the importance of 
combining planning for the public sector with the avoidance of price distortions in
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the economy as a whole. Nevertheless he concludes that the planning machinery 
need not be abandoned but reorientated towards new goals. These include: greater 
emphasis on streamlining the incentive system rather than on preparing blueprints 
for development and sectoral investment and output targets; co-ordination and 
consultation both within government and in the private sector, and programming 
public investment instead of national investment.
If planning has ‘failed’, however, this may be due more to the nature of 
government than the method itself. The removal of controls and the reliance on the 
market mechanism in the former USSR has not led to a substantial improvement in 
the economy. This could indicate that economic stagnation before the fall of 
communism had more to do with the corruption of the Communist party and its 
bureaucracy than the instrument of planning. Following Kalecki113, Eshag argues 
that development planning is essential in order to stimulate development:
the formulation of a meaningful and coherent policy for the allocation of 
investment resources can only take place within the framework of a 
development plan. Such a plan should give at least a broad indication of 
the projected movements in the volume and pattern of production and 
demand, as well as the requirement for productive capacities, including 
raw materials and labour.11
The extent of the role of the state in development is thus still the subject of 
debate but there is no doubt that it has an essential part to play. According to the 
World Bank: ‘An effective state is vital for the provision of the goods and services 
- and the rules and institutions - that allow markets to flourish and people to 
healthier, happier lives. Without it, sustainable development, both economic and 
social is impossible.’ 115 However the Bank argues that instead of the state acting as
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the direct provider of growth, its role should be that of a catalyst, partner or 
facilitator of development. Experience has shown the damage that can be done by 
bad governments:
Governments embarked on fanciful schemes. Private investors, lacking 
confidence in public policies or in the steadfastness of rulers, held back. 
Powerful rulers acted arbitrarily. Corruption became endemic. 
Development faltered and poverty endured.’116
As we shall see, much of this held true in Iran during the Shah’s autocratic 
rule.
2.11 Balanced growth and big push strategies
Balanced growth can refer either to a simultaneous expansion of a set of industries 
or it can refer to such an expansion between agriculture and the industrial sector. 
The big push theory, first advocated by Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, concerns a 
sustained investment effort as a prerequisite of getting industrialisation off the 
ground: ‘Proceeding “bit by bit” will not add up in its effects to the sum total of 
the single bits. A minimum quantum of investment is a necessary, though not 
sufficient, condition of success. This, in a nutshell, is the contention of the theory 
of the big push’. 117
However, as Auty has noted, although sound theoretical arguments can be 
mounted in defence of a big push, ‘implementation has always been the Achilles
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heel of that strategy’. Auty has developed a macroeconomic model of the 
consequences of a big push in heavy and chemical industry development.119 This 
suggests that a construction boom to build these industries triggers inflation and 
fiscal and trade imbalances, which require macro stabilization just as the long-
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gestation heavy and chemical industries come onstream. The resulting deflation 
depresses domestic demand, shrinking the scope for heavy and chemical industry 
plants’ higher-margin domestic sales. Provided the stabilization policy is effective 
and the industrial projects soundly implemented, the performance of the industries 
will rebound as the economy recovers. But in a country pursuing an autarkic 
industrial policy - stressing economic self-sufficiency over the efficient allocation 
of resources - stabilisation will not be effective and economic performance will be 
severely impaired.120
Big push theory is relevant to the case of Iran because the fourfold rise in oil 
prices in December 1973 gave the Shah the economic resources with which to 
initiate a fast-track route to industrialisation. But successful industrialisation also 
requires substantial and efficient investment in supporting infrastructure - 
something which did not adequately accompany Iran’s big push drive, as we shall 
see, and its absence contributed instead to much of the economic and political 
turmoil which followed the oil price hike. In addition, the sudden abundance of 
investment funds can allow money to be wasted, such that a pattern emerges: ‘The 
resource curse theory suggests that a favourable resource endowment may be 
squandered through the pursuit of less prudent policies than would be practical in a 
more resource-constrained country.’121
The Shah was not unusual in having dramatically increased public spending 
after the oil windfall. In fact all the oil-exporting countries followed a similar 
strategy. But very soon the boom had turned into bust and their economies showed 
classic symptoms of ‘Dutch disease’ - whereby favourable price changes in one
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sector of the economy cause distress in other sectors. In a valuable study, Terry 
Lynn Karl has provided an explanation of why the oil-exporters, which benefitted 
from such a large transfer of wealth, followed a development path which led to 
economic deterioration and political decay.122 Iran is the example par excellence. 
Nowhere else were the political consequences of the economic effects of the oil 
windfall so dramatic, ending in revolution just five years after the oil price rise.
Karl argues that dependence on oil shapes a state’s political institutions, its 
framework for decision-making and the decision path of policymakers:
Similar disappointing macroeconomic and political outcomes in nations 
as widely disparate as Iran and Venezuela can best be explained as the 
result of a common condition created by the interaction of commodities, 
booms and states. Oil booms seem to promise the opportunity for real 
choice and for the alteration of a development trajectory. But when they 
occur in countries with a legacy of oil-led development, especially a 
decision-making apparatus dependent on petrodollars, choice is in fact 
quite narrow. Regardless of the other alternatives available, booms 
generate powerful and even overwhelming incentives to sustain existing 
trajectories but on a grander, more accelerated, and ultimately 
unmanageable scale. Thus they are the catalyst for further trouble.’123
Under Karl’s analysis, the pattern is as follows. Citing Hirschman,124 Karl 
finds that the petro-state generates few forward and backward links with the 
economy. Oil technology is capital-intensive, so its inputs have to be imported. 
Fiscal linkages encourage overvalued exchange rates which promote a reliance on 
imports and inhibit the development of agriculture or industrial activity. The oil 
sector is characterised by low employment generation, employing only between 1-2 
per cent of the workforce and, because of the large capital and technological 
resources necessary to exploit the mineral, foreign oil companies become dominant 
internally in the oil exporting country. Oil revenues pour into the state and not
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private enterprise so an oil price rise enhances considerably the role of the public 
sector. Because oil rents are captured by linking up with the state, business, the 
middle class, organized interests, firms and individuals all search for political 
influence in order to gain economically:
their share of oil rents depends on chasing after state patronage, high 
tariff barriers, cheap imports, profitable contracts, and subsidies. These 
goals are powerful incentives for them to form tight links with politicians 
and bureaucrats in order to offer favors for benefits received. Such rent 
seeking, of course, is a classic formula for corruption, which in itself 
raises new demands. It is also the antithesis of the efficient market 
mechanisms and productive economic decision-making necessary to 
create a self-sustaining productive base separate from petroleum.125
Given the access to easy revenues from oil, governments of petro-states do not 
seek to supplement their income through taxation. But with no link between 
domestic taxation and state-building, petro-states generally lack the ability to 
establish distinct public institutions with some autonomy from civil society:
The petro-state is more dependent on a single commodity than any other 
state and the exploitation of this commodity is more depletable, more 
capital-intensive, more enclave-oriented, and more rent-producing than 
the exploitation of any other commodity.126
In an oil boom, petro-states find it impossible to absorb their surplus, even by 
generating new public-sector projects. While facing the impending threat of 
massive inflation, they reach for capital-intensive and long-gestation projects. The 
boom creates new demands from state and civil society and the state, inefficient 
and unable to cut down on expansionist public sector programmes, faces growing 
budget and trade deficits and foreign debt. The illusion of independence is created 
but, in fact, the oil exporter becomes even more dependent on petro-dollars. When
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oil prices finally drop - as oil-importers become more fuel-efficient or new entrants 
come to the market - the boom quickly turns into the basis for a bust. ‘This is the 
paradox of plenty. But it is not inevitable,’ concludes Karl, who argues that if 
petro-states try to build state capacity through diversified tax structures, 
professionalised civil services and more representative and equitable institutions, 
they can break out of the vicious cycle of petro-development and avoid economic 
deterioration and political decay.127
Auty has also found that resource-rich countries are tempted to grow out of 
their development difficulties through a state-engineered big push. But unless 
carefully managed, expansion outstrips domestic absorptive capacity, triggering 
inflation, fiscal repression and a growth collapse. Once again, misallocation of 
resources is dependent on the development of strong institutions.128
Rosenstein-Rodan linked the theories of big push and balanced development 
together to produce a strategy based on a big push towards balanced growth but the 
two need not necessarily be connected. Some writers have altered Rosenstein- 
Rodan’s original big push theory to apply to agriculture instead of industry, arguing 
that the indivisibilities on which his theory rested, are present and even more 
crucial in agriculture.129 Rosenstein-Rodan’s main concern was to show ‘why the 
whole of the industry to be created is to be treated and planned like one huge firm 
or trust’.130 This necessitated the state taking on the bulk of investment and 
planning large-scale industrialisation based on the complementarity of different 
industries: ‘The planned creation of such a complementary system reduces the risk 
of not being able to sell, and, since risk can be considered as cost, it reduces costs.
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111It is in this sense a special case of ‘external economies’.
The logic of the argument is based on taking advantage of external economies 
and recognising where they exist. Howard Ellis challenged the importance that 
Rosenstein-Rodan attached to external economies, arguing instead that far from 
being significant, in most developing countries they are negligible.132 Following 
Jacob Viner, he favoured foreign trade as the means by which a developing country 
could take advantage of the more substantial economies open to them on world 
markets.133 In fact, the real disagreement stems from differing views on the role of 
the state in the economy.134
Apart from the gains to be had from external economies, Rosenstein-Rodan
argued that the indivisibilities from which they stemmed, required a high initial
1
investment in order to make way for additional directly productive investments.
As well as recognising the overwhelming importance of infrastructure to a 
successful industrialisation strategy, Rosenstein-Rodan saw the necessity of a well- 
equipped industrial labour force, hence: ‘The first task of industrialisation is to 
provide for training and “skilling” of labour which is to transform Eastern
1 i / r
European peasants into full-time or part-time industrial workers’. This very 
nearly constitutes a ‘prerequisite’ for industrialisation and taken with the emphasis 
on infrastructure, it can be seen that the big push is the attempt to establish
117conditions under which an industrialisation programme might succeed. It is not 
simply a question of pumping large sums of money into and across a set of 
industries and expecting them to function efficiently.
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Like Rosenstein-Rodan, Ragnar Nurske regarded balanced growth as the 
simultaneous expansion of a number of manufacturing industries.138 He regarded it 
as a means of accelerated growth - ‘As a way of escape from slowness if not from 
stagnation, the balanced growth principle envisages autonomous advance along a 
number of lines more or less simultaneously.’ 139 Capital-intensive methods of 
establishing and running industries were to be preferred to those which were 
labour-intensive. Why?
The answer is obvious. As an adaption to existing circumstances, 
including the existing factor proportions, the pursuit of labor-intensive 
production methods with a view of economizing capital may be perfectly 
correct. But the study of economic development must concern itself with 
changing these circumstances, not accepting them as they are. What is 
wanted is progress, not simply adaption to present conditions. And 
progress depends largely on the use of capital, which in turn depends on 
adequate and growing markets, which in the absence of a strongly rising 
world demand for the country’s exports means a diversified output 
expansion for domestic use.140
Unlike Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurske did not believe that balanced growth necessarily 
implied government planning or large scale investment by the government. Instead, 
balanced growth was relevant to a private enterprise system and Nurske applied the 
concept to economic development with unlimited supplies of capital, where the 
main problem might be demand for capital rather than increased supplies of capital. 
It should be mentioned that Nurske recognised the importance of a balance between 
agricultural productivity and industry so that both sectors could move forward 
otherwise the passivity of one would slow down the growth of the other. He also 
warned against a too literal interpretation of balanced growth:
Producing a little of everything is not the key to progress. The case for
balanced growth is concerned with establishing a pattern of mutually
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supporting investments over a range of industries wide enough to 
overcome the frustration of isolated advance in order precisely to create a 
forward momentum of growth.141
There have been many critics of balanced growth, many of whom argue from a 
position which they regard as more ‘realistic’, either historically or prescriptively. 
Thus Hughes has argued that the history of successful industrial growth has not 
been on the basis of balanced growth.142 Instead, as Rostow has also argued, 
leading industrial sectors pushed ahead and, with the help of technological 
breakthroughs, opened up new markets.143 Some industries do lag behind, but their 
performance is made up for by the dominant industries which carry the economy 
along with them. Since change is always occurring, no given set of industries have 
been responsible for growth and thus, industrial development cannot be said to 
depend on, or even be aided by, a defined industrial structure.
Aside from historical argument, critics point to the difficulties LDCs would 
have both in acquiring the requisite amounts of capital and skilled labour to attain 
balanced investment over a large number of industries. Furthermore, Hirschman 
argues that unbalanced growth can bring about a higher rate of growth and 
development than can balanced growth, precisely because of imbalances which 
would set up stimuli and pressures conducive to the taking of investment decisions:
Our aim must be to keep alive rather than eliminate the disequilibria of 
which profits and losses are symptoms in a competitive economy. If the 
economy is to be kept moving ahead, the task of development policy is to 
maintain tensions, disproportions, and disequilibria.144
Though Hirschman’s discussion of the economic environment of investment
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attitudes is valuable, it is unclear how much imbalance is desirable and where to 
create these imbalances. While imbalance may create desirable attitudes, an 
unbalanced economy may not be the most suitable form of development for any 
given LDC. Again, the individual characteristics of the country in question are 
important: ‘No general formula will serve. The correct division often cuts across 
these categories. The question is what combination of resource policy, reform of 
attitudes (including “incentives”) and of legal, social and cultural institutions is 
necessary in a particular situation.’145
A balanced growth in the economy, especially in the areas of agriculture and 
industry, is highly desirable, as is some sort of regional balance. This does not 
imply the same rates of growth, but rather an appropriate ratio, by which one sector 
does not slow down to the extent of acting as a brake on the growth of the other 
sector. The means by which this balance is to be achieved may well be through a 
policy of imbalanced investment.
2.12 The role o f agriculture
Industrialising countries have faced a common conundrum in deciding how to 
support industrialisation without discouraging agriculture. As far back as 1950, W. 
Arthur Lewis argued for the complementarity of industry and agriculture in a 
discussion on the West Indies. ‘The creation of new industries is an essential part 
of a programme for agricultural achievement. This is not generally realized. There 
are still people who discuss industrialisation as if it were an alternative to 
agricultural improvement’. 146 And in the early 1960s, it was Dudley Seers’ 
contention that there was: ‘no question of choosing between agricultural and
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industrial development, merely of striking the right balance between them. To over­
emphasise industry, as some countries have found cut to their cost, leads 
paradoxically in the end to a slower rate of industrialisation.’147
As a response to what many economists saw as wilful neglect by LDC 
governments of the agricultural sector in favour of the more glamorous industrial 
sector, often in contravention of their own policy statements, the concern with 
restoring the importance of agriculture as a major pillar of any development 
strategy took on new force after a publication of the Paris-based Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) in which the authors put 
forward the argument that:
industry has been over-encouraged in relation to agriculture, and that, 
although there are arguments for giving special encouragement to 
industry, this encouragement could be provided in forms which would 
not, as present policies do, discourage exports, including agricultural 
exports; which would promote greater efficiency in the use of resources; 
and which would create a less unequal distribution of income and higher 
levels of employment in both industry and agriculture.148
What policy there has been towards agriculture in industrialising LDCs has 
usually depended on the role that agriculture is seen to play with regard to industry. 
Hence, one argument in favour of developing agriculture has hinged on that sector 
serving as food supplier to the urban areas. Though this sounds logical, many 
countries have had great problems in ensuring a continuous supply of agricultural 
goods to the urban sector without turning the terms of trade against agriculture.149
LDCs with limited resources have preferred to invest heavily in industry in the 
short-run in the hope of benefiting both industry and agriculture in the long-run.
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One danger, however, is that in attempting to build up an industrial state, a form of 
economic organisation is imposed which ignores the possible benefits from 
encouraging agriculture.150 These include the absorption of labour, particularly 
since many forms of manufacturing tend not to be as labour-intensive as 
agriculture. Lewis urged: ‘Unemployment in the towns cannot be ended by 
spending more in the towns. The basic solution is rather to make the countryside 
economically viable, with a larger cultivated area, with rising productivity on the 
farms, more rural industry, and better social amenities’.151
Finally, it should be mentioned that some states, through the reform of 
agriculture, seek the basis for the later financing of industrialisation. This has 
usually been undertaken by socialist states, for example, Cuba, Tanzania and 
China. It is based on the argument that industrialisation should take place with 
minimum recourse to foreign capital and that the creation of a group of ‘privileged’ 
workers who lose solidarity with other urban workers can be avoided through less 
industrialisation and more emphasis on agriculture.
2.13 Summary
LDCs have long believed industrialisation is the key to economic development. 
Productivity seemed to increase at a faster rate in manufacturing industries than in 
agriculture. A more rapid rate of expansion in industrial production would lead to 
growth and to an increased diversification of the economy. The growth of 
industries would also increase supplies of goods for the basic needs of people and 
goods that enlarged the base for further expansion all round. In this way, economic 
and social development would be accelerated. Because of modem technology,
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ran the argument, there would be an important spillover effect on the rest of the 
economy. In this sense, industrialisation was seen as a dynamic force transforming 
agriculture, construction, transport and other service industries into highly 
productive sectors.
Secondly, it was thought that industrialisation was the means to provide work 
for the growing populations in the LDCs. Thirdly, a central theme of 
industrialisation has been a desire for economic independence as a means of escape 
from post-colonial domination and as a means of sustaining military power and 
thus, national independence. This was key to Iran’s objectives in the 1970s. 
Industrialisation conferred greater national prestige than economic development 
brought about through agriculture.
Most of these objectives were present in the Iranian government’s statement 
of its expectations from industrialisation. These cover the arguments regarding a 
modem economy, employment opportunities and national prestige. The aims were 
listed in Iran’s Fifth Development Plan (1973-77):
Industrial development is of particular importance in view of the fact that 
it provides protection and incentives for the progress of the other sectors 
of the economy, and is a most important factor in raising the national 
income and providing opportunities for productive employment.
At this stage of the country’s economic development, industrialization 
is considered important as an element of sustained, long-term economic 
growth, not just because industrial units established during the Plan 
period will continue to operate in the years to come but rather because the 
measures taken or postponed in this field will determine the country’s 
future. Industrial development not only results in the supply of 
industrial goods required by society but also facilitates increased 
productivity and innovation in other sectors of the economy, and leads to 
the introduction of new and improved methods of management and higher 
levels of technical skill.
In the Fifth Development Plan the country’s industrial development is
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regarded as a basic measure in laying the groundwork of an advanced 
economy which will pave the way for the Great Civilization.152
We have also discussed the main issues involved in implementation. Iran adopted 
an ISI strategy as did many countries in Latin America and the Middle East under 
the auspices of state direction. We do not accept that ISI is a faulty strategy but 
instead agree that it can be seen as the first step towards an export-oriented strategy. 
We believe its success is dependent on the manner of its implementation and on 
good government, a factor increasingly recognized by the World Bank:
Centralized planning, corrective interventions in resource allocation, and 
a heavy hand in infant-industry development were part and parcel of this 
[ISI] strategy. Economic nationalism was added to the mix, to be 
promoted through state enterprises and encouragement of the indigenous
private sector By the 1970s, the costs of this strategy were coming
home to roost. The oil price shocks were a last gasp for state expansion.
For the oil exporters, they created a bonanza, which many threw into even 
greater expansion of state programs. As long as resources were flowing 
in, the institutional weaknesses stayed hidden... State-dominated 
development has failed but so will stateless development. Development 
without an effective state is impossible.153
Iran did not suffer from the more common problem of resource poverty faced by 
most LDCs in trying to industrialise. But we have seen that Iran’s oil wealth was a 
problem in that it made tempting a state-sponsored big push strategy without the 
strong institutions and good government essential to the implementation of a 
successful strategy. Here the inter-relationship between politics and economic is 
crucial to an assessment of Iran’s industrialisation policy. As Gilpin acknowledged: 
‘economic factors alone will not explain success or failure in economic
development economic forces operate within a larger political context’.154 We
shall examine that context in the next three chapters.
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Finally, in assessing Iran’s industrialisation performance quantitatively in 
Chapter 3, we shall look at manufacturing activities (by excluding the contribution 
of mining, electricity, gas and water) and use three conventional indicators: the 
share of value added in manufacturing in GDP; the annual per capita level of value 
added in manufacturing; and the gross output of manufacturing.
124
Endnotes to Chapter 2
1 See, for example, any annual from the mid-1980s of United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization’s Industry and Development Global Report (New York: United Nations).
2 UNIDO, Industry and Development Global Report 1985, (New York: United Nations, 1985), pp. 
9-10.
3 Ibid., p.l.
4 One of the most famous challenges to industrialising economic development came from E.F. 
Schumacher, Small is Beautiful (London: Sphere Books, 1974).
5 See, for example, Wolfgang Sachs (ed.), The Development Dictionary (London: Zed Books,
1992).
6 World Bank, World Development Report 1987 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.iii.
7 World Bank, World Development Report 1999/2000 (New York: OUP, 2000), p.l and p iii.
8 Ibid., p. 14.
9 W.W. Rostow, ‘The Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth’, The Economic Journal (Vol.66, 
No.261, March 1956), p.47.
10 See World Bank, World Development Report 1999/2000, op. cit., p.l, which states that 50 years 
of development experience has shown that ‘growth does not trickle down’.
11 See, for example, E.E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey, 1962); 
Wilbert E. Moore, The Impact of Industry (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965); J.K. 
Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979) and The New Industrial State 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), and Raymond Aron, Industrial Society (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1967).
12 See the title essay in A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1962) for a discussion of the different conditions necessary for 
the growth of industrial development in ‘backward’ countries.
13 S. Kuznets, ‘Quantitative Aspects of Economic Growth of Nations II, Industrial Distribution of 
National Product and Labor Force’, Economic Development and Cultural Change (Vol. 5, No.4, 
July 1957); B. Balassa and H. Hughes, Statistical Indicators o f Levels o f Industrial Development, 
IBRD Staff Working Paper (No. 45, May 1969) and Vinod Prakash, Statistical Indicators of 
Industrial Development: A Critique o f the Basic Data, IBRD Staff Working Paper (No. 189, 
September 1974).
14 See United Nations, International Standard Classification of All Economic Activities (Statistical 
Papers, Series M, No.4, Rev.2,1968), pp.28-9.
15 Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies of the UN Secretariat, 
‘Industrialization and Development: Progress and Problems in Developing Countries’, Journal of 
Development Planning, published by the UN (No.8, 1975), p. 46.
16 UN, A Study of Industrial Growth, (New York: UN, 1963).
17 UNIDO, Handbook o f Industrial Statistics (New York: UN, 1982).
18 B.Balassa and H. Hughes, op. cit., and Vinod Prakash, op. cit.
19 Helen Hughes, ‘Achievements and Objectives of Industrialization’ in John Cody, Helen Hughes 
and David Wall (eds.), Policies for Industrial Progress in Developing Countries (New York: OUP 
for the World Bank, 1980), p.21.
20 Ibid., p.21.
21 Ibid.
22 Vinod Prakash, op. cit., p.5.
23 Such a ‘test’ was devised by R.B. Sutcliffe, Industry and Underdevelopment (London: Addison- 
Wesley, 1971). See also Helen Hughes, as mentioned in text, in John Cody et al., op, cit.
24 Quoted in Helen Hughes in John Cody, et al., op, cit., p. 12.
25 World Bank, World Development Report 1982 (New York: OUP, 1982).
26 Robert Looney, Economic Origins o f the Iranian Revolution (New York: Pergamon,1982), p.61.
125
27 Taken from H.B. Chenery ‘Growth and Structural Change’, Finance and Development (Vol. 8, 
No.3, Sept. 1971), pp. 25-6.
28 See the well-known article by Bill Warren, ‘Imperialism and Capitalist Development’, New Left 
Review (No.81, Sept/Oct. 1973).
29 The World Bank estimated that 800 million people still lived in absolute poverty by the mid-70s. 
World Development Report 1978 (Washington: IBRD, Aug 1978).
30 Dr Ali A. Attiga, ‘How Oil Revenues can Destroy a Country’, Petroleum Intelligence Weekly,
Oct. 19 1981, Special Supplement, p.2.
31 Gunnar Myrdal, Against the Stream: Critical Essays on Economics (New York: Pantheon, 1973).
32 Gunnar Myrdal, ‘Causes and Nature of Development’, Tahqiqat-e Eqtesadi (Vo 1.10, Nos.29 
&30,Winter and Spring 1973), p. 10.
33 Ibid., p.4. 
u Ibid., p. 10.
35 UNIDO, World Industry since 1960: Progress and Prospects (New York: UN, 1979).
16 Ibid., p. 127.
37 W. Arthur Lewis, The Theory o f Economic Growth, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1955), p.9.
38 Ibid., pp.429-30.
39 Mancur Olson, ‘Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force’, Journal o f Economic History (Vol. 23, 
No.4, Dec. 1963), p.533.
™ Ibid., p.541.
41 See, for example, Jahangir Amuzegar, ‘The Iranian Economy Before and After the Revolution’, 
Middle East Journal (Vol. 42, No.3, Summer 1992).
42 Bela Balassa, ‘The Process of Industrial Development and Alternative Development Strategies’, 
Essays in International Finance , No. 141, Princeton University, 1980, p.l.
43 Simon S. Kuznets, Six Lectures on Economic Growth (New York: Free Press, 1961).
44 Jacob Viner, International Trade and Economic Development (Oxford: OUP,1953), chapter 3.
45 Ibid., Viner’s attack was on Louis H. Bean, ‘International Industrialization and Per Capita 
Income’, Studies in Income and Wealth (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Vol.8,1946). He also addressed the same remarks to a book by Mihail Manoilesco, The Theory of 
Protection and International Trade (London: 1931). Manoilesco’s contention was that since per 
capita income was higher in manufactures than in agriculture in all countries, predominantly 
agricultural countries would raise their per capita income by establishing tariff protection for 
manufactures as a means of increasing the proportion of the labour force engaged in manufactures.
46 Jacob Viner, op cit., p.46.
47 See L.G. Reynolds, ‘Wages and Employment in a Labour Surplus Economy’, American Economic 
Review (Vol.45, No.3, 1965) for a discussion of this, and also J. Knight, ‘The Determination of 
Wages and Salaries in Uganda’, Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics
Vol.29, No.3, 1967) who showed that wage employment in Uganda had been fairly constant in spite 
of an expanding manufacturing sector.
48 Helen Hughes in John Cody et al., op. cit., p. 17.
49 See, for example, I. Livingstone, ‘Agriculture Versus Industry in Economic Development’, The 
Journal o f Modem African Studies (Vol.6, No.3, 1968).
50 The Shah coined the grandiose phrase to describe the march towards the goal of becoming the 
world’s fifth industrialised nation while conjuring up the image of Iran’s imperial past in the ancient 
world. See Borozou Faramarzi, Towards the Great Civilization, (Tehran: Ministry of Information, 
1974).
51 See Alex Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976); A. Erlich, 
The Soviet Industrialization Debate (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1960); E.H. Norman, Origins of 
the Modem Japanese State (New York: Pantheon, 1975); T. Veblen, Imperial Germany and the 
Industrial Revolution (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1939).
52 W.W. Rostow, The Stages o f Economic Growth (Cambridge: CUP, 1960), p.26.
53 Gautam Sen, The Military Origins of Industrialisation and International Trade Rivalry (London: 
Frances Pinter, 1984), p.8.
126
54 Ibid., p.65.
55 A. Gerschenkron, ‘Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective’, op. cit., p. 17.
56 T. Dos Santos, ‘The Structure of Dependence’, American Economic Review (Vol. 60, No.2, May
1970), p.231.
57 P.T. Bauer, Dissent on Development (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), in which Peter 
Bauer argues that official foreign aid reinforces the tendency in the LDCs to politicise economic life. 
For Bauer, economic progress depends on human aptitudes and attitudes, on social and political 
institutions and historical experience. It is to a far less extent dependent on external contacts, market 
opportunities and natural resources. See also P.T. Bauer, Equality, the Third World and Economic 
Delusion (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981).
58 For an explanation of the other terms, see T. Dos Santos, op. cit., p.232.
59 There is much debate about the veracity of the argument regarding deteriorating terms of trade. 
See, for example, Dudley Seers, Development in a Divided World (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1971), who contends that it is a fallacious argument. He maintains instead that the gap between the 
rich and poor countries is an outcome of the weakening of trade as a stimulus and population growth 
in the LDCs, pp.22-23.
60 Lenin was the first systematic exponent of the idea that surplus capital from Europe was invested 
in the colonies to produce huge profits which then returned to Europe, thereby impoverishing and 
distorting the economies of those countries. See his Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism 
originally published in 1916. Since then empirical evidence has seriously undermined his argument. 
See M. Barratt-Brown, Essays on Imperialism (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1972).
61 T. Dos Santos, op. cit., p.234.
62 Ibid.
63 For more on the role of MNCs in dependency theory, see H. Radice, International Firms and 
Modem Imperialism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975).
64 The term was first used in the context of Latin America where most dependency theory originates. 
See A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (London: Monthly Review 
Press, 1967).
65 Ibid.
66 Paul Baran, ‘On the Political Economy of Backwardness’ in his collection, The Longer View: 
Essays Toward a Critique o f Political Economy (London: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p.262. The 
underdeveloped bourgeoisie is the result of imposing capitalism and trade from the outside on 
essentially feudal systems; the capitalism that develops then within LDCs is deformed and does not 
become a progressive force. This is a controversial view of the role of capital, separating the neo- 
Marxists from the dependency school.
671. Wallerstein, ‘The Capitalist World Economy’ in his collection of essays, The Politics o f the 
World Economy {Cambridge: CUP, 1984).
68 In fact the following believed that further capitalist industrialisation was not possible: P. Baran, 
The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957); A.G. Frank, 
Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, op. cit.; M. Barratt-Brown, After Imperialism 
(London: Heinemann, 1963), pp. 174-6.
69 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987), p.302.
70 Ibid., p. 304.
71 R.B. Sutcliffe, Industry and Underdevelopment, op. cit.
72 Bob Sutcliffe, ‘Industry and Underdevelopment Re-examined’, Journal o f Development Studies 
(Vol. 21, No.l Oct. 1984), p.131.
73 Ibid,, p. 128.
14 Ibid., p. 129.
75 See Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies of the UN Secretariat, 
‘Industrialization and Development: Progress and Problems in Developing Countries, op. cit., which 
concludes that ‘the ability to sustain a high rate of increase in manufacturing itself hinges on whether 
the expansion of the rest of the economy is adequate or not’ (p.7) and therefore, ‘development
127
policies need to be directed to all sectors of the economy in an appropriate mix, rather than confined 
to one sector’ (p. 15).
76 ‘The Case for Industrialization’, in Industrial Development Survey, Vol. 5 (New York: UN for 
UNIDO, 1973), p.34.
77 Paul Streeten, ‘Industrialization in a Unified Development Strategy’, World Development (Vol. 3, 
No. 1, Jan. 1975), pp.2-3.
78 Hollis B. Chenery, ‘Patterns of Industrial Growth’, American Economic Review (Vol. 50, No.4, 
September 1960), pp. 624-654.
79 Ibid., p.651.
80 Ibid., p.644.
Ibid., p.651.
82 See, Gordon C. Winston, ‘Notes on the Concept of Import Substitution’, The Pakistan 
Development Review, (Vol.7, No.1,1967).
83 R.B. Sutcliffe, Industry and Underdevelopment, op. cit., pp. 251-6. Sutcliffe distinguished 
between three different senses of IS: the substitution of domestic production for goods once 
imported; changes in the pattern of consumption away from goods normally imported, and changes 
in the import content of total supplies of manufactured goods. While Chenery’s definition described 
the reduction in the import content of manufactured supplies over a period of time, Sutcliffe used IS 
to cover only the direct substitution of domestic production for the import of the same product, 
thereby dealing with a much shorter time span than Chenery.
84 Alice Amsden criticised Chenery’s method for underestimating ISI’s importance by defining it in 
an industry as a one-time event instead of a stream of activities. This creates measurement biases 
across countries which have ‘probably generated higher recorded levels of import substitution in 
Latin America and India, with relatively long histories of middle-class importation than East Asia.’ 
See Alice H. Amsden, ‘Structural Macroeconomic Underpinnings of Effective Industrial Policy:
Fast Growth in the 1980s in Five Asian Countries’, Discussion Paper No. 57 (Geneva: UNCTAD,
1993), p.3.
85 See Bela Balassa, ‘The Policy Experience of Twelve Less Developed Countries, 1973-1978’, 
World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 449, April 1981 (Washington: The World Bank, 1981). 
Balassa found, in the wake of the oil price shock of December 1973, that export-promotion 
correlated positively and import substitution negatively with the rate of economic growth during 
1973-79. Countries such as Ivory Coast, Thailand and Tunisia following export-oriented policies 
fared well compared to those dependent on import-substitution such as Jamaica, Peru and Tanzania. 
Balassa and the World Bank blame increased government intervention, higher protection and the 
reduced use of the market mechanism for the shortcomings of ISI relative to export-orientation.
86 Celso Furtado, ‘US Hegemony and the Future of Latin America’, The World Today (Vol. 22,
Sept. 1966), p.375.
87 But, ‘note that it is the initiation of IS that is stated to be ‘easy’, not its effective implementation’, 
Henry Bruton, ‘The Import-Substitution Strategy of Economic Development’, The Pakistan 
Development Review (Vol.10, No.2, Summer 1970), p.126.
88 Albert O. Hirschman, ‘The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin 
America’, The Quarterly Journal o f Economics (Vol.82, No.l, Feb.1968), p.5. In the absence of a 
single impulse to cut down on imports, it becomes important to know what process is to be 
implemented, since this affects the course of the IS policy. For example, if the primary impulse to 
industrialise arises out of a response to a sudden balance of payments crisis, this leads to a bias in 
favour of luxury goods and other non-essential industries. Quite the opposite effect should occur if 
IS is undertaken as a deliberate policy for furthering development.
89 Or what seems like an increase in demand, since domestic production replaces imports as well as 
any increases in consumption.
90 See John H. Power, ‘Import Substitution as an Industrialization Strategy’, The Philippine 
Economic Journal (Vol.5, No.2, 1966). Power believed ‘the crude policies of protection that may 
serve adequately in the first stage, and the economic structure that try encourage, are likely, in my
128
opinion, to become barriers to growth in subsequent stages’ (p. 170). According to Power, these 
barriers consist of economic inefficiency, technical inefficiency and the failure to achieve an 
adequate rise in domestic saving, all of which are a result of the imposition of high and general 
protection rates and an overvalued domestic currency which discourages exports and the 
establishment of backward linkages by industrialists. Writing before the rise of the Asian tiger 
economies, Power had some policy recommendations but remained pessimistic about ISI in general 
while believing also that, ‘the alternatives to an import substitution strategy are not very promising 
either.’ (p. 197).
91 World Bank, World Development Report, 1979 (Washington: IBRD/World Bank, 1979), p.69. 
But note that in a survey of selected countries during the 1960s, the UN found a number had gone on 
successfully to experience growth in second-stage IS: ‘in the group of heavy industries that 
manufacture mostly intermediate goods, durable consumer products and capital goods, import 
substitution played a far more potent and pervasive role during the past decade... import 
substitution still has a considerable potential in heavy manufacturing industries in the developing 
world. Within the component of the manufacturing output generated by heavy industries, imports 
generally loom large in the available supplies of machinery and equipment, basic metals . . .  and 
industrial chemicals. Undoubtedly, therefore, efforts will be made in many developing countries to 
seize the opportunities for further import substitution in these industries.’ Centre for Development 
Planning, Projections and Policies of the UN Secretariat, ‘Industrialization and Development’, op. 
cit., p.39.
92 Albert O. Hirschman, ‘The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization’, op. cit., 
p.15.
93 Ibid., p.27. Export-orientation is not immune from this type of analysis. C. Hamilton, ‘Capitalist 
Industrialisation in East Asia’s ‘Four Little Tigers”, Journal of Contemporary Asia (Vol.21, No. 
1,1983). Hamilton argues that a particular form of state and class relationships developed in Taiwan, 
South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore leading to a successful export-oriented industrialisation 
after a short phase of ISI.
941. Little, T. Scitovsky and M. Scott (eds.), Industry and Trade in some Developing Countries 
(London: OUP for OECD, 1970), p.21. For further criticism, particularly of second-stage ISI, see 
J.N. Bhagwati, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development (Cambridge, MASS: Ballinger 
Press, 1978); Bela Balassa, ‘Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial Countries’, IBRD Staff 
Working Paper No. 34, June 1969.
95 See, for example, World Bank, World Development Report, 1991 (New York: OUP, 1991), which 
conceded that ‘government intervention is essential for development’ and provided a checklist of 
‘good’ intervention. This included reluctant intervention; the application of checks and balances and 
open intervention (such as tariffs instead of quotas), p. 5.
96 See Alice H. Amsden, ‘Structural Macroeconomic Underpinnings of Effective Industrial Policy: 
Fast Growth in the 1980s in Five Asian Countries’, op. cit.
97 Ibid., pp.3-4.
98 Ibid., p.4. See also Richard M. Auty, Economic Development and Industrial Policy: Korea,
Brazil, Mexico and China (London & New York: Mansell Publishing, 1994),who, while sympathetic 
to Amsden’s counter-argument to the ‘oversimplistic market-driven model of Korean success’, 
claims she underrates the contribution of macroeconomic management to Korea’s success. Auty 
argues that ‘effective macro management is essential for a successful industrial policy, which, even 
then, may find its principal justification on strategic military grounds rather than economic ones.’ (p. 
41).
99 H.W. Singer and Parvin Alizadeh, ‘Import Substitution Revisited in a Darkening External 
Environment’, Policies for Development: Essays in Honour o f Gamani Corea, (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1988), p.63. See also David Evans and Parvin Alizadeh, ‘Trade, Industrialisation, and 
the Visible Hand’, Journal of Development Studies (Vol.21, No.l, October 1984). The United 
Nations had argued earlier for complementarity of strategies, that is, IS, export-promotion and the 
satisfaction of growing domestic demand since it had discovered they all made a significant 
contribution to manufacturing production: ‘Of course, the relative contribution of the three forces
129
varied from country to country. But the fact that all of them were working in a positive direction, 
thereby reinforcing one another, is a point of great importance; for it provides convincing evidence 
that the various strategies of industrialization are not necessarily competitive forces or alternatives 
among which the developing countries must always make a choice. Depending on the prevailing 
circumstances, it may well be in the interest of the developing country to pursue all three strategies 
simultaneously.’ Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies of the UN Secretariat, 
‘Industrialization and Development’, op. cit., p.44.
100 H.W. Singer and Parvin Alizadeh, ‘Import Substitution Revisited in a Darkening External 
Environment’, op. cit., pp. 69-70.
101 Eprime Eshag, ‘Successful Manipulation of Market Forces: Case of South Korea, 1961-78’, 
Economic and Political Weekly (Vol. 26, Nos. 11 &12, March 1991), p. 634.
102 World Bank, World Development Report 1979, op.cit., p.59. The Bank advises that in countries 
where the domestic market is relatively small, ISI beyond the early stages should be viewed with 
caution. These countries should switch instead to production for export because manufactured 
exports tend to be more labour-intensive and less skill-intensive than import substitutes. See p.68.
See Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role o f Government in East 
Asian Industrialization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990) for an analysis of the role 
that governments played in the export successes of the south east Four Asian Tigers. See also Hubert 
Schmitz, ‘Industrialisation Strategies in Less Developed Countries: Some Lessons of Historical 
Experience’, Journal o f Development Studies (Vo 1.21,No. 1,October 1984). Schmitz also dismisses 
the idea that market forces adequately explain the very impressive achievements of the Asian 
experience but argues they were able to exploit privileged access to foreign capital and markets.
104 World Bank, World Development Report 1991, op. cit. and World Bank, The East Asian 
Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: OUP, 1993). For a discussion of the 
World Bank’s reluctant acceptance of governments’ role, see Renee Prendergast, ‘The Environment 
for Entrepreneurship’ in Richard M. Auty and John Toye (eds.), Challenging the Orthodoxies 
(London: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). See also Vinod Thomas and Yan Wang, The Lessons o f East 
Asia: Government Policy and Productivity Growth - Is East Asia an Exception? (Washington:
World Bank/IBRD, 1993). The authors acknowledge there is no single or uniform model of success 
in the region given the considerable variation in the degree to which governments intervened in 
different economies. They argue that the main reason for East Asia’s superior performance was not 
that governments intervened less - on average they intervened as much as anywhere else in some 
areas such as public expenditure - but that they intervened ‘efficiently and in ways that contained 
and minimized overall price, trade and macroeconomic distortions.’
105 Danny M. Leipziger and Vinod Thomas, The Lessons of East Asia: An Overview of Country 
Experience (Washington: The World Bank, 1993), p.7.
106 Ibid.
107 World Bank, World Development Report 1997 (New York: OUP, 1997), p. 15.
108 Eprime Eshag, Fiscal and Monetary Policies and Problems in Developing Countries 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1983), p.27.
109 Quoted in Bela Balassa, ‘Indicative Planning in Developing Countries’, World Bank Staff 
Working Paper 439 (May 1990), p.3.
1.0 Ibid., p. 20.
1.1 Ramgopal Agarwala, ‘Planning in Developing Countries: Lessons of Experience’, World Bank 
Staff Working Papers No. 576 , Management and Development Series, No. 3 (1983), p. 10.
112 ‘Analytical techniques cannot cope with the complexity of economic change to produce 
comprehensive and up-to-date plans; plans constrain the economic choices of politicians, and 
obstruction by bureaucrats - as individuals or as groups pursuing their own interests - lead to 
administrative failures which are even more serious than market failures.’ Ibid., pp. 11-12.
113 Michael Kalecki, Essays on Developing Economies (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1976). Kalecki 
argued that government should play an active role in determining the pattern of investment to
130
discourage investment in the production of inessential luxury goods in order to avoid lop-sided 
development, and to ensure adequate resources for the production of necessities.
114 Eprime Eshag, Fiscal and Monetary Policies and Problems in Developing Countries, op. cit., p. 
173.
115 World Bank, World Development Report 1997, p. 1.
116 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
117 Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan, ‘Notes on the Theory of the “Big Push’”, in Howard S. Ellis (ed.) 
Economic Development for Latin America (London: Macmillan, 1961), p. 57.
118 Richard M. Auty, Economic Development and Industrial Policy, op.cit, p. 7. For arguments in 
favour of big push industrialisation, see K.M. Murphy, A. Schleifer and R.W. Vishny, 
‘Industrialization and the Big Push’, Journal of Political Economy (Vol. 97, 1989), pp. 1003-26. .
119 These industries comprise basic metals, non-metallic minerals, chemicals, engineering and 
machinery. Their attraction to developing countries lies in their association witha modem economy 
and their reputed role as a catalyst whose linkages can trigger the proliferation of new industries.
120 Richard M. Auty, Economic Development and Industrial Policy, op.cit, p. 7.
121 Ibid. Other proponents of the resource curse theory include A.H. Gelb, Oil Windfalls:Blessing or 
Curse? (New York: OUP, 1988); G. Ranis and S.A. Mahmood, The Political Economy of 
Development Policy Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) and J.E. Mahon, ‘Was Latin America too 
rich to prosper? Structural and political obstacles to export-led growth,’ Journal o f Development 
Studies (Vol. 28, 1992).
122 Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley and L.A.: 
University of California Press, 1997).
]23Ibid., p.17
124 Albert O. Hirschman, ‘A Generalized Linkage Approach to Development, with Special 
Reference to Staples’, Economic and Development and Cultural Change (Vol. 25, 1977), 
supplement.
125 Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox o f Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, op.cit., p.57.
126 Ibid., p. 238.
127 Ibid., p. 242.
128 Richard M. Auty, ‘Resource Abundance and Economic Development: Improving the 
Performance of Resource-Rich Countries’, (Helsinki: United Nations University/World Institute for 
Development Economics Research, 1998).
1291. Livingstone, ‘Agriculture versus Industry in Economic Development’, op. cit., p.334.
130 Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan, ‘Problems of Industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe’, 
Economic Journal (Vol.53, Nos.210-211, June-Sept 1943), p.204.
131 Ibid., p.206.
132 Howard S. Ellis, ‘Accelerated Investment as a Force in Economic Development’, Quarterly 
Journal o f Economics (Nov. 1958).
133 As quoted by Ellis; the reference is: Jacob Viner, ‘Stability and Progress: the Poorer Countries’ 
Problem’, in Douglas Hague (ed.), Stability and Progress in the World Economy (London: 
Macmillan, 1958).
134 Ellis argued against interventionist policies; though he recognised the success of concentrated 
state investment in the industrialisation programmes of Japan and Russia, they were not the only or 
primary means of bringing about development. He argued that alternative policies, such as the 
encouragement of private investment, had greater merit. The gains from big push investment could 
be overestimated. ‘The economic development of the most advanced countries, at least, scarcely 
seems to be the result of crash programmes,’ he argued. Howard S. Ellis, ‘Accelerated Investment as 
a Force in Economic Development’, op. cit., p.495.
135 This was particularly so for social overhead capital which comprised basic industries such as 
power, transport and communications, and which Rosenstein-Rodan regarded as the main obstacle 
to development in the LDCs. For a discussion of the indivisibilities and the wider issues of 
infrastructure and industry, see, Mrinal Datta Chaudhuri, ‘Infrastructure and Location’, in Cody, 
Hughes and Wall (eds.) Policies for Industrial Progress in Developing Countries, op. cit.
131
136Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan, ‘Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe’, 
op. cit., p.204.
137 For an excellent discussion on the notion of prerequisites see, A. Gerschenkron, ‘Reflections on 
the Concept of “prerequisites” of Modem Industrialization’, Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective, op. cit.
138 See, for example, Ragnar Nurske, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries 
(Oxford: OUP, 1953); Ragnar Nurske, Equilibrium and Growth in the World Economy (Cambridge, 
MASS.; Harvard University Press, 1961).
139 Ragnar Nurske, ‘The Conflict between “Balanced Growth” and International Specialization’, in 
Lectures on Economic Development (Istanbul: Istanbul University, 1958), p. 172.
] 40 Ibid., p.173.
141 Ibid., p.176.
142 J.R.T. Hughes, ‘Foreign Trade and Balanced Growth: The Historical Framework’, American 
Economic Review (Vol.49, No.2,1958).
143 W.W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth (New York: W.W. Norton, 1960) .
144 Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy o f Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1958), p.66. Hirschman suggests that since genuine decision-making is a scarce resource in 
most LDCs, it is better to try and economise on it and set up instead a process by which decisions to 
invest are induced, namely, unbalanced growth and the establishment of forward and backward
linkages.
145 Paul Streeten, ‘Balanced versus Unbalanced Growth’, The Economic Weekly (April 20, 1963), 
p.670.
146 W. Arthur Lewis, ‘The Industrialisation of the British West Indies’, Caribbean Economic Review 
(May 1950), p.6.
147 Dudley Seers, ‘The Role of Industry in Development: Some Fallacies’, The Journal o f Modem 
African Studies (Vol. 1, No.4, 1963), pp. 463-64.
1481. Little, T. Scitovsky and M. Scott (eds.), Industry and Trade in some Developing Countries, 
op. cit., p.l. This study is better known for arguing for the reversal of import-substitution policies.
149 See Edmar L.Bacha, ‘Industrialization and Agricultural Development’, in John Cody, et al.„ op. 
cit., p.67.
150 Argentina is a case in point. The development of industry was sought through a policy of price 
discrimination against agriculture and in favour of industry followed by disappointing growth rates 
in the 1940s and 1950s. See C.F. Diaz-Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History o f the Argentine 
Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).
151 W. Arthur Lewis, ‘Development Strategy in a Limping World Economy’, The Elmhurst Lecture, 
The International Conference of Agricultural Economists (Banff, Canada, Sept. 3-12, 1979), p.8. 
Though Lewis advocated industry for employment in ‘The Industrialisation of the British West 
Indies’, op.cit., his views had changed by the mid-70s.
152 Plan and Budget Organisation, Iran's Revised Fifth Development Plan 1973-77. A Summary 
(Tehran: May 1975), p. 109.
53 World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.23-25
154 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, op.cit., pp. 269-70.
132
Chapter 3. Economic Policies and the Effect on the Economy during the 
Fifth Plan Period
3.1 Introduction
This chapter will examine the Iranian economy during the Fifth Plan Period 
(1973-77) and explore specifically the level of industrial development and 
manufacturing growth achieved through the big push industrialisation policy. In 
this period, the state dominated the economy through public investment 
financed by rising oil revenues. The Fifth Plan was revised in 1974 to increase 
expenditure by 90 per cent with the aim of restructuring the economy through a 
big push to lessen dependence on oil and encourage manufacturing growth. But 
the policy ran into difficulties of shortages of skilled manpower and absorptive 
capacity and helped fuel rampant inflation. This chapter will use the yardsticks 
established in the previous chapter to measure the degree of manufacturing 
growth in the economy and the extent to which this performance lived up both 
to the government’s objectives and to internationally accepted norms.
3.2 Cycles o f economic boom and crisis
Iran’s economy between 1950-1979 was characterised by a tendency towards 
cyclical growth. The economy went into decline after the 1951-53 oil 
nationalisation attempt, when the government was prompted to devalue the rial. 
With the restoration of oil revenues and as a result of increased government 
expenditure and the extension of credit to the private sector, Iran experienced 
its first major boom in the post-war years from 1957-60. However, ensuing
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inflation and large current account deficits signalled an end to the boom and a 
deep recession set in during the early 1960s. The economic situation 
deteriorated to such an extent that the government was obliged to resort to an 
International Monetary Fund-prescribed stabilisation programme, which 
eventually proved successful. One element of the belt-tightening stabilisation 
programme was the reduction of imports, in particular of non-essential or 
luxury items. Import restrictions were retained by the government even after 
they were no longer needed (the balance of payments began recovering from 
1962) and were combined with promotional policies designed to develop the 
country’s industrial structure. It was thus that the government’s import- 
substitution strategy towards industry evolved. The policy can also be seen as 
part of a broader attempt by the government to operate a successful investment 
programme, one which Farhad Daftary has suggested, was launched in the 
mid-1950s when the current expenditure of the government rose from 16 billion 
rials in 1956 to 37 billion rials just four years later, in 1960.1
Seen in the light of the post-1953 coup, it appears that the government may 
have been trying to ease urban discontent among the middle classes who had 
supported prime minister Mohammad Mossadeq, by increasing effective 
demand and supplying goods and services. The relaxation of import controls 
from 1954 onwards meant that import traders benefited considerably from the 
subsequent expansion in imports. In fact, their accumulation of funds needed 
investment outlets and this fact too may have augmented the attractiveness of 
an import-substitution policy, from the government’s point of view.
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From 1963 the country entered another boom period which lasted until the 
end of the decade when, once again, the deficit on the current account grew 
alarmingly, accumulating to $2.6 billion over the period 1963-72. This time, 
however, the government was able to solve the problem through pressure for 
higher oil prices, resulting in the February 1971 Tehran Agreement and, more 
dramatically, in the quadrupling of oil prices in late 1973. As a direct result of 
this, Iran’s foreign exchange earnings enabled the government not only to 
balance the books but also to embark on its big-push drive by revising the Fifth 
Plan to increase expenditure by 90 per cent, from 2,486 billion rials to 4,697 
billion rials.
Unfortunately for the government, oil prices stabilised far sooner than 
expected and indeed began to fall off, thereby bringing to an abrupt end the 
period of massive public expenditure, culminating instead in a deep economic 
crisis from which the government was not to recover. This process has been 
succinctly summarised by Robert Looney:
With the leveling off in oil revenues and cutbacks in government 
expenditures in the mid-1970s, momentum began to slacken. The 
strategy [ISI] became self-defeating and sterile. Domestic saving 
could not be generated to finance the social overhead capital and it 
was necessary to resort to deficit financing which was inflationary. 
The government-imposed controls began to reduce subsidies; groups 
had become accustomed to increased standards of living. This led to 
political pressures for more controls which led to further distortions 
in the allocation of resources. Zero sum activities such as avoiding 
controls, capital flight and speculative investments in urban real 
estate became common. Without momentum the country quickly 
became mired in a vicious cycle of financial repressions, distortions,
135
social conflict and political instability from which it was impossible 
to break out.4
Table 3.1 shows the annual growth of gross national product (GNP) and 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita between the years 1959-1977 in 
constant prices. Between 1963 to 1972, GNP grew at an annual average of 
nearly 11 per cent, while per capita income more than doubled during the 10 
years from $178.6 to $366.3. The impact of the increase in revenue from 
higher oil prices can be clearly seen in the sudden jump in the growth rate, by 
over 40 per cent, from 1972-74. However, GNP grew at only 1 per cent in 1975 
and it actually fell in real terms in 1977.
The cycle just described formed one of two boom periods, beginning, 
ending and punctuated by three periods of economic crisis. The earlier boom 
period, from 1962-1970, was far more prolonged than the second period (1973- 
76), and the 1976 economic crisis was far more pronounced than that of the 
early 70s. The main reason for this was that though the growth rates of the 
second period were spectacularly higher than those of the 1960s, the basis for 
their growth was actually weaker, while the degree of expenditure at the 
government’s disposal allowed those distortions in the economy induced by the 
government’s economic policies, to become far more pronounced during the 
second period. In part too, it was this very magnitude of the country’s economic 
crisis from 1976 that made it one far harder to control.
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These periods of economic crisis are interesting for both their 
similarities and their differences. The most important feature of the early 60s 
and mid-70s was the fact that the economic difficulties were accompanied by 
widespread political disturbances; again, these were far more pronounced in the 
mid- to late 70s. This is in contrast to the balance of payments difficulties of the 
early 70s, when political upheaval did not occur. The main reason for the 
difference is, of course, due to the fact that the government was able both to 
prevent the unhealthy balance of payments situation from developing into a 
crisis which would have affected the population.
It can be said, therefore, that the political discontent brought about by 
high inflation and the fall in the standard of living in the late 70s, had a 
precedent in the early 60s, since the economic difficulties which affected the 
urban population in particular acted both times as a catalyst, bringing out 
widespread political grievances.5 The revolution of 1978/9 was the more 
intense protest movement, in part because more time had elapsed for grievances 
to grow but also, because it formed the response to a more sudden drop in the 
standard of living following a period in which expectations regarding the 
country’s imminent achievements had been kept very high by the government.
The government did not, in the late 70s, have the same opportunity to 
augment its income through external means, as it did in the early 70s. While it 
tried to deflect attention from its own mismanagement of the economy, through 
a policy of price control, anti-profiteering and wage increases in 1975, it had,
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nonetheless, come to be identified with the economic, in particular, the 
industrial policy it had put forward. The sudden downturn in the economy, 
which had not been anticipated by the government, meant that it was to be held 
responsible for this.
3.3 Import-substitution as economic policy
The decision to use protection methods in order to industrialise was made 
explicit from 1963 onwards. Tariffs, rather than quotas, were the preferred 
system. Import-substitution was rigorously implemented through a package of 
tariff protection, industrial credit, production licensing and tax holidays. Tariffs 
were highest on consumer goods and durables and lowest on capital goods, 
indicating a commitment to building up, or creating, the industrial 
infrastructure, though this measure also meant that in many cases, it was more 
profitable to use capital-intensive, rather than labour-intensive methods of 
production.6 The policy and its objectives were clearly stated in a brief passage 
in the Fourth Plan (1968-72):
The Fourth Plan is the first stage of a long-term programme to 
industrialize the country, the objective of which is to make the 
country independent of consumer goods and to manufacture capital 
and intermediate goods inside the country so as to minimize the 
volume of imports, and to diversify the export of locally 
manufactured goods to foreign countries. This will reduce the 
dependence of the economy on oil revenues.7
The industrial sector, therefore, would gradually replace oil production as 
the driving force behind the economy. This policy was reiterated in the 1970s 
by M. Agah, the Secretary of State for Executive Affairs:
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For all who know the Iranian economy, it is clear that the 
fundamental feature of Iran’s long-term development strategy is to 
use the income earned from oil and gas, while at its highest, to 
diversify and build the productive capacity of the economy, so that 
other forms of industry can gradually replace oil, which is expected to 
decline in the 1980s. Only in this way can the country achieve self­
sustained economic growth . . .  In developing non-oil sectors of the 
economy, agriculture has only limited possibilities due to climatic 
and physical conditions such as low rainfall and limited arable lands . 
.. Thus, attention should be focused on the industrial sector.8
This suggested, therefore, a policy of deepening import-substitution into the 
production of intermediate and capital goods and of raising non-oil exports, in 
particular of goods other than primary exports. Another important feature was 
that the main groundwork for these aims should be laid from the income 
derived from the sale of oil, ‘while at its highest’. Since oil reserves were 
expected to decline in the 1980s, the target date would be towards the end of 
the 70s, when real results should have been apparent.
During the Fourth Plan Period, the Ministry of Economy showed 
impatience with a capital constraint, which it perceived to be responsible for 
slowing down the growth process in the country:
Iran aims at being a modem, advanced, industrialized country and is 
making a major effort to achieve this goal. The magnitude of the 
effort can be appreciated by the size of allocations in the 3rd as 
against the current 4th Development Plan. In the 3rd Plan, which 
ended in the spring of 1968, a total of some 20 billion rials was 
allocated to the industrial sector. The current allocation is 20 billion 
rials per year, which means that the allocation in each year of the 4th 
Plan equals the five years of the 3rd Plan. If more capital were 
available, more could be productively absorbed in prepared projects 
as the country goes through a period of one of the highest rates of 
industrial development in the world.9
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With the jump in oil prices from $3.29 a barrel in 1973 to $11.58 in 1974, this 
constraint was lifted and the Shah’s objective became that of achieving within 
10 years the standard of living enjoyed by Western Europe. Within one 
generation Iran would be one of the five most advanced and powerful countries 
in the world. The World Bank explained the Iranian government’s position 
thus:
With the upsurge in oil prices and the expectation after 1973 that 
Government revenues from oil and gas during the period 1979-80 
were likely to exceed $20 billion a year in foreign exchange . . . 
capital became more abundant than before, especially in relation to 
the available resources of labor and management and to the 
infrastructure that had so far developed. Two major alternative 
courses thus appeared to offer themselves to Iran’s planners: either to 
maintain roughly the old pace of development (which was far from 
being slow) while systematically working on the bottlenecks that 
would impede faster development (and thus banking or investing 
abroad for a time the surplus earnings); or alternatively to accelerate 
Iran’s economic development by the injection of most or all of the 
increased earnings in the domestic economy with the view to 
revolutionising Iran’s economic structure within a relatively short 
time. In the event this latter alternative was chosen, principally to 
fulfil a desire to raise Iran to the level of an industrialised European 
country within a decade.10
In a report on the feasibility of achieving this aim, Bahman Abadian concluded 
that though such a goal had never been attained before in such a short period of 
time, it was nonetheless possible but crucially dependent on many carefully 
chosen and difficult policies, which he listed:
The improvement in the quality and style of life comparable to those 
in the West will require many institutional changes . . .  It should be 
pointed out in conclusion, that there is no historical precedence for 
such a radical structural and socio-institutional change in a short span 
of ten years. If Iran accomplishes this without significant side effects, 
it would be a socio-economic miracle dwarfing Japan’s meteoric 
performance during the past two decades.11
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The Fifth Plan, which had been duly revised in 1974, set out its general 
objectives thus:
a) to raise the quality of life for all social groups;
b) to maintain rapid, balanced and sustained economic growth, 
together with minimum price increases;
c) to increase the income of various groups, particularly with a view 
to raising living standards among low-income groups;
d) to expand comprehensively social, economic, political and cultural 
justice with particular emphasis on the equitable distribution of 
services among all social classes and groups;
e) to improve the quality and increase the supply of active manpower 
so as to increase productivity and eliminate development bottlenecks;
f) to preserve, rehabilitate and improve the environment, and raise the 
quality of life, particularly in large centres of population;
g) to develop science and technology and promote creativity and 
initiative;
h) to establish relative competitiveness in the production and export 
of industrial goods, at the international level;
i) to utilize foreign exchange reserves to the full so as to remedy 
domestic shortages and check inflationary pressures, for foreign 
investment and for the creation of sources of national wealth to 
replace depleting oil resources;
j) to maintain and resuscitate the nation’s valuable cultural heritage, 
carry out research and teaching in cultural and artistic fields, expand 
culture and the arts, establish facilities for artistic and literary 
creation and promote cultural relations.12
The interesting thing to note here, apart from the comprehensiveness of this as 
an ‘all-good-things’ list, is the high priority given to economic growth as an 
objective compared with solving the problem of skilled manpower shortages 
(and similar bottlenecks), and the creation of an alternative source of income in 
the face of oil reserve depletion. For industry, the revised plan listed its overall 
objectives as:
a) to increase the value of industrial production from 509 billion Rials 
in the last year of the Fourth Plan to 1,130 billion Rials in the last 
year of the Fifth Plan, an annual average growth of about 17 per cent;
b) to increase the value added of the industrial sector from 164 billion 
Rials in the last year of the Fourth Plan to 408 billion Rials in the last 
year of the Fifth Plan, an annual average rate of increase of about 20 
per cent;
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c) to revise the existing system of operations so as to make 
economies, lower production costs, improve quality and make the 
maximum utilization of the productive capacity of industrial units;
d) to establish new industries and develop existing ones on the basis 
of the relative advantages of each;
e) to raise the export capacity of industrial goods so as to expand the 
markets of domestic industries and ensure long-term requirements of 
foreign exchange.13
The Fifth Plan envisaged, therefore, bringing about major structural changes in 
the economy, particularly in the contribution of the industrial sector to GNP but 
as we shall see in this chapter, the results fell far short of the objectives.
3.4 The level o f industrial development
In 1968, the Plan and Budget Organisation divided countries into three 
categories in terms of industrial development, namely, industrially- developed 
countries with an industrial sector accounting for 25 per cent of GNP, 
developing nations with a 15 to 25 per cent contribution and the under­
developed countries, whose industrial sector accounted for less than 15 per 
cent.14 With a 16 per cent industrial sector contribution to GNP, Iran fell just 
within the second category in 1968.15 Bearing this in mind, we would expect it 
to have grown, at the very least, to 20 per cent by 1978, since the target of 
realising a European standard of living involving, amongst other things, 
industry accounting for over 25 per cent of GNP, would be only five years 
away.
Table 3.2 shows the industrial sector’s contribution to the GNP in 
current prices for the Fifth Plan period (1973-77). From this we can see that the 
industrial group’s contribution is somewhat erratic, though stabilising at just
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under 17 per cent in 1976 and 1977 and increasing to 17.8 per cent in 1978. 
This represents, therefore, an increase in 1978 of just 2.3 percentage points over 
the sector’s contribution to GNP in 1973 and therefore places Iran at the lower 
end of the 15 to 25 per cent bracket of the PBO’s definition of a developing 
country. More disappointingly, if we look at the contribution of the 
manufacturing sector within the group as a whole, we can see that it actually 
declined in the GNP, from 9.7 per cent in 1973 to 7.5 per cent in 1978. 
Nonetheless, it grew at a yearly average of 18.3 per cent in current prices, 
though the pace declined -  apart from in 1977 -  over the period.
The most interesting feature of the table is the part played by 
construction in the industrial group. The rate of growth of construction was on 
average a massive 48.8 per cent for these years, and unlike manufacturing, the 
growth rate increased, from 47.3 per cent in 1973 to an extraordinary 101.3 per 
cent increase in 1976, before falling off. It was therefore construction that 
accounted for the greater part of the growth of the industrial sector as a whole, 
and overtook manufacturing in its contribution to GNP. While manufacturing 
accounted for 9.7 per cent of GNP in 1973 and construction 4.3 per cent, by 
1978 construction contributed 9.1 per cent as opposed to manufacturing’s 7.5 
per cent.
As we shall see, the mid-70s inflation accounted for much of the growth 
of the construction sector, and for some of the industrial sector as a whole. 
Certainly, in the urban centres and Tehran in particular, there was a severe
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shortage of housing and a property boom, with much private wealth being 
invested in property speculation, which was far and away the most profitable 
investment activity at the time. Growth in construction also reflected the very 
high share it was allocated in total fixed investment, as well as indicating the 
high level of economic activity.
For a better comparative basis than the current prices of Table 3.2, 
Table 3.3 shows the industrial sector’s contribution to the GNP in constant 
prices. It should be noted that the Bank Markazi statistics from which these 
results are derived include mining in manufacturing. From this table, it can be 
seen that manufacturing’s growth rate of an average 4.5 per cent a year was the 
lowest growth rate of the group as a whole, and of its constituent sectors. 
Construction made a far less dramatic contribution, though its boom years were 
still 1975 and 1976. The industrial group as a whole contributed no more than
17.5 per cent of GNP, at its highest, in 1976, before falling off. The 
manufacturing and mining sector contribution was by far the highest to GNP 
within the group, reaching 11.7 per cent in 1976, before falling off.
These results should be set against the objectives laid down by the 
government for the Fifth Plan period, in order to see how successful the 
government was in realising its objectives. The revised Fifth Plan stated the 
quantitative objectives for GNP:
During the Fourth Plan period GNP at 1351 prices rose from 686 
billion Rials to 1,165 billion Rials, an average annual rate of increase 
of 11.2 per cent. During the Fifth Plan period GNP in real terms will
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rise by 25.9 per cent annually, from 1,165 billion Rials to 3,686 
billion Rials.16
Table 3.4a shows GNP in constant 1974 (1353) prices for the Fifth Plan period. 
The annual average rate of GNP growth was 2.4 per cent, falling far short, 
therefore, of the 25.9 per cent projected by the government. Even if the year 
1978 is taken as exceptional, because of the industrial halt in the economy, the 
average growth rate of 1973-77 was still only 6.9 per cent per annum.
Definitions of an industrialised country and measures of industrialisation 
have already been discussed in Chapter 1. One of the favoured measures was 
that put forward by the Centre for Development Planning, Projections and 
Policies of the UN Secretariat, which regarded an industrially advanced country 
as having a minimum 17 per cent contribution of manufacturing to GDP. 
Robert Sutcliffe looked towards an industrial sector employing 10 per cent of 
the population and contributing 25 per cent to GDP, with 60 per cent of 
industrial output being in manufacturing.17
Figures for the sectoral contribution to GDP give a much better idea of the 
productive structure of the economy than GNP estimates. Table 3.5 shows the 
GDP in Iran by kind of activity for 1970 and 1972-78, in constant prices. The 
UN figures have been used in preference to Bank Markazi statistics because 
they have the advantage of classifying manufacturing activities separately from 
mining. GDP more than doubled during the eight years from 1970 to the peak 
year, 1977, rising from 1,943.8 billion rials to 3,924 billion rials. It increased
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by 20 per cent during the Fifth Plan years. The slowest growth was in 
agriculture with an annual average of 3.5 and the fastest growing sector was 
services, with an annual growth rate of just under 17 per cent for the Fifth Plan 
period. Table3. 6 gives the sectoral contribution to the GDP in percentage form, 
while Table 3.7 gives the breakdown for the industrial sector. What is most 
noticeable about the figures in Table 3.6 is not the declining contribution by 
the oil and mining sector but its replacement in importance by the services 
sector rather than industry. Hence, oil and mining decreased from 52.3 per cent 
in 1973 to 30.7 per cent in 1978, while the services sector increased rapidly 
from 26.5 per cent to 46.1 per cent for the same years.
Manufacturing’s contribution to GDP was never more than 8.3 per cent, 
though it rose from 6.8 per cent in 1973. Table 3.7 shows that the average 
annual increase of manufacturing was 10.5 per cent (the lowest rate of increase 
in the industrial sector and below average for the sector as a whole) during the 
Fifth Plan period, and its rate of increase also declined over these years. As 
indicated in previous tables, construction grew considerably, increasing by 36.1 
per cent in 1975 and over 50 per cent the following year.
The figures for the contribution of the industrial sector and 
manufacturing to GDP nowhere reach the ones given above for an industrially 
advanced country. Manufacturing contributed 8.3 per cent at its highest 
compared with the minimum of 17 per cent suggested by the UN while the 
industrial sector contributed 14.8 per cent before declining, in comparison with
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Sutcliffe’s 25 per cent for the industrial sector as a whole. Moreover, the 
statistics do not suggest that industry was growing, but rather, that the main 
period of growth was already over before the end of the Fifth Plan period.
The GDP figures also fell far short of the government’s own objectives 
regarding the industrial sector. The Fifth Plan aimed to increase the value added 
of the industrial sector from 164 billion rials in 1972 to 408 billion rials in the 
last year of the Fifth Plan, which corresponds to an annual average increase of 
about 20 per cent.18 Table 3.7 shows that industrial growth during the period 
was erratic, in that it showed a 1.6 per cent decline in absolute terms following 
a year in which the rate of increase had been just over 26 per cent. For the 
period as a whole, the annual average increase was 11.8 per cent and not the 
projected 20 per cent. In part, this average has been brought down by the very 
low figure for 1978, when industry suffered a 15 per cent decrease in real terms. 
But even if we assume a 7.5 per cent decrease for the year, in order to 
compensate for the strikes and industrial upheaval in the last quarter, the annual 
average increase would still be only 13.1 per cent.
3.5 Iran’s industrial growth in a comparative context
Nevertheless, an 11 per cent or 13 per cent industrial growth rate is a high one 
by the standards of most developing countries and it might be worthwhile at 
this point to compare the growth process in Iran with a typical or ‘normal’ 
pattern of growth. The model used will be that provided in a 1975 study by 
Chenery and Syrquin. 19 The study gives a quantitative analysis for over 100
147
countries across the period 1950-70, on the basis of certain structural 
similarities, that is, market size and trade pattern. Three standard growth 
patterns are derived by taking resource allocation into account. These are 
identified as firstly, large countries with balanced allocation; secondly, small 
countries with primary allocation and finally, small countries with industry 
specialisation. A large country is one with a population of 15 million or more in 
1960; this definition embraces Iran.
Like all normal growth pattern studies, which are based on cross-section 
regression analyses, the assumption is that all the countries face similar world 
market conditions, regardless of changes over time. This is definitely a 
drawback, since such conditions may not hold for all countries; indeed, some 
countries may be bound by restrictive trade agreements with other countries. 
Nevertheless, in spite of such shortcomings, the Chenery-Syrquin study 
provides a useful yardstick for the classification of countries.
Table 3.8 shows the ‘normal’ variation in economic structure of large 
countries, using per capita income as a measure of development. Table 3.9 
provides relevant data for Iran as the basis for comparison. Looking at the 
tables together reveals a striking deviation between Iran’s economic structure 
and that expected of a ‘normal’ economy at any given income level. As income 
rises, primary production is usually expected to fall. It remained very high in 
Iran’s case, contributing 41.1 per cent of GNP at an income level of just under 
$800 compared with Chenery and Syrquin’s expected 13.6 per cent for the same
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income level. The reason for this is the importance of oil, which unlike most 
primary products has a high elasticity of demand. The Iranian agricultural sector 
fell to a lower than expected share, indicating that with the growing importance 
of oil, the government felt less concern over the performance of agriculture.
The share of industrial production, on the other hand, is much lower 
than the expected pattern. Iran’s 21.8 per cent share at an $800 per capita 
income is less than that expected of a ‘normal’ economy with income levels of 
just $200. In spite of a four-fold increase in the level of per capita income in 
Iran, the production level of the industrial sector did not increase significantly 
between 1967 and 1977; it rose from 18.5 per cent to 21.8 per cent for these 
years, but this increase was due to the performance of the construction industry. 
Manufacturing, if anything, actually declined.
Iran’s structure of trade was again very different from the ‘normal’ pattern. 
The share of primary exports for Iran’s oil-based economy was very high and 
actually increased with the level of income, though it peaked in 1975. 
Manufactured exports were very low, though in the light of a much lower than 
expected industrial production structure, this is hardly surprising. At the $800 
income level, manufactured exports had only a 0.3 per cent share compared 
with an expected 6.4 per cent share. More interestingly, taking into account the 
government’s objectives of increasing manufactured exports, the share of these 
exports actually fell from 1973, the 1977 figure of 0.3 per cent being much 
lower than the 1971 figure of 1.0 per cent. The shares of imports, investment
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and government consumption are more in line with the ‘normal’ economy, 
though after 1973, they suddenly increased, especially in the case of investment 
and imports and rose some way ahead of the expected pattern. Hence, for the 
$800 per capita income levels, Iran’s imports were between 22.7 per cent and
19.1 per cent against an expected 15.1 per cent; the country’s investment and 
government consumption share stood at, respectively, 34 per cent and 20.1 per 
cent for the same income level, compared with Chenery and Syrquin’s 23.6 per 
cent and 13.6 per cent respectively.
The post-1973 rise in the aggregates for these sectors -  imports, 
investment and government consumption -  reflect the government’s policy of 
injecting large amounts of money into the economy in a big push towards 
industrialisation. Since the increased revenue came from charging a higher 
price for oil, a change in the country’s production structure was not evident up 
to this point. But after 1973, the increased expenditure did not appear to make 
the intended changes; on the contrary, the adverse tendencies in the economy 
were exacerbated and the distortions made more acute. These distortions were 
not induced solely by the peculiar nature of an oil-based economy; they were 
also dependent on the way in which the government chose to direct the 
economy through the expenditure of its privileged source of income.20
3.6 The manufacturing industries: structure, employment and growth
It has been seen that manufacturing grew at a fairly rapid pace throughout these
years, in spite of a disappointing performance in the GDP, relative to the targets
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the government had set. Table 3.10 shows the growth of manufacturing value 
added from 1968 to 1978. The annual growth rate for these years was high at an 
average of 10 per cent. The year in which the fastest growth occurred was 1974 
with 18.3 per cent, but by 1977 the manufacturing value added fell in real terms 
by 15 per cent. The fall continued into the next year such that manufacturing 
value added for 1978 had declined to the 1974 level, in real terms. The 
important point to note from this table, is the fall in manufacturing productivity 
after 1976 just a year or two after the implementation of the revised Fifth Plan.
Table 3.10 covers the productivity of all manufacturing establishments, 
large and small alike, while Table 3.11 sets out the value added for specific 
industries and for manufacturing as a whole, based on large manufacturing 
establishments only, that is, establishments employing 10 or more people. It can 
be seen that for the period shown, productivity increased in most industries, 
many showing a sizeable increase from 1973, due to the rising level of 
investment.
Table 3.12 compares the totals of total manufacturing with those of 
large manufacturing establishments. It can be seen that the manufacturing value 
added of the large establishments accounted for 56 per cent of total 
manufacturing value added in 1970. This proportion decreased to 51.3 per cent 
in 1973 before increasing once again to just over 56 per cent in 1974. Since it 
was the large establishments which represented the modem side of the 
industrial effort, they were to be the engine of the country’s industrial growth
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and development. It is their performance which is, therefore, of the most 
concern. Seemingly in recognition of this, the government ceased compiling 
detailed statistics for the small establishments after 1972.
Table 3.13 sets out information regarding the number of industrial 
establishments, the total persons engaged and the wages paid. The information 
for 1979 is included as a comparative basis, though that year is outside the 
period examined here. For the years in which statistics on both small and large 
establishments are available, it can be seen that just under 3 per cent of all 
establishments were large industrial establishments, employing roughly 33 per 
cent of the total industrial workforce. Their workers earned between 62 per cent 
and 67 per cent of all industrial wages. The table shows that the number of 
large establishments increased by just over 2000 in the three years between 
1974 and 1977, yet employment increased by only 73,720, i.e., an average of 37 
workers per factory. Comparing this figure with the increase of around 1000 
large establishments, between 1969 and 1973, when employment went up by 
over 105,000 we can see that effectively, a 100 per cent increase in the number 
of industrial establishments was accompanied by only a 35 per cent increase in 
the number of workers during this latter period. This suggests a trend towards 
greater automation, or more capital-intensity, as industrialisation proceeded.
The annual wages of industrial workers, on the basis of the information 
provided from this table are given in Table 3.14. As would be expected, the 
wage rates in the larger industrial establishments were substantially higher than
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in the small establishments and grew at a much higher rate of increase. Wages 
in the small establishments are really very low and well below the per capita 
GNP for these years. These small industrial establishments were mostly 
engaged in handicraft production, such as carpet-weaving and small-scale semi- 
agricultural activities, such as the packaging of fruit and nuts for export.
A more detailed picture of wages and employment in large manufacturing 
establishments can be seen in the following six tables. Tables 3.15-3.17 provide 
information on wages and Tables 3.18-3.20 consider the numbers employed. 
Unfortunately, Bank Markazi does not give a unified set of statistics for these 
years. Table 3.15 shows the compensation of workers index from 1975 to 1979, 
taking 1974 as the base year. Leaving aside 1979 for the time being, it can be 
seen that wage rates rose substantially from year to year, by at least 40 per cent 
and by as much as nearly 70 per cent from 1977-78. By 1978, workers were 
earning, on average, three times what they had earned just four years before.
This increase in earnings reflected the rapidly rising cost of living as well as the 
demand for skilled labour during this period. The interesting thing to note from 
the table is an even greater upsurge in wages after the revolution. The index 
jumped to 512 in 1979 from 319.8 in 1978, an extraordinary rise in income.
Table 3.16 shows a breakdown of earnings across selected industries for 
1970-76. The average annual increase in wages was 29.5 per cent, but above 
average increases occurred after 1973. In 1975, there was a 45.7 per cent 
increase on the previous year and an increase of 33.7 per cent in 1976. These
153
increases can be seen more easily in Table 3.17. The lowest were in the textile, 
leather and glass sheets industries and the highest in the automobile and 
automobile tyre industries. Of the wages in the selected industries, between 
one-third and one-quarter were earned in the spinning and weaving industries. 
However, their share of the income dropped from 32.8 per cent in 1970 to 26.5 
per cent in 1976. The automobile industry earnings were second to spinning and 
weaving with 14.1 per cent in 1976. Wages here replaced the higher percentage 
earned in the tobacco industry in the years prior to 1972.
Table 3.20 shows how employment in the automobile industry increased 
rapidly after 1974. There were also significant increases in numbers employed 
in industries as diverse as dairy products, paints and electrical tools. Again, 
spinning and weaving revealed itself to be the highest employer in the selected 
industries. In 1970 it employed 49 per cent of workers in these industries; they 
earned only 32.8 per cent of the wages. However, spinning and weaving was 
one of the few industries that did not expand its workforce after 1975, resulting 
in a drop of its share to 38.5 in 1976 with its workers earning 26.5 per cent.
A comparison of Tables 3.17 and 3.20 indicates that, in general, 
industries demanding skilled workers enjoyed higher than average earnings. 
The automobile industry had been singled out by the government for expansion 
and development not only for the domestic market but for export too: ‘The 
Shah in person has set the goal for Iran National [the largest producer] to 
become one of the world’s top auto makers within seven years. This implies a
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major breakthrough in foreign markets’.21 This explains the particularly large 
increase in workforce in the industry for the years under study. In numerical 
terms, the increase was from 9,125 workers in 1970 to over 20,000 workers in 
1976, as shown in Table 3.19. From this table too, it can be seen that spinning 
and weaving also expanded its workforce by 10,000 workers, in the five years 
from 1970 to 1975 before losing 2,000 of them in 1976. The top five industries, 
in terms of numbers employed in 1976, were spinning and weaving, 
automobiles, household appliances, tobacco and cement. All other industries 
employed less than 10,000 workers and the majority of these, under 5,000.
The total number of workers in the selected industries rose by almost 
45 per cent from 1970 to 1976. Unfortunately, the employment index given in 
Table 3.18 does not cover the same years, so the employment increase of 24 per 
cent from 1974 to 1978 does not strictly bear comparison. From this table, 
which covers all industry, it can be seen that the greatest increase in 
employment took place in non-metal mining, followed by the food, beverages 
and tobacco industries. The total number employed in the selected industries 
amounted to 177,841 in 1976. This compares with the figure for all large 
manufacturing establishments given in Table 3.13, as 470,000 for 1977. In 
other words, the selected industries list leaves out an estimated 292,000 
workers who must have been employed in a wide spread of much smaller 
industries. More information is given on this in Table 3.21. It lists details of the 
926 largest manufacturing establishments for 1977. From the table, it can be 
seen that these establishments employed nearly 275,00 workers. Of the 470,000
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workers employed in 8,200 establishments, almost 275,000 were employed by 
only 926 establishments. In other words, in 1977, 58.5 per cent of workers were 
employed by only 11.3 per cent of the total number of large manufacturing 
establishments. Industrialisation on a large scale was, therefore, fairly limited in 
Iran, even as late as 1977.
3.7 The manufacturing industries: sectoral contribution to output
From Table 3.21, it can be seen too, that intermediate goods accounted for 35.4 
per cent of manufacturing output in 1977, just ahead of consumer goods with 
34.5 per cent. Capital goods accounted for 28.3 per cent. During the 1960s and 
early 70s, import-substitution was implemented especially in the consumer 
goods industries. Thus, tariffs were highest on consumer goods and durables 
and lowest on capital goods. During this period, however, the consumer non­
durable group had a negative ‘real’ contribution to the national income:
This indicates general inefficiency in the Iranian manufacturing 
industry and inefficient investment decisions in the sheltered markets 
of the country, at a cost to the national economy, especially amongst 
consumer goods industries.22
By 1977, the output of the consumer goods industry was in decline relative 
to intermediate goods and even capital goods. This was most noticeable after 
1972, when the government concentrated on increasing substantial amounts of 
investment to some intermediate goods industries and most capital goods 
industries, in particular the motor vehicle industry and basic metals. Table 3.22 
outlines this trend from 1963 to 1974, in terms of gross output of manufacturing
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establishments. The composition of manufacturing value added in percentage 
form is given in Table 3.23 (this is an expansion of Table 3.11) across similar 
years.
From Table 3.23, it can be seen that the percentage contribution of 
manufacturing value added on consumer goods declined from 69 per cent in 
1963 to roughly 51 per cent in 1970 and 1971 before finally falling to 39.6 per 
cent in 1974. Intermediate goods rose, however, from 23.2 per cent in 1963 to
30.3 per cent in 1970 and then 44.7 per cent in 1974. The capital goods industry 
experienced the biggest growth of manufacturing value added. The increase was 
from a 6.7 per cent contribution in 1963 to 15.6 per cent in 1974. However, as 
Parvin Alizadeh also acknowledged:
Despite the rapid growth of intermediate and capital goods industries 
over this period . . .  the ‘capital goods’ sector remained structurally 
narrow and undeveloped.23
Alizadeh has studied the machine tools industry and has researched extensively 
into the motor vehicle industry in Iran; her findings will be summarised here.
The machine tools and machine industry were technologically the most 
important part of the capital goods industry. The capital goods sector can be 
divided into electrical and non-electrical machinery (ISIC Groups 383 and 382). 
The output of subsector 383 was mainly in the consumer durables area, its 
major component being subdivision 3832 (radios, TV, etc.) while subsector 
382 for the most part encompassed the production of industrial machinery.
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Table 3.24 compares the contribution of Iran’s capital goods sector to 
manufacturing value added (MVA) with other countries for similar years.
From the table, it is clear that Iran’s capital goods sector was geared 
towards the production of goods from subdivision 383, the consumer durables 
sector. The ratio of 383 to 382 shows the degree to which the productive 
structure of the capital goods industry varied from country to country in the 
1970s. It was less than one for highly industrialised countries such as the USA 
and Japan, indicating that goods from subsector 382 were the majority share of 
those being produced. This was also the case in India and Brazil. Of the other 
countries, Iran had the highest ratio of consumer durables production to 
industrial machinery. In fact, the table represented an improvement on Iran’s 
earlier performance in the output of goods in subdivision 382, since it was 
virtually non-existent in the 1960s, contributing as it did between 0.5 per cent 
to 0.6 per cent in MVA. This compared with 5.1 per cent to 6.2 per cent for 
India, 3.4 per cent to 4.4 per cent for Brazil, 2.6 per cent for Turkey, 2.3 per 
cent for South Korea and 1.1 per cent for Colombia.24 These figures, taken 
together with the fact that Iran’s per capita income was higher than that of 
India, Brazil, Colombia, South Korea and Turkey, all indicate the narrow and 
underdeveloped structure of the Iranian capital goods industry.
The main drawback of a narrow capital goods sector is that it cannot 
then aid the vertical integration of manufacturing industries. This is particularly
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important for those industries that are heavily import-dependent for their 
component parts. Alizadeh cites the case of Japan:
At the level of speculation, one can argue that the presence of a 
relatively developed capital goods sector in Japan provided a fertile 
ground for the rapid development of the Japanese industries in the 
1950s and 1960s. In this respect, one can refer to the development of 
the Japanese automotive industry. This industry, which was almost 
wholly dependent on imported parts and components in the early 
1950s, achieved 100% local content by the late 1950s and also 
Japanese firms began to develop their own models by the mid- 
1960s.25
Iran’s manufacturing industries were marked by the degree of their import- 
dependence, particularly in the intermediate goods, capital goods and consumer 
durable industries. In 1970, the import-content of the pharmaceutical industry 
was 100 per cent, tyres 90 per cent, air coolers 88 per cent, and passenger cars 
80 per cent.26 Alizadeh’s study of the motor vehicle industry reveals that the 
local content of the industry was limited to the extent that almost all the locally- 
produced passenger car models were essentially an assembly operation. The 
revised Fifth Plan envisaged the local content of the vehicles manufactured 
domestically would reach 75 per cent during the course of the Plan. However, 
by 1978, the actual weighted local content of domestically-produced vehicles 
averaged 45.3 per cent.27
Returning to the manufacturing industries as a whole, Table 3.25 presents 
UNIDO’s statistics on the composition of manufacturing value added for the 
two years, 1970 and 1978. These show a 6.6 per cent decrease over the period 
for consumer goods and a decrease, too, of 7.8 per cent for intermediate goods. 
The capital goods industry shows an even more pronounced increase than in the
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other tables, an increase of 226.5 per cent. UNIDO’s statistics show consumer 
goods contributing 28.2 per cent to the manufacturing value added in 1978, 
intermediate goods a massive 60.7 per cent (through the inclusion of petroleum 
refineries), while in spite of its rapid growth, the capital goods industry 
contributed only 11.1 per cent. Both the original and revised Fifth Plans 
emphasised the importance of the intermediate and capital goods industries. 
The original plan listed as its second qualitative objective:
to establish new industries related to existing industries and available 
resources, particularly producing capital and intermediate goods, and 
thereby reduce future dependence on imported goods.28
The revised plan explained the importance of these industries thus:
In the Fifth Development Plan the country’s industrial development is 
regarded as a basic measure in laying the groundwork of an advanced 
economy which will pave the way for the Great Civilization. Thus, 
while the necessary measures are envisaged in the Fifth Plan to meet 
existing shortages and ensure current requirements, an appropriate 
climate will be created for the production of a wide range of machine 
tools, industrial equipment and base metals required for the 
manufacture of capital goods.29
Finally, the productivity of the main sectors can be seen in the 
production indices for the period. Table 3.26 covers the years 1962-72, while 
Tables 3.27 and 3.28 cover the period after 1972 for both large manufacturing 
establishments and industry as a whole. Apart from fluctuations in some of the 
consumer goods industries, Table 3.26 bears witness to the success of the 
Fourth Plan, with substantial increases in productivity for intermediate goods 
industries such as chemicals and basic metal, and for capital goods industries, 
in particular transport equipment and electrical machinery. The combined index
160
rose from 60 to 100 from 1962-67, during the Fourth Plan period it rose even 
more spectacularly from 100 to 198.
By contrast, the general index of industrial productivity rose only 17 
points during the Fifth Plan period (Table 3.28), partly due to the inclusion of 
mining which dropped from 109 points in 1973 to 97 by 1978. The 
manufacturing index rose by 59 points, the most noticeable increases in 
productivity being in the beverages and machinery industries. The index 
numbers for both electrical and non-electrical machinery experienced their 
greatest increases before 1976, when production for non-electrical machinery 
rose from 18 in 1973 to 121 in 1976 and from 40 to 116 for electrical 
machinery across the same period. Between 1976 and 1978, there was only a 
five point rise for non-electrical machinery, while electrical machinery actually 
dropped in productivity from 116 in 1976 to 106 the following year, before 
rising again to 137 in 1978.
3.8 Structure o f investment
In order to attain the envisaged objectives of increasing the value of industrial 
production from 509 billion rials in 1972 to 1,130 billion rials in 1978 (an 
annual average growth rate of 17 per cent), and of increasing the value added of 
the industrial sector from 164 billion rials to 408 billion rials over the same 
period, the revised Fifth Plan projected an investment level of 780.1 billion 
rials. This compares with 506.4 billion rials envisaged in the original Fifth Plan, 
that is, an increase of over 50 per cent.
In addition, credits for industry would rise from 103.5 billion rials in the 
Fourth Plan to 194.5 billion rials in the original Fifth Plan, and 368.09 billion 
rials in the revised plan. Table 3.29 shows the projected fixed capital formation 
for industry during the Fifth Plan, and Table 3.30 shows the total credits for 
industry. The revised Fifth Plan took the opportunity of increasing 
development credits to the private sector from 20 billion rials in the original 
plan to 100 billion rials, as can be seen in Table 3.30. Of the 780.1 billion rials 
allocated for investment, 36 per cent would be in the public sector and 64 per 
cent in the private sector. This was in line with an established policy of 
encouraging private sector participation in the country’s industrialisation 
programme. Reference is made to this in a section of the revised plan, the 
objective being:
to transfer gradually to the private sector public-sector industrial units 
which have in the past been established to guide and encourage 
private interests to invest in industry.31
In a speech to the Iran-United Kingdom Financial Conference in 1975, the 
prime minister, Amir Abbas Hoveida outlined the government’s policy towards 
the private sector:
The Government has always valued the role of the business 
community in the growth of the economy, both in domestic and 
foreign trade. This country’s development plans are closely 
predicated on a close, complementary cooperation between the public 
and private sectors...
Our commitment to a mixed economy will never change. The private 
sector is expected to play a very substantial role in the current Fifth 
Plan: to provide 43 per cent of all new investment in agriculture; 64 
per cent of investment in industry; and nearly three quarters of the 
investment in housing. And these are only examples.
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Moreover the private sector has been invited to involve itself in such 
traditionally public sector preserves as road and port construction, 
port management and in steel and petrochemicals, after the primary 
processing stages. The Government will continue its active role in 
infrastructural development and the provision of social services, and 
is perfectly willing to leave to the private sector the more profitable 
activities.32
Emphasis on private investment in manufacturing began in the early 1960s 
with the Third Plan. The primary means of bringing about increased 
participation from a private sector traditionally wary of unfamiliar and risky 
enterprises was to provide:
a) protection of the domestic industry by banning the import of goods 
similar to those being manufactured in Iran, b) exemption from 
customs duties for machinery, certain spare parts and raw materials 
destined for Iranian factories, c) tax holidays . . . d) the granting of 
loans and equity participation in industrial firms on the part of the 
Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran . . . 33
The industrial banks were very important in this process and they were 
responsible for over 75 per cent of private investment in industry in the ten 
years from 1962.34 In that decade, industrial investment amounted to 357 billion
c
rials, of which 62 per cent was in the private sector. An assessment of the 
success of the Third Plan’s policy of encouraging private sector investment was 
made by the PBO in the Fourth Plan:
Together, the public sector and the private sector will have made a 
total investment of 70 billion rials in industry and mining by the end 
of 1346 [1967]. Of this sum Rials 46 billion was invested by the 
private sector and 24 billion rials by the Plan Organization. Private 
investment therefore exceeded that originally provided for by the 
Third Plan by 50 per cent. At the start of the Third Plan, it was 
recommended that Government intervention should be confined to a 
few basic industries and to investments in projects which, for one 
reason or another, fall outside the private sector. In practice, however, 
the Government, in addition to laying the foundations of future basic 
industries, by providing effective assistance to and even participating
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in private industry, also spurred the private sector to greater industrial 
investments during the Third Plan...
At the start of the Third Plan the private sector, owing to economic 
stagnation, did not show much inclination towards making new 
investments. But from the end of 1342 [1963] private investment 
started picking up at an unprecedented rate. In this revitalized activity 
the assistance provided by Plan Organization and the industrial banks 
played an important role. The policy of the Government in 
encouraging and protecting the private sector resulted in increasing 
confidence on the part of private investors who channelled their 
savings into the industrial sector.36
The private industrial sector grew mainly because increased revenue from 
oil had led to higher government expenditure which in turn, raised total market 
demand. Other incentives included the heavy tariff protection and increased 
foreign investment in industries as well as long-term loans by the development 
banks. The main problem in persuading investors to look to industry was, as 
Parviz Sadigh also points out, that great profits were to be made in land 
speculation. Although government incentives and the newly established Tehran 
stock exchange did prove fairly successful, the vast majority of investors and 
entrepreneurs still preferred to invest in land, particularly urban land.
For a small group of private investors, the development banks, in 
particular the Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran (IMDBI), 
provided cheap and long-term credit. The Bank itself received substantial 
government subsidies, although nominally a privately-owned joint stock 
company.38 Because of the high cost of administration of small loans, the 
IMDBI preferred to give large loans, thereby effectively depriving small 
industrial establishments of the facility to obtain cheap credit. This, as well as 
the fact that companies had to apply to the Ministry of Economy for licences
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(known as Commencement and Operation Permits) usually resulted in 
potentially profitable projects being given to established industrialists with 
political connections. Table 3.31 outlines the characteristics of these permits for 
the period 1964-73.
Since a licence was a prerequisite for eligibility to apply for a loan, the 
allocation policy resulted in the creation of an industrial elite and the 
concentration of industrial ownership:
In principle, licensing laws represent sound policy for a developing 
nation that would like to have some say in how capital resources are 
utilized, how much foreign investment is permitted, and to have the 
size, number, location, and products of enterprises in any one industry 
controlled. . . In practice, however, the licensing laws in Iran could 
not achieve these goals. From the legal point of view, the laws 
specified a confusing array of elaborate regulations necessary for the 
application of a license, but did clearly define how one proposal 
would be judged better than another. Furthermore, there was neither a 
consistent long-run plan from which administrators could work nor 
the experts capable of assessing the relative merits of the proposals. .
In effect, the licensing laws have, by limiting the expansion of the 
entrepreneurial class, ensured that industry was controlled by a small 
handful of the favored elite. On the negative side, the removal of 
government support as granted under licensing helped to see that 
these businessmen did not overtly defy the government. On the 
positive side, the laws ensured entrepreneurs were not only willing to 
give the Shah a financial return from their operations but were also 
directly or indirectly through an immediate family member active 
participants in the Shah’s government.39
It was oil wealth allowed the government to create powerful social groups by 
bestowing favours on them. The regulations regarding licences enabled a 
handful of industrialists to become a favoured group. The same group benefited 
from the extensive transfers of credit from the government to the private sector
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in the 1970s. While banks based their decision to give loans on the 
creditworthiness of borrowers:
What made the system in Iran really different was the extent to which 
‘creditworthiness’ was correlated with political power. . . The 
advantage of the modem bourgeoisie in benefitting from credit 
subsidy mainly resulted from its political and cultural proximity to 
the Shah.40
What also differentiated the social and political environment in which the banks 
operated from that prevailing in most other developing countries, was:
heavy subsidy which raised the stakes for the borrowers, government 
control of banks which reduced the chance of the banks to act 
independently of the center of political power, and, most important, 
the unique role played by the royal family which made those with 
close ties to it less of a credit risk.41
Salehi-Isfahani also describes the drawbacks for the banks of this politicised 
form of credit subsidy. For example, not only did political connections facilitate 
the acquisition of a loan, they also helped in delaying repayment by obtaining 
new loans to cover old ones. This situation became increasingly serious by the 
late 1970s, so much so, that cost overruns of 20-100 per cent had to be met by 
the specialised banks. The chairman of the Industrial and Mining Development 
Bank of Iran (IMDBI) in his 1977 annual speech regretted to:
repeat once more that a large part of the Bank’s financial assistance 
had to cover shortages of financial resources due to cost inflation and 
overruns and not for new investment42
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Salehi-Isfahani draws the conclusion that credit subsidy became a means 
by which one section of the bourgeoisie was favoured at the expense of the 
other. The traditional merchant class had less access to credit subsidy than the 
new industrial and westernised elite. This unequal access between the 
traditional and modem bourgeoisie meant that:
their confrontation in the 1979 revolution could not be blamed on an 
inevitable historical necessity. Nor can it be blamed purely on their 
cultural and political differences. Rather, the blame should go to the 
dictatorial political system which amplified these differences into 
more serious conflict in the economic sphere.43
It is not necessary to agree with Salehi-Isfahani’s final conclusion to note that 
credit subsidy as a form of encouraging private sector participation in industry 
had become a politicised process in Iran, whereby industrialisation was used as 
a tool of patronage and control. The extent of the Shah’s involvement in the 
private sector reinforced the political nature of the industrial experiment, as part 
of an overall politicisation of important sectors within the country, which in 
itself derived from the nature of government in Iran:
The Shah and his family were able to gain a measure of control over 
the private industrial establishments through direct ownership. Every 
large establishment in Iran needed the Shah’s blessing to remain 
operative. As a result, industrialists generally gave the Shah shares in 
the operation. (One businessman who was interviewed for this study 
stated that 10 per cent was customary.) These shares were never in 
the Shah’s name, and rarely in those of his family, but in the name of 
one of the organizations he controlled. The most commonly 
mentioned organizations in this regard were the Pahlavi Foundation 
and Bank Omran. Shares in the enterprises were usually too small to 
involve the holding organizations directly with the day-to-day 
administration of the company but were large enough to give the 
royal family access to confidential information and to allow audits 
conducted by their own personnel.44
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Bank Omran was one of the commercial banks which, along with the Central 
Bank (Bank Markazi) and Bank Melli, also gave loans to the private sector. 
Table 3.32 shows the activities of the specialised banks, which includes the 
IMDBI, the Development and Investment Bank of Iran and the Industrial Credit 
Bank (ICB), for the years 1975-78. From this it can be seen that the number of 
applicants was fairly low, the highest figure being 618 applicants in 1975. The 
amount paid out was high in relation to the number of applicants, especially 
since the number of application for loans did not necessarily represent the 
number finally approved. Assuming, however, that it did, each applicant in 
1975 would average a loan of 82 million rials and one of just over one billion 
rials in 1977. The industrial enterprises favoured, therefore, were large, 
certainly in terms of capital.
The amount paid by the banks increased by roughly 11 billion rials 
from 1975 to 1977, but then decreased in 1978 along with a fall in applications 
for loans. Taking inflation into account and the decrease in applications for 
loans, it can be argued that the 11 billion rials increase does not represent a 
substantial increase in loans paid by the banks. If 1978 is included, the average 
for the period is 51.3 billion rials, which is nearer the amount paid out in 1975 
than any other year. Tables 3.33 and 3.34 show the loan operations of the two 
largest specialised banks, the IMDBI and the ICB. The ICB was a government- 
owned bank funded by the Plan and Budget Organisation. The amount paid out 
by the ICB increased from 1.3 billion rials to 13.75 billion rials (current prices) 
in 1975. After 1973, the share of working capital dropped from around one
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third to 7.2 per cent in 1974 and 6.1 per cent in 1975. The IMDBI increased the 
value of its loans similarly after 1973 and the number of its applicants also 
increased suddenly. In 1973, 7.5 billion rials was paid out and just two years 
later, in 1975, 33.6 billion went in loans, the increase being a direct result of 
greater government revenue made available to the bank. It should also be noted 
that the amount approved by the banks varied substantially from what was 
actually paid out. For some years, this could be as much as double or more.
Table 3.35 is concerned with the activities of the IMDBI only. From 
this, information regarding the number of borrowers and the degree of foreign 
shareholding is given. Throughout the period, the total number of borrowers 
numbered no more than 650, which was a fairly small proportion of the 
manufacturing establishments in existence (8,200 large manufacturing 
establishments in 1977, to say nothing of 191,070 small manufacturing 
establishments in 1972). This would tend to support the view that easy credit 
was available to an elite among the private industrial sector and, at the very 
least, to large capitalist industrial establishments.
While the majority of credit was extended to those establishments 
producing intermediate or capital goods, this meant also that nearly half the 
bank’s customers were borrowers with foreign shareholders. Table 3.36 shows 
the government’s credits to industry and mining and demonstrates the degree of 
government commitment to the more capital-intensive industries. The 
metallurgical and metal industries received over 60 per cent of government
169
credits in 1973, though this proportion dropped to 41.4 per cent in 1976. The 
chemical and petrochemical industries enjoyed the next largest amount, which 
in 1973, formed 14.2 per cent of credits and in 1976, 12 per cent. Together, 
these industries obtained well over 50 per cent of government credits for this 
period, which rose from just over 17 billion rials to a massive 69.4 billion rials 
within three years. The increase in government investment expenditure played a 
large part in the government’s ability to encourage the private sector to take part 
in industrial investment. Table 3.37 provides information on the pattern of 
investment and consumption expenditure. Government investment expenditure 
rose from 20.4 billion rials in 1963 to 143.4 billion rials in 1972 and then to 
1,055.1 billion in 1977. At constant 1974 prices, this represented a less 
dramatic, but still sizeable, 3-fold increase for 1972-77.
Private investment rose from 31.9 billion rials in current prices in 1959 
to 144 billion in 1972 and to 776.8 in 1977. In constant prices, this was a 150 
per cent increase for 1972-77, with the annual average growth for 1973-77 
being a sizeable 51 per cent compared with just over 24 per cent for 1963-72. In 
spite of these large increases, private investment expenditure was never as high 
as government expenditure after 1960. Indeed, the ratio of private to 
government expenditure declined significantly from 1.53 in 1959 to 1.00 in 
1972 and finally to 0.74 in 1977. Again, this reflected the far greater sources of 
revenue the government had at its disposal than the private sector.
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Although government expenditure was great, government consumption 
was greater still.45 In fact, it grew at an accelerated rate during the 1960s and 
70s. From Table 3.37 it can be deduced that private consumption in 1977 was 8 
times what it had been in 1963 ,while public consumption had grown almost 27 
times during the same period. For this reason, Katouzian has argued that it is 
erroneous to assume that the Shah’s mistake lay in accelerating growth at a high 
rate; state consumption was the ‘real culprit’, resulting in the rapid depletion of 
resources and negative net savings46 In part, state consumption was high 
because its income came in the form of oil revenues and, as such, Katouzian 
goes on to say, it was easier to spend than earn income.
Finally, it should be noted that although the state was able to encourage 
increased private investment, the private sector was very much under state 
control and not as independent of the public sector as would usually be the case. 
For example, in his report of the early 70s, Dragoslav Avramovic writes:
While most of the industrial growth has taken place in the private 
sector of the economy, the government has continued to exercise a 
major influence on investment and output decisions. Some projects, 
notably in petro-chemicals, are government-owned; and the integrated 
steel mill, presently under construction, is also in public ownership. 
Perhaps more important, the government authorities decide on the 
structure and location of output through the tariff and import policy 
and through licensing of new investment. An essential link in the 
relationships of the public and private sectors and of the domestic 
economy and international capital is the rapidly-growing Industrial 
and Mining Development Bank of Iran. It has participated in the 
promotion, financing and direction of almost all new industrial 
projects undertaken in the last few years. The government through its 
industrial policy, and the IMDBI through lending and equity 
investments, are in a position to exercise strategic leadership in 
industrialisation, while continuing to rely on private sources of 
savings and private management of individual enterprises.47
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The government’s pervasive regulatory powers in the activities of the private 
sector, also resulted in frustrating delays for individual businesses:
Government bureaucracy has really slowed the pace of business. The 
private sector is required to obtain the approval of the state 
bureaucracy even for most of its minor decisions.48
The aims of the Fifth Plan regarding the private sector had been:
to encourage private sector savings and investment in productive 
activities and to strengthen the capital market;
to ensure greater cooperation between public sector and private sector• • 49activities.
Superficially, the government did succeed in raising private sector investment, 
but the basis on which this was achieved was not a solid one nor did it meet the 
government’s objective that fixed capital formation for industry by the private 
sector should exceed that of the public sector by at least 80 per cent (see Table 
3.29). The pursuit of quick and easy profits was the main motive of the private 
sector and it was greatly aided in this by the provision of easy credits by the 
government. Once the government was no longer in a position to do this, the 
private sector began turning to other activities or sending capital abroad. In 
other words, the private sector was heavily subsidised by the government and 
did not turn into the independent engine for growth that the government 
ostensibly envisaged.
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3.9 Foreign direct investment and skills shortages
The Iranian government’s interest in obtaining foreign investment and technical 
expertise originated in the 1950s and the Law for the Attraction and Protection 
of Foreign Investments was passed in 1955. The main provisions of the Law 
were the following:
1) Capital imported into Iran shall be subject to the legal 
protection of the Government and all the rights, exemptions and 
facilities granted to the domestic capital and private productive 
enterprises shall also apply to foreign capital and firms. In the 
regulations, foreign capital is defined as foreign exchange imported 
through authorised banks, machinery, equipment and parts, patent 
rights, expert services and the like.
2) The Government guarantees the repatriation of profits in the 
same currency as that originally imported and in the case of 
nationalisation [of which there was no case up to 1979] will provide 
fair compensation for foreign firms.
3) The Law applies to all foreign investment for development, 
rehabilitation, and productive activities in industry, mining, 
agriculture and transport. Development activities a redefined as those 
activities which help raise the production level and income of the 
country, or directly or indirectly earn foreign exchange, or affect an 
economy in its expenditure.
4) Investment in the banking sector will also enjoy the privileges 
of the Law.
5) The capital is privately-owned without any foreign Government 
participation.50
The Law did not cover the purchase of foreign technology and was designed to 
be as attractive as possible to potential foreign investors. Iran’s needs however, 
changed considerably over the period after 1955 but no amendments were made 
to the Law to keep up with the developing situation. The major change was that 
the capital constraints of the 50s and early 60s gave way to a more urgent 
constraint in terms of skilled and technical manpower. This deficiency had been 
acknowledged by the government as one of the failures of the Third Plan:
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Despite the efforts made in the Second and Third Plans to 
industrialize the country and the successes achieved so far, the 
industry and mining sector still faces basic problems, some of which 
are enumerated below:-
a. Insufficient numbers of skilled workers, specialists, management 
experts and difficulties in employing foreign experts;51
The inability to attract foreign investment on a large-scale basis was identified 
by the Fourth Plan as a major impediment to the expansion of the mining 
industry. One problem was the attraction of experts to fill the skills constraint, 
the other was the necessity of a policy geared towards:
The gradual replacement of foreign experts by Iranians, and greater 
emphasis on training and employing the technical talents of Iranians 
and the adoption of policies aiming at further participation of 
industrialists and entrepreneurs in on-the-job training in industry;52
During the Fifth Plan period, the government devised its policies in the full 
knowledge that there would be a shortfall in skilled manpower. Table 3.38 lists 
the projections calculated by the PBO, according to which out of a demand for 
2,112,000 jobs, 721,200 would not be available. This represented a 34.1 per 
cent labour shortage. Most of these shortages were for skilled industrial 
workers and skilled construction workers. The revised Fifth Plan showed an 
awareness that this would be a problem in the face of the amount of investment 
it wished to undertake:
. . . three new dimensions have been added to Iran’s medium-term 
planning discipline, all directly as an increase in oil revenues: 
a. planning on the basis of the availability of national resources, 
limiting infrastructural capacities, and other limitations to production, 
including the shortage of skilled manpower;
b. planning with regard to the importance of the proper utilization 
of that part of the country’s foreign exchange earnings which cannot 
be absorbed in the short term;
c. planning with no constraint on foreign exchange, with 
particular stress on procuring domestic needs from foreign sources of
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supply and increasing the capacities, organizations and systems 
necessary for such procurement.53
While point c) explicitly states that internal shortages of supply would not 
impede the government in its determination to carry through the big push, 
nevertheless, it seems that the government was not prepared for the problems 
which would arise. Thus, although Iran planned to recruit 10,000 foreign 
experts in 1976 in addition to the 50,000 already employed from countries such 
as India, the Philippines, South Korea and Vietnam,54 it did not plan to cover 
more than 15 per cent of the 34 per cent labour shortage with foreign workers.55 
The rest were to emerge out of an increased number of Iranian students abroad 
deciding to return home and from more intensive education and training 
programmes within the country. There was little prospect, however, of a 
sufficient number of people being trained in the short term, and the returning 
students could not make up the shortfall, their numbers being very low. During 
1971, 1,946 students returned and from March to November 1975, 2,916 
returned.56 But this was a drop in the ocean compared to the 595,000 vacancies 
which needed to be filled domestically.
A Foreign Employment Centre was set up in 1975, but by the end of 1977 
the shortages of skilled manpower, whether foreign or national, remained a 
serious constraint on the government’s investment programme. The Minister of 
Education and Science, Manuchehr Ganji, appealed to industrialists to invest in 
technical and vocational training facilities.57 Nevertheless, the problem was not 
circumvented and the government was obliged to continue to rely on a visible
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number of foreign technicians, who enjoyed higher salaries than their Iranian 
counterparts and a more affluent lifestyle and thus became a source of 
nationalist grievance. In any case, the employment of foreigners is usually only 
suitable as a short-term remedy, but in Iran’s case the need for skilled workers 
was so great that the dependence would have had to have been for a substantial 
period of time. There is no evidence to show that the implications of this had 
been fully considered by the government. 58
Tables 3.39 and 3.40 show the inflow of foreign private capital by 
amount and by country for 1971-77. The Center for the Attraction and 
Protection of Foreign Investments (CAPFI) had been set up under the 1955 Law 
and it channelled the funds into the appropriate industries. Foreign investment 
increased from under 1.5 billion rials in 1971 to 6.3 billion in 1977. Table 3.39 
is noticeable for the diversity of the year-to-year investments as these were 
mainly determined by the project at hand. Nevertheless, it is clear that after 
1973 petrochemicals took on a new importance as did metallurgy from 1976. 
The country most involved in the petrochemical industry was Japan; indeed, in 
1977 all foreign investment for petrochemicals came from Japan.
Agreement on a huge petrochemical complex at Bandar Shahpur on the 
southern shore of the Persian Gulf was reached with a Japanese consortium in 
April 1973. This signified the creation of the Iran Japan Petrochemical 
Company (UPC) in which each country had a 50 per cent holding. The plant 
was to produce olefins and aromatics and then to move into salt electrolysis.
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Both the cost of the plant and the date it was due to come on stream were 
constantly revised upwards and forwards. Originally the complex was estimated 
to cost between $900 million and $1 billion, by 1977 the costs were estimated 
at $2 billion and in February 1979 the amount had gone up to $3.25 billion.59
The rising costs were in part affected by the initial rise in oil prices but 
later, and more importantly, by the fact that the costs of the project were 
denominated in yen. When the yen rose rapidly in 1978, the costs of the 
enormous project soared. The complex was 85 per cent complete at the time of 
the revolution but by 1984 Japan decided that it was economically unviable and 
reduced its stake to 25 per cent, as well as making the Iranian government agree 
to bear the costs of completing the project.
While the Shah cannot be held responsible for what happened to the 
plant after the revolution, there is good reason to think that the UPC complex 
was never a suitable project. It aimed to produce at least ten petrochemical 
products without being certain of the markets for each of these:
. . . both Iranian and Japanese sources claimed that between 50 and 
70 per cent of the complex’s products would be absorbed by the 
internal Iranian market - a goal which interested outsiders suspected 
would stretch Iranian and Japanese ingenuity. The problem was not of 
there not being sufficient domestic demand, but of attracting the 
necessary downstream investments to convert IJPC’s intermediate 
products into marketable end-products. . . Petrochemicals being 
complicated affairs, the planners have only to miscalculate the 
demand for two or three of the end-products and the economics of the 
others are also affected. . . Even if the events of late 1978 had not 
occurred, IJPC’s planners were probably being too ambitious to 
establish such a complex project in Iran by the late 1970s.60
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Because of the huge sums of money involved in the UPC project from 1973, 
Japan became Iran’s largest foreign investor as shown in Table 3.40. In 1977 
just under 40 per cent of foreign capital came from Japan. The US was, on 
balance, the second largest investor, though until Japanese involvement it had 
been the largest. The amount of foreign capital increased from 1.47 billion rials 
in 1971 to a peak of 6.54 billion in 1976 before falling off slightly the following 
year. Of this foreign investment, 35 per cent and 40 per cent was in 
petrochemicals in 1976 and 1977 respectively, as can be seen from Table 3.39.
From 1973-77 inclusive, the inflow of foreign investment amounted to
25.3 billion rials while total investment for the Fifth Plan period was projected 
at just under 4,700 billion rials.61 Foreign investment, therefore, played a very 
small part in the contribution of capital to the country’s development. As Fred 
Halliday notes:
Because Iran has had plentiful supplies of capital, the main aim has 
not been, as it has in many other third-world countries, to get 
investment monies from these firms, and indeed they make up a small 
part of the total invested. . . Moreover, whilst the firms have been 
guaranteed favourable terms, the Iranian state has imposed strict 
terms on them in other respects, a strictness made possible by oil 
revenues . . . The Iranian state, for its part, is heavily reliant on these 
firms for its industrialization programme since it is only in this way 
that under capitalist relations it can install and run the equipment 
needed for developing the medium and heavy sides of industry.62
In other words, the shortage of indigenous know-how, managerial and other 
skills made Iran dependent on foreign firms for the implementation of major 
projects and enterprises. In addition to this, few foreign concerns invested in 
those industries involved in exports. In the mid-1970s, only 4 out of 23 firms
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with foreign partners exported their goods. It seems that foreign investors 
preferred those industries geared towards the lucrative home market protected, 
as they were, behind high tariff barriers. To a great extent, the limitations 
imposed by the Iranian government on the operation of foreign firms made little 
difference to their importance. The major limitation was that foreign firms 
operating inside Iran as a joint venture with an Iranian partner were subject to a 
maximum shareholding of 49 per cent. Table 3.41 shows the ownership 
patterns of the 223 foreign firms operating in Iran. Only 11.7 per cent had a 
majority shareholding, while just under half the companies (48.4 per cent) held 
10-35 per cent of the stake. According to Rafii, this is not a good guide to the 
extent of foreign control actually exerted. Managerial control was almost totally 
in foreign hands in the joint ventures and in enterprises with 24 per cent foreign 
equity or more. In addition to this, wholly-owned Iranian companies sometimes 
brought in foreign collaborators for their expertise and they too could exert 
significant influence.64
However, by the mid-70s, relations between the Iranian government and 
some foreign companies, in particular those of the US had begun to sour. 
Bashiriyeh suggests that this was due to Iran’s oil policies and extensive arms 
procurement programme which irritated some members of the US State 
Department and Congress.65 Tension was compounded with the establishment 
of the Law for the Extension of Industrial Property in 1975. This reduced the 
amount of shares foreign ventures could own to 25 per cent and some
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companies, including B.F. Goodrich, the tyre company, decided to pull out of 
Iran at that time.
The Law itself, which was established by imperial decree, had been 
primarily designed to regain populist support for the government. Private 
companies were to sell 49 per cent of their shares to workers and the general 
public, while state-owned industries were to sell off 99 per cent. Ostensibly, it 
was to prevent the emergence of ‘industrial feudalism’ by broadening the 
ownership base of Iran’s industries and mines.66 The Shah declared this formed 
the 13th principle of the Revolution of the Shah and the People, a process 
which had begun in 1963 with the six point White Revolution and which had 
land reform as its central pillar In reality, the move was a populist one made 
necessary by rising inflation and a sudden downturn in the economy. A policy 
of price controls and anti-profiteering had also been launched. Shareholding 
workers could not participate in management and each worker could buy no 
more than five shares while employers could own 51 per cent. To allay the fears 
of private industrial owners, the prime minister pointed to the real aim behind 
the Law and assured owners that: ‘they will still have the absolute control of 
their factory and of the majority of shares. The aim is to create a sense of
• / : oequality among workers’.
It can be concluded that foreign direct investment in Iran was not large 
in terms of financial commitment, partly because Iran had large reserves of 
capital, but also because the opportunities for foreign investment were not
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particularly great in terms of developed infrastructure, skilled labour or even the 
size of the market. The influence of foreign companies in Iran lay instead in the 
skills they brought with them and the degree to which the country became 
technologically dependent on them. Unlike some countries, for example Japan, 
Iran was unable to use the imported technology as a basis for building up local 
capability and her shortages of skilled manpower ensured an unenviable 
reliance on foreign know-how. At the time, this dependence was seen by many 
as a political move, actively encouraged by the government in order to please 
country’s Western and especially American allies. As a specific act of 
clientelistic relations, it would be difficult to prove.
3.10 Trade policy
Iran’s trade policies should be seen in the context of its import-substitution 
industrialisation strategy. As industrialisation proceeded, it would be expected 
that imports of capital and intermediate goods would increase to extend the 
range of domestic consumer goods production. At the same time, an increase of 
non-oil exports would also be expected, especially by the mid-1970s when ISI 
had already been in force for nearly 15 years and since the whole point of 
industrialisation was to find a substitute for foreign exchange income after oil 
reserves were depleted. The revised Fifth Plan has a section outlining policy 
towards ISI in terms of tariffs on imported goods:
A constant review of the level of tariff protection given to various 
branches of industry, with due regard for the development potential of 
each branch, will be a basic principle of the country’s tariff policy,
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and this policy will be implemented during the Fifth Plan period in 
the following manner,
i. In the case of consumer goods, the present policy of reducing 
tariff protection so as to raise the quality of goods manufactured in 
Iran and thus enable such goods to be competitive with similar 
imported goods will be continued.
ii. In the case of intermediate or capital goods, appropriate tariff 
protection will be given to manufacturers of such goods so as to 
reduce imports and encourage the domestic manufacture thereof. 
Such protection will gradually be reduced after a reasonable period of 
time.69
The tariff policy of the Fifth Plan represented a policy change, but one 
consistent with the objective of deepening import-substitution. Reference has 
already been made to the government’s early policy of blanket protection of 
domestic industry evolving out of the economic stabilisation programme of the 
early 1960s. Tariffs increased throughout the period and by 1970, the level of 
duty on consumer goods was five times greater than it had been in 1960; it was
• 70four times greater for intermediate and capital goods.
In addition to such controls, the quantity of imports was also restricted 
in the period up to 1973, such that the domestic market became a monopoly for 
domestic producers. From 1973, the government reduced import controls, in 
part to promote efficiency but also to meet growing domestic demand, which 
was increasingly unable to be satisfied by producers within the country. The 
effect of the relaxation of import controls was to allow a flood of imports. 
Table 3.42 shows the composition of imports for 1971-78 in US dollars. The 
value of imports rose five-fold during the period, from $2.1 billion to $10.4 
billion. The last figure is for 1978 and itself represents a drop from the year 
before when imports amounted to $14.6 billion (and therefore represented a
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seven-fold increase). The year 1977 gives a more accurate picture than 1978, as 
we have mentioned before, and therefore percentage shares have been 
calculated for that year rather than 1978.
Just under 65 per cent of imports were of intermediate goods in 1971,
23.4 per cent were of capital goods and only 11.8 per cent were consumer 
goods imports. This was before restrictions on consumer goods were lifted. By 
1977, consumer goods imports accounted for 18.4 per cent of all imports, while 
intermediate goods had dropped to 54.1 per cent and capital goods accounted 
for 27.5 per cent of imports. Goods destined for the manufacturing and mining 
industries claimed the largest part of the intermediate and capital goods 
imports, accounting for roughly three-quarters of all intermediate goods and 
two-thirds of capital goods imports. The most eye-catching feature of the table 
is the huge leap in the value of imports in the two years after the increase in oil 
revenue. Thus, in 1973, the value of imports was $3,737 million. This rose by 
just under $3 billion the following year to $6,614 million. In 1975, imports 
increased substantially again, to $11,696 million.
Table 3.43 shows Iran’s main trading partners during this period. The 
statistics do not include military imports. From the table it can be seen that in 
1973 Iran imported primarily from the former West Germany, followed by 
Japan and the US. A similar situation prevailed in 1978. Iran’s trade was 
overwhelmingly with the free market countries of the developed West and 
Japan. In 1973, just under 77 per cent of her imports was from these countries.
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This rose to 84.1 per cent in 1978, despite an increase of imports from the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries from 9.1 per cent in 1973 to
12.4 per cent in 1978.
It is clear from the table that all the countries listed increased the 
volume of their exports to Iran over the five year period, the US, Japan, former 
West Germany and the former Soviet Union by three times as much, while 
countries with a smaller volume of trade multiplied their exports to an even 
greater degree, such as Spain with a nine-fold rise. Only from Brazil did 
imports not rise significantly. The most noticeable feature of imports during 
this period is the rise in consumer goods, especially of food and live animals 
while intermediate and capital goods, although rising, actually dropped in 
relation to previous periods. Table 3.44 gives a sketch of the import and export 
trends from the early 1960s. There are several important features to note here.
Imports at both constant and current prices rose significantly during the 
1973-78 period. The rate of growth at current prices was 43.1 per cent 
compared with 23.6 per cent for 1963-72. At constant prices too the increase 
was remarkable, from 19.7 per cent for the period 1963-72, to 29 per cent 
during 1973-78. Kamran Mofid has also demonstrated the degree of import 
penetration in the economy, by reference to the ratio of imports to GDP. Over 
the periods 1962-67,1968-72,1973-77, the ratio rose from 13.6 per cent to 16.4 
per cent and then to 18.0 per cent. If oil is excluded from the GDP, the degree 
of penetration was even higher. For the same periods it increased from 16.9 per
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cent to 20.6 per cent and then to 29.1 per cent for the Fifth Plan period.71 The 
main reason for this rise was the upsurge in consumer good imports, which had 
an average growth rate of 5.7 per cent during 1973-78. This compared with a 
negative growth rate of -6.7 per cent for 1963-72 (Table 3.44). By contrast, the 
ratio of both intermediate and capital goods to total imports fell during the Fifth 
Plan period. Their respective rate of growth had been 1.3 per cent and 2.3 per 
cent during 1963-72. This compared with negative rates of -1.3 per cent and -
3.0 per cent for 1973-78.
The real disappointment was to be felt in Iran’s export performance in 
spite of the government’s promotion of the 1970s as the ‘Export Decade’. Since 
the 1960s, the government claim was that import-substitution would result in 
fewer imports and higher non-oil exports. Diversification of manufacturing 
production would also result, so the government predicted, in less reliance on 
oil for foreign exchange. It has already been mentioned that oil reserves were 
due to start becoming depleted by the late 1980s and that the government’s 
efforts, therefore, represented a race against time.
By 1977, the reverse of the intended outcome of the government’s trade 
policy had occurred. Imports, as we have seen, were at an all time high while 
exports of non-oil products, instead of emerging as a substantial foreign 
exchange earner by the late 70s, actually declined in absolute terms. The export 
figures given by Looney in Table 3.44, cover oil and non-oil exports. They 
show a decline in the rate of growth of exports at current and constant prices in
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the 1973-78 period compared with the preceding 1963-72 years. The ratio of 
exports to GNP showed, for the first time since 1959, a negative growth rate 
during the Fifth Plan period. Looney writes:
While non-oil exports were able to expand in line with those of the 
oil sector during the period up to 1973 (albeit from a much lower 
base), they did not play a significant role after 1973. The inability of 
non-oil exports to make a major contribution to Iran’s foreign 
exchange earnings, given the emphasis placed on developing 
alternative sources of non-oil exports, began to cause many observers 
to question the viability of the country’s long-term development 
strategy . . .  it was clear that manufacturing was not moving in the 
direction of establishing a comparative advantage in any of the major 
industries that the government counted on as eventually replacing 
exports, a matter of serious concern given the fact that both oil 
production and revenues were expected to begin declining in the mid- 
1980s.72
Table 3.45 shows the composition of Iran’s non-oil exports for 1971-78 in 
terms of their value. The value of exports increased from $334.6 million in 
1971 to $625.2 million in 1977, before falling off to $542.8 in 1978. This 
represents a doubling of the value of exports from 1971-77, which is 
substantially less than the seven-fold increase in imports for the same years.
In 1971, traditional and agricultural goods, in particular Persian carpets 
and cotton, amounted to 76.6 per cent of Iran’s non-oil exports. This figure 
declined during the period but by only six percentage points by 1977. The 
contribution of non-petroleum mining increased from 4.9 per cent in 1971 to
7.5 per cent in 1977. The value of the export of industrial products such as 
clothing, soap and chemicals rose from 18.4 per cent to 21.7 per cent. These are 
very modest changes in the composition of Iran’s export structure considering 
the fact that the government had been importing $52 billion of intermediate and
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capital goods since 1962 precisely in order to generate the kind of productive 
structure which would result in a boost to non-energy exports.
When oil exports are included in the country’s foreign exchange earnings, 
the picture deteriorates further. Table 3.46 shows that Iran’s dependency on 
income from its export of fuels actually increased during the period, from 86.7 
per cent in 1965 to 97.6 per cent in 1977. Exports of manufactured goods fell 
from 4.4 per cent in 1965 to 1.2 per cent in 1974 and finally to 0.8 per cent in 
1977. Some of the increase in reliance on oil exports was due to the rise in oil 
prices but that was not the sole reason for the increase in revenues. It was also a 
result of faster depletion of oil reserves and the manifestation of a tendency 
towards increased reliance on oil revenues which was already apparent before 
1973. By 1976, Iran was producing 6 million barrels a day (mbd), which was 
just 1 mbd below her productive capacity of 7mbd. This amount was kept as 
spare capacity in case of an emergency. There were many opponents of the 
Shah’s policy of maintaining high levels of oil production. As Shaul Bakhash 
writes:
On the eve of the revolution there was already a growing consensus 
within the administration in favor of lower rates of oil production and 
more restrained levels of development spending . . . Iran’s oil 
resources, it was argued were not only being wasted; they were also 
being plundered. The oil companies were not merely seeking to 
maximize profits. Along with their governments, they were party to a 
conspiracy to exhaust Iran’s mineral resources, to undermine native 
Iranian industry, and to make the country dependent on the West and 
a consumer of Western products. The shah, in pursuit of his grandiose 
military and economic programs, was not simply an unwitting tool of 
the United States and the Western European countries: he was a 
willing lackey, an active partner, in the despoliation of Iran.73
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Table 3.47 gives information on the levels of production and export of oil from 
1967 to 1978 from which it can be seen that both production and exports after 
1973 exceeded levels in the previous period. In 1967, Iran produced just over
2.5 billion barrels a day. Production rose steadily until 1974 to just under 6 
billion barrels, an increase of around 130 per cent. Exports rose almost in 
parallel, by 145 per cent for the same years. From 1975 to 1977, production 
steadied between 5.5 billion barrels a day and 6 billion. Despite a five-fold 
increase in the price of oil, from $2.47 in 1972 to $11.46 in 1974, therefore, the 
government followed a strategy of escalated production and exports of oil to 
fund its big push industrialisation programme.
Nevertheless, industry was not able to absorb the whole of the increase. 
Indeed after 1973, the share allocated to the Plan and Budget Organisation for 
development expenditure dropped from nearly 80 per cent to 71 per cent.74 The 
excess was taken up by the Treasury General and was spent on increased arms 
procurement and the development of some social welfare benefits, which 
required imports of food and clothing.
3.11 Exports and the rise in domestic demand
As we have seen, the big push industrialisation programme in fact resulted in a 
decline in the value of manufactured goods’ exports (Table 3.46), as a 
percentage of total exports, to under 1 per cent in 1977, while revenue from 
fuels accounted for over 97 per cent of the state’s income. Even those industries
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which had been specially selected by the government for priority treatment, 
fared poorly. For example, the value of the motor vehicle industry’s exports 
increased until 1975 when they amounted to $28.3 million, before suffering a 
steady and rapid fall to $9.5 million by 1978. In addition, the ratio of non­
energy exports to imports declined drastically after 1973 and therefore, the 
stated goals of the government to diversify and increase non-energy exports 
cannot be said to have succeeded.
The disappointing performance of non-energy exports was a reflection 
of at least two factors; one was the increased size of the domestic market and 
the other was the relatively poor quality of Iranian goods, caused by inefficient 
production procedures. In addition to these, it should also be remembered that 
until the early 1970s, production had been geared towards satisfying domestic 
demand (which, in the end, it was not able to do) through import-substitution 
and the transition to export-orientation proved difficult for the government. 
Many firms had taken advantage of the high tariffs on finished consumer goods 
and low tariffs on capital and intermediate goods, to set up assembly operations 
for finished consumer goods. The lack of foreign exchange constraint meant too 
that finding alternative means of production of capital and intermediate goods 
would not necessarily be cheaper than their importation. This contributed to the 
already-mentioned late inception of the capital goods industry in Iran, which in 
turn constrained the growth possibilities of industry.
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Within the consumer goods industry, industrial production was geared 
towards basic consumer goods. Despite the country’s relatively large 
population, and therefore, potentially sizeable market, income levels for the 
great majority of the population were very low, while illiteracy ran at over 60 
per cent even by the mid-late 1970s. In 1973, 50 per cent of large urban 
manufacturing establishments were in the food and textile sectors. These two 
sectors accounted for 60 per cent of total industrial sales and 52 per cent of 
urban industrial employment.75
With the government’s massive investment and expenditure 
programme, which included state subsidisation of basic necessities after 1973, 
demand did rise but despite increased production levels (Table 3.27), it could 
not be satisfied. Domestic demand was still rising for basic consumer goods, 
especially clothing and food, which accounted for the rise in consumer goods 
imports in relation to intermediate goods in the post-1973 period, as already 
noted. With the relaxation in import controls, there was an increase too in the 
importation of consumer durables, though many of these were basically luxury 
items, such as German cars and washing machines, and appealed to the 
wealthier sections of the population.
Increasing the level of imports seemed the obvious solution to the 
problem of a shortfall in supply but the policy encountered difficulties 
connected with supply rigidities (port congestion, transportation shortfalls etc.), 
which resulted in money being wasted:
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The cost is difficult to quantify. The only readily identifiable costs 
were demurrage charges for keeping ships waiting at anchor. In 
1974/5 these cost Iran over $1 billion, almost 5 per cent of foreign 
exchange earnings . . . Delays in the ports almost certainly cost Iran 
much more than its imported inflation.76
In addition to a shortage of goods and services, the country also suffered 
from a shortage of electrical power. Visitors to Tehran would remark on the 
irony of power cuts, a phenomenon usually associated with underdeveloped 
economies, in a country widely imagined to be on the brink of an industrial 
revolution. The revised Fifth Plan projected an increase of 377.4 per cent in the 
generation of electric power by publicly-owned facilities over 5 years. In 1972, 
power generation stood at 6,870 million MWH; this was to increase to 32,800 
million MWH by 1977. In fact, it only reached half this amount by then and 
stood at 15,655 million MWH.77 Given the amount of investment and the 
efforts directed to achieving the pre-set goal, the achievement was 
disappointing and reflected not only the limits to productive investment, but 
also the degree to which the government had miscalculated the rate of rise in 
supplies of electricity generation. Needless to say, the power shortages resulted 
in stoppages of production. For example, the Imperial Commission set up to 
investigate waste, reported a 43 per cent decline in production at the Arak 
aluminium plant and a 45 per cent fall in output at the Arak machine tools 
factory caused by the power failures.78
Apart from the increased size of the domestic market, another reason for 
the poor performance of non-energy exports was government policy towards
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export-orientation (already briefly mentioned) as well as the relative lack of 
competitiveness of Iranian exports on the international market. We have already 
noted that import-substitution through protective tariffs made the home market 
more profitable for producers. Export incentives, in the form of cheap export 
credit, were introduced by the government only in 1970. According to Sadigh, 
long-winded administrative procedures accompanying the incentives did not 
make them attractive.79 Nevertheless, the value of non-oil exports did increase 
after 1970, from $273 million to $635 million in 1973.80
The government laid emphasis on increasing exports as one of its five 
major objectives for industry in the revised Fifth Plan. It stated the aim was:
to raise the export capacity of industrial goods so as to expand the 
markets of domestic industries and ensure long-term requirements of 
foreign exchange.81
However, the government dropped its policy of export incentives from 1974 in 
an attempt to divert potential exports into satisfying domestic demand. In other 
words, an entirely inconsistent policy towards the promotion of exports was 
pursued and one which showed how soon the economy had gone out of the 
government’s control after implementation of the revised Fifth Plan. It has to be 
reiterated once again that accelerated investment made possible by the increase 
in oil revenues was intended to industrialise the country so that non-oil exports 
would cover foreign exchange earnings after oil supplies ran out. In fact, the 
government’s industrialisation drive obliged it actively to discourage non-oil 
exports. This shows that the degree of demand unleashed by the huge
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investment programme had not been foreseen by the government, which then 
had to take desperate steps to control it. Fereidun Fesharaki, who worked in the 
Plan and Budget Organisation, wrote:
Not only were all the funds injected into the economy, but also Iran 
began to borrow internationally again. Many planners at PBO felt 
that, perhaps, one third to one half of the oil funds were wasted 
through unproductive, unnecessary and over-ambitious "white 
elephant" projects and imports. The very fabric of the social order 
was disturbed through uncontrolled spending. Non-oil exports which 
had reached $600 mn in 1974 fell in absolute terms. People went on a 
wild buying spree, project costs escalated, inflation which was under 
4 per cent in the 1960s reached 30-40 per cent. In short, all the
benefits of 20 years of planning were destroyed in less than three
82years.
The competitiveness of Iranian goods on the international market is another 
point to consider on the same issue of non-energy exports. Table 3.48 provides 
information on the ex-factory price of selected goods compared to the 
international price for the year 1971. It can be seen that there was no necessary 
correlation between the rate of protection and the competitiveness of Iranian- 
produced goods. Most of the consumer goods listed were below CDF prices, 
with the notable exception of sugar, while intermediate goods were either 
below CIF prices or only up to 10 per cent above. It was in the relatively 
underdeveloped capital goods and durable consumer goods areas that prices 
were in general above CIF prices. Of the 13 examples listed, 11 were above CIF 
prices, 6 of which were either 20 per cent or above.
It is difficult to find a similar set of figures for the Fifth Plan period but 
there is good reason to believe that the overvaluation of the rial and accelerating
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domestic inflation from 1975 onwards made Iranian goods less competitive 
than in 1971. Alizadeh’s study of the automobile industry reveals that of the 
five main assembly plants for passenger cars, the ex-factory price of one of 
these was 23 per cent above CIF prices, while cars produced at the four other 
plants were more substantially in the region of 41 per cent to 63 per cent above 
CIF prices.83 According to Alizadeh this was a reflection of the high cost of 
locally-produced parts, such as engines, in the case of the exceptional plant, 
while three of the other four plants, operating at lower levels of production, 
manufactured cars of limited local content and were essentially assembly 
operations. The divergence between their ex-factory price and international 
prices indicates the uneconomical nature of an assembly operation below a 
certain level. The exceptional plant produced five times as many cars as the 
next largest plant and was the only plant to work on a two-shift basis.84
Another drawback for the industry was the operation of factories below 
capacity. Alizadeh writes:
Despite increased demand after 1973, especially of trucks, Iranian 
production capacity was not fully utilised because of the substantial 
influx of imports. In 1974 and 1975 the government temporarily 
reduced import restrictions on trucks (and to a lesser degree on other 
vehicles) and itself imported a large number of trucks for prompt 
implementation of its own projects.85
Inefficiency was caused, too, not only by high production costs and under­
utilisation of capacity but also, as already noted, a lack of sufficiently skilled 
manpower:
194
Within three years Iran had become an exceptionally high-cost 
country without the benefits of skilled or efficient labour. General 
Motors calculated in late 1975 that it took 45 man-hours to assemble 
their Chevrolet Iran in Tehran against 25 man-hours in West 
Germany for the same car, the Opel Commodore. GM Iran had 
managed to reach 45 hours in just over 12 months, having scaled 
down from 80 hours at the outset of production. The comparative 
difference of labour costs was 5.2. GM lost $4.2 million in the first 
two years of operations. In fact the automotive industry’s survival 
depended on high protective barriers (taxes of between 200 and 500 
per cent) and a generous pricing policy because so many of the 
components were imported. (The Chevrolet Iran sold for $8,500 
against $4,500 for the Opel Commodore in West Germany.) When 
price controls were introduced in July 1975, the motor industry was 
among the first to protest, and indeed was one of the few privileged 
sectors to have the controls rescinded in early 1976’86
Iranian goods were also less competitive because the rial was overvalued. 
The high exchange rate was intended to encourage capital imports and to keep 
food prices down, but it also had the effect of working against small businesses 
and making Iranian exports expensive on the international market. 87 Table 
3.50 gives an estimate of real exchange rates in Iran from 1972-78.88
3.12 Fiscal policy and inflation
The impact of increased government expenditure which resulted from the rise 
in oil prices and led to the revision of the Fifth Plan is best seen in the effect it 
had on prices during this period. Table 3.49 gives the consumer and wholesale 
price indices for 1962 to 1978, from which it can be seen that Iran entered a 
period of price rises in 1973-78 at least four times greater than preceding 
periods. The average wholesale price increase for 1962-67 was 1.3 per cent; for 
1968-72, 3.9 per cent but for 1973 it rose to 12.2 per cent. A similar pattern 
prevailed with the retail price index, which rose by 129 points during the Fifth
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Plan period, compared with a rise of 30 points for 1968-72 and one of just 6 
points for the period 1963-67.
The steepest rise in prices for the consumer can be clearly seen in the 
two-year period from 1975-77, when annual prices rose from 9.7 per cent to
25.5 per cent. Pesaran writes:
. . .  at the same time the growth of domestic value added started 
declining. The growth of real investment in construction which had 
amounted to 53.2 per cent in 1975 and 22.9 per cent in 1976, declined 
to 2.7 per cent in 1977. The total gross domestic fixed capital 
formation at constant prices which had grown by 64 per cent in 1975 
and 21 per cent in 1976, grew by only 3.4 per cent. In fact for the first 
time since 1969 real investment of the private sector in machinery 
and equipment decreased by 6.8 per cent in this year and largely as a 
result of a dry year, value added of the agricultural sector also 
declined by 0.8 per cent in 1977.89
Tables 3.51 and 3.52 give the breakdown in price rises for the wholesale and 
consumer price index. The wholesale price index shows that domestically- 
produced goods rose at a faster rate than either imported or exported goods 
while exported goods rose more rapidly than imported goods. Of the rest, non- 
metal building materials (particularly cement and bricks) rose by nearly 86 
points from 1974-78. All the other commodities, apart from textiles and 
clothing, rose by between 50-60 points for the same period.
As we have already noted (Tables 3.5 and 3.7), expenditure on, and the 
value added, of construction grew very rapidly from 1974. For a while, land 
speculation became the most profitable economic activity for those who could 
afford to buy up land and build apartment blocks. Table 3.52 shows that the
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consumer price index for housing was the highest of all sectors. It rose by 142 
points from 1973 to 1977, an increase of almost 170 per cent in four years. 
Once again, the greatest increase was between the years 1975-77 when the 
index rose by 105 points, an increase of nearly 90 per cent in two years, an 
official figure which along with the figures for inflation, are known to be 
underestimates.90 Rents shot up and shortages of affordable accommodation 
became a source of considerable aggravation:
To solve the resulting housing shortage, the government reacted with 
an even greater effort. Industrial projects now had to have housing 
components for the workers, thereby tripling development project 
costs. The already strained market for building materials was thereby 
further aggravated. . . The circle seemed endless. The situation had 
become untenable by mid-1975/1976. The whole question of 
lessening inflation while engaging in a Big-Push development 
strategy had been erroneously concentrated on emergency programs 
to solve bottlenecks. Since each bottleneck was replaced by another, 
the ‘more effort’ approach only aggravated the situation by requiring 
more expenditures in an already cash-laden and goods-poor economy. 
Rather than retrench on the fiscal front, the government - at the 
urging of the shah - pushed forward, oblivious to the social 
repercussions and the resulting discontent.91
Table 3.52 also indicates the high rise in food prices, particularly that of fresh 
fruit and vegetables. The index rose by a staggering 114 points between 1974 
and 1978 for traditionally cheap and abundant agricultural produce. The 
government had failed to install a viable distribution system between the farmer 
and retailer and its pricing policy served to reduce the profitability of 
investment in farming while having the perverse effect of paying greater sums 
of money for imports than to the farmer for the same commodity'92
197
The rise in prices was accompanied by substantial wage rises, at first the 
result of the state’s generosity in the face of increased oil revenues but later, a 
reflection of the shortage of skilled labour. The compensation of workers index 
(Table 3.15) shows a rise of 44 per cent in 1975, and a further rise of 37 per 
cent in 1976. In 1976 the government attempted to curb inflation through a 
series of measures including a wage freeze (an annual increase of 1 per cent 
was allowed). Nevertheless, shortages of skilled labour meant that employers 
could not abide this and in addition, the wage freeze provoked strikes for pay 
increases in 1974 and especially in 1975, even though strikes were illegal. The 
increase in wages diminished but was still high at 28 per cent in 1977 and 27 
per cent in 1978. Despite the wage rises, by 1976 around 60 per cent or more of 
workers’ take-home pay went on housing, and inflation continued to hit the 
unprivileged sections of society. The government took a number of measures 
during this period to curb price rises, but these proved ineffective since the 
underlying cause of the inflation, the increase in government expenditure which 
had caused demand to rise in excess of supply, was not curbed. Nor did the 
government feel in a position to raise the subsidies it had implemented after 
1974 for fear of provoking political discontent.
The most notorious of the government’s policies to curb prices was the anti­
profiteering campaign initiated in August 1975 under which the prices of over 
20,000 commodities were to be restored to pre-oil boom prices. Those found 
guilty of over-charging would be imprisoned. Indeed, some prominent 
businessmen were arrested but since many of these were formerly supporters of
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the Shah’s regime, it meant that political discontent now penetrated the upper 
echelons of the propertied class. The anti-profiteering campaign coupled with 
the implementation of the Law for the Extension of Industrial Property, which 
has already been discussed, resulted in a lack of confidence by the private sector 
in the government and in the economy. The recession set in, capital started 
leaving the country and, after the lifting of foreign exchange controls, the 
outflow of capital accelerated. It has been estimated at between $4 billion to $6 
billion during 1978-79. 93
These measures did not lead to a reduction in inflation, as can be seen for 
the years 1976 and 1977 in Table 3.49. Looney describes the situation as that of 
an ‘empty economy’, whereby excess demand is induced by price controls. 
Price controls can only be effective when there is an attempt at making demand 
and supply balance at a realistic price. Otherwise resources will then be drawn 
out of industry into final output and final consumption which in turn will 
threaten the continuity and efficiency of production and distribution.94 By mid- 
1977 the government did indeed have a real problem caused by insufficient 
generating capacity.
Taxation policy was also revised from 1975 and the effect can be seen in 
Table 3.53. The tax on income and wealth had dwindled from a 14.5 per cent 
contribution to total revenue in 1970 to 5.1 per cent in 1974. This then rose to 
just under 10 per cent by 1977. The government raised taxes by 71.6 per cent in 
1975; taxes on salaries were raised by 71 per cent in 1976 and 51 per cent in
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1975.95 Indirect taxes were also raised but the balance of payments deficit, 
which had eased in 1975 to stand at 144.4 billion rials, worsened substantially 
during the next two years. It increased to just under 170 billion rials in 1976 
and then increased by over 85 per cent the following year to stand at a deficit of 
314.8 billion rials. The government resorted to domestic and international 
borrowing.
By late 1976, the Shah embarked on a new policy by urging restraint and 
belt-tightening measures. He established an Imperial Commission to investigate 
wastages and corruption in the bureaucratic machinery. For the first time in 12 
years he appointed a new prime minister (Jamshid Amuzegar) in August 1977. 
The new cabinet reversed most of the policies established in 1975; it disbanded 
the anti-profiteering campaign, checked government spending and attempted to 
encourage the private sector by extending banking credit and reversing the price 
control policy. But at the same time it was committed to appealing to the 
working class by raising wages, raising taxes and implementing the workers’ 
profit-sharing and share-participation scheme. The contradictory objectives of 
the deflationary programme:
. . . brought a sudden growth in unemployment, especially among the 
unskilled and semiskilled, and this, coming after rising expectations, 
helped create a classic pre-Revolutionary situation. The combination 
of inflation, shortages and evident income-distribution inequities 
probably contributed more to growing discontent than did the 
standard factor cited in the West of “too rapid modernization”. It was 
mainly how modernization was carried out, and the results of these 
policies, that were important.96
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By 1977, it was clear that the predictions of a report by the Hudson Institute 
made two years earlier on Iran’s industrialisation attempts were vindicated. The 
report concluded that if Iran did not meet the targets of the Fifth Plan:
Iran, in the final decade of this century, could prove to be no more 
than a half-completed edifice, with the trappings of power and 
international influence and none of the substance.97
Furthermore, the report indicated that even in the unlikely event of the targets 
being met, Iran’s economy would be no more developed than India’s or 
Mexico’s.
3.13 Summary
With the upsurge in oil prices, the Shah took the decision to inject most of the 
increased earnings into the domestic economy with the aim of diversifying the 
country’s productive structure and raising livings standards to that of an 
industrialised European country within 10 years. In this chapter we have seen 
how that policy misfired.
As we saw in section 3.4 above, the revised Fifth Plan envisaged annual 
GNP growth in real terms of 25.9 per cent; instead it grew at 2.4 per cent 
annually, or excluding 1978, at 6.9 per cent in constant prices, according to 
Bank Markazi. The Plan and Budget Organisation defined an industrially- 
developed country as one in which the industrial sector accounted for 25 per 
cent of GNP and a developing nation as one in which the contribution was
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between 15-25 per cent. In 1968, Iran’s industrial sector contributed 16 per cent 
to GNP, rising to 17.8 per cent in 1978. According to the PBO’s own definition, 
Iran’s industrial performance was towards the bottom of the league table of 
developing nations by the end of the Fifth Plan, despite the big push. Moreover 
much of the industrial sector’s growth was driven by construction, as property 
speculation flourished during the period of rampant inflation. Manufacturing’s 
contribution fell from 9.7 per cent of GNP in 1973 to 7.5 per cent in 1978. It 
was the slowest growing component of the industrial sector with an annual 
average rate of 4.5 per cent at constant prices during the Fifth Plan period, 
according to Bank Markazi.
As far as GDP is concerned, manufacturing’s maximum contribution, in 
constant prices, was 8.3 per cent in 1977 and 1978. This was below the average 
for the industrial sector as a whole of, respectively, 14.2 and 13.9 per cent, as 
shown in Table 3.6. This compared with the UN’s definition of an industrially- 
advanced country having a minimum manufacturing contribution of 17 per 
cent. The industrial sector’s contribution to GDP, which reached 14.8 per cent 
in 1976, was also well short of R.B. Sutcliffe’s 25 per cent contribution.
We also saw in section 3.5 that though Iran’s industrial growth rate was 
relatively high at an annual 11-13 per cent, comparing its pattern of growth 
using the Chenery-Syrquin study, its economic structure deviated from that of a 
‘normal’ country, principally due to the role of oil in the economy rather than 
expected changes in productive structure. Section 3.7 argued that Iran’s
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manufacturing industries were import-dependent and the capital goods sector 
relatively underdeveloped, despite the high priority given to the sector under the 
Fifth Plan. The government’s policy of encouraging private sector investment 
through the grant of industrial licences gave rise to an industrial elite with 
privileged access to government subsidies and loans. This politicised the 
process, leading effectively to a state-controlled private sector which enabled 
the government to continue to control investment and output decisions and did 
not allow the private sector to develop as an independent engine for growth.
The big push drive ran into serious obstacles, including skills shortages, 
which made the country dependent on foreign expertise and exacerbated 
distortions within the economy. Iran’s export performance remained weak and 
manufactured goods’ exports actually declined in value, while imports of 
consumer goods surged. Government spending led to waste, inefficiency and 
high inflation which by late 1976 had reached serious proportions and measures 
to control price rises, including anti-profiteering controls, contributed to 
political discontent. By 1978, the targets of the Fifth Plan had not been met and, 
instead, the country was in revolutionary turmoil.
In the next chapter we shall consider the state’s role in the planning process 
and the politicisation of the planning mechanism before going on to examine in 
Chapter 5 the international context lying behind the Shah’s desire for big push 
industrialisation.
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Chapter 4. State and Development: The Planning Process
4.1 Introduction
Industrialisation in Iran was brought about through state-driven development 
planning. In this chapter we will argue that the state’s dominance of the process 
undermined the independence of the Plan and Budget Organisation. The 
weakness of the institution and the politicisation of the planning process 
ultimately hampered the success of industrialisation drive because there were 
no independent checks on the feasibility of the Shah’s big push policy.
4.2 The origins o f planning in Iran
Planning in Iran was primarily a post-war development, ostensibly initiated in 
order to reconstruct the Iranian economy in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. Prior to this, Reza Shah had engaged on a programme of modernisation in 
the 1920s and 1930s which involved the re-organisation of government 
finances and the imposition of centralised rule over the country.1 Industrial 
projects were launched and social reforms undertaken which, in their form, 
indicated a desire to rebuild the country in the image of the West. Though this 
policy produced results, it was sometimes pursued in a way that seemed 
questionable to observers:
When the Shah orders a railway, a harbour or factory, one has the 
feeling he does so, not because the estimates of the experts show that 
it will be profitable, but simply because he feels that every respected 
country had a railway &c., and because it gives him an inferiority 
complex not to possess one also.3
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In many ways, Reza Shah bore greater resemblance to Russia’s Peter the Great 
than to Mustafa Kemal, Turkey’s nationalist leader, with whom he is more 
usually compared. Reza Shah’s policies were to be achieved through the use of 
the state which he regarded as an instrument for change. Using his considerable 
organisational abilities and aided by the payment of the first substantial oil 
royalty in 1921, Reza Shah extended control over the state by building up the 
army and bureaucracy and diminishing the power of ethnic groups, in 
particular, the tribes.4 As head of state, Reza Shah ensured that ultimate control 
resided with him. Thus, Arthur Millspaugh of the US State Department, who 
had been head of a financial mission to Iran since 1922, was removed from his 
post of treasurer-general in 1927 because, ‘there can’t be two Shahs in this 
country, and I am going to be the Shah’.5
Reza Shah regarded economic self-sufficiency through industrialisation as 
the key to building a self-reliant country, free of foreign influence. To this end, 
a policy of import-substitution was pursued, following the announcement in 
1930 that the government had decided to ‘develop new industries as a means of 
reducing imports and supporting the exchange’.6 This policy was implemented 
in the consumer goods industries, in particular, textiles and sugar. To facilitate 
the IS policy, a series of measures were introduced, with varying degrees of 
success. These included the Foreign Trade Monopoly Law, which allowed 
greater control of imports and exports by the government, foreign exchange 
controls and import quotas. Increased government intervention in the economy 
was necessary both for the organisation and implementation of such policies -
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no other sector was either willing or able to carry through such a programme. 
Hence, Reza Shah’s statement that:
As far as the textile mills are concerned, I know that we should make 
cloth in our own country and avoid imports and I have told this to 
many people, but as no one came forward I had to do it.7
4.3 Planning and national independence
A more systematic approach to economic policy did not emerge until after Reza 
Shah’s reign when planning was finally introduced. Following Reza Shah, the 
main idea behind planning was to initiate a big push towards economic self- 
sufficiency. The importance of national independence was impressed upon 
Reza Shah’s son, Mohammad Reza, even more forcefully after the humiliating 
1941 Anglo-Russian invasion of Iran, which prompted the removal of Reza 
Shah. Mohammad Reza’s desire for economic strength stemmed from a similar 
wish for political independence with which he equated economic self- 
sufficiency. His own pursuit was of a nationalism which became paradoxical in 
form, conditioned as it was by the perceived exigencies of Iran’s international 
position combined with the resources necessary to reinforce that position. 
Industrialisation as the means to economic independence was not pursued as an 
autarkic policy (neither the means nor the ends was autarkic); its aim was to 
serve the dual purpose of not only preventing outside powers from interfering in 
Iran’s internal affairs but also of enabling Iran to play a role in international 
affairs. As Ann Schulz has noted, the Shah’s commitment to economic 
development had political objectives, particularly in terms of neutralising
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potential opposition from three identifiable groups, namely, the clergy, the 
merchant class and the landowners:
Destroying the political base of these groups is an important part of 
his model of development. . . Most critics agree with the Shah that 
there are few alternatives to his rule, in view of the lack of strong 
political institutions in Iran. Neither the Parliament, nor the Cabinet 
as a collective group, nor political parties have acquired any 
significant power. Within the constraints of the Shah’s national 
development policies, as they have woven a pattern of personal 
privilege, no new political institutions appear to be evolving.8
After the war and the end of the Anglo-Russian occupation, currency 
reserves were too low to finance the envisaged seven-year plan. Iran therefore 
requested a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD). This was only to be granted on a project-by-project 
basis, the projects themselves having first to be approved on technical grounds 
by an acceptable agency. It was thus that Iran invited a US consulting firm, 
Morrison Knudson, to test the feasibility of the plan which, constrained by the 
terms under which the IBRD loan had been granted, took the form of a list of 
investment projects rather than a development plan in the usual sense.
The 1949 Plan Act established the Plan Organisation to supervise and co­
ordinate the first and subsequent plans. The allocation of expenditure projected 
for the First Plan (1949-55) differed from the sectoral allocations in the Fourth 
(1968-72) and Fifth Plans (1973-77) by laying greater emphasis on agriculture 
than industry. The 1949 Act authorised the Plan Organisation to distribute 21 
billion rials (i.e., 21,000 million rials). Agriculture took 25 per cent; transport
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and communications, 23 per cent and 4 per cent respectively; industry and 
mines, 19 per cent; and social affairs, 29 per cent.9 Since the object of the Plan 
was to reconstruct and develop the country, it is interesting to note that it was 
thought that this would be best achieved through spending more on agriculture 
than on industry.
Agriculture enjoyed a greater share of expenditure than industry up until 
the Fourth Plan and this expenditure represented a recognition of the centrality 
of agriculture to the economy. It is noteworthy that agriculture and the rural 
sector came to be seen as dispensable largely when increased revenues from the 
sale of oil enabled the country to go ahead with its ‘modernisation’ programme. 
In other words, the push towards ever greater amounts of investment in 
industry, unaccompanied by a strategy for agriculture and at a time when the 
economy still relied heavily on rural produce (both for internal consumption 
and for exports), reveals a deliberate reluctance on the part of the government to 
recognise the enduring importance of the agricultural sector.10 This neglect is 
significant because it suggests, perhaps more clearly than anything else, the 
commitment that deteriorated into a tendency towards industrialisation for 
industrialisation’s sake.
A number of difficulties arose during the seven-year period (1948-1955) 
which prevented effective implementation of the plan. For the most part, they 
arose from the need to build up the embryonic Plan Organisation.11 In addition, 
funds for the plan dried up with the 1951 nationalisation of oil and the
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subsequent embargo on Iranian oil. The plan was then effectively suspended, 
having never really got off the ground. It had disbursed only 20 per cent of 
planned expenditure. Nevertheless, the First Plan had brought about the 
establishment of the Plan Organisation which was to remain the central 
planning machinery of the state, though the range of its powers was in debate 
from the very beginning.
4.4 Domestic politics in the planning process
Much of the history of planning in Iran can be described in terms of a duel 
between the technocrats of the Plan Organisation and the Shah as head of the 
Economic Council, a ministerial body. For the greater part, this was due to a 
difference in outlook and, more damagingly, to a divergence of aims. The staff 
of the Plan Organisation were economists and administrators who saw 
themselves as separate from the political system; indeed, they endorsed the 
name ‘organisation’ in preference to the more political appellation, ‘ministry’. 
Consequently, political appointments were opposed (though the head of the 
Plan Organisation was a political appointment) as were attempts at political 
interference in the work put out by the organisers. Thus, reports and 
recommendations based on available data and drawn up by the Plan 
Organisation’s economists were often ignored or adjusted by ministers in what 
would often seem an arbitrary manner to those in the Plan Organisation.
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Yet the general aim of introducing a formal system for planning had been 
to enable the national allocation of public resources to be organised according
1 9to a predefined national strategy of development. This was in 
contradistinction to the ad hoc way in which decisions regarding industrial 
projects had previously been undertaken by ministers anxious to carry out the 
orders of the Shah. Once it had been decided that a new body should be created 
to execute the plan rather than the ministries or the bongahs (semi-independent 
organisations operating certain government enterprises), there was debate over
1 'Xthe exact function of the new body. The debate, in the Majlis (parliament) and 
the Cabinet, revolved around the degree to which the new governmental 
organisation for planning was to be independent of the ministries, in terms of 
having executive powers over the plan. Some argued that the Plan Organisation 
should supervise the decisions made by the ministries and/or the bongahs and 
therefore act as a powerless co-ordinating board. Others thought that it should 
take on executive decisions itself both regarding expenditure and the execution 
of projects. In the end, the Plan Organisation was to be:
substantially independent of regular government ministries and had 
financial allocations apart from the regular budget. Despite its name, 
it bore no resemblance to the usual central planning agency. It was 
intended to be an independent action agency able to execute capital 
investment projects without the delays, inadequacies, and political 
orientation of the normal government ministries.14
Although the Plan Organisation tried to guard its independence, the Shah and 
his politicians fought for control of the organization. The fight could lead to the 
downfall of a powerful Director. As Nikki Keddie writes:
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In addition to inexperience, corruption, and sometimes bad foreign 
advice, Iranian plans suffered from jealousies between ministers and 
government departments that wanted the PO [Plan Organisation] to 
give them the money and let them implement projects. The PO, on the 
other hand, wished to have ministries act under its instructions on 
development projects. This unresolved and continuing dispute, 
punctuated by currying of favor with the top by the involved parties, 
was one cause of Ebtehaj’s forced resignation as head of the PO in 
1959 and his replacement by more pliable and less competent 
directors in the next few years. Ebtehaj also disagreed with 
economically irrational royal interference with the plan.15
4.5 The Ebtehaj affair
Given the nature of the political system and the lack of strong institutions in 
Iran, it is not surprising that the degree of importance or strength of an 
organisation often lay with the personality of the man at the top. The Plan 
Organisation’s ‘golden age’ was in the 1950s and early 60s when it attracted 
skilled manpower and benefited from the competent leadership of Abol Hassan 
Ebtehaj, a widely-respected economist.16 The formulation and execution of the 
Second Plan (1955-62) were almost completely the responsibility of the Plan 
Organisation which was granted 90 per cent of the government’s net oil 
revenues in October 1954 by the Majlis as development expenditure. The Plan 
was prepared for an outlay of 68 billion rials.17 But before the Second Plan had 
run its course, Ebtehaj had, in 1959, tendered his resignation and in 1961 he 
was held in police custody for seven months without being formally charged. 
Released on bail, he was then acquitted in 1964. The circumstances leading to 
his resignation and ‘arrest’ are of interest and merit discussion. The account 
regarding his resignation can be found in George Baldwin’s book from which 
the following figures are taken.18
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In 1958, two petrochemical projects were under consideration by the 
Plan Organisation, in order to make use of the large amounts of gas ordinarily 
wasted during the production of oil. The projects were considered for the 
Khuzestan area in southern Iran, which needed help in development. One was 
for the country’s first chemical fertiliser plant, designed by Belgian consultants, 
at the cost of $23 million. The other was a programme by an American 
company for a $10 million PVC plant. It had been decided that both plants 
should be located at Ahwaz. It was recognised by the American company that 
Iran’s consumption level of PVC was very low but the company argued that 
such a market could be created which would also promote the production of 
five fundamental chemicals, demand for which exists in any country embarking 
on industrialisation.
In the event, the PVC plant had to be dropped from the Second Plan in 
early 1959 as part of an overall cutback in investment expenditure when it 
became clear that the Plan Organisation’s share of oil revenue had taken a 
significant fall. (This was despite Majlis approval for a doubling of expenditure 
since the implementation of the plan.) Nevertheless, the Plan Organisation 
intended to stick to the Second Plan in keeping the fertiliser plant project for 
Ahwaz, when the Ministry of Industry and Mines announced it had signed a 
contract with three European firms to build a nitrogen fertiliser plant at Shiraz. 
The plant would have the same capacity as the one designed by the Belgians for 
the Plan Organisation but would cost 50 per cent more; it was not known to
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have been studied; moreover, the Ministry had no funds for a project of this 
size.
It became clear that not only was the Ministry’s project more expensive 
than the Plan Organisation’s, but that it was also inferior. It had been designed 
by equipment suppliers, lack of competitive bidding meant that its capital costs 
per ton put it amongst the highest in the world, its location was also inferior - 
Shiraz had no railway nearby and was over 100 kilometres from the nearest 
source of natural gas. Baldwin writes:
The Ministry’s tactic of committing the country to a major foreign 
exchange payment in moral violation of a government pledge to the 
World Bank and in defiance of the development plan was 
symptomatic of the lack of control and discipline within the 
government. Would an ambitious Minister dare risk his political 
future with such an act if he had not first cleared it with the Shah? 
And if this had happened, why would the Shah let one of his 
Ministers play such a game in violation of all the Shah’s assurances 
that he believed in planning and financial responsibility? These were 
questions which never got answered.19
Under the circumstances, Ebtehaj felt obliged to resign if the government was 
really serious about going ahead with the project. The Shah chose not to support 
Ebtehaj and his resignation was accepted. Subsequently, the Plan 
Organisation’s independence was weakened by making the director responsible 
to the prime minister and by transferring the industrial plants owned by the Plan 
Organisation to the Ministry of Industries. These changes were later written into 
the Third Plan Law. Two years later, in a manner seemingly unconnected with 
his resignation, Ebtehaj was arrested. The prime minister at the time, Ali
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Amini, publicly disclaimed responsibility for the arrest. Ebtehaj was never 
formally charged, but, ostensibly, he was held for corruption and wasting public 
funds. He was finally acquitted with no explanation but it seems likely that the 
arrest was caused by his forthright criticism of the US aid programme to Iran, 
made in a speech in San Francisco just one month earlier:
Even if a recipient government becomes convinced in all good faith 
of the fairness of certain bilateral programs offered by another 
country, it would soon be condemned in the public mind. Opposition 
leaders will charge the government with selling out to the 
imperialists, and the public will believe these charges.
. . . Where the recipient government is corrupt, the donor 
government very understandably appears, in the judgement of the 
public, to support corruption . . .
Even more pointedly:
I can think of no better summary of all the disadvantages and 
weaknesses of the bilateral system than the modem history of my own 
country. Not so very many years ago in Iran, the United States was 
loved and respected as no other country, and without having given a 
penny of aid. Now, after more than $1 billion of loans and grants, 
America is neither loved nor respected; she is distrusted by most 
people, and hated by many. . . Social and political unrest is a 
manifestation of the despair and lack of faith of the people [a 
reference to the strikes and disturbances taking place in the country, 
which were to reach their climax in June 1963], of their distrust of 
incompetent and sometimes corrupt governments, and of the whole 
pattern of bilateral agreements that seem to support the bankrupt 
system.20
Given the weakness of the government case against him and the frankness with 
which he had criticised the main pillar of the Shah’s foreign policy, it seems 
likely that the offence Ebtehaj committed was political. For the Shah, the affair 
represented the necessity of bringing the Plan Organisation more directly under 
the control of the government and of preventing its director from gaining too
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much in the way of status or importance. Indeed, no successive director was to 
criticise the Shah’s policies so vocally.
4.6 The expansion o f the planning process
An improvement in the machinery of planning took place during this period 
with the establishment of a planning unit in 1957 named the Economic Bureau, 
which later became known as the Division of Economic Affairs. It attracted 
newly-returned Iranians studying abroad, but also drew on economic advisors 
from Europe and the US - for example, the Harvard Advisory Group. It quickly 
grew in importance in the Plan Organisation, undertaking a mid-period 
evaluation of the Second Plan and designing projects for the second half of the 
plan period. In mid-1959, the division was entrusted with the duty of preparing 
the Third Plan, which was to begin in September 1962. The Cabinet informed 
the division that the plan was to be much broader in scope than previous plans. 
In fact, the Third Plan represented the first attempt at comprehensive planning 
and, as such, was to be concerned with the overall rate and pattern of 
development in the whole economy. One major change, though, referred to 
above, was of a decrease in the responsibility of the Plan Organisation for plan 
implementation. All development projects, after being considered and approved 
by the Plan Organisation, were to be executed by the ministries and other 
government agencies. A High Economic Council, outside the Plan 
Organisation, was created ‘in order to coordinate economic activities of 
different government organizations and to secure the Plan’s proper 
enforcement.’21
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One major problem detrimental to efficient planning was the constant 
revisions made to the development expenditure of the plan in operation. 
Mention has been made of this with reference to the Second Plan but another 
example occurred in 1962 when the Third Plan, which had been drawn up 
essentially by the division of economic affairs in the Plan Organisation, was 
submitted to the Majlis. The Third Plan’s budget of 190 billion rials had already 
been reduced to 140 billion rials, when it was approved by the Majlis. 
Nevertheless, this was overruled by the prime minister just two weeks later 
when the budget was again cut back by nearly one-third. Ten days after this
decision, a newly-appointed prime minister then increased the budget to nearly
00200 billion rials. These were alterations made to the public sector programme. 
Farhad Daftary writes:
The rationale of these revisions was never explained, nor were the 
effects of these changes on private investment activities and the 
overall growth target ever discussed.23
In fact, these manoeuvres were connected to the uncertain political 
conditions created by the economic difficulties and political discontent of the 
early 1960s, which was also reflected in the office of prime minister changing 
hands four times in three years. During this period, the Agricultural Minister, 
Hassan Arsanjani, introduced the Land Reform Law of 1962 which aimed to 
create a class of independent farmers. The Shah later amalgamated land reform 
into a wider development programme -  the famous ‘White Revolution’ -  
though by altering Arsanjani’s proposals for the second stage of reform, he
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rendered them less effective. According to George Baldwin, the Shah’s land 
reform hijacked the sensible Third Plan proposals,24 land reform itself being the 
outcome of pressure on the Shah by the US Point IV programme, begun in 
1952, as a means of giving technical assistance to the Ministry of Finance. (It 
was to this bilateral assistance which Ebtehaj had referred in his San Francisco 
speech.)
Arsanjani was a member of Ali Amini’s reformist government, which was 
reluctantly appointed by the Shah in the face of increased pressure by the 
Kennedy Administration to instigate economic reforms.26 Disagreement 
between the Shah and Amini regarding the size of military expenditure, as well 
as the decision by the entire directorate of the Plan Organisation to resign in 
protest at a move by Ministry of Justice officials to inspect their books, ensured 
Amini’s downfall after only 14 months. Thus, the downward revisions to the 
budget of the Third Plan need to be seen against the background of the launch 
of the White Revolution, which required budgetary support that had not been 
included in the Third Plan. An increase in oil revenues accruing to the 
government was the cause of the subsequent upward revision to the budget of 
the Third Plan. In this way, international and domestic pressures affected the 
planning system and frustrated some of its reformist attempts.
Obviously, ministerial interference with a Majlis-approved budget 
created uncertainties regarding sectoral allocations for the Plan and contributed 
to a generally inefficient procedural system. This was recognised in 1964, when
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the government decided to adopt the Comprehensive Budget principle, thereby 
introducing programme budgeting.27 In addition, responsibility for preparing 
the budget was handed from the Ministry of Finance to the Bureau of the 
Budget which was created in the Plan Organisation for this purpose. Hence its 
change of name some time after to the Plan and Budget Organisation (PBO). 
Nevertheless, for better budgeting procedures to be introduced, it would have 
been necessary to adhere to two principles, namely, that once made, the budget 
should be respected and, that once promised, money should be made available 
when it was due.
4.7 The erosion o f the PBO’s independence
From the mid-60s, with the removal of executive authority from the PBO, a 
steady weakening of the impact of PBO contribution to decisions regarding 
development (industrialisation) policy took place. This coincided with the 
Shah’s growing personal interest, which was also accompanied by a greater 
increase in oil revenue. The Shah acted through the High Economic Council:
In the early years, a meeting of this council was viewed as a 
ceremonial gathering in which the development plan was explained to 
the Shah. In later years, however, the meeting of the High Economic 
Council turned into the most crucial step of plan preparation. During 
this meeting, the Shah actually dictated the basic goals and targets of 
the development plan. This changed the logic of the whole process 
and the planning effort was reduced to a futile exercise.28
According to Razavi and Vakil, the process had a demoralising effect on those 
working within the PBO. For example, the Technical Affairs Division of the
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PBO, which ensured the technical quality of development projects through 
evaluation and inspection, had been known for its satisfactory performance of 
these duties. This was jeopardised in the late 1960s when technical evaluation 
of a project became a formality and when, in effect, only two of the six bureaux 
remained active -  ‘the remaining bureaus joined the alienated and indifferent 
majority of PBO employees.’29 By the mid-70s, planning had became reduced 
to the simple disbursement of assigned expenditure.
A different view of this process has been given by a former director of 
the PBO, Khodadad Farmanfarmaian, who headed the organisation in the 
1970s. Reflecting on the origins of the Plan Organisation, he begins by giving 
weight to Olsen and Rasmussen’s view that the old bureaucracy was unable to 
undertake reform:
As a consequence, the Shah’s regime narrowed the base of popular 
support even further by creating what was called “planning 
mechanism” as a bridge approach to do what was needed. The 
planning groups were given full authority for designing, for planning, 
for budgeting, for disbursing, for execution of plans. This new 
organization, which was insulated from the rest of the Iranian 
government and did not represent the popular will, became the main 
arm of reform and development.
There was a great deal of opposition to this nascent organization. 
The old bureaucracy challenged the new planning organization 
power, and gradually the Plan Organization was folded into the 
traditional government.30
It is interesting to note Farmanfarmaian’s implication that the Plan Organisation 
was somehow working ‘out-of-bounds’ until it was put under the supervision of 
a ministry, the philosophy of its existence and its achievements being resented
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by the old bureaucracy. Implied too is that the push for development should be 
the prerogative of the central government (not that the Plan Organisation ever 
worked independently of the government), as the only true representative of the 
people. In the post-revolutionary era, it is feasible to question even the 
legitimacy of the Shah’s regime in the eyes of the people, let alone its degree of 
representation. Nevertheless, Farmanfarmaian does confirm the point made 
here, namely that the Plan Organisation’s power was significantly reduced once 
it came under the ministries. The main reason for this, as we have seen, was not 
administrative but to ensure that the Plan Organisation could more easily be 
influenced as part of the political process. This was part of an overall policy, 
though one which was never explicitly stated, of political centralisation and it 
extended to all aspects of government, from the army to political parties and the 
press.
4.8 Obstacles to planning
Much has been written about the shortcomings of planning in Iran and many 
causes ascribed to it. The main criticisms range from the plans themselves to 
the social and political climate in which they were drawn up and executed. In 
1950, under the title, ‘Can Persia Plan?’, The Economist magazine considered 
the question mainly in the context of the difficulty of raising the necessary 
funds against an unfavourable economic climate. The importance of 
administrative co-ordination and the need for good management were also 
mentioned. But commenting on the Iranian desire for less foreign interference 
in the country’s internal affairs, The Economist wrote:
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. . . two facts reduce their chances of being left alone. One is 
their position on the map, which keeps them within the orbit of the 
cold war. The other is the course of recent events in China, which 
suggests that they must now choose between two patterns of social 
change - either the ruthless, methodical process now being imposed 
upon China; or the more hesitant, unspectacular transformation that 
takes place when eastern feudalism accepts western aid for “social 
development”. . . .  a ruling class of the present pattern must inevitably 
choose the western way. In practice, they have done so, for two years 
ago they accepted a modicum of American military assistance, and 
recently the Shah made an official visit to the United States. So far, 
however, by no means all Persian politicians have faced the 
implications.31
The implication was that if Persian politicians wanted reform, they would have 
to follow the Shah in embracing ‘the western way’, which referred not only to a 
form of economic development but also to a political camp. The article is 
noteworthy for seeing the one as entailing the other, by placing state planning 
within a geopolitical context. The basis for the strategic alliance is promulgated 
somewhat disingenuously, by fashioning the developmental choice in terms of 
stark alternatives. According to The Economist, Iran’s strategic importance 
meant that she would always be interfered with by outside superpowers, her 
only choice being to decide by whom, one way of conveying this decision being 
through the selected method of development. One does not have to accept the 
logic of this argument to recognise that Iran’s developmental process has 
indeed taken place within a geopolitical framework and one, furthermore, that 
has exerted an active influence on the nature of that development. This will be 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
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Daftary sees the narrowness of the first two plans as impediments to a 
serious development effort, and cites too, the problem of a scarcity of statistical 
data and arbitrary methodology on the part of the planners.32 Commenting on 
the planning experience up to the 1960s, Olsen and Rasmussen make a number 
of points. They mention government over-centralisation as a limiting factor, 
administratively, on the implementation and supervision of projects in the 
provinces. Another administrative difficulty lay in the co-ordination and co­
operation of non-Plan Organisation planning agencies. These agencies were 
representatives of various ministries and other governmental institutions:
Some agencies showed no willingness at all to cooperate with Plan 
Organization. This was typically the case where the agency had its 
own revenue and clearly saw that over-all planning might involve part 
of this revenue being used for investments in different parts of the 
economy.33
Olsen and Rasmussen also identify a problem which existed in the early 60s 
and became far more pronounced in later years, namely, the lack of skilled 
manpower in Iran. They write:
. . .  the limiting factor in the economic development seems neither to 
be the level of capital formation nor a permanent lack of foreign 
exchange but the level and training, or rather the speed with which 
the expansion of education and skill formation takes place.34
This shortcoming is also stressed by Hossein Baher, who argues that decisions 
should have been based on a reasonably articulate humanpower plan.35 Writing 
in the mid-70s, Baher found a shortage of almost all sorts of skills in Iran,
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particularly for medium-level occupations in most sectors and especially in 
manufacturing. This shortage of skilled labour is particularly important in an 
economy which was in any case attempting to develop industry at the expense 
of agriculture. Baher saw the scarcity of skills as serious enough to present a 
real threat to the feasibility of the Fifth Plan and any subsequent plans. The 
shortage of adequate levels of skilled labour in Iran is not a matter of opinion 
but a fact of the most crucial importance. Development theory has recognised 
the inadequacy of relying solely on high levels of capital and growth to foster 
development. Amartya Sen has pointed to skilled manpower as being probably 
the most vital component of a successful industrialisation effort.
The need for experienced managers and trained personnel was recognised 
by the Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran (IMDBI) in its annual 
report for the last year of the Fourth Plan (1968-72):
Adequate financial and credit resources will be available to carry out 
the Plan (the Fifth) but the most serious shortage will be in adequate 
managerial resources which are requisite for effective use of men and 
minerals. Experience has showed that competent, sensible and thrifty 
management, in all phases of project implementation . . . makes 
billions of rials difference in costs and it constitutes, all too often, the 
difference between success and failure, or prosperity and 
bankruptcy.37
On a different level, Olsen and Rasmussen comment on the unfavourable 
social and political climate as a hindrance to efficient planning. They point to 
the Tate-feudal’ way in which government posts were given to political 
favourites, or in order to balance political rivals. This lack of professionalism
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resulted in a high turnover of personnel, which, in turn, led to abrupt changes of 
policies. Furthermore, the centralised decision-making process meant that there 
was a general unwillingness on the part of individuals to carry responsibility, 
combined with a sense of distrust of colleagues. This then:
led very often to decision by committee, the most important 
committee being the Council of Ministers. Decisions are sometimes 
made on the spur of the moment without any preparation and without 
the support of recommendations resulting from an analysis of the 
problem by competent and informed professionals. Consequently 
quite a few laws, decrees, and regulations on the statute books and 
quite a number of policies in the administrative practice are mutually 
inconsistent and sometimes contradictory.38
The importance of the political climate is also emphasised by George Baldwin, 
who argues that the failings of government placed the greatest handicap on 
economic planning and effective administration. Indeed, he goes so far as to 
say that the success of a development plan centres on politics, not policies. In 
other words, development planning can only work in a favourable political and 
cultural environment. On the situation in Iran specifically, he concludes: 
‘Iranian politics and an organized development effort are uncongenial 
bedfellows’ and that attempts to circumvent Iranian politics by placing the Plan 
Organisation outside the ministries still failed because of the difficulties of 
insulating a government body from the prevailing patterns of political 
behaviour. But since Iran did achieve some measure of economic growth and 
industrialisation, Baldwin draws the conclusion that economic development and 
economic planning are not interdependent and that a failed planning experience 
does not necessarily mean that economic development will not take place.
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A somewhat similar view is taken by Razavi and Vakil who argue that 
good fortune rather than good planning accounted for much of Iran’s economic 
success. Commenting on the achievements of the Third Plan, for example, they 
write: ‘Good planning clearly had not been a predominant causal factor in the 
process, though, and we are left feeling that the economic results were achieved 
independently of the plan.’40 In part, their view is influenced by what they see 
as a failed attempt to draw up comprehensive plans, though it could be argued 
that if a plan succeeds, it should not matter whether or not it conforms to a 
certain style of planning. The success of the Fourth Plan is ascribed to the high 
levels of investment and good financing involved. In a sense, this is true, since 
Iran’s industrial and institutional development, even at the end of the Third 
Plan, were young enough to respond dramatically to heavy spending of the sort 
that took place during the Fourth Plan period.
Jahangir Amuzegar, who has written extensively and positively, on 
Iran’s economic development describes a paradoxical situation in the late 50s. 
He writes:
Despite the state’s concerted efforts . . .  its plans and programs do 
not seem to have achieved their proclaimed objective of improving 
the living conditions of the Iranian masses. Although there is no 
statistical proof, there seems to be conclusive evidence that in the last 
thirty years the lot of the average individual in Iran has deteriorated 
and the inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income have 
been intensified.
In view of the many conditions favorable to Iran’s economic 
growth, one cannot help wondering why public industrialization 
schemes have had but very few significant and lasting results.41
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Amuzegar hazards two guesses as to why this should be. One concerns the 
‘mentality’ of the Iranian elite, which, according to Amuzegar, had become 
self-interested and cynical as well as unable to accept responsibility for its own 
actions. Instead:
there should be a change of heart among the Iranian elite so as to 
accept economic enterprise and material wealth as desirable social 
goals; national prestige and political power should no longer be the 
exclusive prerogatives of the successful bureaucrats but should be 
shared also with business leaders and corporation managers.42
Emphasising the need for a resourceful and independent work force, Amuzegar 
criticised the government for failing to set the necessary example. It had not 
been able to control the economy and frequent manipulation of exchange rates 
and created uncertainty amongst the business community. More importantly, 
the government should try to obtain the full backing of the people: ‘Without 
this support, the state development programs will fall prey to the vagaries of 
public indifference, subconscious opposition, or deliberate sabotage’.43 By 
changing its economic policies, the government could try to create a self-reliant 
citizenry; in order to make growth self-sustaining, it had to increase skills and 
technology and accept that: ‘people should have every opportunity to employ 
their initiative, talents, and capabilities, and also every desire to use their 
knowledge, training, and education in the service of the country’s progress. In a 
word, they should be able to identify themselves with their government and 
their interests with state interests.’44
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Though Amuzegar wrote this in 1957, much of what he says rings true for 
a much later date. If anything, by the mid-70s, the workforce became even more 
dependent on the government for the execution of its duties as the consequence 
of an ever more centralised approach to administration and decision-making. 
This affected all areas of government and not just the economic sectors.45 
Similarly, the degree of political repression increased in later years, in particular 
after the urban unrest of the early 60s, indicating a very high degree of mutual 
distrust between the Shah and the population as a whole.
4.9 The rush to industrialise during the Fourth and Fifth Plans 
The Fourth Plan (1968-72) had achieved a high rate of growth combined with 
price stability. The overall growth target of 9 per cent per annum (a high target 
by any standards) was exceeded, so that real GNP increased by 11 per cent in 
the final year of the plan.46 Manufacturing value added grew very rapidly, at an 
average of 12.3 per cent per annum over the five-year period. This was about 
twice as fast as in other developing countries.47 It was achieved by very high 
levels of investment in construction and imported machinery and equipment. 
Import controls and easy private sector credits led to high profit expectations, 
which sustained the growth levels of industry during this period. The adverse 
trends which resulted from this pattern of economic development were sectoral 
imbalances of economic growth (agriculture had done less well than expected 
and grew at only 3.9 per annum), a widening urban-rural gap, increased 
government involvement in investment and the production of goods, growing
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dependence of foreign imports and foreign know-how, as well as a deterioration 
in the balance of payments.
By the early 70s, development prospects were not looking very good 
because of a relative shortage of foreign exchange. The income from oil 
revenues was not enough, despite an increase in the price of oil, to satisfy Iran’s 
foreign exchange requirements during the Fourth Plan period. The price of 
heavy crude rose from $1.72 to $2,125 per barrel, and that of light crude from 
$1.79 to $2.17 after the agreement signed at the Tehran Conference in February 
1971. At the national level, this represented a rise in oil income from 80.8 
billion rials in 1967 to 163.7 billion rials in 1972 (constant prices) - in effect, a 
doubling of income over five years, though sustained by a higher rate of reserve 
depletion.48 But by March 1973, Iran had a foreign debt of $5.9 billion, the 
long-term repayment of which represented between 11 and 18 per cent of oil 
revenue in 1971-73.49
The government expected a major balance of payments crisis in the Fifth 
Plan period (1973-77) and this might well have played an important part in the 
Shah’s push for increased oil prices in December 1973. The Fifth Plan 
represented an opportunity to redress these imbalances and adverse trends, 
especially after the increase in revenue from oil. The Shah, however, decided to 
continue the acceleration policies of the Fourth Plan, ignoring the negative 
findings of a project he had commissioned from the PBO.50 This report drew 
attention to the volatile nature of oil revenues given their dependence on world
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supply and demand conditions. It did not think that Iran could become the 
world’s fifth industrial power by the end of the century and it pointed to the 
major bottlenecks that needed immediate attention - transport, power supply 
and the ports. It also emphasised the need for the promotion of non-oil exports.
The Fifth Plan period coincided with the worst economic crisis in Iran 
since the early 60s. A significant factor was the rapid, increased spending of 
the early 70s and, by the mid-70s, the crisis indicated an inadequacy in the 
economy’s infrastructure as well as the limit to the country’s absorptive 
capacity. As in the 1960s, the crisis took the form of runaway inflation but then 
developed into deep stagnation. Looney attributes a stagnant-prone productive 
structure in Iran to its oil-induced economic development.51 Since the oil 
industry retained its ‘enclave’ nature, it did not import dynamism to the 
economy in the same way as a fully integrated and productive industrial sector. 
This meant that production and trade evolved in an artificial environment in 
which distortions came to be built. These distortions then impeded diversified 
economic development and created a stagnant-prone productive structure.
Another writer examines the specific impact of Iran’s rentier economy on 
the domestic political process. While the rentier economy is usually considered 
in terms of its economic impact, Afsaneh Najmabadi sees it as a means of 
depoliticising the Iranian elite, manifested by the marked reluctance of the 
nouveaux riches in showing a desire to shape political events:
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This was best demonstrated by the remarkable ease with which they 
packed their bags and left the country when the chips were down. . .
No other class in history has behaved quite like that at a time of 
revolution. What accounts for this total political abdication of the 
upper classes in Iranian society?52
The answer, Najamabadi believes, lies in the ability of the Iranian state, with 
the Shah at its head, to distance itself from the rest of society through its 
independent source of income -  oil revenues. This put the government in the 
singular position of being independent of the population for its income, instead 
of relying on taxation:
A curious inversion of the classical formula ‘no taxation without 
representation’ occurred; the Iranian state felt no compulsion to be 
representative since it was effectively not taxing the population. The 
population itself gave up political claims on the state, since it was not 
being taxed.53
But two dangers are apparent, one mentioned by Najmabadi, the other a logical 
derivation of her argument. The first is that oil is a natural resource and, as 
such, may be perceived as a form of national wealth, not one accruing solely to 
the government. This would not be of great concern to the wealthy elite, since, 
as in the case of Iran, they would already be deriving the benefits of its 
exploitation. But, for the poor, it would be a different matter. They would 
believe that a national resource should be distributed equally amongst the 
population and not monopolised by its elite. An awareness that oil reserves, 
exploited at a rate of 6 million barrels a day, would not last more than another 
decade or so, had taken root. For whole sections of the population, this meant
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they would have been unable to enjoy the benefits of oil wealth and, with no 
prospect of a self-sustaining economy being set up, the reserves would have 
been largely wasted.
Secondly, Najmabadi comments on the characteristics of this form of 
apolitical elite:
Such a system can last only so long as the state continues to be all 
powerful and all resourceful. But there is no mechanism for repairing 
even the slightest fissures. The political vacuum that the state has 
created leaves with it no capacity for self-reform.54
This would appear to fit the situation as it developed in Iran. The government 
was able to support the ‘no taxation and no representation’ system while oil 
revenues and income were high but the system broke apart remarkably quickly 
once the government found itself both short of cash, by the late 1970s, and 
unable to control the economy. Moreover, one of the tactics it employed was to 
blame the merchant class and members of the industrial elite for high inflation 
because of their alleged profiteering and corruption. Once this was done, the 
state was making claims on its citizens and they in turn were able to make 
counter claims, thus breaking down the ‘no taxation and no representation’ 
situation. Latterly, some industrialists began to complain that they had been 
denied participation in the political process, whilst the merchant class, though it 
had benefited in economic terms from the Shah’s economic policies, took an 
active part in the revolution.
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These developments meant an uneven course for the Fifth Plan itself; it 
was substantially revised in December 1973 and effectively abandoned in late 
1976, while preparations were made for a Sixth Plan which would be taken out 
of the PBO altogether and given over to a number of committees to disburse the 
funds. This never got off the ground, and in 1978, the Shah announced that the 
country no longer needed planning, calling instead, for long-term ‘guidelines’ 
with a one-year development budget. In effect, the revised Fifth Plan had 
signalled the end of the growth of the planning process in Iran.
4.10 The Fifth Plan in political context
The revised Fifth Plan can best be understood within the context of the ‘Great 
Civilization’ which it strove to attain through industrialisation. Thus:
In the Fifth Development Plan the country’s industrial development is 
regarded as a basic measure in laying the groundwork of an advanced 
economy which will pave the way for the Great Civilization. Thus, 
while the necessary measures are envisaged in the Fifth Plan to meet 
existing shortages and ensure current requirements, an appropriate 
climate will be created for the production of a wide range of machine 
tools, industrial equipment and base metals required for the 
manufacture of capital goods. The utilization of the country’s vast 
resources of natural gas and mineral ores, which constitute the basic 
fundamentals of the petrochemical and metallurgical industries, forms 
the main axis on which industry itself and the other economic sectors 
will develop.55
Reaching the Great Civilization had not been a stated objective in the 
original Fifth Plan. Another interesting difference between the two plans is the 
emphasis on the importance of a more equitable distribution of income in the
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original plan; this concern was placed before that of economic growth in the list 
of priorities:
The experience of other countries, both developed and developing, 
indicates that rapidly rising national income is not necessarily 
accompanied by the more equitable distribution of this income among 
the various social groups. Nevertheless, as a result of Iran’s social 
and economic revolution, not only have per capita incomes risen 
rapidly but major progress has also been made towards a more 
equitable distribution of national income. As the ShahanShah 
Aryamehr said in a speech from the Throne inaugurating the current 
session of parliament, “Our policy in the Fifth Five-Year Plan is to 
lay particular stress on the twin policies of agricultural development 
and extended social welfare, so that by implementing the Plan living 
standards, especially among the lower income groups, are raised, and 
at the same time every Iranian feels deeply conscious of his 
responsibility to improve the society he lives in and participate in his 
country’s affairs, to the best of his abilities.”56
This concern was dropped from the revised plan; the closest objective was a 
pledge to ‘increase the income of various groups, particularly with a view to 
raising living standards among low-income groups’. The shift from concern 
with income distribution to that of paving the way towards the Great 
Civilization is indicative of the mood created after the monumental success in 
pushing through a four-fold increase in oil prices. It is best characterised, on the 
part of the Shah, by great confidence bordering on arrogance. Politically, the 
Great Civilization concept was accompanied, for the first time in Iran, by the 
formal imposition of one-party rule and the introduction of the new pre-Islamic 
calendar. The population was to be left in no doubt that the Great Civilization 
would be an entirely monarchical creation.
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The revised plan is written in a style that reflects the Shah’s great personal 
interest in the document, hence too, the change of emphasis in its contents. In 
the meeting held to revise the Fifth Plan, at Ramsar, on the Caspian coast, in 
August 1974, the Shah declared:
Two years ago, when the Fifth National Development Plan was being 
drafted I was constantly on the look-out for loftier and more extensive 
objectives for the country's social and economic development, and 
came out vigorously in support of proposals of this nature that were 
submitted. At that time, the very idea of such objectives was 
unthinkable for some people. But I now see that Iran is racing 
towards development faster than was envisaged, and that we shall 
attain these objectives.58
This is dangerously close to expressing a desire for pursuing objectives that 
look impressive rather than desirable.
4.11 Summary
So far, we have discussed some of the issues involved in the planning 
experience in Iran. These were: the use of the state as an instrument for change, 
the economic goal of self-sufficiency through import-substitution 
industrialisation and the political ends that such independence was ultimately to 
serve (internally, by consolidating an autocratic structure and, externally, by 
aspiring to hegemonic status). The result of striving for political ends through 
economic means can be seen in the subsequent political interference in the 
economic process. This was reflected here in the experience of the Plan 
Organisation. We saw in the previous chapter how such interference impeded 
the progress of the Fifth Plan.
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A point of clarification should be made about subsuming economic activity 
to political ends. In some ways, it is widely assumed that economics serves 
politics and, somewhat cynically, that any government will manipulate the 
economic process in order to benefit itself. There has also tended to be a direct 
relationship between the accumulation of wealth at the level of the state, and an 
increasing nationalism which may develop, under the aegis of the state, into the 
desire for conquest. Joan Robinson writes:
A government is bound to be concerned with the economic affairs of 
its subjects, if only to establish the basis for taxation. National power 
has always been used (even under the guise of laissez faire) to 
promote national interests. . . .it is clear enough that national 
patriotism was developed and systematized in Western Europe along 
with the commercialization of social relationships, and that it gave 
national governments great support in the schemes of economic 
expansion through conquest and trade which soon brought everyone 
under their sway and in the end, by revulsion, spread national feeling 
to the rest of the world.59
The essential thrust of the argument that politics and economics are inseparable 
is not challenged here. But a distinction can be made between political 
objectives and economic goals, more precisely the use of the economic process 
to support the political objectives. Iran was to be the world’s fifth industrialised 
power by the 1990s - that can be regarded as both an economic and political 
goal. The unstated objectives were the fulfilment of certain geostrategic goals, 
principally to attain equal terms with the world’s largest economic and political 
powers. The continued security of the Shah’s own rule was another important 
political objective to be bolstered by the economic ambitions. This is the 
context in which the big push towards industrialisation can be understood, with
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its concomitant characteristics of intensity and scale, such as the decision to go 
for growth maximisation over and above the economic justification for it, the 
high rates of military spending and the cultivation of an exaggerated 
nationalism, which were all intended to impress and give an aura of 
permanence for both internal and external reasons. We shall go on to examine 
the international political forces behind the Shah’s industrialisation drive in the 
next chapter.
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Chapter 5. The International Dimension
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 we provided an in-depth examination of the results of the Shah’s 
big push strategy and demonstrated how these fell well short of its goals. We 
have argued that the main reason for the failure was because the policy was 
pursued primarily for political reasons instead of economic feasibility. We saw 
in the last chapter that the autocratic nature of the state under a monarchical 
dictatorship, in which oil wealth accrued to the government, gave the Shah the 
means to politicise the planning process and prevent the emergence of strong 
institutions.
Why, against all the odds, did the Shah harbour the unrealistic ambition of 
turning Iran into the world’s fifth most industrialised nation by the end of the 
twentieth century? In this chapter we will argue that the Shah’s rationale 
stemmed from international factors, specifically the humiliations wrought upon 
Iran as a strategically important oil-producing country, caught between 
superpower politics. For the Shah, the way out of such tutelage was through the 
establishment of economic strength and independence, which he thought could 
be achieved through a big push industrialisation drive to propel Iran into the 
ranks of the world’s largest economies and make it a power to be reckoned 
with. Before turning to the international drivers, let us first consider the identity 
of the powerful nation the Shah strove to create.
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5.2 Monarchy and the nation
There was no doubt in the Shah’s mind that he, as monarch, would lead Iran to 
such independence. He made the major economic and political decisions and 
he aimed to foster a national identity based on the glorification of the 
monarchy. We saw in Chapter 3 that the Shah used the process of 
industrialisation as a tool of patronage and control over the emerging middle 
class. This patronage system is a hallmark of personal rulership; the two are 
forms of political organisation that are often closely identified with nation- 
building. Zonis, Jacobs, Binder and Fatemi1 have, amongst many others, 
detailed the form of personal rule that existed in Iran under the Shah while Roth 
has examined patrimonialism as a form of rulership in what he terms ‘new 
states’. 2
In his view, many of the new states are engaged in a form of empire- 
building, rather than nation-building:
One of the major reasons for the predominance of personal rulership 
over legal-rational legislation and administration in the new states 
seems to lie in a social, cultural, and political heterogeneity of such 
magnitude that a more or less viable complementary and 
countervailing pluralism of the Western type, with its strong but not 
exclusive components of universality, does not appear feasible.3
The problem of ‘empire-building’ in the sense used by Roth had largely been 
solved by the Shah’s father, Reza Shah, who used suppression to control Iran’s 
ethnically diverse population, including the Kurds in the west and the Baluchis 
in the east, and the main tribal groups, such as the Bakhtiaris and the Qashqa’is, 
Some ethnic problems persisted throughout the Shah’s rule, principally the
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Kurdish question, but empire-building in the sense of consolidating and 
extending centralised control was essentially achieved in a process which 
Dupree describes as ‘internal imperialism’.4 The process was made easier by 
the fact that ethnic Persians formed a majority and, because of the country’s 
history, had a keen sense of Iran as a nation. This can be contrasted with 
younger countries such as Iraq or the Persian Gulf states which have had to 
foster a sense of nationhood.
Instead, the Shah used personal rulership to define Persian nationhood, by 
equating Iran with monarchical rule and by aiming to create a powerful new 
force in international politics. It is argued here that the motivation behind 
economic policy, particularly the industrialisation programme, was inextricably 
bound up with the latter aim. An economically powerful Iran, transformed from 
an agrarian-based society with high levels of illiteracy to a major player in 
international politics, would reflect on the dynamism and success of the 
country’s leadership, in the form of personalised monarchical rule. This form of 
nationalism would, therefore, be distinct from the nationalism of Dr 
Mohammad Mossadeq, the populist prime minister who nationalised the 
Anglo-Iranian oil company in 1951.5 To this end, the Shah embarked on a 
policy of glorifying the monarch. So confident was the Shah of his grip on 
domestic politics that this policy was aimed as much, if not more, at the outside 
world than to his people. There were at least three major landmarks in this 
process.
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The first was in October 1967, when, after 26 years on the throne, the Shah 
held a coronation ceremony amidst much publicity and splendour. At the 
ceremony, the Shah crowned himself as emperor, his wife Farah as empress and 
his son Reza as crown prince. Secondly, in an opulent ceremony in October 
1971 the Shah celebrated 2,500 years of monarchy amidst the ruins of the 
ancient seat of the Persian Empire, Takht-e Jamshid, or Persepolis. ‘It was 
fabulous; it really was like one thousand and one nights’, said one guest.6 The 
problem was that the show was all too obviously put on to impress and seek the 
endorsement of foreign heads of state. Marvin Zonis writes:
For the Iranian people, however, the institution of monarchy was not 
significant. That anniversary had never before been noted, let alone 
celebrated. But worse, the Shah intended to orient the celebrations 
not to the Iranian people but rather to the heads of state of all the 
world’s countries. They would be the guests of the Shah. The people 
of Iran were not invited to the party.7
Thirdly, the Shah imposed a new monarchical calendar to replace the old 
Islamic calendar. Thus, 1976 became 2535 (2500 years of monarchy plus the 
Shah’s 35-year rule), instead of 1355. The unpopularity of this move was 
scarcely confined to the clergy -  it were as if the Queen of England had decided 
overnight to replace the Christian calendar with one beginning with the rule of 
Alfred. The inconvenience of the measure was seen at home as an extremely 
unnecessary way of bringing home the importance of the monarchy.
Questioned in 1976 as to whether the institution of monarchy was doomed 
to extinction, the Shah replied: ‘I find that the monarchy has served us well, as
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well in the present nuclear age as it did in the days of our first great empire. The 
prosperity and power that Iran commands today provides the best argument for 
this claim.’8 The Shah also defended strongly the extravagance of the 
celebration of 2,500 years of empire:
The Iranians think of their sovereign as a father. What you call ‘my 
celebration’ was to them the celebration of Iran’s father. The 
monarchy is the cement of our unity. In celebrating our twenty-fifth 
hundredth anniversary, all I was doing was celebrating the 
anniversary of my country, of which I am the father.9
But as one of the Shah’s biographers has written:
There were two other reasons the Shah did not mention: He wanted to 
show the Iranian people that Iran had once again become a great 
nation, triggering a national awareness of a new Iran restored to the 
great days of Darius. And he wanted to record Iran’s entry onto the 
international stage, impress the emirs of the Persian Gulf and the 
people of the third world.10
Two tools were to be used in propelling Iran onto the world scene; one was 
the creation of a strong military, the other the economic programme geared 
towards making Iran the world’s fifth industrial power. Moreover, though Iran 
was allied to the West, the Shah regarded the eventual success of his policies as 
providing an alternative to the materialism of the Western world:
I am convinced that a return to the Aryan path alone can save 
humanity from a world escalating to war, decadence and doom. When 
I read about events in Vietnam or see the so-called ‘drop-outs’ of 
Western civilisation - hippies, nihilists and followers of strange cults 
- 1 get a feeling that before the century is out, the weapons of death, 
drugs and self-destruction will have wrecked our world and forced 
humanity back into the caves. The time has come, therefore, for those
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who believe in a spiritual, moralistic, peaceful way of life to stand up 
and show mankind the other high road, the Aryan path of salvation.11
It is argued here that unrealistic ambitions and the hasty implementation of 
the big push industrialisation programme were severely detrimental to the 
success of this strategy. Although the strategic alliance between Iran and the 
United States formed the backbone of the Shah’s military and political 
ambitions, rising oil income afforded him the opportunity to try to step beyond 
the relationship and assert Iran’s power as a sovereign nation state. The 
relationship between social and political organisation on the one hand and its 
effect on economic growth and development on the other, has often been 
questioned. In a study of developing countries between the years 1950-70, 
Meyer and Hannan concluded that the dominance of the state in society has a 
positive effect on economic growth and that the expansion of the world system 
during these years affected forms of social and political organisation. But they 
also argue that ‘economic success apparently involves the ability of a state to 
organize effectively its population rather than its ability to compete with other
1 9states’. A similar causal relationship between the strength of the state and 
Iran’s economic development is not made here; simply, that the Shah 
recognised that military strength was useless without economic strength and 
believed that a nation’s independence entailed having both.
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5.3 Iran’s early foreign relations
At the turn of the last century, Iran was a poor country ruled by the corrupt and 
indolent Qajar kings. Their unpopularity led to the Constitutional Revolution, a 
nationalist revolt which broke out in 1905 and culminated in the overthrow of
1 3the Qajar dynasty. Iran at this time was not a formal colony but British 
influence was so strong that the country can effectively be regarded as having 
had a semi-protectorate status. During this period, Britain and Russia clarified 
their respective positions towards Iran through the 1907 Anglo-Russian 
agreement, which divided the country into spheres of influence.
However, by 1911, Iran’s independent constitutional government 
threatened the interests of the two powers and in November 1911, Russia 
delivered a British-backed ultimatum to the Iranian government which included 
a prohibition on the hiring of foreign advisors without the prior consent of 
Russia or Britain. This reference was to the American financial advisor, 
Morgan Shuster, who had arrived in Iran in 1909 to reform the country’s tax 
administration. Russian troops invaded the north and threatened to occupy 
Tehran. British forces were already in the oil-rich province of Khuzestan.
The Tehran invasion was averted by Iran’s acceptance of the ultimatum, 
but the Russian and British occupation remained. The Russian revolution led to 
a short period of Soviet disengagement from Iran’s internal affairs. Instead, the 
Iranian government entered into a secret accord with Britain in 1919 whereby 
the British would control the armed forces, transportation and communications
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and administrative advisors, in exchange for a loan. The agreement finally 
collapsed in the face of popular unrest and opposition, resulting in the fall of 
the government of prime minister Vosuq ul-Dawleh government in 1920. 
Reporting on the disturbances in the country, the Commander of the British 
Military Mission wrote:
It does not appear to be realised at home how intensely unpopular the 
agreement was in Persia and how hostile the public opinion had 
become to Vosuq’s cabinet before it fell. It was believed that the 
agreement really aimed at the destruction of national independence 
and that the prime minister had sold the country to Britain. The 
secrecy with which the agreement was concluded, the fact that the 
Majlis was not summoned and attempts were made to pack it by the 
most dishonest methods . . .  all added to the conviction that Great 
Britain was in reality no better than the hereditary foe, Russia.14
The absence of a stable government enabled a colonel in the Cossack Brigade 
stationed in Qazvin to march on Tehran and seize power. The degree of British 
involvement in the coup has been subject of controversy but it is known that the 
commander of the British forces in Iran, based on Qazvin, Major-General Sir 
Edmund Ironside, had selected Reza Khan as a potential leader. In his diary 
Ironside noted: ‘Reza Khan has carried out a coup d’etat in Tehran, but true to 
his promise to me he has declared his loyalty to the Shah . . .  I fancy that all the 
people think I engineered the coup d’etat. I suppose I did strictly speaking’.15
Reza Khan was first appointed Army Commander, then war minister 
before becoming prime minister in 1923. Two years later, parliament abolished 
the Qajar dynasty and Reza Khan was made Reza Shah:
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So ended the Qajar period. And with it the British lost, one by one, 
the various privileges and concessions that had given them such a 
special position in Persian eyes during much of that period. 
Capitulations and consular courts; sow ar escorts and seigneurial 
rights at Gulhek; British telegrams, stamps and bank notes; a British 
quarantine service; naval bases on Persian islands; the Residency at 
Bushire; the oil company in Khuzistan; and, last of all, British 
paramouncy in the Persian Gulf - all had to go before the Persians 
would feel able to live in their own country amongst the English on 
terms of equality.16
But all did not go unduly quickly and, in 1941, the 1907 Anglo-Russian 
agreement was implemented when Soviet and British forces, alarmed at Reza 
Shah’s support for Nazi Germany and driven by the convenience of an Allied 
supply route through Iran, invaded the country. Reza Shah was deposed and his 
21-year old son, Mohammad Reza, installed as Shah instead. The humiliation 
of the Allied invasion left a deep impression on the Shah, as did the expulsion 
of his father by the British, first to Mauritius and finally to South Africa, where 
he died three years later. There were lessons to be learnt, ones which the Shah 
was afforded the opportunity of implementing decades later with the increase in 
Iran’s oil wealth:
I came to the conclusion that besides the Nazis and the fascists, there 
were obviously other moral outcasts in the world. I realised also that 
unfortunately in this world of ours it’s always the one who is stronger 
who is right. Might is right and to be strong you need a people who 
are united, a sound economy and of course, adequate weapons.17
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5.4 US-Iranian relations
In order to understand the Shah’s motivation in choosing big push 
industrialisation , it is necessary to trace the history of Iran’s relations with the 
US. Contact between Iran and the US began in the early nineteenth century but 
it was not until the 1940s that the US became a serious rival to British and 
Soviet domination of the country. After Reza Shah’s overthrow, Britain and 
the new Shah agreed on the necessity for reforms to build up an efficient 
administrative machinery and restore the country’s fortunes. In 1942, the 
Iranian government agreed to co-operate with a team of American military 
advisers headed by Dr Arthur Millspaugh, Iran having been made eligible for 
lend-lease aid. A year earlier, 30,000 American troops had arrived in Iran to 
help with war shipments to the Soviet Union. The Chief of the Division of Near 
Eastern Affairs, Wallace Murray, remarked that ‘we will soon be in the position 
of actually “running” Iran through our impressive body of American advisers 
eagerly sought by the Iranian Government and urgently recommended by the 
British Government’.18
Iran’s strategic importance had begun to be acknowledged. A US 
memorandum described in September 1942: ‘The urgent advisability of placing 
Americans in strategic positions in the Iranian Government and, in particular . . 
. the necessity of sending a military mission to observe and, if possible, check 
any internal plots in the Iranian Army.’19 By 1943, six major American
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missions were located in Iran. These were the US Army missions of Generals 
Wheeler, Greely and Ridley in 1942; the Gendarmerie Military Mission, known 
as GENMISH in 1943; the Persian Gulf Service Command of General Donald
H. Connolly in 1943; and the American Financial Mission of Dr Arthur 
Millspaugh, also in 1943. An agreement signed that year allowed the chief of 
American military advisors, under the command of the US War Department:
any and all records, correspondence and plans relating to the 
administration of the Army, needed by him. He was also given the 
power to investigate, summon, and question ‘any member of the 
army’ in ‘matters which in his opinion will assist him in his duties; 
and the option to recommend appointment, transfer, or dismissal of 
Iranian officers to the Shah’.20
Millspaugh’s main aim was to reduce and stabilise prices, which he attempted 
to do by imposing a progressive income tax but this earned him the opposition
of the landowning and merchant classes. In addition, the nationalist and
communist groupings resented a foreigner reorganising Iran’s economy. He was 
finally dismissed by the Iranian parliament in 1945, though some deputies 
feared that this could damage American-Iranian relations at a time when the US 
was regarded as a ‘third force’ to counterbalance unpopular British and Soviet 
influence.21
However, the beginnings of the Cold War had already caused the US to 
think more deeply about the strategic importance of Iran. In 1944, Dean 
Acheson wrote:
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The military, political and commercial security of the United States 
requires stability and order in the vast belt of territory from 
Casablanca to India and beyond, which constitutes the Mohammadan 
and Hindu world. Certainly we favor the evolution of self- 
government for the diverse peoples of that area, as we favor the 
restoration of their liberties to the democratic peoples of France and 
Spain. But we have a stake of our own in their political 
development.22
A year later an American military planner, Colonel Harold B. Haskins, 
expanded on the lessons learnt from the Second World War:
Unfortunately, Iran’s position geographically, bordering Russia on 
the north, with British oil interests in the south, and its important 
strategic location in any war, will continue to make this country an 
object of basic interest to the major powers. It must be borne in mind 
that in any future war, control of any part of Iran will allow the 
bombing either of the Russian oil fields in the north or of the British 
oil fields in the south. In the post-war period, Iran’s location is of 
importance in connection with . . . transit facilities for the various 
world airways projects. It is these inescapable factors that give Iran 
an international importance and one beyond what its size and 
population would otherwise warrant. It is, therefore, not for any 
sentimental reasons nor even for any idealistic democratic principles, 
worthy as these may be, that the United States is forced to take a 
continuing interest in Iran.23
US interest in Iranian oil was not confined to protecting British and Soviet 
oilfields. American oil companies had begun to seek oil concessions from the 
1920s, a move which sometimes brought them into conflict with Britain, the 
dominant oil power in Iran.24 Historians disagree about the extent to which 
American entry into Iran was motivated by commercial concerns or by the 
necessity of a political response to the Soviet Union towards the end of the 
Second World War. While the revisionists see oil as the primary reason for
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American interest in Iran, Cottam argues instead that, ‘Iran has the distinction 
along with Greece and Eastern Europe of being part of the first arena of the 
Cold War’. Certainly, the Shah himself thought in terms of superpower 
rivalry, tinged with a deep suspicion of all outside powers:
The first attempt [to efface Iran from the map of the world] went back 
to 1907: the Anglo-Russian convention of August 30 in that year 
divided our country into two. . . The renewal of the same plan in the 
interests of the Second World War shows the continuity of a certain 
Western policy with regard to Iran. In fact, in 1945, the British 
foreign secretary, Bevin, and the American foreign secretary, Byrnes, 
had suggested to Stalin in Moscow that Azarbaijan, Kurdistan and 
Khuzestan become autonomous provinces. Initially Stalin accepted 
this proposition. But Molotov pointed out to him that they only had to 
wait for the whole of Iran to come under Soviet domination.27
It seems likely that an interplay of political and economic factors accounted 
for the origins of American interest in Iran and that though Britain and the US 
were rivals for oil, they were united in their approach to the Soviet Union. As 
James Bill writes:
This cooperation increased significantly as the Soviets responded by 
pursuing a heavy-handed policy of lengthened military occupation 
and direct intervention in northwestern Iran. Thus the economic 
competition for Iranian oil that marked the early and mid-40s, quickly 
and directly blended into political rivalry. It was this economic and 
political competition involving the United States, the Soviet Union 
and Great Britain that marked the early manifestations of the Cold 
War.28
But it would be incorrect to regard early US-Iranian relations as instigated 
solely by the American side. As mentioned, Iran regarded the Soviet Union and 
Britain as the greater enemies at the time, and even encouraged US involvement
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as a means of counterbalancing their influence. And the Shah hoped to trade on 
American fear (and his own fears) of the spread of communism to draw the US 
into an alliance. He intended to use this relationship to build a strong economy 
and military, rather than one doing the bidding of the US. The strategy began to 
work, though slowly at first, with both sides portraying the early ties as 
mutually encouraging. According to one of the documents seized from the 
American embassy in Tehran after the 1979 revolution:
Beginning late in the last century, Iran turned to the United States as 
the preferred patron for its international dealings. The United States 
responded affirmatively and, particularly after World War n, made a 
major commitment to Iran’s sovereignty.29
Soviet troops had still not withdrawn from the north, when the rebel provinces
of Kurdistan and Azarbaijan declared themselves autonomous in 1945 with
strong Soviet support. However, the rebel movements were crushed the next
year by prime minister Qavam al-Saltaneh, while the Soviet Union did nothing
to intervene. In fact, Soviet troops chose this period to withdraw from the north
after their long delay. While fear of the Soviet Union was one factor, the
decision to turn to the United States was also a product of a growing power
struggle between the Shah and the prime minister. Quoting foreign office
materials, Azimi writes that in 1947:
The Shah had been pressing for the purchase of American war 
materials valued at $40,000,000, and Qavam was opposed to such a 
deal, ostensibly because he preferred to spend money on more 
constructive ends, but in reality because the additional equipment 
would further strengthen the Shah.30
257
This was a period in which the Shah had not yet managed to monopolise power, 
leaving parliament and the prime minister considerable room for manoeuvre. 
The period from 1941 to 1948 is regarded by most Iranian historians as one in 
which the monarchy functioned essentially as a constitutional one.
5.5 The beginnings o f US military aid to Iran
The 1940s saw the beginnings of the Shah’s drive for the accumulation of US 
arms, a drive which was initially unsuccessful but which took off in the late 60s 
and 70s. And though domestic control was an integral part of the strategy, the 
sustaining impulse was a result of international forces, namely, the predicament 
Iran found itself in the early part of the century. Its effective division between 
British and Russian domination in the midst of the Cold War, reinforced the 
Shah’s own desire to begin the build-up of a national deterrent to any Soviet 
aggression. R.K. Ramazani has written:
The Shah sought American involvement in Iran as a way of 
strengthening his security forces. He, like his father, regarded military 
strength as the sine qua non of royal survival. To American officials, 
he presented military strength as the essential prerequisite for social 
and economic modernization as well as national independence.
Despite American reluctance to get involved at the beginning, the 
Shah managed to acquire US aid to strengthen the Imperial 
Gendarmerie and the Iranian Army during the War, and to receive 
American military equipment soon after.31
That American involvement was not confined to the military, but extended to 
the economy, is not surprising, since this followed the normal pattern of
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superpower strategic involvement. Moreover, it was a reflection of the Shah’s 
view of the importance of both the economy and the army as twin foundations 
of a strong and independent nation.
After the ill-fated Millspaugh mission, Iran invited the American 
engineering firm, Morrison-Knudson to draw up a survey in 1947 for possible 
development aid. The firm suggested a development plan, a feasibility study for 
which was drawn up by the American firm, Overseas Consultants Inc, on the 
advice of the American economic advisor, Max Thornburg. But foreign help in 
such a key role in the development process was not popular at home and in 
1951, the contract with OCI was terminated, though this was also due to the 
Iranian government’s disagreements with their recommendations.
In 1947, Truman’s declaration that the USA should, ‘support free peoples 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside 
pressure’ resulted in Congress approving $400 million of aid to Greece and 
Turkey as an emergency measure. Iran was given $51 million in credit in the 
same year for the purchase of weaponry; it was to be repaid at 25 per cent 
interest over the next 12 years. The US did not regard Iran as stable enough to 
justify substantial military aid and policy was aimed at giving the Shah enough 
aid to consolidate his position at home. Any Soviet attack would have to be 
confronted by US troops, if it had to come to that. This view is well illustrated 
in a 1949 letter from Ambassador John Wiley to Dean Acheson regarding the 
Military Assistance Program (MAP) to Iran:
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No one imagines that now or in future Iranian Army could prevent 
Soviet invasion. As we understand it, object of MAP from military 
point of view is to insure internal security and to increase cost of 
invasion in terms of personnel and time required, and possible to 
maintain with tribal assistance some form of prolonged resistance 
particularly in southern mountains.32
But the Shah looked for his own military deterrent. The humiliation of the war, 
the Anglo-Soviet invasion and his father’s exile meant that the ideal would be 
for the army to act as an independent force and not be reliant on the American 
deterrent capability. Seizing on the opportunity accorded by the Truman 
doctrine, the Shah made his first visit to Washington:
Because I had succeeded over the Azarbaijan rebels under Soviet 
patronage and Truman had announced containment, I was confident 
of getting aid from America. Greece and Turkey got substantial US 
aid but my hopes were belied because when I went to the US in 1949 
to ask for increased economic and military aid, I returned home 
empty-handed.33
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who met the Shah, later recorded that he 
found him to be ‘a very impractical young man. . . full of grandiose ideas; he 
fancied himself as a great military leader’ while his plan of building an army 
strong enough to deter the Soviet Union was ‘utterly fanciful and never had any 
basis at all’.34
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5.6 The Mossadeq challenge
One event was to accelerate American involvement in Iran. This was the rise of 
the Shah’s prime minister, Dr Mohammad Mossadeq and the nationalisation of 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in May 1951. Two years later, Mossadeq had 
been overthrown by an alliance of British, American and pro-Shah forces in an 
operation referred to as Operation Ajax by the Americans, and Operation Boot 
by the British. Iranians referred to the coup as 28 Mordad, after the day and 
month it took place. The operation marked a turning point for the Pahlavi 
dynasty and was echoed 25 years later by the revolution itself:
American policy in Iran increasingly identified itself with the Shah’s 
regime after the events of 1953. Military, economic, educational, 
financial, industrial and political ties bound the United States to 
Pahlavi Iran to such an extent that it became difficult to disentangle 
the two parties. The world situation after 1953 did much to tighten 
this linkage. But the events of August 1953 represented the turning 
point, and, as such, remained indelibly engraved in the minds and 
memories of the Iranian people. During the revolution of 1978-9, the 
masses of Iranian opposition to the Shah’s rule, whether secular or 
religious, were determined to see that 1978 would not be a repetition 
of 1953. In the process they shouted slogans such as ‘Remember 
Mussadiq’ and ‘Down with the American Shah’.35
The British, alarmed at the loss of their oil assets, had succeeded in playing on 
American fears of alleged communist insurgency in Iran to put the coup into 
place. By June 1953, President Eisenhower refused to continue aid to Iran 
and, along with the British, placed an embargo on Iranian oil. It took several 
attempts to get rid of Mossadeq but the successful coup took place on 19 
August 1953. C.M. Woodhouse, a diplomat based at the British embassy from 
1951-2, wrote:
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Of course, there were some things we did not plan. We did not plan 
the Shah’s flight from the scene of action. We did not plan the 
violence which cost over three hundred lives. In other respects the 
course of the revolution [coup] was more or less what we were trying 
to bring about. . . What we did not foresee was that the Shah would 
gather new strength and use it so capriciously and tyrannically, nor 
that the US government and the Foreign Office would fail so abjectly 
to keep him on a reasonable course. At the time we were simply 
relieved that a threat to British interests had been removed.37
The Mossadeq threat marked a turning point in the Shah’s attitude towards 
government and was an important step in the evolution of an autocratic system. 
This had already begun in 1949 when the constitution was changed to give 
greater powers to the Shah, including the right to dissolve parliament. The 
move was precipitated by an assassination attempt several months earlier. In 
September of that year, the US ambassador reported that the Shah had 
abandoned plans for free elections to the 16th parliament because he thought 
that:
corrupt and venal political influences were effectively working to 
take improper advantage of free elections. The Shah was now 
convinced that with the great illiteracy among and backwardness of 
the great mass of Iranian people any application of electoral 
principles of Western democracies would be premature and bad. His 
Imperial Majesty was determined to have a Majlis with which he 
could work in harmony. He intended moreover to make considerable 
reforms of governmental structure but he wanted me to be completely 
assured that he had no idea whatsoever of setting up a dictatorship.38
In the wake of Mossadeq’s overthrow, the Shah moved to dismantle the former 
prime minister’s party, the National Front, arrest members of the Tudeh 
(communist) Party and purge high-ranking members of the army and the 
executive. According to Abrahamian:
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The regime could feel confident that it had eliminated the 
organization, if  not the appeal, of both the Tudeh and the National 
Front. Muhammad Reza Shah, like his father Reza Shah, could now 
rule without an organized opposition. History had come full circle.39
5.7 The Shah’s doctrine o f ‘positive nationalism ’
The Shah and Mossadeq had been bitter enemies, partly because of the Shah’s 
opposition to nationalization of the oil industry but later the Shah changed his 
position. He wrote in his memoirs: ‘On 2 May 1951 the nationalisation of the 
oil industry was ratified. I was the most convinced partisan of this 
nationalisation, but it should have been preceded or followed by negotiations.’40 
The Shah was critical of Mossadeq but at the same time wanted to take credit 
for the nationalisation of the oil industry by drawing a distinction between a 
correct and incorrect set of procedures.
The Mossadeq challenge resulted in the beginnings of an extensive 
security apparatus and an increase in the Shah’s monopoly on power in the 
name of efficiency, as he emphasised in an interview many years later:
When there’s no monarchy, there’s anarchy, or an oligarchy or a 
dictatorship. Besides, a monarchy is the only possible means to 
govern Iran. If I have been able to do something, a lot, in fact, for 
Iran, it is owing to the detail, slight as it may seem, that I’m its king. 
To get things done, one needs power, and to hold onto power one 
mustn’t ask anyone’s permission or advice. One mustn’t discuss 
decisions with anyone.41
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The Shah also made it clear how important the influence of Mossadeq had been 
on the evolution of a counter-philosophy:
It was strenuous work to clear away the debris left by his negative 
policies. I had therefore to evolve a policy of positive nationalism. It 
was later termed an independent national foreign and domestic 
policy. The emphasis was always on the word national, meaning 
thereby that the national capital Tehran, and no other place was the 
seat of all decisions in all matters, be they national, international, 
domestic or foreign.42
What had started out as a definition of nationalism ended up as a definition of 
centralisation and the concentration of power. It became a justification for royal 
dictatorship. The doctrine of positive nationalism was also meant to appeal to 
nationalists through the use of the word ‘independent’, since foreign 
interference in Iran’s domestic affairs was so unpopular. But, the Shah’s 
definition of nationalism amounted to little more than a statement of what could 
and could not be tolerated under the country’s political system:
I am strongly of the opinion that what is best for Iran is Iranian 
nationalism. Obviously, it cannot be communism, nor can it be based 
on religion. We have no church but we have our mullahs, maulavis 
and Fadayans. Some of them - fortunately not all - are reactionaries 
living in the stone age. It is no use trying to balance one’s country 
between one brand of capitalism, or socialism or any other -ism. If 
one tries to do so, one may not be able to do anything, for fear of 
hurting one side or another. In the context of positive nationalism, on 
the other hand, one does things which are good for one’s country and 
its people, without performing any rope-walking act. Positive 
nationalism implies a policy of maximum political and economic 
independence, consistent with the interests of one’s country.43
The Shah went on to say:
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In this way, we become stronger and more prosperous, building in the 
process a new and resurgent Iran. I therefore laid down a set of guide­
lines for my people to distinguish positive from negative nationalism:
1- Easy to tear things down, difficult to build them up;
2- Suspect those who attack only one kind of imperialism;
3- See whether those who preach socialism are using policies 
germinated in Iran or imported;
4- Never be deceived by the high-sounding pronouncements of these 
nationalists when they hold out promises for the development of the 
country, but judge whether their promises can be implemented 
effectively within a given period of time.44
The first point, while being generally cautionary, is a veiled reference to 
Mossadeq’s nationalisation attempt, which, though popular, had provoked an 
oil embargo on Iran with its resulting economic hardships. Since the Shah was 
attacked for succumbing to American imperialism, the second point is intended 
to spotlight left-wing groupings for not being similarly critical of Soviet 
imperialism. The third point is also anti-communist: since Marxism did not 
originate in Iran, it would of necessity be imported. The last point is ironic in 
retrospect, since it was the Shah’s own ‘big-push’ which fuelled the economic 
crisis on the eve of the revolution.
In fact, the Shah’s doctrine of positive nationalism was extraordinarily 
negative, since it sought to attack the traditional pro-Mossadeq and pro­
independence nationalists. In addition, it had little ideological content and could 
not withstand scrutiny as a doctrine in its own right. In his study of Iranian 
nationalism, Richard Cottam writes:
The Shah was aware of his failure to attract popular support, and he 
made two independent efforts to attract nationalist (not necessarily
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Nationalist) support. One of these was on the propaganda front. 
Through his speeches and the controlled press he insisted that he, not 
Mossadeq, was the true nationalist. He described his nationalism as 
“positive” which means that it was directed toward a real program of 
improving the welfare of the people, whereas Mossadeq’s nationalism 
was negative and self-destructive. This propaganda carried a hollow 
ring when viewed in the context of a regime under which corruption 
had flourished, luxury imports and luxury real estate had consumed 
much of the oil revenue, the wealthy were virtually untaxed, 
agricultural reform had suffered a stinging reverse, labor had become 
the prisoner of criminal elements, and men regarded as servants of 
foreigners were in high positions.
The other approach was the Shah’s sponsorship of a “tame” 
nationalist opposition. 45
In 1954, under financial pressure from the US, the Shah accepted a 
consortium agreement for oil which would allow Iran to receive royalties on a 
50-50 profit basis, while the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company received 
compensation for the nationalisation of its assets. According to James Bill:
From the Shah on down, the Iranians were not pleased with this 
agreement. Even Ali Amini [prime minister] often admitted that the 
consortium arrangement was not what Iran deserved or needed, since 
control still existed in the hands of the foreigners. On the other hand, 
it was the best agreement Iran could have gotten given the time and 
circumstances. In the words of Fatollah Naficy, ‘Iran had to choose 
between the devil and the deep blue sea, between chaos and 
humiliation. What happened is that they chose humiliation rather than 
chaos, leading possibly to communism.’46
The Shah had not got what he wanted but the consortium agreement paved the 
way for gradual Iranian control of the oil industry. Nevertheless, the Shah did 
not forget the humiliation of having to agree to the arrangement in exchange for 
increased US aid. It was not until 1971 that he was finally able to turn the tables 
on the West by pushing through OPEC oil price rises. This humiliation was all
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the more acute because of the various constituencies the Shah wanted to please. 
He wanted absolute power in order to be unchallenged and to govern Iran as he 
wished; at the same time he wanted to portray himself as a nationalist in order 
to neutralise the opposition from the pro-Mossadeq lobby and to capitalise on 
nationalist feeling. These two aims did not go together. Furthermore, genuine 
fear of Iran’s vulnerability drew him into the alliance with the US but this did 
not square with the portrayal of himself as a nationalist, though it did help him 
in seeking absolute power. Finally, he hoped to use the US alliance for 
nationalist ends but in doing so, appeared dependent. The incompatibility of 
these positions is evident in one of his interviews:
If you’re asking me whom I consider our best friends, the answer is: 
the United States amongst others. The United States understands us 
best for the simple reason they have many interests here. Economic, 
therefore direct interests, and political, therefore indirect interests . . .  
Iran is the key, or one of the keys, of the world. I only have to add 
that the United States cannot withdraw within the frontiers of their 
country, they cannot revert to the Monroe Doctrine. They are 
compelled to respect their responsibilities to the world and, 
consequently to attend to us. This detracts nothing from our 
independence, because everyone knows our friendship with the 
United States doesn’t make us their slaves.47
5.8 The forging o f a US-Iranian alliance
Consolidation at home was combined with an increasingly close alliance with 
the US, primarily through economic and military aid. American aid to Iran had 
amounted to $500,000 in the fiscal year 1950, growing to $1.6 million in 1951 
and $23.4 million in 1952. But the Shah did not regard this as sufficient and the 
period is dominated by the Shah’s insistence on more aid and the US’s
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reluctance to dispense it. One American embassy report noted in 1950 that: 
‘The Iranians built a dream world in which our part was to loan them $250 
million and when we played our role only to the extent of making a $25 million 
loan, the Iranians thought we had let them down.’48
In late 1951, William Wame, country director until 1955, had arrived to 
administer the Point IV technical assistance programme, which had first been 
agreed upon in 1949. The object of Point IV, as outlined by Wame, was ‘to help 
strengthen Iran’s economy and to help underwrite her political integrity’.49 
Technical assistance was also to pave the way for American investment in Iran, 
as was made clear in a 1949 message from President Truman: ‘Technical 
assistance is necessary to lay the groundwork for productive investment. 
Investment, in turn, brings with it technical assistance. In general, however, 
technical surveys of resources and of the possibilities of economic development 
must precede substantial capital investment.’50 And, the whole thrust of US 
policy was made clear in a State Department memorandum on the ‘Political and 
Economic Factors involved in Military Assistance to Iran in FY 1951’:
The primary objective of our policy toward Iran is to prevent its 
domination by Soviet Russia, and to strengthen its orientation 
towards the West. Our policy lays first emphasis on economic and 
social development to strengthen the country’s resistance to 
communism. Principal reliance in this connection is placed upon the 
Iranian seven-year program which is expected to draw largely upon 
the country’s own financial resources for its implementation. 
American aid to Iran in the economic and social fields, as now 
planned, will be confined to technical assistance under the Point 
Four, Smith-Mundt and Fulbright program. A second facet to the 
implementation of our policy is to develop Iranian self-confidence 
and power to resist by providing military assistance under MAP.51
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The value of the military assistance programmes had been acknowledged at the 
end of the Second World War. US Secretary of State, James Byrnes had written 
to Secretary of War, Robert Patterson in October 1945 that:
Continuance of the Military Missions to Iran, at the request of the 
Iranian Government, is considered to be in the national interest of the 
United States. Strengthening of Iran’s internal security forces by the 
American Missions contributes to the stabilization of Iran and, 
thereby, to its reconstruction as a sound member of the international 
community. By increasing the ability of the Iranian Government to 
maintain order and security, it is hoped to remove any pretext for 
British or Soviet intervention in Iran’s internal affairs. . . The 
stabilization of Iran, moreover, will serve to lay a sound foundation 
for the development of American commercial, petroleum, and 
aviation interests in the Middle East.52
The most important US military mission was the Military Assistance 
Advisory Group, or MAAG, which was established in 1950 to implement the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Along with ARMISH, the US Army 
Mission, the programme lasted until the revolution in 1979. MAAG aimed to 
improve the Iranian military command structure and to facilitate US military 
and financial assistance. It also dealt in civilian as well as military sales to such 
an extent that Ricks comments, ‘From 1953 to 1979, MAAG became involved 
in every branch of Iran’s military and police forces and affected nearly every 
facet of Iran’s economy.’53 One of the ways in which MAAG continued its 
influence in Iran, albeit in an unofficial capacity, was through its chiefs, who, 
once retired, found employment with private American contractors anxious to 
do business with Iran. According to James Bill:
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These included ARMISH-MAAG generals Harvey Jablonsky and 
Hamilton Twitchell (Northrop and Stanford Research Institute, 
respectively); US Air Force MAAG chief Harold Price (Philco-Ford); 
and US Navy MAAG head Capt RS Harward (TRACOR, Rockwell 
International). Jabolonsky represented the archetypal hard-hitting 
influential military man become arms salesman. As a trusted 
confidant of the Shah on military matters, Jablonsky was able to whet 
the Shah’s technological appetite in ways favorable to Northrop.54
In such ways American influence became inextricably linked with most aspects 
of the Iranian military, industry and, ultimately, the economy. George Baldwin 
also noted that:
The largest, most pervasive source of technical assistance, on 
manpower problems was the United States foreign aid program, both 
civilian and military. There was hardly an agency or program of the 
Iranian Government concerned with training or education that did not 
have its Point IV experts or US contract group.55
One of the main aims of the American missions was to bolster Iranian 
internal security after the Mossadeq challenge and, in 1957, an intelligence 
security organisation, SAVAK, was set up with help from the CIA and, 
subsequently, Israel’s Mossad. However, these developments helped fuel 
domestic resentment of the US, which accelerated with the increase in 
American aid and presence and since the Shah’s consolidation of power was 
popularly perceived as due almost entirely to American support. Between 1953 
and 1960, American aid to Iran exceeded $1 billion - $567 million was given in 
economic aid and $450 million in military aid. The relative distribution of the 
aid is significant since it emphasises the weight that the US gave to the 
fostering of a stable economic climate over the exigencies of a build-up of the
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military. The Shah wanted both, but it was not until oil revenues increased and 
the Nixon administration came to power that his protestations regarding the 
communist threat were finally to bear fruit in the form of accelerated arms 
sales, paving the way for Iran to have an independent military.
Throughout the 1950s, the Shah continued his policy of seeking 
increased American aid to bolster his position at home and abroad and sought 
to integrate the country into the West’s defensive system. Thus, in 1955, he 
took Iran into the Baghdad Pact, a collective security agreement with Turkey, 
Pakistan, Iraq and Britain, later renamed CENTO.56 R.K. Ramazani writes that 
the Shah:
showed consistent determination to deepen and broaden American 
interests in Iran both as a means of strengthening his rule through 
military and economic modernization and as a device to resist Soviet 
and British pressure.57
The Shah welcomed the Eisenhower Doctrine, a set of proposals for a new 
Middle East policy, since it was a public declaration of US military assistance 
‘against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international 
communism’. The US was also pledged to help countries develop their 
economic strength. Ties between the two countries culminated in 1959 with a 
bilateral defence pact, guaranteeing an American military commitment to Iran. 
The previous year, both American and Iranian anxieties had been heightened by 
developments in Iraq. In July 1958, a revolution ousted from power the pro- 
British Nuri Said in favour of Abdul Karim Kassem. Moreover, the whole of
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the Middle East appeared to have been thrown into turmoil by the rise to power 
of Gamal Abdel Nasser through the Free Officer’s coup in 1952, the rise of 
Arab nationalism and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956, an echo of 
Mossadeq’s nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry. Though Britain, France 
and Israel invaded Egypt, Nasser proved more difficult to deal with than 
Mossadeq, and he stayed in power until his death in 1970.
These developments in the Middle East helped prompt the Eisenhower 
Doctrine and resulted in an increased commitment to the Shah. This was 
because Iran was now seen as a crucial link in American strategic plans to 
isolate Nasser and contain communism through the reinforcement of a pro- 
Western buffer south of the Soviet Union. Economic links were also reinforced 
with numerous private American bodies involved in Iranian commerce and 
industry. American oil companies acquired a share in Iranian oil production for 
the first time ever in 1954 when they entered the consortium agreement with 40 
per cent.
5.9 Towards a political and economic crisis
In 1957, a major private investment and commercial treaty was signed with the 
US, giving American firms highly favourable terms for participation. An 
important project to develop Khuzestan was drawn up between the Plan 
Organization in Iran, headed at that time by the forceful personality of Abol 
Hassan Ebtehaj, and the Development and Resources Corporation of New 
York. The American team was headed by David Lilienthal and Gordon Clapp,
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chiefs of the New York corporation.58 The project fell prey to the realities of 
the Iranian political system, as described in Chapter 4 on the planning process. 
James Bill writes:
Because the Shah initially backed the Khuzistan project and because 
Lilienthal himself became an American appendage to the technocratic 
elite of Iran, David Lilienthal developed a strong loyalty to Pahlavi 
rule and became an extremely effective voice for the Shah in the 
United States. His idealism and dynamic commitment to technocratic 
success blinded him to the realities of power, poverty and corruption 
in the Iranian bureaucracy. . . Despite construction of the enormous 
Dez Dam and other hard-eamed, expensive accomplishments, the 
Khuzistan project had mixed success, and the project gradually 
ground to a halt after Ebtehaj’s fall.59
Nor was inefficacity limited to certain development projects. An American 
investigation into the manner of US aid distribution and its use to Iran reached 
startling conclusions in 1957:
1. United States aid and technical-assistance programs in Iran which, 
between 1951 and 1956, totaled a quarter billion dollars, were 
administered in a loose, slipshod, and unbusinesslike manner.
2. The so-called expanded technical-assistance program which began 
in January 1952 and resulted in US obligations of over $100 million 
in a 5-year period, was neither technical assistance nor economic 
development, but an ad hoc method of keeping the Iranian economy 
afloat during the years of the oil dispute.
3. The expenditure of technical-assistance funds during these years 
was undertaken without regard to such basic requirements of prudent 
management as adequate controls and procedures, with the inevitable 
consequences that it is now impossible - with any accuracy - to tell 
what became of the funds.
4. Amounts requested for United States aid to Iran seem to have been 
picked out of the air. There is no evidence that they were based on an 
advance study of what the Iranian economy needed, the amount it 
could absorb, or programs which could be intelligently administered 
by the United States personnel available at the time to expend the 
funds.60
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The fact that American economic aid may not have been put to good use is 
both a reflection of the political and economic conditions in Iran and the nature 
of the US-Iranian relationship. Increased US economic aid signified increased 
US commitment to Iran’s defence from the Shah’s standpoint. At the same 
time, though much of the aid may not have been fed successfully into the 
economy, the appearance was of activity and project-building and, to this 
extent, served its purpose. In fact, Iran was heading towards a financial crisis as 
described in Chapter 4. As Reza Moghadam writes:
There was virtually no systematic control over the amount of credit 
extended by commercial banks, and the quantity of currency put in 
circulation by Bank Melli, the country’s largest commercial bank and 
the bank of issue, was largely determined by the archaic criterion of 
maintaining a minimum level of legally prescribed currency cover.
Thus a combination of excessive growth of public sector investment 
expenditures and a rapid pace of credit and monetary expansion led to 
severe inflationary pressures and a difficult external payments 
position. By 1960 official foreign exchange reserves had fallen to a 
very low level and the new central bank had difficulty in assuring 
adequate foreign exchange for essential imports.61
Iran’s total outstanding external debt had increased fifty-fold in the space of 
five years from $10 million in 1955 to about $500 million in 1960. This was 
despite a rapid rise in oil revenues from $18.5 million in 1954 to almost $290 
million in I960.62 The government was therefore obliged to adopt an economic 
stabilisation programme in autumn 1960 with the help of the International 
Monetary Fund. This aimed to restore domestic price stability and the external 
balance by containing government expenditure, to restrict the expansion of 
private sector credit and limit the use of short-term external credit by 
government agencies. The programme was successful in reducing inflation but
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spawned an economic recession which lasted until 1964. The economic crisis 
triggered off a political crisis, with an open challenge by sectors of the 
opposition to the government about its conduct in the 1960 elections. The post 
of prime minister was held by four different incumbents between January 1960 
and December 1962. The Shah also had to ward off a serious political challenge 
in the shape of Teimour Bakhtiar, the first chief of SAVAK, who was plotting a 
coup against him.
This period of instability coincided with the election of John Kennedy as 
US President in 1961. Kennedy’s political agenda towards developing nations 
threatened by the spectre of communism was different from the outgoing 
Eisenhower administration, with an emphasis on political reform and economic 
prosperity, rather than a strong military sector, as the key to stability. He 
outlined this policy within two months of being sworn in, through the Alliance 
for Progress programme directed at Latin American states in the wake of Fidel 
Castro’s rise to power in Cuba. According to James Bill: ‘Kennedy and his 
advisers considered that economic programs focusing on agrarian reform and 
improved housing, health and educational systems were the best way to head 
off future Cubas in Latin America.’63 The policy was also directed towards Iran 
and was precipitated by remarks that Soviet Premier, Nikita Khruschev, had 
made to American officials in April 1961. Khruschev had said that there would 
be certain revolution in Iran leading to a communist government. According to 
Fred Halliday, Kennedy: ‘made it clear that there had to be internal reform in 
Iran if the Shah’s regime was to survive. This was a policy similar to that being
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urged in Latin America, and in the Iranian case Kennedy was especially 
alarmed by Soviet prognoses that the Shah’s regime would soon fall’.64
With the US termination of its annual military aid of $30 million to Iran’s 
army and Kennedy appearing to ignore repeated requests for more military 
assistance, the Shah found himself with little choice but to implement a policy 
geared towards economic reform. The American government set up a task force 
to investigate the nature and scope of reforms in Iran and, according to a US 
official and ambassador to Iran from 1965, Annin Meyer:
The result of that task force activity was to instruct our ambassador 
that we would provide $35 million in aid to Iran in return for which 
we would expect from the Iranians various steps which we considered 
necessary for progress, including even a suggestion as to the prime 
ministerial candidate we considered best qualified to administer the 
proposed reforms.65
A series of riots in May 1961 obliged the Shah to dismiss prime minister 
Jafar Sharif-Emami and to replace him with a man he personally disliked but of 
whom the US approved, Ali Amini. Amini was not initially a pliant prime 
minister but he ultimately came to be seen as pro-Shah. Mahdavy explains 
some of the problems he faced:
Dr Amini came to power with all the appearances of determination to 
effect reforms. He made immediate concessions to popular demands. 
Parliament was dissolved, the Economic Stabilization Programme 
was vigorously implemented, a number of corrupt government 
officials and military officers were prosecuted and a land reform was 
promised. Thus the government seemed to be concerned not only with 
the economic crisis but also with the basic social and political
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problems threatening the country. . . However, with Amini’s 
increasing reluctance to hold elections, it soon became apparent that, 
caught between the National Front and the Shah, and unable to bring 
the two together in a compromise solution, he had chosen to side with 
the Shah.66
Under US pressure, the Shah embarked on a series of social and political 
reforms. Land reform was one of the six points of the Shah’s ‘White 
Revolution’ which he announced in January 1963. It was to be undertaken in 
two stages, from 1962-64 for landholdings of over one village, and from mid- 
1964 for landowners with one village or less. However, the land reform 
programme was not well implemented, partly because of the government’s 
lukewarm commitment to its thorough implementation. Hassan Arsanjani, the 
minister of agriculture responsible for the programme at the time, told James 
Bill that:
I knew I had to act with power and speed since I had no social 
revolution on which to base the reform. Even the Iranian constitution 
justified feudalism and the Pahlavis were the biggest feudals of all. If 
the program were to be introduced slowly, it would never get off the 
ground. The entire Iranian government in its heart of hearts was 
against serious land reform.67
Besides land reform, the ‘White Revolution’ comprised the 
nationalisation of forests, enfranchisement for women, the establishment of a 
Literacy Corps, workers’ shares in industrial profits and the privatisation of 
factories. The programme was launched with huge publicity and the Shah used 
it as a major propaganda tool throughout his rule; he even wrote a book about
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it. The White Revolution was also presented as ‘the Shah-People Revolution’. 
Asked whether Shah and revolution were not a contradiction in terms, the Shah 
said:
People outside Iran would perhaps consider the term ‘a revolutionary 
monarch’ an image-building cliche . The fact is, however, that the 
revolution in Iran is as much a people’s revolution as it is the Shah’s .
. . In the contest between the people and the reactionaries, the people 
won; and since my programme was essentially a people’s programme, 
they called it ‘The Revolution of the Shah and the People’.
Q: Was Your Majesty not dubbed a socialist or a communist?
A: What’s in a name? I can tell you this much. We were not bound by 
capitalism or any other dogma. My only concern has been and will 
ever be the majority of my people.69
So through the 1962 reforms the Shah to portray himself as a reforming 
monarch and, while land reform may not have actually helped the majority of 
landless peasants, it did restructure land tenure in the countryside in favour of 
small landlords.70 These changes also intensified political unrest, culminating in 
the June 1963 riots in which Ayatollah Khomeini, who came to power after the 
1979 revolution, played an important role.
5.10 The attempt to forge an independent military
In March 1962, the US proposed reducing the Iranian army from 240,000 men 
to 150,000 men over two to three years in exchange for a renewed commitment 
to Iran’s security and a substantial contribution to a sound economic plan. In 
addition, Kennedy proposed a Peace Corps programme to teach English in 
Latin America. Africa and the Middle East. In Iran, Americans would go into 
Iran’s countryside to assist the reform programme there. Though the Shah
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acquiesced to these demands, he began to look elsewhere in an attempt to 
diversify his alliance. He moved to break the ice in relations with the Soviet 
Union in 1962 by promising that foreign missile bases would not be stationed 
in Iran. This was followed up by a trade agreement. Trade with the Soviet 
Union picked up from an annual turnover of $31.7 million in 1962 to $41.4 
million in 1963, though the real expansion in trade between the two countries 
occurred after 1966.71
By the end of 1963, President Kennedy was dead and relations with the 
United States moved into a new and friendlier phase with the Johnson 
Administration. The US Defense Department’s push for exclusive jurisdiction 
over American servicemen in Iran finally bore fruit in October 1964, when the 
Iranian parliament accepted a bill granting diplomatic immunity to American 
armed forces operating in Iran.72 When it emerged that President Johnson had 
agreed to give the Shah a $200 million arms purchasing credit four months 
earlier, many Iranians could not help but think that the country’s sovereignty 
had been sold to buy American weapons. No one verbalised this more 
forcefully and publicly however than Ayatollah Khomeini, who deplored the 
manner in which the bill had been passed and its implications:
The previous government approved this measure without telling 
anyone. The present government recently introduced a bill in the 
Senate and settled the entire matter without breathing a word to 
anyone. A few days ago, the bill was taken to the Majlis and with a 
few deputies voicing some opposition it was passed. They passed it 
without any shame, and the government shamelessly defended this 
scandalous action.
They have reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than of an 
American dog. If someone runs over a dog belonging to an American,
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he will be prosecuted. Even if the Shah himself were to run over a 
dog belonging to an American he would be prosecuted. But if an 
American cook runs over the Shah, the head of state, no one will have 
the right to interfere with him.
Are we to be trampled underfoot by the boots of America simply 
because we are a weak nation and have no dollars? . . . The President 
of the United States must know that he is the most obnoxious person 
in the world in the eyes of our people.73
The Shah expelled Khomeini who moved first to Turkey and then set up base in 
Iraq where he continued clandestine anti-government activities. It was the 
strength of his opposition to the US which ensured him such popularity some 
15 years later. While the alliance with the US was seen as an unequal one by 
many Iranians, this was not the Shah’s view. He believed that though the US 
was obviously the stronger party, the alliance was one of necessity in Iran’s 
defence against possible Soviet aggression. He also regarded it as an alliance 
between friends. There has been much debate about whether the Shah’s main 
intention behind the alliance was to bolster his own position at home or whether 
he hoped to build up a military force capable of taking on the Soviet Union by 
itself. For example, Thomas Ricks quotes Senator Hubert Humphrey’s much- 
cited statement of April 1961 to the effect that:
Do you know what the head of the Iranian Army told one of our 
people. He said the Army was in good shape, thanks to US aid - it 
was now capable of coping with the civilian population. That Army 
isn’t going to fight the Russians. It’s planning to fight the Iranian 
people.74
Barry Rubin quotes a much earlier exchange, when Undersecretary of State 
Robert Lovett wrote in 1947 that, ‘US military assistance should continue [to]
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be aimed at internal security, not national defense of Iran.’ But, according to 
Rubin:
The Shah’s views could not have been more different. The Soviets 
might attack at any time, he told American officials, and Iran needed 
a strong army of 150,000 men. It would be a good idea to limit Iran’s 
forces, replied John Jemegan, director of the State Department’s 
Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, because “it could be 
such a drain on the national economy as to increase the very poverty 
of the people, which His Majesty considered the greatest asset of 
Communism”.75
The Shah’s approach to the potential of his army changed during his rule. 
Internal stability was always a consideration but the ongoing tussle with the 
United States over the size of the army signified either a disagreement as to the 
necessary numbers for the maintenance of internal security, or a genuinely 
ambitious desire on the Shah’s part to begin building up a national deterrent 
capability. Certainly, from the mid-60s, the Shah was determined to play at 
least a major regional role and the army enabled him to do this, for example, 
through his active support of Sultan Qaboos’ throne in Oman. Moreover, his 
anxiety regarding developments in Iraq led him to regard the threat of an 
outbreak of war with Iraq as highly probable, and far more likely than with the 
Soviet Union.76 In fact, the decision to relocate the country’s main oil export 
terminals from Abadan, along the banks of the Shatt-al Arab waterway, a 
border river of disputed sovereignty with Iraq, down to Kharq Island in the 
Persian Gulf, was determined by the perceived Iraqi threat.
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In the 1960s, the Shah became worried about the strength of US 
commitment to Iran for a number of reasons. One was the Kennedy experience, 
another was the cut-off in military aid to Pakistan by the Johnson 
Administration in 1965 because of the war with India. ‘Now we know that the
• 77United States would not come to us if we were attacked’, said the Shah. 
Another bone of contention was the attitude towards Nasser. The Shah objected 
to the US’s food aid programme to Egypt and to its recognition of the pro- 
Nasser government in North Yemen. These experiences led to a determination 
on the Shah’s part that, ultimately, only an independent military would be an 
adequate guarantee of Iran’s security. Accordingly, he kept up cordial relations 
with the Soviet Union, both to act as a lever on the US and to pursue a less one- 
party dependent foreign policy.
5.11 Iran’s military build-up and growing regional role
By the early-70s, the Shah spoke of Iran becoming the world’s fifth power, both 
in economic and military terms. Within this idea lay the intention that Iran 
would become an invaluable prop to the West’s defence structure. In an 
interview in December 1973, he illustrated some of these points:
When negotiating with the Russians, Iran must always remember the 
chief dilemma: to become Communist or not? There’s nobody so 
crazy or naive as to deny the existence of Russian imperialism. . . .
There exists what I call the USSR’s pincer movement. There exists 
their dream of reaching the Indian Ocean through the Persian Gulf.
And Iran is the last bastion defending our civilization, what we 
consider decent. Should they decide to attack this bastion, our 
survival would depend only on our ability and will to resist. So the 
problem of resistance already looms today.
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Q: And Iran is strong today, as regards military preparation, isn’t 
it?
A: Yes, but still not strong enough to be able to resist a Russian 
attack. That’s obvious. For instance, I haven’t the atom bomb. 
However, I feel strong enough to resist should a Third World War 
break out. . . So, should the Soviet Union attack us, we’d resist. And 
we’d probably be overcome, after which the non-Communist 
countries would not just stand there looking on. They would 
intervene. Which would mean the Third World War. . . I speak of it 
as something possible with the hope it doesn’t occur. As an 
occurrence in the not-so-distant future, I see the possibility of a small 
war with some neighbour or other. After all, we have nothing but 
enemies on our frontiers.78
But Iran’s increasing militarisation was incomprehensible to some observers. 
Writing in 1968, Manouchehr Parvin sought to understand the ‘proportionally 
large allocation of the national budget to military expenditure’, through one of a 
number of hypotheses. The first was that a large army was needed to suppress 
internal dissent, the second that Iranian national security, for some reason, cost 
more than that of other nations:
The third alternative hypothesis is that Iran’s foreign policy has 
changed gradually and silently with the result that the Iran of today is 
pursuing an expansionist policy. It is possible that we may have failed 
to consider other relevant factors, including a threat of invasion from 
Mars or elsewhere known to the Iranian government, but unknown to 
us.
In this article we have implied that it is the business of the Iranian 
taxpayer to know what criteria have been used to spend his taxes. 
This does not imply a demand for the publication of military secrets 
but rather concrete explanations as to the reasons which have 
necessitated the present amount of military expenditure.79
The US approach to Iran’s military has already been surveyed, to which can be 
added the views of Ledeen and Lewis, namely, that until the early 60s, one of 
the important aims of US military aid to Iran was to ensure the army became a 
force for stability within the country:
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In a sense, the Iranian military was to serve as a “safety net” for the 
Palace were it to be threatened once again. The Americans may have 
concluded that the Iranian military, properly armed, trained, and 
indoctrinated, could act as a stabilizing force with or without the 
monarch. As Robert Pranger and Dale Tahtinen noted, the Iranian 
military became the object of a major campaign: “In fiscal years 1953 
through 1961 our total military assistance to Iran was about half the 
assistance we gave all countries in the 1953-1969 period, and all of it 
was in the form of outright grants”.80
In 1964, Iran received its first substantial post-Kennedy arms aid from 
the US and by 1966, the Shah had managed to obtain, after much lobbying, his 
first F-4 Phantom jets, nearly two years before Israel. At the same time, 
activities with the Soviet Union and even the Eastern bloc were developing. In 
June 1965, the Shah made a state visit to the then Soviet Union and signed a 
major commercial treaty a year later. This provided for a gas pipeline and a 
steel mill; the latter was particularly welcome since it had been rejected on 
economic grounds by Western companies. The Soviet Union welcomed Iran’s 
moves towards a diversification of partners:
Although Iran still maintains its ties with the west and the consortium 
still controls the lion’s share of the country’s oil resources, and 
although the system of military and political agreements concluded in 
the post-war years still exists, the period of one-sided orientation has 
ended and the first results are apparent.81
In 1967, an accord for the purchase of ‘non-sensitive’ arms was completed, 
with Iran receiving about 100 Soviet BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers, 
lorries and small anti-aircraft guns. Soviet economic credits and grants totalled
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$521 million between 1966 and 1970.82 The Shah undertook an extensive tour 
of Eastern Europe in 1966, visiting Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Poland. By the mid-late 60s, the Shah was impatient to accelerate the pace 
of economic development and put pressure on the US government to encourage 
the major oil companies to increase production in Iran, thereby, increasing oil 
revenues. The State Department co-operated and requested the favour from the 
oil companies on the grounds of national security. Undersecretary of State 
Eugene Rostow urged the companies in 1968 to remember that Iran was very 
important to the maintenance of US interests in the region; that Soviet influence 
was increasing and that the Arabs might gain control of Middle Eastern oil. Iran 
was the only Moslem Middle East country that supported Israel, a fact 
particularly marked in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The 
consortium duly came up with more money.83
A growing independence vis-a-vis the US was also evident in the 
financial sphere. Iran was believed in the US, to have reached the ‘take-off 
stage of economic development by 1967 and American economic aid was 
virtually terminated. Altogether, some $1 billion had been supplied to the 
country since 1953. Moreover, increased oil revenues gave Iran greater 
purchasing power for American armaments, as the US substituted credits 
instead of grants for Iranian purchases from 1967. A number of other 
developments aided the Shah in his aim to become a major regional power, the 
most important of which was the announcement by British prime minister, 
Harold Wilson, in January 1968 that the Britain intended to withdraw its troops
from the Far East and the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971. In a speech delivered 
to the Iranian parliament in 1969 the Shah said:
It goes without saying that we shall not hesitate to take any 
precaution necessary to increase our military preparedness in the 
defence of our territory and frontier. This policy has now assumed 
greater significance in view of the unforeseen responsibilities which 
may confront us when British forces withdraw from east of Suez in 
1971. Evidently, Iran will be shouldered with a heavy financial 
burden. On the other hand, it is only reasonable that the defence for 
the security of this area should be assumed by the countries of the 
area.84
The Shah seized on the opportunity afforded by a potential vacuum after the 
British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf by positioning Iran as a major 
regional player in an area of possible conflict. Once relations with the former 
USSR had improved, the Shah moved to strengthen Iran’s defence capability 
southwards through a repositioning of troops. In 1967, a new Third Army Corps 
with paratroopers was established at Shiraz in the south; a major Iranian 
military base was built at Chah Bahar on the Gulf of Oman for the rapid 
deployment of forces and in 1972, the Khorramshahr naval base, situated on the 
Shatt-al Arab was moved to Bandar Abbas, near the entrance to the Persian 
Gulf at the Straits of Hormuz.
At the same time, American perceptions of the Soviet threat had also 
begun to diminish; the worst days of the Cold War were over and the spirit of 
detente had led to superpower agreements regarding a limited nuclear test ban 
and a process of disarmament. Writing in 1970, Richard Cottam believed that
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this signified a change in American-Iranian relations to the effect that the client- 
state relationship between the two was over:
. . .  the intensity and direction of American policy in Iran has 
reflected the perception of threat to the United States implicit in 
Soviet ambitions in Iran. What basically is behind the transformation 
of such formerly hardliners as President Nixon to negotiators is the 
steady decline since 1962 and the Cuban missile crises of perceptions 
of that threat. . . Consequently the intensity of American-Iranian 
relations should decline to the point that interference beyond that of 
normal diplomatic relations will cease. . . the United States appears 
likely now to move back toward the role of benevolent observer.85
The Vietnam War had taken its toll on American energies and provoked a shift 
in foreign policy. Hence, in July 1969, President Nixon outlined America’s 
response to a non-nuclear threat to a friendly country, in what became known as 
the Nixon Doctrine:
. . we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested 
according to our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation 
directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing 
the manpower for its defense . . 86
The implication was that the US would not only avoid direct military 
involvement in regional issues, but would expect the burden of defence to be 
borne by individual nations. This suited the Shah’s plans. In an interview with 
The Times in 1969, he said:
We are prepared, along with Saudi Arabia, to protect the countries of 
the Persian Gulf. Our airborne and armoured units stationed at Shiraz
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can be as much of a help to the sheikhdoms as the British troops and 
it is not clear that the British forces, in a case of crisis, would fight.
We want a common defensive policy for this region. We may propose 
that the Gulf becomes a closed sea and the port of Bahrain be used as 
a joint naval base.87
The response to this idea from other nations in the region was lukewarm. Iraq 
was openly hostile and proposed an Arab regional security arrangement that 
would exclude Iran. But Oman, battling against the Dhofar rebellion, welcomed 
the proposals. In fact, Sultan Qaboos was to acknowledge Iran’s regional role 
three years later by requesting help to suppress the rebellion. The Shah sent 
over 2,000-3,000 troops and the rebellion was finally put down with the further 
assistance of Britain and Jordan.
It is unsurprising that the response from the Arab states should have been 
less than welcoming. Iran had long claimed sovereignty over Bahrain and, in 
1971, invaded and occupied three small islands (Abu Musa, Greater Tunbs and 
Lesser Tunbs) in the Persian Gulf, which belonged to the sheikhdoms of 
Shaijah and Ras al-Khaimah, on the eve of the creation of the United Arab 
Emirates. Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Iran a day after the seizure. 
Iran’s military build-up had alarmed Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia itself. 
In the background too, was Iran’s tacit support for Israel during the 1967 war. 
However, the Shah combined intimidation with accommodation. The Bahrain 
dispute was settled through the auspices of the United Nations, with Lord 
Caradon, the British representative praising: ‘Iran’s magnanimity in waiving its
o o  m
historic claim’. An accommodation was reached with Shaijah m November 
1971, whereby Iran would give financial assistance to the sheikhdom. But Iran
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held on to the three islands and relations with Iraq deteriorated to the point of 
spasmodic fighting along the Iran/Iraq border throughout the following year. 
The Shah continued to be worried about Iraq’s Soviet-backed government, 
which was reinforced by the Iraqi-Soviet friendship treaty signed in 1972.
The developments in the region enabled the Shah and President Nixon to 
concur that the danger from small radical states was even greater to regional 
security than the Soviet threat. The US needed another strong ally in the region 
in addition to Israel. Moreover, the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 also meant, from 
the Shah’s point of view, that he had to be concerned about stability on his 
eastern flank as well as the west. It was under these conditions that President 
Nixon paid a visit to Iran with Henry Kissinger in May 1972, during which he 
told the Shah that the US would be willing to sell Iran any conventional 
weapons it wanted - the famous blank cheque which was delivered against the 
advice of the US Department of Defense.89 A blank cheque to Iran had the 
added advantage, from the American point of view, of being filled in with 
dollars for, unlike the US’s other major allies -  Pakistan, South Korea and the 
Philippines -  the Shah could afford to buy in cash through the sale of dollar- 
denominated oil. Moreover, argued the Americans, if the US was not prepared 
to sell arms to Iran, plenty of other people were. Kissinger also denied that arms 
sales diverted resources from the Shah’s industrialisation programme:
Nor can it be said that the Shah’s arms purchases diverted resources 
from economic development, the conventional criticism of arms sales 
to developing countries. The Shah did both. Iran’s economic growth 
was not slowed nor was its political cohesion affected by its defense
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spending. Cut off from military supplies - an impossibility anyway, in 
light of the ready availability of British and French arms - Iran might 
have grown more vulnerable to outside pressures without gaining in 
domestic stability.90
Kissinger acknowledged the criticisms, made with hindsight, that US support 
for the Shah contributed to his overconfidence but in 1972 emphasised Iran’s 
strategic importance:
It is not obvious, of course, that self-assurance in an ally is a bad 
thing. Nor was this how the problem appeared in 1972. The real issue 
was that the required balance within an area, essential for the 
security, and even more the prosperity, of all industrial democracies 
appeared in grave jeopardy. More than 15,000 Soviet troops were still 
in Egypt, with which we had as yet no diplomatic relations and which 
was tied to the Soviet Union by a Friendship Treaty signed a year 
earlier. Just seven weeks before, on April 9, the Soviet Union had 
concluded a similar Friendship Treaty with Iraq, followed by massive 
deliveries of the most advanced weapons. Syria had long since been 
a major recipient of Soviet arms - and had invaded Jordan twenty 
months earlier. Britain at the end of 1971 had just completed the 
historic withdrawal of its forces . . . Our friends - Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, the Emirates - were being encircled.
It was imperative for our interests and those of the Western 
world that the regional balance of power be maintained so that 
moderate forces would not be engulfed nor Europe’s and Japan’s (and 
as it later turned out, our) economic lifeline fall into hostile hands. 
We could either provide the balancing force ourselves or enable a 
regional power to do so. There was no possibility of assigning any 
American military forces to the Indian Ocean in the midst of the 
Vietnam war and its attendant trauma. . . Fortunately, Iran was 
willing to play this role. The vacuum left by British withdrawal, now 
menaced by Soviet intrusion and radical momentum, would be filled 
by a local power friendly to us. Iraq would be discouraged from 
adventures against the Emirates in the lower Gulf, and against Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia. A strong Iran could help damp India’s temptations 
to conclude its conquest of Pakistan. And all of this was achievable 
without any American resources, since the Shah was willing to pay 
for the equipment out of his oil revenues.91
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5.12 The emergence o f the ‘twin pillar' policy
It can be seen from the foregoing that a combination of factors propelled the 
Shah into the position that he had always sought. International strategic 
developments, a series of economic changes at home, increased oil revenues 
and a friendly US administration had resulted in Iran, not only finally becoming 
an independent sovereign nation, but a regional power too. Twenty years of 
warning the US about the Soviet threat and the need for a strong Iranian 
military had paid off - the US had come round to his point of view.
This was not, of course, how it was seen in Iran itself. The restoration of 
Mohammad Reza Shah to the throne in 1953 signified to many Iranians that he 
was a lackey of the Americans; therefore, the closer strategic alliance between 
the two countries was not for them, as the Shah saw it, the practice of an 
independent foreign policy, but the deepening of client-state relations. Nixon’s 
endorsement and the blank cheque gave the Shah a renewed confidence which 
was reflected at home in the 2,500th anniversary of the monarchy held at 
Persepolis. Many writers trace the origins of the Shah’s ‘megalomania’ 
resulting in increased political suppression at home and an ambitious foreign 
policy to this period, as Kissinger also tacitly acknowledged above. For 
example, Ionnides writes that Nixon’s endorsement of Iranian arms purchases 
made the Shah:
feel like a partner rather than a subordinate to the United States, as he 
perceived himself until then. In fact, the Shah felt more than a 
partner. He thought of himself as defender of the West from then on.
He gained more self-confidence and his ego was greatly uplifted. It
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was the ego of a man who was humiliated in 1953 and felt insecure 
throughout his rule.92
Stability in the Middle East was to be dependent on the US ‘twin pillar’ 
policy, which balanced Iran with Saudi Arabia, lest the Arab world felt 
excluded by American reliance on two non-Arab countries - Israel and Iran - for 
its security. But Iran, with its much greater population, was seen as the main 
pillar so that the strategy was closer to one pillar and a half than anything else. 
However, the danger of the ‘twin pillar’ policy was that the two pillars, instead 
of co-operating with one another, would become competitors. This was 
reflected particularly in the field of armaments, as Saudi Arabia showed 
increased anxiety about the scale and quality of Iran’s weapons purchases. 
Sirriyeh argues that the consequence of a policy aimed at stabilising the region 
in fact led to an arms race with all its destabilising potential.94 Saudi Arabia 
and Iran became increasingly competitive in a different sphere - that of OPEC - 
and the early 1970s saw the two countries jostling for leadership of the 
organisation.
The effect of the Nixon doctrine can be seen clearly from Table 5.1. Iran’s 
purchase of US arms rose six-fold between 1971 and 1973 with a slight 
increase in 1975 before the whole amount was doubled in 1977. For Saudi 
Arabia, the jump is both less consistent and less dramatic; it also begins after 
the Iranian build-up, an indication that it was, in part, a response to Iran’s move.
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Nevertheless, Saudi expenditure went up five-fold between 1973 and 1975 
before dropping to a third of Iran’s military expenditure in 1977.
Table 5.1: US foreign military sales agreements with Iran and Saudi 
Arabia for selected years 1968-1977 (fiscal years, millions of dollars)
1955-68 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977
Iran 505.4 235.8 363.9 2,171.4 2,446.1 5,713.8
Saudi
Arabia 5.857.8 4.2 15.9 709.3 3,614.8 1,898.0
Source: US Department of Defense, Security Assistance Agency, Foreign 
Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts December 1974 (Washington DC: 
1978, p.l.) Quoted in Hossein Sirriyeh, US Policy in the Gulf, 1968-1977 
(London: Ithaca, 1984).
Between 1972 and 1977, the value of US arms sales to Iran was $16.2 
billion, according to James Bill who comments that between 1972 and 1978, 
‘the transfer of arms from America to Iran took place at levels never before 
known in international political history.’95 And, despite Iran’s friendship with 
the US, which prevented the Shah from joining the oil boycott in the aftermath 
of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, many American politicians began to worry about 
the utility of such large transfers of arms. For example, Edward Kennedy 
warned of the dangers of a regional arms race at a time when the Soviet threat 
appeared to have diminished:
it is hard to foresee the Gulf states becoming heavily armed without 
this leading to new definitions of relations among them, new 
ambitions, new points of friction - and an escalating arms race. The
293
more heavily armed the various states become, the more likely it is 
that small disputes will be exacerbated by the presence and possible 
use of modem weapons.96
Under such conditions, Kennedy asked:
do American and Western arms sales promote our national interest in 
true political and military security or do they work against that 
security - by increasing the risks of rivalry, instability (within or 
among states), conflict, and hence stoppages in the flow of oil?97
Apart from questioning what Iran was defending itself against, some 
observers wondered whether Iran had, by 1975 reached the limit of its ability to 
absorb the number and quality of military equipment it was receiving. For 
example, Richard Burt wrote at the time:
. . . it is natural to ask whether Iran’s military ambitions have outrun 
her technical competence. As with Iranian society in general, it is 
tempting to argue that the massive influx of technology threatens to 
exceed the country’s ability, now and in the future, to absorb it. On 
the most simple level, there seems to be a degree of truth in the 
argument of some military observers that Iran is a ‘paper tiger’ owing 
to its almost complete lack of real combat experience. The average 
Iranian fighter pilot flies more hours than his Israeli counterpart, but 
can Iranian readiness be compared to battle-tested air forces 
elsewhere?98
Kissinger, who is credited with being the main architect of the ‘twin 
pillars’ policy, is fiercely defensive in his memoirs about the strategy, and 
points to its continuation by subsequent administrations as evidence that it was 
sound:
Our choice in 1972 was to help Iran arm itself or to permit a perilous 
vacuum... Presidents Ford and Carter encouraged the Shah’s military 
strength for the same reason that Nixon approved the first increment:
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It was considered in the overwhelming strategic interest of the United 
States, of Iran and of the stability of the region."
If anything, the opponents of arms sales to Iran demonstrated to the Shah the 
high level of commitment shown by the US administration to his government. 
Yet, it carried with it the danger of a change in American support and therefore, 
the need for an independent foreign policy was as acute as ever. For the Shah, 
military strength and a strong economy were the means towards the creation not 
only of an independent nation but of a powerful nation.
5.13 The surge in oil wealth
By the early 1970s, the Shah, confident of his monopoly on power at home, 
believed that Iran was an independent nation that could no longer be pushed 
around by outside powers. The next task was to create the ‘great civilisation’ 
whereby Iran would become the world’s fifth power. The engine propelling 
many of these developments was oil. OPEC’s creation in 1960 marked the 
beginning of a change in the relationship between producer countries and the oil 
companies. The Shah realised that the importance of oil could be exploited as a 
means of attaining his goals.
In 1969, when Iran was producing 3.3 million barrels a day, the Shah 
suggested to Nixon that Iran pay for its arms in oil but this idea was turned 
down. The consortium still had the power to set the level of oil production from 
Iran. However, in December 1970 Iran participated in an OPEC threat to halt 
production unless host countries enjoyed a greater production share. Two
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months later an agreement was reached in Tehran between the international oil 
companies and the producer countries to the effect that higher oil prices would 
be granted as long as the producer countries agreed to keep oil prices stable. 
The 1971 Tehran Agreement was a turning point in the history of the 
international oil industry:
The world perceived it as a triumph for Opec and more particularly 
for the Shah. The world press had covered the month of negotiation 
with dramatic headlines . . .  Opec and the Gulf states were, of course, 
delighted, but no one more than the Shah. In his eyes it was his, and 
Iran’s, triumph. He invested Amuzegar [Oil Minister] with the Order 
of the Taj, First Class. Psychologically it did him no good. Already he 
had taken on, in his own mind, the mantle of the British in the Gulf; 
now he could add to this triumph; and in October he would solemnise 
his apotheosis with the Persepolis coronation, the celebration of 2500 
years of the Iranian kingdom.100
Iran’s oil revenues had increased from $290 million to $550 million between 
1961 and 1965. Oil production rose from 3.8 million b/d in 1970 to 5.2 million 
b/d in 1972. Revenues from oil nearly doubled over the two years from $1.3 
billion to $2.5 billion.101 In May 1973, Iran finally took full control of the 
Iranian oil industry out of the hands of the Consortium into its own nationalised 
company, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), despite this being in 
contravention of the Tehran Agreement. In 1970, the United States had become 
a net importer of oil and the developments between the producer countries and 
the oil companies, as well as political developments in the region, had become 
of paramount importance. Moreover, a fear that oil demand would outstrip its 
supply combined with a $2 per barrel OPEC rise in price in October, pushed 
prices up during 1973, to $5.2 a barrel compared with $2.5 for 1972.
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These changes led to a statement in 1973 by Joseph Sisco, then assistant 
secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, to the effect that the policy 
objectives of the United States included: ‘continued access to Gulf oil supplies 
at reasonable prices and in sufficient quantities to meet our growing needs and
1 (Y>those of our European and Asian friends and allies.’ Iran was regarded as the 
lynchpin in this security arrangement, but though Iran would ensure security of 
supplies through OPEC, it argued in favour of raising the price of oil four-fold 
in December 1973; it seemed, therefore, that the two objectives -  that of 
security of supply and ‘reasonable’ prices -  could not be reconciled in one 
political actor and that a choice had to be made. Henry Kissinger was clear that 
if the price the US had to pay for security in the Gulf was more expensive oil, 
then so it had to be:
We owed the Shah a great deal for his unflagging loyalty during the 
October war. NATO allies had permitted overflights of their territory 
by the Soviet airlift to the Middle East: the Shah had adamantly 
refused. . . He kept us informed of what he understood to be Arab 
purposes. He was available as an intermediary . . . Above all, he 
refused to join the pressures organized by other oil producers in the 
Persian Gulf. Iran did not participate in the Arab oil embargo nor did 
it curtail its oil production. . . He continued to supply oil to Israel.
When we moved a carrier task force into the Indian Ocean, it was 
fueled from Iran without argument about compensation.103
Indeed, Kissinger argued that the Shah had been unfairly labelled by historians 
, as the main impetus behind the December price rises ‘for which others shared 
equal if not greater blame’.104 The degree to which it was Iran rather than 
Algeria or Iraq (these two countries wanted an oil price higher than that 
eventually agreed upon) which were to blame for the 1973 increases is 
debatable. Perhaps the question of who actually forced the price rises is less
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important than the fact that the Shah was more than happy to take the 
credit/blame for the move. Saudi Arabia had argued for a lower increase but 
was overruled by Iran. Ian Skeet believes that:
The Shah must be held primarily responsible for what was a 
disastrous decision not only for the rest of the world but also for Iran.
Some of those who were able warned him but he did not listen. He 
was not a man to listen, and he was beguiled by a vision of dollars 
that would create his Great Civilisation, an Iran reformed and reborn 
to greatness. . . In the euphoria of 1973 the Shah could not follow a 
Saudi, he must lead.105
The Shah was also mindful of Iran’s unfavourable balance of payments 
position which had come under severe strain from 1970 onwards. For the first 
time, the country’s level of net foreign exchange reserves had become negative 
by roughly $170 million. Not only would the increase in oil prices wipe out this 
problem which threatened another economic disaster on the scale of 1960-63, it 
would also allow him to capitalise on the long fought-for arms sales that the 
United States was now willing to make and which were essential if Iran was to 
play a major role not only in the Persian Gulf but further afield.
Increased oil revenues gave the Shah the belief that he could finally 
transform Iran’s economy into a major industrial power in the space of a decade 
or so. Last, but not least, the Shah saw the move as the ultimate in showing the 
world how powerful Iran was, and, he enjoyed flaunting this, in particular to the 
West. Interviews given to Western networks after this period show a man who, 
though closely allied with the United States, bore an almost vengeful hatred of 
the West and of Britain, in particular. In an interview with the BBC, he
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predicted that the West would return to the caves, while Iran flourished. A 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State report of May 
1976 read:
In recent months the Shah has permitted unusually severe criticisms 
of the United States in the Iranian media. He has lent his own name to 
sweeping charges against the US, raising public questions about the 
bases and alliance and US reliability.106
When asked in 1976 whether the price of oil might be pushed up again, he
said:
Of course it’s going to rise. Certainly. And how. . . There’s no other 
solution. However, it’s a solution you of the West have wished on 
yourselves. Or, if you prefer, a solution wished on you by your ultra­
civilized industrial society. You’ve increased the price of wheat you 
sell us by 300 percent, and the same for sugar and cement. You’ve 
sent petrochemical prices rocketing. . . You make us pay more, 
scandalously more, for everything, and it’s only fair that, from now 
on, you should pay more for oil. Let’s say . . .  10 times more.107
Perhaps too, in his relations with the West, the Shah was practising a 
psychological lesson he appeared to have learnt:
I have several criticisms to offer in regard of Western policies. But 
my main grudge is this: the west treats those who are their friends as 
negligible quantity. As to others who bully them, they lick their boots. 
There is a kind of masochistic complex in the West.108
In the event the rise in price per barrel from $5.2 to $11.5 meant that Iran’s 
foreign exchange receipts from oil increased from $5 billion in 1973 to $19 
billion in 1974. Over a two-year period (1972-74), Iran’s foreign exchange 
income had risen almost eight-fold. In previous chapters we have discussed
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how this additional income was distributed within the economy. It also led to a 
sudden increase in military expenditure. Table 5.2 shows US military aid and 
sales to Iran from 1972-78:
Table 5.2: US Military Aid and Sales to Iran, 1972-78
(millions of dollars)
Year Grant Cash/Credit Sales Total
1972 0.2 214.0 215.0
1973 0.2 245.0 245.4
1974 0.2 648.6 648.8
1975 0.1 1,006.1 1,006.2
1976 0.05 1,924.9 1,924.9
1977 - 2,424.7 2,424.7
1978 - 1,907.3 1,907.3
Source: US Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales and Military 
Assistance Facts, Year Series, quoted in Christos P. Ionnides, America’s Iran 
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1984), p. 16.
According to the table, Iran bought some $8.4 billion worth of arms from the 
US during 1972-78. Statistics vary greatly, however, regarding the true level. 
For example, James Bill quotes a figure of $16.2 billion in US military sales to 
Iran for the same period taken from the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, US Military Sales.109 Such a figure is very high indeed since it would 
amount to four-fifths of all foreign exchange for the first year of high oil
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earnings - 1974. He also finds that by 1977, ‘the military and security 
establishments in Iran were absorbing over 40 percent of the Iranian budget’. 
However, even if the size of the figures is disregarded, it can clearly be seen 
from the table that Iran almost tripled its purchases of arms from the US in 
1974 compared to 1973 and that this figure itself increased by over 55 per cent 
the following year.
The powerful effect of the increase in oil prices is, therefore, clear. Apart 
from solving the balance of payments problem and injecting large amounts of 
capital into the economic system, it also enabled high levels of arms purchases. 
While it would be going too far to say, as some have, that the US agreed to oil 
price rises, or indeed encouraged them so that it could sell weapons to Iran and 
the Middle East (Saudi expenditure also increased dramatically), it is certainly 
the case that the US, seeing the substantially greater numbers of dollars going to 
the Middle East almost overnight, was not then likely to discourage a circular 
flow through increased levels of arms and other exports. For example, a secret 
policy document shows that policy since the oil price rises had been to ensure 
these petrodollars were recycled. The policy framework had been:
To assist oil exporters to employ their rapidly growing incomes in a
constructive way, supportive of the international system.110
Arms and technology, as the most expensive items, were the most efficient in 
helping this recycling process to succeed.
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By July 1976, some 25,000 Americans (and their dependents) were 
working in military-related jobs in Iran, only 6,000 men fewer than in the 
professional Iranian military. An estimated 60,000 Iranian students lived in the 
US by the end of 1977. Indeed the relationship between oil, arms, the US and 
Iran, according to some authors, fits almost exactly the pattern of militarised 
sub-imperialism, whereby Iran was armed by the US in order to guarantee the 
security of increasingly important oil supplies to the US and the West.111 
Though the argument is persuasive and though security of oil supplies was 
certainly a major policy objective of the US, it ignores almost completely Iran’s 
own inclination in the matter and the genuine conflict with the US over pricing 
policy. Certainly, in its confidential documents, the US saw a conflict of 
interests over petroleum pricing but one that was rectified in other ways:
On the petroleum price issue, the perceived interests of Iran and the 
US are opposed. Iran wants a relatively high price, to bring maximum 
returns to Iran over the relatively brief period (estimated at about ten 
years) before its exports of petroleum fall sharply. . . It is not likely 
that the US could persuade Iran to underbid OPEC prices. . . 
Furthermore, Iran’s willingness to act as a dependable source of 
supply (albeit at OPEC prices) should be recognized and encouraged. 
Iran did not participate in the Arab oil embargo, and the US should 
(as advocated by the Administration) extend to Iran and other 
petroleum suppliers which did not join in that embargo the tariff 
preferences extended by the US to all LDCs in general.112
After the oil price rises, the Shah thought of himself as far less dependent on 
the US. He did not regard Iran as part of the twin-pillar policy per se. For 
example, in response to a question about Iran’s being a Western enclave in the 
Middle East, the Shah had the following to say:
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If in the past we walked along the same path as the west, it was not 
because we were their camp followers. No, of course not. We 
believed in the philosophy of human freedom and liberal values, as 
the west does, and so we worked in co-operation with them. Now let 
me return to this canard of Iran being ‘a western enclave’ in the 
Middle East. The answer is a categorical NO! I would say NEVER! 
You must know my father was exiled by a western power. When I 
succeeded him they did not give me an easy time. They made 
innumerable mistakes in Iran, as indeed in this entire region: and I 
have had to face them and put up with them. They created many 
problems for me and this is putting it mildly.113
It is, of course, ironic, that the Shah’s perception of the situation was so 
different from that of most of his subjects. The drive towards making Iran 
strong militarily and economically (two sides of the same coin) was precipitated 
by this desire to make Iran an independent and powerful nation. Nevertheless, 
the process entailed Iran becoming increasingly dependent on the US, not only 
because of its needs for arms but also in the business field. The Shah believed, 
however, that the country was becoming strong enough to stand apart from the 
US and, after 1973, many of his actions were aimed at distancing himself from 
the US. According to a confidential document to the US Department of State 
from the American embassy in Tehran in 1975:
The Shah appreciates past US assistance and the fact that we have 
never exploited Iran. He considers us a necessary ally. Nevertheless, 
as he has grown in confidence and as Iran began to approach its 
present regional power status, the freedom of access to many areas of 
civilian society which we formerly enjoyed has been somewhat 
constricted. . .
In the military sphere, too, the Shah is attempting to reduce his 
dependence on the US by diversifying his arms sources where he can 
without affecting the efficiency of the armed forces which are his 
ultimate power base. But he realizes that many of the sophisticated 
weapons he wants and the advisory capacity to train his troops to use 
them are available nowhere but from the US. In addition, at the 
present time, US influence permeates virtually all levels of the Iranian 
military structure so that a withdrawal or even a sharp reduction of 
that presence would adversely affect Iranian combat readiness.
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Consequently, the character of the US-military relationship is not 
likely to change dramatically in the foreseeable future.114
5.14 The quest to become a regional power
In the 1970s, the US was the major arms supplier to the Persian Gulf states and 
82 per cent of these transfers were made to Iran, as can be seen in Table 5.3 
below.
Table 5.3: Values of Arms Transfers to the Persian Gulf by Major 
Supplier and Recipient Country, cumulative 1973-77
(current million dollars)
Recipient Total US USSR France UK W. Germany
Iran 7,005 5,425 390 100 350 400
Iraq 3,740 . 2,600 240 20 60
Saudi A. 2,068 968 . 230 525 5
Kuwait 455 165 30 150 90 20
Oman 114 4 . . 60 .
Bahrain 1 1 . . .
Qatar 41 1 . 30 10
UAE 284 4 . 220 . .
Total 13,708 6,568 3,020 970 1,055 485
Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968-77 (Washington DC: 1979, p. 156. 
Quoted in Sirriyeh, p.89.
In fact, over one-third of all US military purchases between 1970-76 were made 
by Iran.115 And, as we have seen, though sceptics could not understand why Iran
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needed such armaments when it could never be in a position to take on the 
Soviet Union alone, the Shah himself regarded them as essential both for Iran’s 
security needs (because of the threat from the Soviet Union’s allies) and for 
Iran’s status as a regional power. A secret working paper from the American 
embassy in Tehran outlines the regional threats as perceived by the Shah. While 
the Shah expected the US to assist him were the Soviet Union to invade:
What concerns him far more is the indirect threat which the Soviets 
pose through their assistance, both overt and covert, to those 
governments - particularly Iraq’s - and dissident elements in the 
region which appear intent on undermining Iran’s security. The 
strategic implications of close political ties among India, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and the USSR worries the Shah. . . With signs of 
declining Soviet influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Shah 
fears that the USSR will now turn with increased vigor to expanding 
its influence in the Gulf, cementing ties with Afghanistan and Iraq in 
the north and supporting insurgent attempts to topple conservative 
governments in the littoral states to the south. This is the primary 
reason that the Shah has committed Iranian forces in Oman to combat 
the rebellion backed by the PDRY, a Soviet client.116
The Dhofari rebellion, the increased role of the Soviet Union in the Indian 
Ocean and the 1971 Indian invasion of Pakistan, all contributed to the Shah’s 
decision, in the light of the Nixon doctrine and the blank cheque, to expand 
Iran’s strategic interests outside the Persian Gulf and into the Indian Ocean. The 
Shah had been particularly disgusted that no one had been able to prevent 
Pakistan’s division into two nations by India, despite the existence of CENTO. 
An article in the daily paper, Kayhan, echoed the official view:
Pakistan, an ally of the United States through two multilateral and 
one bilateral treaty, has been attacked and dismembered without a
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ripple of serious protest. There is no reason why Pakistan’s plight 
should be treated as an isolated case that could not be repeated 
anywhere else in the region.117
The New York Times quoted the Iranian prime minister, Amir Abbas 
Hoveida, as saying that alliances such as CENTO were no more effective than a 
nice ‘club’ and that: ‘It is apparent now that one has to rely on one’s own
I I Sstrength for defence’. These events reinforced the Shah’s belief that he could 
not rely on others in the defence of the country. A military buildup was the only 
solution, not only to filling the vacuum left by the British, but also to ensuring 
Iran’s defence should Iraq or another hostile power invade.119 He hoped a 
strong army and navy, would act as a deterrent to such aggression. He also 
hoped to assist other friendly countries threatened by hostile powers. For 
example, in 1972 he committed himself to the territorial integrity of Pakistan by 
saying that any attack on Pakistan would be regarded as an attack on Iran itself 
‘Iran’s growing self-confidence in foreign affairs’, was noted by the US along 
with a concern that these were not being conducted within ‘a well-designed 
multilateral framework’.120
In November 1972, the Shah announced for the first time that he intended 
to expand Iran’s ‘security perimeter’ beyond the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of 
Oman into the Indian Ocean. In a speech on the fortieth anniversary of the 
Iranian navy, he told the navy that its ‘striking power’ would increase ‘several 
times over’ within the next two years. While until three or four years previously 
he had only had the defence of the Persian Gulf in mind, ‘then came events that
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forced us to think of the Gulf of Oman and Iran’s coast there. Then other events
in the world taught us that the sea contiguous to the Gulf of Oman, and I mean
1^1the Indian Ocean, recognizes no frontiers’. The move outside the Middle East 
was the logical extension of the Shah’s increasing ambition to turn Iran into a 
world power. One of the American documents from the embassy in Tehran 
notes that:
It appears that the Shah’s intent in expressing greater interest in South 
and East Asia is to project an image of greater strategic scope. He 
may feel that the rest of the world tends to think of Iran as a country 
on the fringe of the Middle East rather than as a country which has 
other broad strategic interests as well.122
Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean had increased since 1968 and the Soviet 
navy had made six appearances in the Persian Gulf, fuelling Iranian fears that it 
was shipping arms to Iraq.123 For this reason the Shah couched his policy 
towards the Indian Ocean in the same terms as that for the Persian Gulf, namely 
that it should be an area free from superpower intervention and one in which 
the security of the region should depend on the states of the region:
First of all we would like to see an Indian Ocean free of all world 
rivalries and conflicts. Its security and defence should be left to the 
countries of the region. Second, we would like to see cooperation 
among all its countries take shape and reality.124
Needless to say, this policy did not meet with the approval of anti-American 
states in the region. For example Iraq’s information minister pointed out that:
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Some [littoral states] said we should not have American and Soviet 
navies here, and we were against this because it was a way to keep 
out only American influence and exclude the Soviets. The Americans 
are already here . .. Who is endangering the security of the Gulf? We 
don't see any present danger, more important is free passage in the 
Gulf.125
But, according to Burrell and Cottrell, Iran’s attempt to extend security into the 
Indian Ocean was also aimed at protecting her oil tanker lanes:
This wider concern with security is a reflection of the Shah’s view 
that the area over which he seeks paramountcy is of global 
importance, because of both its strategic position and its enormous oil 
reserves. The need to protect the oil routes beyond the Straits of 
Hormuz and across the waters of the Indian Ocean lies at the heart of 
much of Iran’s current military planning. Tehran is now aiming at 
building up a defense capability that will allow it to protect tankers 
bound for Europe as far as the tenth parallel {i.e. just north of 
Malagasy), and negotiations are believed to be underway with 
interested parties concerning the defense of the eastbound tanker 
route to Japan.126
Iran used its oil wealth to further this policy. For example, economic 
assistance was given to Mauritius in return for port facilities. Diplomatic 
relations with South Africa were established in 1971 but suggestions of a 
trilateral defence arrangement with Australia were not met warmly by the 
Canberra government. However, the Indian Ocean policy pushed Iran further 
afield in cultivating relations with other powers. Though China was communist, 
it was anti-Soviet. Iran announced it would establish diplomatic relations with 
China in August 1971 and the two countries began economic and commercial 
ties soon after. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Peng Fei, visited Tehran in June
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1973 and expressed support for Iran’s military buildup as a natural response to 
the threats it faced.
Iran tried to back up its armaments policy with that of rapprochement 
with many countries in the region. While originally extremely alarmed at the 
1973 overthrow of Afghanistan’s king, Zahir Shah, by 1975 the pro-Soviet 
President, Daoud Khan, was a visitor to Tehran and was given $2 billion in 
economic aid. The restoration of relations between Iran and Afghanistan also
• 197led to improved relations between Afghanistan and Iran’s ally, Pakistan. 
Iran’s self-appointed role as regional defender entailed the settlement of 
regional disputes and the Shah was happy to take the credit for negotiating the 
recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan128 and the gradual improvement in ties 
between India and Pakistan.129 He invited India, Afghanistan and Iraq to join 
the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) which was founded by Iran, 
Pakistan and Turkey in 1964, but Pakistan was not wholehearted about this 
forced alliance with India.130 However, the Shah saw the Indo-Pakistani 
dispute as one of the most destabilising conflicts in the region:
An Indo-Pakistani settlement is the first imperative for the safety, 
security and development, not only of the subcontinent, but of the 
neighbouring region, including my country.131
An improvement in Iran’s own relations with India was essential if the Indian 
Ocean policy was to work. Relations had been strained because of India’s non- 
alignment and what was regarded as its Soviet-leaning government in contrast 
to Pakistan’s pro-American one. However, India was the largest regional power
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and one in possession of a nuclear capability so the Shah regarded an 
improvement in relations as a necessity. Though India was a rival to Iran, it was 
badly hit by the oil price rises and after 1973, had to seek outside assistance. 
Iran began friendly overtures in 1973 and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited 
Tehran in 1974 when a package involving Iranian oil for iron ore was agreed 
upon. The nuclear disparities between the two countries remained a potential 
source of friction but Iran hoped, nevertheless, that India would support its
1 ^ 7plans for an Indian Ocean community. In 1974 the Shah embarked on a 
major tour of Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and India to ‘sell’ 
his idea of an Indian Ocean community.
The Shah’s Indian Ocean plans never materialised but the vision was 
grand. It involved the formation of an economic community, which some 
authors believe was driven by Iran’s need for raw materials for its 
industrialisation drive.133 According to the Shah:
It is neither utopian nor a dream. In the signing of the Economic 
Protocol between Iran and India, two ancient neighbours, followed by 
increased trade, investment and industrial cooperation and a joint 
Indo-Iranian Shipping Corporation, I see a working model for my 
plan of an Indian Ocean Economic Community. We can then cover 
the entire Indian Ocean complex from the north to the south, the 
Middle East, the Persian Gulf countries and the African states west of 
the Ocean. And we may even extend the hand of cooperation right up 
to Bangladesh and, maybe, Burma, Thailand and Singapore as well, 
right down to Australia.
Q: Can one go further and presume that your plan might be expanded 
into an even grander design, to cover the entire world?
Shah: Why not? All our past proclaims our future. What has been 
done so far points to the possibility of what more we can do.134
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Within the Middle East itself, the most important development was the 
settlement of tensions with Iraq in March 1975. Iraq recognised the border 
demarcation between the two countries as being down the deepest channel 
(thalweg) of the Shatt-al Arab waterway and promised no longer to harbour 
anti-Pahlavi dissidents. In exchange, Iran gave up its support for the Iraqi Kurds 
which had been intensified after Iraq’s 1972 treaty of friendship and 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. There was also a change in relations with 
Egypt facilitated by the death of Nasser in 1970. President Sadat had moved to 
end the dispute between South Yemen and Oman, which found favour with the 
Shah. In May 1974, Iran and Egypt signed a $1 billion trade agreement and, 
even more importantly for Egypt’s shattered economy in the aftermath of the 
October 1973 war, Iran agreed to participate in a plan to deepen and widen the 
Suez canal.
It was not enough for the Shah that Iran was becoming a world power, it 
had to be seen to be one. Thus, from being a recipient of foreign aid, Iran turned 
into a major aid donor in the space of a few years. And, as with a major power, 
the Shah decided to disburse aid to friendly countries. In 1975 this 
commitment included a $120 million low interest loan to Egypt as part of the 
economic agreement; a $200 million loan to Indonesia for a chemical fertilizer 
plant; a $150 million long-term loan to Syria, in an attempt to woo her away 
from the Soviet Union; a $4 million housing loan to Jordan; $12.5 million in 
loans to Bangladesh and the financing of port and communications facilities in 
Turkey.135 The Shah also proposed a $2-3 billion fund with the joint
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participation of the oil-exporting countries but this had to be abandoned. An 
OPEC fund announced in April 1974 also foundered until, in November 1974, 
Iran initiated the creation of an OPEC fund to disburse aid to developing 
countries worst hit by the price rises but it was not fully established until May 
1976. Iran provided the largest share, 26 per cent, of its $800 million capital.136 
A confidential 1975 US document was sceptical both of Iran’s commitment to 
aid and ability to disburse funds:
In Iran, where words are often more important than reality, a 
statement of intentions can serve the same purpose as an actual 
program, at least in the short run, regardless of one’s capacity to 
realize the intentions. It is in this spirit that Iran has announced 
enormous aid and trade deals, many of which, on closer inspection, 
turn out to be little more than agreements in principle with only an 
embryonic organization to administer a foreign aid program which is 
expected to disburse by March 21, 1975, an estimated $2.6 billion of 
the $9 billion of Iranian aid funds pledged in 1974.137
Aid was not confined to the developing world. More than a third of the $7.2 
billion disbursed out of an estimated total pledge of $12 billion by 1977, went
1 n o
to industrialised Western countries, notably France and the UK. This was the 
first time an oil-producing nation had loaned money to an industrialised 
country. But, as Robert Graham describes:
some of these commitments, so eagerly undertaken, were to prove an 
embarrassment in less than eighteen months. The case of a $1.2 
billion loan to Britain symbolised this turn-round. The loan was 
negotiated in July 1974 on the basis of three tranches being paid at 
market rates to a British local authority over a three-year period. The 
first $400 million tranche was paid on time to the National Water 
Council. However, the second tranche had to be split into two 
separate payments of $200 million each by special arrangement in 
June and September 1976. This was because Iran could not afford to
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release so much foreign exchange at one time. By the time the final 
tranche was due, Iran did not want to pay.139
The impact on the international economy of the 1973 price rises appeared 
at the time to pin oil to the centre of the international economic system. The 
Shah, not only concerned himself with restoring the Iranian economy and 
giving out loans to the developing and developed countries, he also saw himself 
as a sort of world statesman. This was most clearly illustrated by his description 
of the plan he had submitted to the United Nations to solve the world’s 
economic problems:
Inspired by my country’s humanistic trend, from Cyrus the Great to 
my own father Reza Shah and the 2,500 years of our glorious history, 
I have presented to the United Nations the outline of a plan for a 
World Co-operative Directorate, with a Neutral International 
Development Bank to feed and speed the economic rehabilitation of 
all three worlds, the developing, the developed and the oil-producing 
countries. What we propose is a 36-member joint Directorate, formed 
of a dozen representatives each of the oil-producing, industrialized 
and developing countries, which will work in triangular co-operation 
to the mutual benefit of all.140
The purpose of such a quotation is not ridicule but to underline the argument 
put forward here, namely that the drive behind the domestic economic policy 
followed by the Shah after oil price rises cannot be fully understood if isolated 
from the Shah’s vision of Iran in the international context. The Shah was 
determined that Iran should become a major international power, as illustrated 
in this chapter, but he knew that oil reserves would only last a further ten years 
or so. Iran would provide the West with an example of what hard work and the
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Shah’s leadership could do. In interview with the Washington Post, he said, ‘In 
ten years time, we shall be what you are today’. 141
5.15 The quest for nuclear power
Soon after the 1973 oil price rises, the Shah embarked on an ambitious nuclear 
power programme so that Iran could continue exporting oil for as long as 
possible. He planned to spend an estimated $33 billion on the construction of 
20 nuclear reactors by the 1994, which would have made Iran the largest 
producer of nuclear energy in the Indian Ocean region.142 According to 
Fereidun Fesharaki, there were other reasons behind the programme:
First, the Shah was under international pressure to recycle the 
petrodollars. The nuclear power programme was expensive, modem 
and ensured a continuous dependence on Western technology. 
Second, the Shah’s own image of modem Iran, under his leadership, 
was well suited to prestigious projects, such as nuclear power. Third, 
the Shah’s leadership role in Opec (at the time) and his argument that 
oil should not be used for burning as a fuel, made the nuclear option 
attractive for demonstrating his own lead within the organisation in 
moving towards non-petroleum energy options. Fourth, though 
military use was not a direct goal, the Shah expected that over time 
his options for building nuclear bombs would be open.143
This was one of the Shah’s most conspicuous ‘white elephant’ projects since, 
by October 1978, it was decided to axe 16 of the plants and a further two were 
also dropped from the programme by the end of that year. But in 1974, the 
Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) was established to begin 
negotiations for the nuclear reactors. Despite the worry about the Shah’s 
nuclear ambitions, the US was anxious to participate as fully as possible in the 
economic benefits of the programme:
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The US and Iran are currently negotiating an agreement on atomic 
energy, as Iran is planning to install nuclear power plants. It is 
important, if the US is not to be cut out of this near ten billion dollar 
business by foreign competitors, for the US to continue to give very 
high priority to these negotiations and to ensure that the Embassy in 
Tehran is adequately staffed to back them.144
However, many observers feared the Shah’s nuclear power programme 
was aimed at developing nuclear weapons. The 20 nuclear reactors would 
produce plutonium in quantities large enough to construct hundreds of nuclear 
weapons. Since Iran was rich in mineral reserves, these observers tended to 
disregard the Shah’s stated reasons for wanting nuclear energy, and therefore, 
the need for 20 reactors seemed more than excessive for the purposes of civilian 
needs. Moreover, soon after India detonated a nuclear device in the Indian 
Ocean in May 1974, the Shah gave an interview in which he apparently 
answered the question, will Iran acquire nuclear weapons with the reply, 
‘Without a doubt, and sooner than one would think’.145 The Shah later denied 
the statement. Alternatively, by having nuclear reactors installed, the Shah 
would retain the ability to produce nuclear weapons if they were ever to be 
needed. George Quester writes:
The Shah’s long-run strategy might be neither to make the bomb, nor 
to reassure the outside world by staying as far away as possible from 
it. Rather it might be providing a meaningful warning to Israel, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, Libya and Pakistan: “If you go nuclear, we will too.”146
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The nuclear power programme contributed to deepening economic ties with the 
US. In November 1973, Iran and the US had established a joint economic 
commission to facilitate trade between the two countries. According to James 
Bill: ‘Between January 1973 and September 1974, United States companies 
signed contracts and joint ventures with Iran that totaled $11.9 billion’.147 In 
March 1975, Iran and the US signed what was then the biggest such economic 
package ever concluded between two countries. Spread over a five-year period 
and excluding oil, the deal provided for $5 billion in military purchases, $5 
billion in ordinary trade items and $5 billion in additional goods and services. It 
included the construction of eight nuclear reactors.
By the end of 1975, Iranian non-military imports from the US for that 
year were $2 billion out of a total import bill of $10.3 billion, with the balance 
of trade $1.1 billion in favour of the United States.148 Without doubt the trade 
relationship was of great importance to the US, especially since it was 
conducted in terms particularly favourable to the US and exceptional in the 
context of trade relations between a developed and underdeveloped nation. This 
was recognised by the US government:
The flow to Iran of US goods and technicians, military and civilian, is 
financed almost entirely by the Government of Iran. The latter 
contributes far more, in financial terms, to the US-franian bilateral 
relationship than does the US government. He who plays the piper 
calls the tune. Happily the tune is generally pleasing to the United 
States.149
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In 1976, the US supplied Iran with $2.15 billion of its total non-military import 
bill of $12 billion, or just under 17 per cent of the total market share. Military 
imports for the year were estimated at $5 billion, of which the US was again the 
major supplier. Iran’s other major non-military trade partners were the former 
West Germany with 18.1 per cent, Japan with 16.3 per cent the UK with 7.7 per 
cent and the former Soviet Union with 1 per cent.150 The US government 
estimated that by 1980, the Iranian civilian market would be worth some $21 
billion to the US.151 Therefore, by the mid-70s, ties to the US through the 
military relationship, trade and business and oil all contributed to the deepening 
of the alliance. Some of these transactions were tainted with corruption, 
particularly in commissions and brokerage fees. But the sheer amount of money 
involved meant that Iran continued to be a vital business interest to many 
American companies. As James Bill writes:
The Nixon-Kissinger-Ford policy toward Iran had powerful support 
from the major US arms, electronic and telecommunication 
industries. By the fall of 1975, thirty-nine such companies had 
contracts and representation in Iran...
The Iranian market was a bonanza for these industries, and the 
competition for contracts was sordid, involving bribery, huge 
commissions and pay-offs of all kinds. The situation brought out the 
worst in both countries. In a June 20, 1972, US Embassy report on 
corruption in Iran, a section entitled “American companies and 
Influence Peddlers” listed seven US companies that were “to the 
Embassy’s knowledge, buying the influence of the persons listed with 
them”. The companies listed included General Electric (Allison 
Engine), Northrop, Boeing Aircraft, Cities Service, McDonnell- 
Douglas, Radio Corporation of America, and Neill-Price. These 
allegations, which represented the US diplomatic assessment of the 
situation, reflected the business climate of the time.152
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5.16 Turning the tables on the US
Security of oil supplies was a continuing concern for the US. In 1973, 23 per 
cent of US imports were from the Persian Gulf region, increasing to 38 per cent 
by 1976 153 but by 1978, this had decreased to 17 per cent.154 A US policy 
document reiterated the Administration’s policy towards Iran in 1976:
Iran’s oil is important to the US and essential to its allies. This will 
remain true in the coming decade. US interests also require that Iran 
continue to play constructive regional role, and that Soviet influence 
in the region remain limited.155
In many ways, this preoccupation with trade and business as well as the 
importance of Iran as a regional ally appears to have blinded the US to some of 
the very real difficulties that the Iranian economy began facing as early as 1974, 
when, by the Shah’s own admission, the country already had a deficit of $5 
billion.156 Yet, it is also clear that sections of the US government understood 
the implications of what was increasingly seen as a military alliance between 
the US and Iran. According to the same 1976 document:
If US policies may be judged to have been successful in securing key 
US interests, they have also produced some paradoxical results. One 
of these, already mentioned, is that Iran is becoming a power - thanks 
in part to US arms sales policy - capable of playing a regional role 
opposing, as well as furthering, US interests. Another is that the 
Iranian desire to purchase US arms and US willingness to go far in 
permitting these purchases has had the practical and distorting effect 
of making the military element the key factor in the bilateral 
relationship. In the longer run this may not be the best basis for a 
constructive relationship.157
318
The same document draws attention to the need for a more consistent 
government sales policy:
a deficiency which reduces the effectiveness of and public support for 
our arms sales policy is the absence of agreed and reasonably 
comprehensive criteria to define its limits. All US officials appear to 
agree there must be limits, but where they are or should be remains a 
gray area which needs clarification.158
The US’s increasing dependence on imported oil, and the sudden oil 
wealth of the producer countries interacted with one another to produce an 
unusual outcome. The Shah, who had resented dependence on outside powers, 
suddenly saw himself in a position where the US was dependent on him. Gone 
were the days of such humiliating episodes as the Kennedy era; instead Iran was 
now a country at whose feet powers such as the US, Germany, France and the 
UK were falling in their eagerness to do business. The Shah could indeed feel 
not only satisfaction and importance but also that anything was possible - 
nothing was out of Iran’s reach and this translated itself most dramatically into 
the ambitions he harboured for transforming Iran into a fully-fledged industrial 
power, illustrated by his doubling the allocations made in the fifth plan.
Despite Jimmy Carter’s human rights campaign and the deficiencies in 
arms sales policy, there is nothing to suggest that in terms of military 
commitment, the US lessened its support for Iran during his administration. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor from 1977, writes of the twin- 
pillar policy in his memoirs:
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The high point of that policy was the decision made by President 
Nixon and Henry Kissinger to gratify the Shah’s desire for a rapid 
military buildup through massive US arms transfers to Iran. 
Recognizing Iran’s strategic centrality, we chose to continue that 
policy, approving major sales of arms to Iran in the course of 1978, 
but we also encouraged the Shah to couple his extraordinarily 
ambitious efforts to modernize the country with more rapid progress 
toward constitutional rule. . . It is hard to tell in retrospect whether 
the Shah simply paid lip service to the goal of democratization when 
speaking to us or whether he himself recognized the need for some 
change.159
Despite continuing criticism regarding the levels of Iranian arms purchases, 
and a pledge by President Carter that under his Administration, the US would 
no longer act as the world’s leading arms salesman, the sale of arms to Iran 
continued unabated. Indeed, no objections were raised to any of the items on 
the Shah’s 1977 ‘shopping list’.160 This included a request for seven of the 
highly advanced air defence system, known as AWACs, at a total cost of $1.2 
billion. The Administration’s approval of the sale caused an uproar in Congress 
and the Senate, leading to a series of hearings in the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations in July 1977. In the same month, the House International 
Relations Committee opposed the sale by 19 votes to 17. President Carter 
decided to withdraw the request and to resubmit it once the summer 
adjournment was over, in September. This time, an amended proposal was 
pushed through Congress with Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, arguing 
strenuously that the Shah was a force for regional stability and a major oil 
supplier for the US and its allies: ‘To preserve our mutual confidence Iran must
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know that the United States will help it to meet its legitimate defense 
requirements’.161
In fact, Carter had decided that Iran was an exception to his new rulings 
on arms transfers, as was clearly illustrated by an exchange between Senator 
Frank Church and Assistant Secretary Leslie Gelb at the Senate hearings:
Senator Church: On May 19th, the President sent us a new policy 
with regard to conventional arms transfers. One of the major 
principles of that new arms transfers policy was that the United States 
would not be the first supplier to introduce into the region newly 
developed and advanced weapons which could create a newer 
significant combat capability. Can you reconcile the proposed sale of 
the AWACs system with this principle? . . .
Mr Gelb: Senator, it is not reconciled.
Senator Church: It is irreconcilable with the principle?
Mr Gelb: That’s right. The President made an exception to the 
guideline.162
The Carter Administration also approved the sale of $1.8 billion worth of an 
additional 160 F-16 fighters to Iran and began considering a request for another 
140 of the same aircraft.163 The Shah visited Washington in November 1977 
amidst prominent anti-Shah demonstrations. The Shah told Carter that he would 
press for an oil price freeze at the December OPEC meeting. Though the human 
rights issue was raised, it was not pressed and indeed, turned into another 
opportunity for the Shah to lecture to the West, as Carter himself described:
because of reports of increasing violence in Iran, when the Shah made 
his first visit to Washington in November 1977,1 spoke to him about 
the need to address the revolutionary forces against him, among both 
Iranian students in the United States and the demonstrators on the
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streets of Iran. The Shah discounted these activities as “a few 
communists and their sympathizers”, who had no legitimate 
complaints and no popular support. He insisted that the imprisonment 
of his vocal critics and gunfire from the police into demonstrating 
crowds were the best ways to stamp out the dissension. Indeed, the 
Shah went so far as to suggest that the Western leaders might well 
emulate his toughness, lest our permissive democratic principles open 
floodgates of public protests that could not be controlled.164
Carter repaid the visit by spending New Year’s Eve in Tehran, a particularly 
high honour accorded only to the US’s closest friends. In addition, Carter had 
said that he intended to consult the Shah on aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
It was during this visit that he made the toast that became famous in retrospect 
for its ill-timing on the eve of the revolution.
Iran under the great leadership of the Shah is an island of stability in 
one of the more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to 
you, your majesty, and to your leadership, and to the respect, 
admiration and love which your people give you.165
Yet it was Jimmy Carter who, in his inaugural address on 20 January 1977, 
had pledged that: ‘Our moral sense dictates a clear preference for those 
societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights’. 
This was only four years after Amnesty International’s 1974-75 report on Iran 
which stated that, ‘The Shah of Iran retains his benevolent image despite the 
highest rate of death penalties in the world, no valid system of civilian courts 
and a history of torture which is beyond belief. But Iran had become a special 
case to the US and the arms sales had acquired such a momentum of their own,
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providing an important source of financial support to the US economy, that the 
anticipated criteria no longer applied. Gary Sick writes too that:
President Carter was an activist president with a deep commitment to 
specific goals. But he was remarkably free of ideological 
preconceptions in his approach to a problem. His commitment to the 
promotion of human rights and the reduction of world-wide arms 
sales was beyond question; yet he was prepared to give the Shah the 
benefit of the doubt in his efforts to introduce reforms, and he was 
prepared to engage the prestige of his office in a difficult legislative 
fight for an arms sale to Iran that he believed was consonant with US 
security interests, to the discomfort of many of his more ideological 
subordinates.166
5.17 Summary
The main slogan of the 1979 revolution was ‘Independence, Freedom, an 
Islamic Republic.’ It was the outcry of a nation’s resentment that its leader had 
effectively sacrificed the country’s independence to keep himself in power as an 
autocratic and dictatorial monarch. That the Shah was perceived as firmly in the 
pocket of the West was hardly surprising, given the country’s history and its 
people’s long memory. The British brought in Reza Shah and later dispensed 
with him. The United States, with British connivance, organised the coup d ’etat 
against the populist and nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq to 
restore the Shah to the throne in 1953.
However, in this chapter we have argued that a careful assessment of the 
period shows that the relationship was not as straightforward as the popular 
image. While there is no question that the Shah was a firm ally of the West, 
there is also a good deal of evidence to show that he also resented his own
dependence. This led him to decide to develop a foreign policy and a domestic 
economic policy which would make him independent of the powers that had 
forced his father into a humiliating exile and accorded him scant respect in the 
early years of his own rule. He sought to overcome this humiliation by aiming 
to propel Iran into the international arena as a major power in its own right. He 
believed he could achieve something not achieved previously -  transforming a 
less developed country into a major military and industrialised power in a 
fraction of the time it had taken Japan to build up its economy. In foreign policy 
terms, this led to the decision to pursue a military build-up, through the 
strategic alliance with the US. In economic policy terms, it took the form of the 
Shah’s decision to adopt a big-push industrialisation strategy -  an influence 
which we have argued has to date been underplayed when examining the 
reasons for the strategy’s failure. The drive towards industrialisation was 
flawed, as we have seen in previous chapters. The rush, with scant regard to 
economic feasibility and available resources, led to severe economic 
imbalances.
The key to the Shah’s ambition was Iran’s growing oil wealth. Rising oil 
revenues gave the Shah the opportunity to be master of his country’s destiny 
and to lecture Western governments on their shortcomings. Zbigniew 
Brzezinski’s own impression of the Shah in late 1977 is a good summary of the 
personal environment the Shah inhabited:
When discussing issues, he showed a keen analytical bent and he was 
particularly effective, I thought, in summarizing the geopolitical 
dilemmas of his region. At the same time, I felt that he displayed
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megalomaniacal tendencies, that his entourage was excessively 
deferential to him, and I wondered on what basis he was making his 
various decisions. . . In general, the Pahlavis reminded me of 
Western-type nouveaux riches, obviously relishing the splendors of 
wealth and a Western life style, but at the same time the Shah clearly 
seemed to enjoy being a traditional Oriental despot, accustomed to 
instant and total obedience from his courtiers. He almost seemed 
suspended between the two worlds, and there was a strange sense of 
ambiguity about him. He simultaneously exuded intellectual strength 
and personal softness. I wondered how the Shah would be able to 
respond to the social dilemmas which his own program of 
modernization had produced, but I also felt that we had no alternative 
but to support him.167
In the final analysis, the Shah showed himself to be a prisoner of his 
country’s history. As his memoirs written after the revolution show, he was 
convinced that his overthrow had, at least in part, been in the hands of the
1 A8US. But the roots of his failure lay in his own misguided economic and 
industrialisation strategy coupled with his refusal to allow dissenting views and 
political liberalisation.
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Chapter 6. Conclusion
Mancur Olson argues in his book, Power and Prosperity, that: ‘theories of 
markets that leave out government -  or conceptions of politics in which the 
economy is exogenous -  are inherently limited and unbalanced. They do not tell 
us much about the relationships between the form of government and the 
fortunes of the economy or adequately explain why some societies are rich and 
others are poor.’ 1 In this thesis this view has been taken as a self-evident 
premise. In writing about Iran during this period, we argue that the failure of the 
industrialisation drive following the 1973 fourfold increase in oil prices cannot 
be blamed solely on economic factors. Politics played a crucial part in the way 
industrialisation was implemented and international politics played a decisive 
role in the Shah’s decision to push for rapid industrialisation after 1973 until his 
overthrow in the 1978-79 revolution. These years spanned the country’s Fifth 
Plan, the objectives and content of which were virtually dictated by the Shah. It 
has therefore been convenient to take the Fifth Plan period as the period of 
study.
It was argued in Chapter 1, which reviewed the existing literature, that the 
international dimension has largely been ignored in providing a comprehensive 
account of the political and economic failure of the country’s industrialisation 
process. Instead, we have argued that Iran’s subordination in the international 
political system provided an important motivation for the Shah in seeking to 
adopt a big push industrialisation policy. We saw that the existing literature 
could be divided broadly speaking into those works that provide a primarily
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economics-based explanation for the deficiencies of the industrialisation policy 
and those which also consider the broader domestic political structure.
Robert Looney and Parvin Alizadeh provided a primarily economics-based 
explanation. Robert Looney believed that the pressure to increase output 
through runaway public spending without redistributing income, or 
implementing a coherent strategy for agriculture and in the absence of strong 
institutions, was mainly to blame for the economic crisis which precipitated the 
revolution. He was also critical of the way in which import-substitution 
industrialisation was implemented. Parvin Alizadeh’s case study of ISI and the 
automobile industry found that manufactured exports, instead of rising as a 
proportion of GDP, actually fell after 1973.3 Her study concluded that the 
content and design of ISI were to blame, including the lack of consistent policy 
regarding export promotion and a deterioration in the competitiveness of 
locally-produced products.
Massoud Karshenas and Kamran Mofid extended their analyses into a 
political economy approach to explain the reasons for the failure of 
industrialisation under the Shah.4 Karshenas adopted a political framework for 
the analysis of Iran’s economic problems, arguing that structural bottlenecks 
constrained growth and that these bottlenecks arose out of social pressures and 
the country’s historical development experience, including the special 
circumstances of an oil-producing nation. Mofid blamed the Shah’s big push 
strategy for causing rapid inflation, a decline in absorptive capacity and waste.
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The strategy emerged out of a political desire to pave the way for the ‘Great 
Civilisation’ which held sway because of the nature of Iran’s government as a 
dictatorial monarchy. Homa Katouzian developed further the thesis that the 
state’s monopoly on power and oil revenues distorted the development process, 
which he argued had been superficial in character and indulgent.5 Razavi and 
Vakil delineated the day-to-day problems for technocrats and economists 
responsible for implementing Iran’s development plans.6 They concluded that 
the Shah’s growing interference with the planning process reduced it to a futile 
exercise and agreed with Mofid that excessive spending caused the rampant 
inflation of the mid-70s.
Hossein Bashiriyeh and Farrokh Moshiri sought primarily to explain the 
causes of the revolution rather than to provide an analysis of industrialisation in
n
Iran. Both argued that an understanding of the nature of the state was essential 
to understanding the forces behind the revolution. Bashiriyeh saw the sharp 
decline in the economy as the catalyst to revolution while Moshiri saw inherent 
contradictions in the state between authoritarian political policies and a 
modernising economic system as the main cause of revolution. Finally, Theda
Skocpol, in her theory of revolution, argued that the international context is
• • • * % important in understanding the causes of modem social revolutions.
We agree with Skocpol that the international context is important and have 
sought to add this dimension to the existing work on the subject of Iran’s 
industrialisation programme. In analyzing the role of political factors in Iran’s
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industrialisation push, the central (domestic economy) argument argued here is 
that Iran’s experiment with industrialisation failed primarily because the 
economy was unable to absorb over-accumulated funds caused by the sudden 
increase in oil prices in late 1973. In addition, we argue that the drive to 
dispense these funds in the effort to industrialise, despite known constraints on 
the economy to absorb them, had its roots in the Shah’s experience of Iran’s 
place in the international system as a strategically important but weak country. 
The Shah was an ambitious man who sought to purge the country’s 
humiliations at the hands of the great powers -  Britain, the former Soviet Union 
and the USA -  by creating the ‘Great Civilisation’ in Iran. Economic power 
was a precondition for military and imperial power and he sought to transform 
the the economy through industrialisation. This took the form of a big push 
through import substitution in the hope of propelling Iran into the league of top 
five world powers. But it was in precisely this rush to industrialise, and the 
desire to impress the outside world, in which the roots of its failure lay.
Chapter 5 examined how the Shah’s decision came about, through an 
account of the history of Iran’s relations with the United States, the superpower 
under whose sphere of influence it fell for most of the last century, to elucidate 
the main features and forces behind this strategic role. The conventional view 
of the Shah’s foreign policy is that it was an example of a classic client-state 
relationship. We have argued that paradoxically, the Shah appeared to believe 
that he exploited the relationship to Iran’s benefit with the aim of establishing a 
measure of independence in order to transform the country into a regional and
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eventually, world power in its own right. Though he had been backed firmly by 
the US, the humiliating circumstances in which his father was unseated from 
the throne and periodic pressure on him to reform, for example, in the early 
1960s, fuelled his desire for independence. In his attempts to do so, the Shah 
displayed many of the characteristics which have come to be associated with 
other ambitious authoritarian leaders -  he hoped that by striving to create a 
successful economic system, to bask in the reflected glory. His vision was of an 
independent nation, eventually economically and militarily strong enough to 
join the handful of most powerful states in the international system. He sought a 
strong enough defence to deter perceived threats of aggression from 
neighbouring Iraq and competed militarily with regional neighbours, such as 
Saudi Arabia and.other third world powers, such as India, through his Indian 
Ocean security plan.
Grandiose vision and vanity may sometimes be galvanising forces but in 
Iran’s case, far from propelling the country to greatness, they were instrumental 
in precipitating an economic crisis and the undoing of the political system. The 
nature of Iran’s political system, an authoritarian monarchical dictatorship, 
facilitated this process since the individual at its apex, the Shah, was able to 
execute his policies against the advice of those working for him. The country 
lacked a sizeable middle class tier that might have helped in the 
industrialisation process and its institutions, certainly as far as the economy 
were concerned, were weak.
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The method by which the economy was to be transformed was through 
import-substitution industrialisation. This strategy has since become 
unfashionable, partly due to the early success of the export-oriented economies 
of Southeast Asia, but also because of the international economy’s gravitation 
towards free trade and open competition. In the 1950s and 60s, however, ISI 
was the fashionable strategy for economic development, particularly since the 
prevailing view was that export-oriented industrialisation resulted in declining 
terms of trade for developing countries dependent on the export of commodities 
and the import of manufactured goods for their foreign exchange.
There is still no definitive conclusion to the debate on contending 
strategies of development. EOI has been a success story for the newly- 
industrialising countries but critics argue that much of its success is dependent 
on cheap labour and a buoyant world economy in which states are able to afford 
high levels of imports. The lengthy economic recession in Japan and the Asian 
crisis in the 1990s have also taken the gloss off the strategy as a panacea for 
growth. The terms of this development debate were discussed in Chapter 2 and 
it was concluded that a distinction has to be made between the successful 
implementation of an industrialisation strategy and a successful 
industrialisation strategy per se. We do not contend that ISI was necessarily the 
‘wrong’ industrialisation strategy; after all, countries such as Brazil, Mexico, 
India, Korea and China have all relied on ISI and others, such as Japan and the 
Soviet Union, relied heavily on state intervention in their early days of 
industrialisation. In Iran’s case what was at issue was the rationale and its
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manner of implementation: big push industrialisation needed a strong 
infrastructure and human resources manifestly lacking at the time, but these 
constraints were ignored since the policy was pursued more for the Shah’s geo­
strategic aims than economic feasibility.
Iran’s specific position as a ‘rentier’ economy, in which government 
income is derived from oil wealth, was also examined in Chapter 2. While this 
is an important notion in the debate on development, this thesis adopts the view 
shared by Roger Owen: ‘in almost every case, its influence is not self-evident 
and cannot properly be understood without the usual detailed and difficult 
analysis of the political economies of the states concerned.’9 Successful 
implementation of economic plans is dependent on an efficient system geared 
towards the pursuit of sensible policies in the name of economic development. 
To this extent, the following view expounded by Gilpin is endorsed:
What is important for economic development and escape from 
dependence is the capacity of the economy to transform itself. This 
task is ultimately the responsibility of its own economic and political 
leadership . . .  too many of the less developed countries have suffered 
the consequences of poor leadership.10
For many countries, this may be too harsh a position to adopt, ignoring as it 
does the very real problems caused by the client-state syndrome that dominated 
relations between the superpowers and the less-developed countries for much of 
the last century. However, Iran in the 1970s was not unduly constrained in its 
own relationship with the US. The Shah had the unqualified backing of
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Washington and oil revenues removed capital constraints usually associated 
with other developing countries. The opportunity to lay firm foundations for 
successful economic development was there; it was the leadership’s 
responsibility to lay them.
Yet there were considerable political obstacles to the implementation of 
the industrialisation programme. Chapter 4 examined the political obstacles in 
relation to the Plan and Budget Organisation, the main planning organisation. It 
also discussed the pattern of economic decision-making. According to the 
deputy head of the PBO: ‘a major consideration in implementing many large 
projects and in deciding from which foreign suppliers to procure the necessary 
equipment and services, was not the economic feasibility of the project, or who 
offered the best or optimal technology on the most advantageous terms, but 
often political “horse trading” and/or corruption.’11
Corruption and inefficiency exist everywhere but are not in themselves
enough to prevent backward countries from industrializing, as acknowledged by
1 ^Alice Amsden in her book, The Rise o f the Rest. Yet in Iran’s case, a 
combination of detracting factors helped to account for the paucity of results. 
The most harmful damage to the economy came with the Shah’s decision to 
double expenditure provided for in the original Fifth Plan against the advice of 
economists from the PBO. The decision was made as a result of the coming 
together of two important aims. The Shah’s military aims, which had taken 
place against a background of regional changes explained in Chapter 5,
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coincided with the four-fold increase in oil revenues and suddenly appeared to 
make possible both his politico-military and economic aims. Thus, expenditure 
on the military spiralled as did expenditure within the economy. But the form 
and pace of the big push strategy led to over-accumulation and resultant failure. 
Fred Halliday commented just before the revolution:
If Iran fails to benefit fully from its short-lived assets, if the economy 
is not developed by the time oil runs out, this will be in part because 
the regime has misspent the money it received, despite all its ‘plans’ 
and propaganda. And the cause of this misspending lies in its political 
character - in the expansion of arms purchases and services, in the 
incapacity to implement early enough unpopular economic measures 
needed to curb imports, consumption and capital flight.13
Some developing countries, such as Korea, spent as much as Iran on 
defence but much more on education. According to Reza Moghadam:
the pattern of expenditures reflected the wrong priorities. In 1977/78 
defence expenditures were equal to 10.25 per cent of GNP, whereas the 
comparable figure for education was 4 per cent and for health 1.3 per 
cent. These figures help explain the serious shortage and overcrowding 
of schools and the appalling conditions in public hospitals.14
We agree that the big push strategy arose out of ‘wrong priorities’, namely the 
Shah’s desire to assert Iran’s position in the international system through a 
combination of economic strength and military might during a relatively short 
period to time span allotted to it by the Shah, roughly 10 years. The close 
relationship between industrialisation and military prowess has been argued by 
Gautam Sen in his book, The Military Origins o f Industrialisation and
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International Trade Rivalry. ‘Most states institute industrialisation for political 
reasons, that is, because of international political rivalry’.15 Oil wealth enabled 
Shah to buy in military capability from abroad but he sought the prestige of a 
developed economy through industrialisation. Some people might question the 
portrayal of the Shah’s industrialisation programme as a failure, despite the 
downturn in the economy from 1976 and the subsequent revolution. Chapter 3 
took up the issue by examining the primary statistical information available. It 
concluded that, within given parameters, the big push strategy did not succeed. 
These parameters were set by government-stated goals and the degree of 
resources invested in the attempt compared to its results.
It was seen that manufacturing, which was to have become the power­
house of the economy performed far more weakly than expected. 
Manufacturing’s contribution to GDP never exceeded 8.3 per cent, far short of 
the 17 per cent minimum for an industrially-advanced country (non-LDC) as 
defined by the Centre for the Development Planning, Projections and Policies 
of the UN Secretariat. Non-oil exports did not begin to replace oil as a means of 
earning foreign exchange as had been the aim, and actually declined in absolute 
terms by the late 1970s. Exports of manufactured goods fell from 4.4 per cent 
of exports to 0.82 per cent in 1977. This thesis backs up and acknowledges 
similar findings regarding the failure to industrialise by the specialist authors 
referred to above.
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One popular reason given for the shortfall in the socio-economic goals is 
that the Shah’s attempts to modernize were resisted by his backward people and 
that the revolution represented the rejection of modernisation in favour of the 
establishment of an Islamic state more in tune with the identity of the 
population. If anything, it is the belief here that it was precisely the failure to 
modernise, combined with political restrictions and the Shah’s unpopular 
strategic alliance with the US, that contributed to the impetus behind the 
revolution. It is hoped that Chapter 3 threw sufficient light on the unfavourable 
economic situation in terms of policies and results.
Once again, it should be emphasised that it was a coincidence of economic 
and political factors that enabled the Shah to embark on his task of turning Iran 
into the world’s fifth power with single-mindedness in the early 1970s. This 
thesis has sought to isolate these political and economic factors and to highlight 
the development of their interplay. The task has not been easy because the 
‘Iranian experience’ does not fit neatly into a standard economic or political 
theoretical framework. Finally, it should be noted that a theory of inevitability 
is not implied. There was nothing inevitable about the revolution or the conduct 
of policy under the Shah. Choices were available and choices were made. The 
particular combination of these choices has formed the raw material for this 
thesis.
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Table 3:1
Growth of GNP and GNP per capita, 1959-77
(constant 1959 prices, billion rials)
Year GNP at factor Population GNP per capita
cost (millions) (US $)
(billion rials)
1959 265.7 21.17 165.6
1960 278.3 21.77 168.7
1961 288.1 22.39 169.8
1962 303.4 23.03 173.9
1963 320.7 23.70 178.6
1964 351.2 24.37 190.2
1965 390.5 25.07 205.6
1966 431.0 25.78 220.7
1967 479.4 26.52 238.6
1968 531.9 27.30 257.2
1969 581.3 28.05 273.5
1970 646.3 29.25 291.6
1971 730.8 30.02 321.3
1972 857.4 30.90 366.3
1973 1208.4 31.80 552.3
1974 1700.3 32.79 767.0
1975 1718.5 33.20 765.7
1976 1966.9 33.66 832.2
1977 1952.3 34.63 798.5
Average annual compound growth rate of GNP between 1960 and 1977: 12.1%
Exchange rate: Rials equivalent to 1 US$
1961-72 75,75 1975 67.6
1973 68.8 1976 70.02
1974 67.6 1977 70.6
Source: P. Alizadeh, The Process of Import Substitution 
industrialisation in Iran, 1960-78 (Unpublished 
D.Phil thesis: University of Sussex, 1984), p.200.
344
Table 3:2
Industrial Contribution to GNP 1973-78
(current prices, billion rials)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
GNP
1728.3 3079.4 3497.4 4691.7 5483.2 4917.6
Industrial Group 268.7 366.6 525.2 791.1 928.4 873.3
(Manufacturing) (167.6) (223.2) (278.7) (331.9) (415.8) (370.0)
(Water & Power) (26.0) (32.8) (39.2) (42.0) (58.8) (54.0)
(Construction) (75.1) (110.6) (207.3) (417.2) (453.8) (449.3)
Percentage share in 
GNP:*
Industrial Group 15.5 11.9 15.0 16.9 16.9 17.8
(Manufacturing) (9.7) (7.2) (8.0) (7.1) (7.6) (7.5)
(Water & Power) (1.5) (1.1) (1.1) (0.9) (1.1) (1.1)
(Construction) (4.3) (3.6) (5.9) (8.9) (8.3) (9.1)
Percentage growth 
over previous year:* 
GNP 78.2 13.6 34.1 16.9 -10.3
Industrial Group 36.4 43.3 50.6 17.4 -4.0
(Manufacturing) (33.2) (24.9) (19.1) (25.3) (-11.0)
(Water & Power) (26.2) (19.6) (7.1) (40.0) (-8.2)
(Construction) (47.3) (87.4) (101.3) (8.8) (-1.0)
Annual average growth rate - industrial group: 
of which 
manufacturing: 
water & power: 
construction:
28.0 per cent
18.3 per cent 
16.9 per cent 
48.8 per cent
* author's calculation
Source: UN, National Accounts Statistics, 1982
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Table 3:3
Industrial Contribution to GNP 1973-78
(constant 1974 prices, billion rials)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
GNP 2940.0 3124.0 3185.1 3602.3 3825.9 3237.8
Industrial Group 387.7 436.8 532.5 630.4 591.6 501.8
(Manufacturing group)* (264.4) (312.9) (360.9) (423.0) (359.4) (312.3)
(Water & Power) (21.6) (25.7) (33.0) (33.4) (36.6) (47.9)
(Construction) (101.7) (98.2) (141.6) (174.0) (179.3) (141.6)
Percentage share in
GNP:**
Industrial Group 13.2 14.0 16.7 17.5 15.5 15.5
(Manufacturing group)* (9.0) (10.0) (11.3) (11.7) (9.4) (9.6)
(Water & Power) (0.7) (0.8) (1.0) (0.9) (1.0) (1.5)
(Construction) (3.5) (3.1) (4.4) (4.8) (4.7) (4.4)
Percentage growth 
over previous year:**
GNP 6.3 2.0 13.1 6.2 -15.4
Industrial Group 12.7 22.0 18.4 -6.2 -15.2
(Manufacturing group)* (18.3) (15.3) (17.2) (-15.0) (-13.1)
(Water & Power) (19.0) (28.4) (1.2) (9.6) (30.9)
(Construction) (-3.5) (44.2) (22.9) (3.0) (-21.0)
Annual average growth rate - industrial group: 6.3 |per cent
of which 
manufacturing: 4.5 per cent
water & power: 17.8 per cent
construction: 9.1 percent
* includes mining 
** author's calculation
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1356, 1359
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Table 3:4a
Iran's GNP, 1972-78
(constant 1974 prices, billion rials
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
GNP
constant 1974 2635.7 2940.0 3124.0 3185.1 3602.3 3825.9
prices
Percentage
increase on 11.5 6.3 2.0 13.1 6.2
previous year*
Average annual increase 1973 - 78 : 2.4 percent
1973 - 77 : 6.9 percent
author's calculation
Source: as Table 3:3
1978
3237.8
-15.4
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Table 3:4b
General Index
Annual Average of the Wholesale Price Index
(1974=100)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
75.4 85.5 100 105.3 119.5 136.9 149.9
Source: as Table 3:3
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Table 3:5
Gross Domestic Product by Kind of Activity
(billion rials, constant 1974 prices)
1970 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Agriculture 233.9 264.1 279.9 289.8 303.9 326.1 327.3 332.4
Oil & Mining 1037.1 1340.3 1465.3 1452.6 1286.2 1420.6 1398.2 1020.5
Industry 183.2 255.8 313.5 366.6 448.3 565.2 556.1 471.1
Manufacturing (114.5) (159.1) (190.0) (223.2) (258.9) (296.3) (323.9) (281.6)
Water & Power (11.8) (20.3) (26.8) (32.8) (38.9) (40.0) (52.9) (47.9)
Construction (56.9) (76.4) (96.7) (110.6) (150.5) (228.9) (179.3) (141.6)
Services 486.6 699.1 743.5 1026.0 1205.7 1517.1 1642.4 1558.6
GDP 1943.8 2559.3 2802.2 3135.0 3244.1 3829.0 3924.0 3382.6
(at factor cost)
Source: UN, National Accounts Statistics, 1982
Table 3:6
Sectoral Contributions to the Gross Domestic Product
1970, 1972-8 (percent)
1970 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
8.5 8.3
37.0 35.6
14.8 14.2
(7.7) (8.3)
39.6 41.9
Source: Table 5 
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Agriculture 12.0 10.3 10.0 9.2 9.4
Oil & Mining 53.3 52.4 52.3 46.3 39.6
Industry 9.4 10.0 11.2 11.7 13.9
Manufacturing (5.9) (6.2) (6.8) (7.1) (8.0)
Services 25.2 27.3 26.5 32.8 37.2
1978
9.8
30.7
13.9
(8.3)
46.1
Table 3.7
Annual Growth Rate of Industry 1973-78
(per cent)
Average Annual 
Increase
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Manufacturing 10.5 19.4 17.5 15.6 14.5 9.3 -13.1
Water & Power 16.4 32.0 22.4 18.6 2.8 32.2 -9.9
Construction 14.4 26.6 14.4 36.1 52.1 -22.0 -21.0
Industry (Total) 11.8 22.6 16.9 22.3 26.1 -1.6 -15.3
Source: Based on Table 5 
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Table 3:8
Normal Variation in the Economic Structure with Level of Development1
Per Capita Income (US$ 1964)
$200 $300 $500 $800 $1,00C
Structure of Production: 
Primary Production2 32.0 25.4 18.5 13.6 11.7
Industry Production3 25.3 29.2 33.4 36.4 37.5
Structure of Trade:
Primary Exports 6.2 4.9 3.8 2.9 2.6
Manufactured Exports 2.9 3.8 5.1 6.4 7.1
Imports 14.3 14.2 14.5 15.1 15.5
Investment 19.9 21.6 23.0 23.6 23.6
Government Consumption 10.9 11.6 12.5 13.6 14.1
Notes: 1 All the aggregates are taken as a percentage of GNP in current prices
2 Agriculture and Mining
3 Manufacturing and Construction
Source: H.B Chenery and M. Syrquin, Patterns of Development : 1950-1970 
(Oxford : OUP, 1975), Tables S5 and S9, pp.200, 204
Table 3:9
Structural Changes in the Iranian Economy (1967-77)*
1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977
Per capita income at 
constant 1959 prices 238.6 273.5 321.3 552.3 765.7 798.5
Structure of Production:
Primary production: 
Agriculture 
Oil
42.70
(22.7)
(20.0)
41.40
(20.4)
(21.0)
43.60
(16.7)
(26.9)
46.10
(13.2)
(32.9)
49.20
(9.6)
(39.6)
41.1
(9.3)
(31.8)
Industrial Production: 
Manufacturing 
Construction
18.5
(13.5)
(5.0)
19.2
(13.9)
(5.3)
18.3
(13.4)
(4.9)
17.4
(13.0)
(4.4)
17.0
(11.0)
(6.0)
21.8
(12.3)
(9.5)
Structure of Trade:
Primary exports (total): 
Oil
13.1
(11.5)
13.1
(11.5)
17.3
(15.8)
20.9
(19.0)
37.7
(37.1)
28.8
(28.4)
Manufactured exports: 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.3
Imports (total) 15.9 16.2 15.1 14.4 22.7 19.1
Investment 19.7 20.2 19.8 19.3 29.7 34.0
Government Consumption: 14.2 15.6 17.2 19.8 22.6 20.1
* All the aggregates are taken as a percentage of GNP in current prices
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report & Balance Sheet, 
1349 (1970), 1353 (1974), 1354 (1975), 1356 (1977).
Table 3:10
Growth of Manufacturing (1965-78)*
Year Manufacturing Value Added Annual Growth Rate
(billion rials) of Manufacturing
(constant prices)
Constant Prices (1974) Current Prices
1968 133.7 88.2 -
1969 147.0 100.5 9.9
1970 163.1 113.7 10.6
1971 190.5 138.1 16.8
1972 224.8 171.5 18.0
1973 264.4 231.9 17.6
1974 312.9 312.9 18.3
1975 360.9 380.0 15.3
1976 423.0 496.0 17.2
1977 359.4 493.0 -15.0
1978 312.3 437.0 -13.1
* Mining is included in manufacturing
Source: UN, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1978 and 1983.
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Table 3:11
Value Added of Large Industrial Establishments
(billion rials; current prices)
*
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Food Products 10.53 13.26 15.45 20.58 27.07
Beverages 1.29 1.37 1.11 1.47 1.85
Tobacco 7.54 7.93 8.06 8.50 9.32
Textiles 10.11 10.78 12.69 18.00 25.17
Wearing Apparel 2.44 2.49 1.79 2.17 2.60
Leather & Products 0.31 0.52 0.64 0.89 1.27
Wood Products & 
Furniture & Fixtures
0.77 0.96 0.89 1.41 2.25
Paper & Products 0.74 1.46 1.42 2.09 3.00
Industrial Chemicals 4.20 6.16 8.72 11.87 15.94
Petroleum Refineries, 
Petroleum & Coal Products
0.50 0.78 0.83 2.25 3.05
Rubber Products 0.60 0.60 1.33 1.84 2.57
Pottery, Glass & 
Non-metal Products
6.75 6.84 8.73 14.28 23.21
Basic Metal 2.17 2.73 7.70 8.77 16.59
Metal Products 3.44 3.55 2.96 5.29 10.58
Machinery (non-electrical) 0.53 0.80 1.97 2.90 4.24
Electrical Machinery 4.07 4.48 6.24 9.06 13.06
Transport Equipment 6.57 6.74 5.92 7.83 10.10
Other Manufacturing 
Industries
0.16 0.29 0.26 0.21 0.31
Total Manufacturing 63.63 72.70 88.00 121.65 175.71
* Factor Values
Source: UN, Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 1975 and 1977
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All Establishments
Large Establishments
Large Establishments 
as percentage of all
Table 3:12
Manufacturing Value Added
(billion rials, current prices)
1970 1971 1972 1973
113.7 138.1
63.6 72.7
56.0 52.6
171.5 231.9
88.0 121.7
51.3 52.55
1974
312.9
171.7
56.2
Source: Tables 10 and 11 
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Table 3:13
Statistics on Manufacturing Establishments, Employees and Wages Paid 1969-79
(value in millions of rials)
Year Number of Persons Engaged Wages Paid
Establishments
Large Small Large Small Large Small
1969 5,066 172,588 256,755 499,923 14,803 8,962
1970 5,239 178,366 261,206 518,007 15,709 9,430
1971 5,487 - 278,770* - 17,993 -
1972 5,651 191,070 303,626 562,930 21,048 10,470
1973 6,056 - 362,170* - 31,342 -
1974 6,191 245,077 396,280* - 39,897 -
1977 8,200 - 470,000* - - -
1979 4,502 _ 414,550* _ 249,340 -
* Rounded figuers
Source: Ministry of Economy, Iranian Industrial Statistics, 1969, 1970, 1972 
UN, Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 1978; PBO, Annual Statistics of 2536 (1977)
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Table 3:14
Annual Wage of Industrial Workers
(thousand rials, current price)
Large Small
Year Establishments % Increase Establishments % Increase
1969 57.65 - 17.93 -
1970 60.14 4.3 18.20 1.5
1971 64.54 7.3 - 1.1*
1972 69.32 7.4 18.60 1.1*
1973 86.54 24.8 - -
1974 100.68 16.3 - -
1979 601.47 _
* Assuming a wage of 18.400 thousand rials in 1971.
Source: Based on Table 13
Table 3:15
Compensation of Workers Index of Large Manufacturing Establishments
(1974=100)
Relative
Weight 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Food, Beverages 
& Tobacco
Textiles, Clothing 
& Leather
Wood & Wooden 
Products
Paper, Cardboard 
& their Products
Chemicals
Non-Metal Mining 
Products*
Basic Metal
Metal Machinery 
& Equipment
Other Manufacturing
14.0 144.9 187.6
25.5 135.0 170.4
0.9 143.1 202.0
2.0 165.8 216.8
13.8 146.4 202.2
9.1 152.2 215.8
11.6 120.3 162.8
22.7 158.0 235.6
0.4 103.3 146.1
232.9 311.5 481.6
200.9 257.6 482.8
230.6 347.7 576.2
279.2 373.9 576.4
265.3 309.7 470.8
303.8 385.6 658.2
209.3 260.8 392.9
311.8 401.5 586.9
169.6 187.9 306.5
General Index 100.0 143.6 196.3 251.4 319.8 512.0
* Except oil and coal
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1358 (1979)
Table 3:16
Total Wages, Salaries and Fringe Benefits of Employees in the Selected Industries
(million rials)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Dairy Products 130 152 172 226 279 414 590
Vegetable Shortening 404 467 547 672 941 1,343 1,717
Alcoholic Beverages 109 128 144 171 230 347 420
Non-alcoholic Beverages 174 197 248 341 453 693 1,200
Tobacco 1,070 1,244 1,433 1,744 2,142 3,136 3,633
Spinning & Weaving 3,226 3,792 4,694 6,060 7,708 10,027 12,105
Leather 82 97 125 144 184 248 310
Machine-made Shoes 238 262 415 563 599 982 1,365
Petrochemicals 776 810 913 1,138 1,403 2,376 2,841
Paints 66 87 110 131 178 271 418
Pharmaceuticals 225 255 295 358 484 618 984
Cosmetics & Soaps 218 227 299 371 539 828 1,112
Automobile Tyres 244 259 358 378 512 808 1,458
Glass sheets 74 113 214 269 347 439 498
Cement 485 550 710 819 1,229 1,758 2,320
Basic Metals 319 449 607 775 1,031 1,438 2,155
Household Appliances* 646 694 818 1,183 1,583 2,355 3,435
Radio, TV & Telephone 319 381 486 631 838 1,305 1,653
Electrical Tools 156 183 225 307 445 707 1,014
Automobiles 872 1,024 1,233 1,733 2,331 4,082 6,449
Total Selected Industries 9,833 11,371 14,049 18,014 23,456 34,175 45,677
‘Electrical and non-electrical
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1353 (1974) & 2535 (1976).
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Table 3:17
Percentage Share of Wages of Employees in the Selected Industries
1970 1972 1974 1976 1975 1976
___________________________________Percent Change
Dairy Products 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 48.9 42.5
Vegetable Shortening 4.1 3.9 4.0 3.8 39.8 27.8
Alcoholic Beverages 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 44.6 21.0
Non-alcoholic Beverages 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.6 53.0 73.2
Tobacco 10.9 10.2 8.9 8.0 46.4 15.8
Spinning & Weaving 32.8 33.3 32.6 26.5 28.3 20.7
Leather 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 31.9 25.0
Machine-made Shoes 2.4 2.9 2.5 3.0 63.9 39.0
Petrochemicals 7.9 6.7 7.0 6.2 41.7 19.6
Paints 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 50.6 54.2
Pharmaceuticals 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.2 31.8 59.2
Cosmetics & Soaps 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.4 53.3 34.3
Automobile Tyres 2.5 2.6 2.1 3.2 57.8 80.4
Glass sheets 0.8 1.5 1.4 1.1 27.2 13.4
Cement 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.1 43.0 32.0
Basic Metals 3.2 4.3 4.3 4.7 39.6 49.9
Household Appliances* 6.6 5.8 6.6 7.5 49.3 45.9
Radio, TV & Telephone 3.2 3.5 3.8 3.6 43.6 26.7
Electrical Tools 1.6 1.6 1.9 2.2 52.7 43.4
Automobiles 8.9 8.8 9.8 14.1 73.8 58.0
Total Selected Industries 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 42.7 33.
*Electrical and non-electrical
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1353 (1974)& 2535 (1976)
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Table 3:18
Employment Index of Large Manufacturing Establishments
(1974 = 100)
Relative
Weight 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Food, Beverages
& Tobacco 11.2 110.5 123.2 134.2 140.4 141.7
Textiles, Clothing
& Leather 36.0 104.0 104.2 100.0 100.7 106.2
Wood & Wooden
Products 1.4 111.0 116.3 112.2 122.3 123.3
Paper, Cardboard
& their Products 1.6 127.3 134.4 129.7 134.2 141.6
Chemicals 9.9 110.6 122.4 128.8 129.6 131.6
Non-Metal Mining
Products* 9.1 114.6 134.7 148.8 156.3 167.8
Basic Metal 7.4 113.5 112.1 117.4 119.1 127.9
Metal Machinery
& Equipment 22.6 117.4 128.0 133.5 140.2 144.0
Other Manufacturing 0.8 78.6 78.5 78.2 69.8 62.3
General Index 100.0 110.0 117.3 120.4 124.0 129.0
Except oil and coal
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1358 (1979)
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Table 3:19
Number of Workers of the Selected Industries
1970 1971
Dairy Products 1,191 1,275
Vegetable Shortening 4,176 4,417
Alcoholic Beverages 1,445 1,537
Non-alcoholic Beverages 2,345 2,514
Tobacco 6,882 7,413
Spinning & Weaving 60,122 61,722
Leather 1,426 1,418
Machine-made Shoes 4,419 5,124
Petrochemicals 3,018 3,036
Paints 758 904
Pharmaceuticals 1,957 2,085
Cosmetics & Soaps 2,014 2,054
Automobile Tyres 1,305 1,450
Glass sheets 773 915
Cement 4,360 4,512
Basic Metals 3,312 4,105
Household Appliances4' 8,586 8,562
Radio, TV & Telephone 3,810 4,282
Electrical Tools 1,777 2,070
Automobiles 9,125 8,970
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
1,331 1,428 1,581 1,898 2,205
4,492 4,818 5,230 5,520 5,993
1,639 1,824 1,935 1,912 1,858
2,590 2,854 3,142 3,929 5,137
7,191 7,142 7,652 8,137 9,024
64,804 67,970 70,277 70,471 68,413
1,739 1,655 1,611 1,574 1,611
6,332 7,426 6,983 7,664 8,062
3,248 3,676 3,843 4,127 4,318
993 1,020 1,114 1,282 1,479
2,239 2,572 2,765 2,884 3,170
2,162 2,367 2,911 3,176 3,449
1,635 1,754 1,943 2,076 3,001
1,505 1,854 2,023 1,823 1,597
4,615 4,870 6,115 6,394 7,227
4,901 5,738 6,256 6,380 6,616
9,270 10,655 11,825 13,069 13,585
4,633 5,124 6,245 6,576 6,294
2,519 2,898 3,356 3,879 4,532
10,117 12,188 14,307 18,228 20,270
Total 122,800 128,365 137,955 149,833 161,114 170,999 177,841
* Electrical and non-electrical
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1353 (1974) & 2535 (1976)
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Table 3:20
Percentage Share of Workers in the Selected Industries
Percent Change 
1970 1972 1974 1976 1975 1976
Dairy Products 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 20.1 16.2
Vegetable Shortening 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.4 5.5 8.6
Alcoholic Beverages 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 -1.2 -2.8
Non-alcoholic Beverages 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.9 25.0 30.7
Tobacco 5.6 5.2 4.7 5.1 6.3 10.9
Spinning & Weaving 49.0 47.0 43.6 38.5 0.3 -2.9
Leather 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.9 -2.3 2.4
Machine-made Shoes 3.6 4.6 4.3 4.5 9.8 5.2
Petrochemicals 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.4 7.4 4.6
Paints 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 15.1 15.4
Pharmaceuticals 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 4.3 9.9
Cosmetics & Soaps 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.9 9.1 8.6
Automobile Tyres 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.7 6.8 44.6
Glass sheets 0.6 1.1 1.3 0.9 -9.9 -12.4
Cement 3.5 3.3 3.8 4.1 4.6 13.0
Basic Metals 2.7 3.5 3.9 3.7 2.0 3.7
Household Appliances* 7.0 6.7 7.3 7.6 10.5 3.9
Radio, TV & Telephone 3.1 3.4 3.9 3.5 5.3 -4.3
Electrical Tools 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.6 15.6 16.8
Automobiles 7.4 7.3 8.9 11.4 27.4 11.2
Total Selected Industries 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 6.1 4.0
* Electrical and non-electrical
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1353 (1974) & 2535 (1976)
364
Table 3:21
Composition of Manufacturing Output, 1977 - 926 Largest Establishments
(current prices, million rials)
Amount % Share Number of Employment % Share 
Establishments (persons)
Consumer Goods 218,111 34.5 427 120,273 43.7
Food, Beverages 118,581 18.7 208 24,970 9.1
Tobacco 12,976 2.1 3 9,860 3.5
Textiles & Clothing 71,131 11.2 160 75,063 27.3
Leather Hide 12,040 1.9 43 6,897 2.5
Wood & Products 3,383 0.6 13 3,503 1.3
Intermediate Goods 222,283 35.4 359 90,568 32.9
Paper & Printing 12,772 2.0 15 4,996 1.8
Rubber & Tyres 11,876 2.2 7 3,743 1.4
Chemicals 63,305 9.9 113 25,233 9.2
Non-Metal Products 42,218 6.7 164 30,010 10.9
Basic Metal 80,254 12.7 22 19,486 7.1
Metal Products 11,858 1.9 38 7,100 2.5
CaDital Goods & Durables 180,749 28.3 105 62,700 22.8
Machinery 78,657 12.3 84 38,472 14.0
Transport equipment 102,092 16.0 21 24,228 8.8
Miscellaneous 11,495 1.8 35 1,372 0.6
Total 632,638 100.0 926 274,913 100.0
Source: Bank Markazi Iran, Large Manufacturing Establishments in 1977 
(Tehran: Department of Economic Statistics, 1978)
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Table 3:22
Consumption of Gross Manufacturing Output, 1963,1968-74
(current prices, billion rials)
All Establishments Large Establishments
1963 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Consumer Goods 63.90 135.00 152.51 103.49 98.79 113.69 142.94 179.84
Food, Beverages 27.00 69.62 80.11 44.60 47.72 55.74 68.72 84.40
Tobacco 5.00 7.69 8.11 8.43 8.97 10.27 10.74 11.60
Textiles & Clothing 25.33 50.75 56.06 47.28 38.36 43.08 56.94 74.58
Leather Hide 2.33 1.77 2.06 1.26 1.56 2.29 3.10 4.18
Wood & Products 4.24 5.17 6.17 1.92 2.18 2.31 3.44 5.08
Intermediate Goods 18.79 46.06 55.43 46.56 58.80 110.95 117.96 181.01
Paper & Printing 2.05 3.69 5.04 4.13 6.45 7.60 11.00 15.83
Rubber & Tyres 0.89 3.82 4.18 2.47 2.48 3.99 5.47 7.44
Chemicals 3.85 9.24 11.16 12.60 18.81 26.37 35.48 44.98
Non-Metal Products 5.32 10.88 12.15 10.81 11.23 14.64 23.52 37.62
Basic Metal 1.10 5.65 8.24 9.21 12.25 50.46 27.66 47.40
Metal Products 5.58 12.78 14.66 7.34 7.58 7.89 14.83 27.74
Capital Goods & Durables 5.53 21.21 29.55 27.82 33.24 46.70 62.34 81.67
Machinery }
} 5.53
9.00 11.64 12.44 15.07 21.61 30.49 41.55
Transport equipment } 12.21 17.91 15.38 18.17 25.09 31.85 40.12
Miscellaneous 1.11 2.87 2.94 0.45 0.61 0.84 1.01 1.20
Total 89.36 205.14 240.43 168.32 191.44 272.18 324.25 443.72
Source: UN, Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 1972,1975,1977
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Table 3:23
Composition of Manufacturing Value Added, 1963,1968-74
(percentage)
All Establishments Large Establishments
1963 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Consumer Goods 69.0 61.4 58.7 51.8 51.3 46.2 43.6 39.6
Food, Beverages 20.8 21.7 21.6 18.6 20.1 18.8 18.1 16.5
Tobacco 10.4 8.6 8.3 11.8 10.9 9.2 7.0 5.3
Textiles & Clothing 31.5 28.0 26.1 19.7 18.3 16.5 16.6 15.8
Leather Hide 2.2 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Wood & Products 5.7 2.6 2.2 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.3
Intermediate Goods 23.2 27.6 27.3 30.3 31.7 37.5 39.9 44.7
Paper & Printing 3.6 2.0 2.6 2.6 3.3 3.1 3.5 3.7
Rubber & Tyres 0.9 2.4 2.6 0.9 0.8 1.5 1.5 1.5
Chemicals 2.6 5.2 5.2 7.4 9.5 10.9 11.6 10.8
Non-Metal Products 7.6 10.2 9.9 10.6 9.4 9.9 11.7 13.2
Basic Metal 0.7 2 1.9 3.4 3.8 8.8 7.2 9.4
Metal Products 7.9 5.8 5.1 5.4 4.9 3.4 4.3 6.0
Capital Goods & Durables 6.7 9.6 12.2 17.5 16.5 16.1 16.3 15.6
Machinery }
} 6.7
3.9 4.7 7.2 7.3 9.3 9.8 9.8
Transport equipment } 5.8 7.5 10.3 9.3 6.7 6.4 5.7
Miscellaneous 1.1 1.4 1.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2
Total (billion rials) 40.21 75.88 87.33 63.63 72.70 88.00 121.65 175.71
Source: Derived from UN, Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 1972, 1975,1977
367
Table 3:24
Share of Capital Goods in Total Manufacturing Value Added 
For Various Countries
Non-
Electrical
382(a)
MVA
Electrical Machinery
383(b) 3832 3832 as 
MVA MVA % of 383
383
382
382+/ 
383 / M
Iran (1974) 2.4 7.4 3.2 44.0(a) 3.0 9.8
India (1976) 8.6 7.1 1.2 17.6 0.8 15.7
Brazil (1973) 8.7 5.8 1.0 18.0 0.6 14.4
Mexico (1975) 4.5 6.4 2.7 41.8 1.4 10.9
S.Korea (1973) 2.3 6.6 4.7 71.5 2.8 8.9
Turkey (1973) 3.1* 3.5* - - 1.1 6.6
Colombia (1973) 2.2* 2.8* - - 1.2 5.0
USA (1972) 11.1 8.9 4.6 52.0 0.8 20.0
Japan (1973) 11.4 10.9 5.1 47.2 0.9 22.3
Hungary (1973) 9.8 8.8 3.4 39.1 0.9 18.6
* percentage of output rather than value added 
MVA = manufacturing value added
Notes: (a) Subsector 382 in Iran consists of:
3821 Motor and generator
3822 Agriculture machinery
3823 Metal works and woodcutting machinery
3824 Industrial machinery - food-making machinery, textile machinery, 
cement manufacturing machinery, etc.
3829 Compressor, lift, industrial furnace, steam press, etc.
(b) Subsector 383 consists of:
3831 Electrical industrial machinery and apparatus
3832 Radio, television, telephone
3833 Domestic electrical appliances, electrical heater, fan, 
air conditioner, etc
3839 Wire, cable, dry-battery, lamp, switch, etc.
Source: P. Alizadeh, op. tit. , p.226
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Table 3:25
Composition of Manufacturing Value Added, 1970 & 1978
(percentage)
1970 1978 % Difference
Consumer Goods 30.2 28.2 -6.6
Food Products 12.2 9.8 -19.7
Beverages 0.6 1.1 83.3
Tobacco 4.9 2.2 -55.1
Textiles 9.4 10.9 16.0
Wearing Apparel 1.6 2.7 68.8
Leather & Fur Products 0.3 0.2 -33.3
Footwear 0.3 0.4 33.0
Wood & Cork Products 0.9 0.6 -33.3
Furniture & Fixtures 0.3 0.3 0.0
Intermediate Goods 65.8 60.7 -7.8
Paper 0.9 1.0 11.1
Printing & Publishing 1.0 1.2 20.0
Industrial Chemicals 1.9 3.4 78.9
Other Chemicals 1.9 3.4 78.9
Petroleum Refineries 45.6 32.3 -29.2
Miscellaneous Products 
of Petroleum & Coal 0.2 0.2 0.0
Rubber Products 0.9 1.6 77.8
Pottery, China & Earthenware - - -
Glass 1.0 2.8 180.0
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 4.1 6.9 68.3
Iron & Steel 2.0 1.1 -45.0
Non-Ferrous Metals 3.7 2.5 -32.4
Metal Products (excl. machinery) 2.6 4.3 65.4
Capital Goods 3.4 11.1 226.5
Non-Electrical Machinery 0.1 1.7 1600.0
Electrical Machinery 1.7 5.6 229.4
Transport Equipment 1.6 3.8 137.5
Source: UNIDO, Handbook of Industrial Statistics (New York: UN, 1982)
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Table 3:26
Manufacturing Production index 1962-72
(1967=100)
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Combined Index of 
Selected Goods 60 65 69 76 87 100 114 127 143 170 198
Food 72 71 74 73 80 100 107 116 128 131 146
Beverages 81 91 102 88 90 100 161 179 144 153 183
Textiles 73 61 57 80 84 100 97 107 126 148 164
Wearing Apparel 36 73 81 84 90 100 114 114 117 132 165
Wood & Furniture 44 107 80 83 89 100 115 107 116 142 134
Paper & Cardboard 93 50 48 75 91 100 81 97 112 160 175
Leather & Hide 75 82 62 77 89 100 141 147 133 96 101
Rubber Industries 57 70 150 90 86 100 114 144 156 165 198
Chemicals 72 48 48 73 89 100 159 188 243 403 506
Non-Metal Mining 
Products* 50 52 61 75 81 100 122 134 139 157 179
Basic Metal 59 70 70 65 80 100 118 146 172 202 278
Metal Products 59 70 70 65 80 100 113 123 134 182 189
Non-Electrical
Machinery 74 77 79 84 94 100 99 112 113 126 195
Electrical Machinery 23 27 30 51 73 100 127 148 181 233 274
Transport Equipment 19 22 36 42 45 100 200 188 251 299 389
Other Manufacturing 
Industries 29 34 53 62 91 100 116 99 121 233 214
* including construction
Source: Ministry of Economy ( Bureau of Statistics), 
Trends in Industrial & Commercial Statistics (First Quarter, 1974)
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Table 3:27
Production Index of Large Manufacturing Establishments
(1974=100)
Relative 1974 1975 1976 1977
Weight
General Index 100.0 100.0 114.7 134.6 150.6
Food, Beverages 21.6 100.0 108.4 122.8 123.4
& Tobacco
Textiles, Clothing 15.8 100.0 116.8 130.6 149.8
& Leather
Wood & Wood 0.5 100.0 119.5 143.2 191.5
Products
Paper, Cardboard 1.7 100.0 105.2 125.0 148.9
& Products
Chemicals 15.3 100.0 108.2 127.4 148.1
Non-Metal Mining* 9.1 100.0 119.7 147.8 162.8
Products
Basic Metal 10.5 100.0 108.0 112.5 143.1
Metal Machinery 24.8 100.0 125.2 158.0 175.6
& Equipment
Other Manufacturing 0.7 100.0 82.2 92.0 98.5
Industries
excluding oil and coal
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report & Balance Sheet, 1358 (1979)
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1978
128.4
112.1
142.8 
183.0
134.7
117.5
150.9
113.7 
138.3
70.6
Table 3:28
Index Numbers of Industrial Production
(1975=100)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
General Index* 86 96 100 111 111 103
Mining Index** 109 112 100 110 109 97
Manufacturing Index* 73 88 100 121 120 132
Food 95 98 100 109 112 110
Beverages 66 86 100 136 169 196
Textiles 89 96 100 117 125 141
Wearing Apparel 
& Footwear 57 85 100 122 110 123
Leather & 
Leather Products 70 91 100 142 152 170
Furniture & Fixtures 70 89 100 105 116 142
Industrial Chemicals 
& Products 84 94 100 74 135 135
Pottery, China, Glass 
& Non-Metal Products 56 78 100 116 120 137
Metal Products 64 75 100 115 113 130
Machinery
(non-electrical) 18 67 100 121 127 126
Electrical Machinery 40 72 100 116 106 137
Transport Equipment 53 76 100 124 115 121
* Excluding tobacco 
** Including petroleum refineries
Source: UN, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1983.
Table 3:29
Fixed Capital Formation for Industry during the Fifth Plan
(billion rials)
Fixed Capital Formation
Public Sector Private Sector Grand
Total
Develop­
ment
Resources 
of Public
Total Private
Savings
Develop­
ment
Total
Credits Enterprises (1+2) Credits (4+5) (3+6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Food Industries 8.94 15.00 23.94 30.00 10.00 40.00 63.94
Textiles, Handicrafts, 
Rural and Leather 
& Industries 5.18 0.50 5.68 38.00 10.00 48.00 53.68
Cellulose & Printing 17.49 0.30 17.79 43.00 7.00 50.00 67.79
Chemicals & 
Petrochemicals 75.14 4.00 79.14 64.00 20.00 84.00 163.14
Non-metallic Minerals 5.78 1.70 7.48 55.00 20.00 75.00 82.48
Metallurgical Industries 82.57 - 82.57 127.00 23.00 150.00 232.57
Mechanical Industries 27.04 3.50 30.54 4.00 2.00 6.00 36.54
Electrical & 
Electronic Industries 13.55 - 13.55 20.00 2.00 22.00 35.55
Automotive Industries 12.13 - 12.13 19.00 6.00 25.00 37.13
Miscellaneous - - - 3.00 - 3.00 3.00
Technical Assistance 4.32 - 4.32 - - - 4.30
Total 252.14 25.00 277.14 403.00 100.00 503.00 780.14
Source: PBO, Iran's Fifth Development Plan, Revised, A Summary (PBO, May 1975)
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Table 3:30
Total Credits for Industry During the Fifth Plan
(billion rials)
Current Credits Development Credits
for Maintenance Grand
of Operational 
Status Quo Fixed Non-Fixed Total 
(2 + 3)
Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Food Industries 1.53 8.94 - 8.94 10.47
Textiles, Handicrafts, 
Rural & Leather Industries 1.68 5.18 0.38 5.56 7.24
Cellulose & Printing - 17.49 - 17.49 17.49
Chemicals & 
Petrochemicals - 75.14 1.30 76.44 76.44
Non-metallic Minerals - 5.78 0.10 5.88 5.88
Metallurgical Industries 2.50 82.57 - 82.57 85.07
Mechanical Industries - 27.04 1.48 28.52 28.52
Electrical & 
Electronic Industries - 13.55 - 13.55 13.55
Automotive Industries - 12.13 0.45 12.58 12.58
Industrial Credits - 100.00 - 100.00 100.00
Technical Assistance - 4.32 0.16 4.48 4.48
Supervision of 
Industrial Affairs 3.30 - 0.49 0.49 3.79
Studies & Research 0.94 - 0.47 0.47 1.41
Administrative Services 1.05 - 0.12 0.12 1.17
Total 11.00 352.14 4.94 357.09 368.09
Source: PBO, Iran's Fifth Development Plan, Revised, A Summary (PBO, May 1975)
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Table 3:31
Characteristics of Operation and Commencement Permits 
Issued for Manufacturing Establishments
(million rials)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Number Issued 
Operation Permits 69 295 299 179 146
Commencement Permits 302 596 743 527 541
Total Capital
97
689
114 123
386 325
Operation Permits 1361 3473 4020 4355 3906 12935 6130 4592
142120
413483
115907532
Commencement Permits 6699 7687 28317 12917 16738 22373 15812 12572 1075135703*
Value of Machinery 
Construction & Land
Operation Permits 929 2404 2750 3011 2585 8650 4140 3293
Commencement Permits 3181 4915 17529 6725 9848 16385 12246 11146
53534306
755432357
Total Employees
Operation Permits 3410 7633 6806 5348 3949 5062 6470 5231 79916583
Commencement Permits 9542 15561 26691 11272 19729 22705 12218 6283 915510715
* Increase in the investment proposed in 1973 mainly due to the Petrochemical Complex to have been 
established in collaboration with Japan, with a capital of 28 billion rials.
Source: Ministry of Economy, (Bureau of Statistics)
Trends in Industrial and Commercial Statistics (First Quarter, 1974)
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Table 3:32
Loans of the Specialised Banks*
(million rials)
1975 1976 1977 1978
Number of Application for Loans 618 582 582 329
Amount Demanded 60,212 83,198 87,143 51,577
Amount Approved 58,956 65,324 60,903 47,724
Amount Paid 50,809 54,932 61,982 37,487
* Includes specialised loans
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1358 (1979)
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Table 3:33
Loan Operations of the Industrial and Mining
Development Bank of Iran 1970-78
(billion rials)
Loans 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Number of Applications 111.0 77.0 164.0 167.0 186.0 221.0 582.0 582.0 329.0
Amount Demanded 83.2 87.1 51.6
Amount Approved 4.5 6.8 8.1 17.4 24.2 37.2 65.8 60.9 47.7
Amount Signed 4.5 5.3 6.4 11.1 19.6 34.9
Amount Paid 3.3 4.6 4.8 7.5 12.7 33.6 54.9 62.0 7.4
From 1972 approximately one quarter of the total of loans paid by the IMDBI 
related to working capital.
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 
1353 (1974), 1354 (1975), 1359 (1980)
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Table 3:34
Loan Operations of the Industrial Credit Bank
(billion rials)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Number of Applications 141 120 208 222 232 295
Amount Requested 2.82 3.85 5.78 11.42 23.49 31.82
Amount Approved 1.32 2.86 3.55 8.23 18.95 19.49
Industrial Loans 
Working Capital
(1.05)
(0.26)
(2.20)
0.66)
(2.45)
(1.09)
(6.94)
(1.29)
(18.35)
(0.61)
(19.12)
(0.37)
Amount Granted 1.29 0.85 2.57 4.19 7.84 13.75
Industrial Loans 
Working Capital
(0.90)
(0.39)
(0.77)
(0.07)
(1.74)
(0.83)
(2.77)
(1.42)
(7.28)
(0.56)
(12.91)
(0.84)
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 
1353(1974), 1354(1975)
Table 3:35
IMDBI Loans to Manufacturing Industries
Total No. No. of Borrowers (2) as 
of w Foreign % of
Borrowers Shareholding (1)
Loan Amount Share 
to Industries (%) 
(billion rials)
As at 20 March 1978 Oct.59 - March 78
Consumer Goods 169 13 7.6 59.6 44.3
Textiles
Food
Others
72
72
25
5.5
4.1
24.0
37.0
18.4
4.2
27.5
13.7
3.1
Intermediate Goods 181 75 41.4 52.0 38.6
Paper & Printing 16
Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals 38
Rubber & Tyres 8
Non-Metal Minerals 61
Metallurgy 58
3
30
4 
13 
25
18.7
78.9
50.0 
21.3
43.0
3.5 
} 7.6 
}
19.6
21.3
2.6 
} 5.6 
}
14.6
15.8
Capital Goods & Consumer 
Durables
Machinery (non-electrical)
Machinery (electrical) 
Automotive
54
32
22
36
25
10
66.6
78.1
45.4
23.0
0.7
11.7
10.6
17.1
0.5
8.7
7.9
Miscellaneous 23
Total (excl. miscellaneous)
Total (incl. miscellaneous) 427
17
141
77.2
33.0
134.6 100.0
137.5
Total No. of Borrowers from October 1959 - March 1978 : 650
Source: IMDBI, Annual Report, various issues; Center for Attraction and Protection of Foreign 
Investments, List of Foreign Investors in Iran up to March 1978 (Tehran: 1978) in 
P. Alizadeh, The Process of Import Substitution in Iran (1960-78), op. cit.
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Table 3:36
Government Disbursements from Fixed Capital Formation for Industries and Mines
(million rials)
Project of Establishment 
Share & Expansion of: 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
% Share 
in 1973
%
in
1978
Food Industries 317 1,059 1,520 3,792 2,034 4,034 1.9 4.5
Handicrafts 30 246 1,006 3,707 2,215 1,909 0.2 2.1
Cellulose & Printing 899 3,763 4,752 6,175 9,290 7,384 5.3 8.2
Chemicals & 
Petrochemicals 2,419 6,119 18,347 8,333 15,357 10,693 14.2 11.9
Non-Metal Minerals 510 2,000 3,504 4,702 6,939 4,127 3.0 4.6
Metallurgical & 
Metal Industries 10,404 14,718 22,696 28,689 48,742 48,903 61.2 54.5
Mechanical Industry 1,558 2,552 6,155 5,711 5,949 3,250 9.2 3.6
Transportation Vehicels 424 3,154 4,248 5,716 9,393 7,178 2.5 8.0
Electric & Electronic 
Industries 271 1,000 2,410 1,650 1,599 1,500 1.6 1.7
Technical Aid 165 420 404 512 838 483 1.0 0.5
Programme of Industrial 
Supervision & Research 13 0 0 387 183 125 0.1 0.1
Total Industry 17,010 35,031 65,042 69,374 102,539 89,723 100.0 100.0
Mines 6,500 15,201 18,353 11,820 14,953 20,810
Industrial Credits 
Projects 1,750 28,770 20,000 10,750 14,050 4,250
Grand Total 25,260 79,002 103,395 81,944 131,542 114,843
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 2535 (1976), 1359 (1980)
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Table 3:37
Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation and Consumption Expenditure
(billion rials)
1959* 1963* 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Current Prices
Total Private Sector
Machinery
Construction
31.9 31.1 144.0
(77.7)
(66.3)
160.4
(83.1)
(77.3)
225.2
(112.1)
(113.1)
521.6
(331.5)
(190.1)
663.0
(355.2)
(307.8)
776.8
(353.0)
(423.8)
Total Public Sector
Machinery
Construction
20.8 20.4 143.4
(35.2)
(108.2)
202.9
(57.0)
(145.9)
336.8
(108.7)
(228.1)
544.0
(133.1)
(410.9)
814.9
(219.1)
(595.8)
1055.1
(286.7)
(768.4)
Gross Domestic Fixed 
Capital Formation
Machinery
Construction
49.8
(21.3)
(31.4)
51.5
(13.8)
(37.7)
287.4
(112.9)
(174.5)
363.3
(140.1)
(223.2)
562.0
(220.8) 
(341.2)
1,065.6
(464.6)
(601.0)
1,477.9
(574.3)
(903.6)
1,831.9
(639.7)
(1,192.2)
Ratio of Private to 
Government Investment 1.53 1.52 1.00 0.79 0.67 0.96 0.81 0.74
Annual Average Growth 1959-63* 1963-72* 1973-77*
Total Private Sector 
Total Public Sector 
Total GDFCF 
Machinery 
Construction
-0.6
-0.5
0.8
(-10.3)
(4.7)
18.6
24.2 
21.0
26.3 
(18.6)
48.3
51.0
49.9
46.2
(52.0)
Private Consumption 
Public Consumption
209.4
30.5
262.1
40.3
686.6
252.6
879.7
325.4
1,127.8
628.3
1,316.0
807.4
1.532.5
1.003.6
2,160.8
1,073.8
Constant 1974 Prices 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Total Private Sector 
Total Public Sector 
Gross Domestic Fixed 
Capital Formation
198.9
211.6
410.5
200.3
256.3
456.6
225.2
336.8
562.0
451.4
472.2
923.6
509.8
604.6
1,114.4
505.4
647.2
1,152.6
Private Consumption 
Public Consumption
880.3
354.2
1,014.6
427.9
1,127.8
628.3
1,207.3
722.5
1,242.9
796.0
1,422.5
786.0
Source: Robert E. Looney, Economic Origins of the Iranian Revolution, op. cit., p.66 
(N.B. His figures for machinery and construction have been erroneously transposed.)
Bank Markazi, Annual Report & Balance Sheet, 1356 (1977)
OECD, Latest Infonnation on National Accounts of Developing Countries, No. 11,1979
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Table 3:38
Projected Demand and Supply of Manpower 
by Occupations During the Fifth Plan
(thousand persons)
Category Demand Supply Shortage
Architects, Town Planners, Civil Servants 7.8 4.0 3.8
Electrical and Electronic Engineers 5.5 2.8 2.7
Mechanical Engineers 6.9 4.2 2.7
Chemical, Mining & Metallurgical Engineers 2.0 1.0 1.0
Other Engineers 14.2 8.3 5.9
Senior Medical Personnel 8.5 7.2 1.3
Other Medical Personnel 35.6 14.3 21.3
Educational Personnel 287.4 230.0 57.4
Higher Educational Personnel 22.5 21.0 1.5
Technicians 116.6 75.0 41.6
Other Technical and Vocational Personnel 8.0 4.0 4.0
Managerial, Administrative & Sales Personnel 185.0 185.0 -
Mining, Drilling and Extractive Workers 23.0 15.0 8.0
Transport Workers 41.0 41.0 -
Skilled & Semi-Skilled Industrial Workers 520.0 230.0 290.0
Skilled Construction Workers 290.0 20.0 270.0
Unskilled Workers 538.0 528.0 10.0
Total 2,112.0 1,390.8 721.2
Source: Plan and Budget Organisation of Iran
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Table 3:39
Inflow of Foreign Private Capital and Loans through the Center for 
Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investments
(million rials)
% Share
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1971 1977
Agro-industry 83 122 458 33 263 1 - 5.6 -
Mining 140 146 274 109 12 - 230 9.5 3.6
Food 24 119 114 9 10 86 242 1.6 3.8
Rubber 155 118 233 1,209 654 244 277 10.5 4.4
Pharmaceuticals 
& Chemicals 351 114 79 140 253 172 321 23.8 5.1
Petrochemicals 64 - 1,121 1,336 911 2,309 2,524 4.3 39.8
Metallurgy 118 171 11 422 273 1,733 1,478 8.0 23.3
Electrical & Electronic 
Industries 276 195 194 511 251 481 358 18.8 5.6
Automobile Industry 
& Transportation 76 99 1,027 22 675 111 - 5.2 -
Building Materials 
& Construction 74 23 64 201 169 - 205 5.0 3.2
Hotels 55 63 24 52 14 152 53 3.7 0.8
Other 56 166 415 456 491 1,248 660 3.8 10.4
Total 1,472 1,336 4,044 4,500 3,976 6,537 6,348 100.0 100.0
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1356 (1977)
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Table 3:40
Inflow of Foreign Private Loans and Capital by the CAPFI by Countries
(million rials)
% Share
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1971 1977
United States 502 349 1,090 797 589 1,324 1,197 34.1 18.8
United Kingdom 268 29 25 52 135 148 302 18.2 4.8
Germany 295 131 662 130 238 1,730 238 20.0 3.7
France 127 102 23 61 629 214 566 8.6 8.9
Japan 55 221 1,659 2,867 1,707 2,728 2,524 3.7 39.8
Italy 225 0 - - 78 39 1,001 15.3 15.8
Other - 499 585 593 600 354 520 - 5.2
Total 1,472 1,336 4,044 4,500 3,976 6,537 6,348 100.0 100.0
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1356 (1977)
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Table 3:41
Ownership Pattern of Foreign Firms in Manufacturing Sector
(as at 20 March 1978)
Foreign Shareholding (%) Total No.
of
10-35 36-50 51 -100 Foreign I
Food & Beverages 2 1 1 4
Textiles 3 0 0 3
Other Consumer Goods 3 4 0 7
Paper & Printing 1 1 0 2
Chemicals 12 20 16 48
Petrochemicals 1 5 0 6
Non-Metallic Minerals 12 1 0 13
Metallurgy 17 10 2 29
Electric & Non-Electric 
Machinery, & Automotive 30 24 4 58
Other 26 21 2 49
Total 108 89 26 223
Total (%) 48.4 39.9 11.7 100.0
Source: Center for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investments, 
List of Foreign Investors in Iran up to March, 1978 (Tehran: 1978)
Table 3:42
Composition of Imports, 1971 - 78
(million dollars; current prices)
% Shares
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1971 1977
Consumer Goods 242 332 557 1,017 1,995 2,250 2,697 2,114 11.8 18.4
Intermediate Goods 1,336 1,596 2,274 4,266 6,212 6,713 7,910 5,350 64.8 54.1
Agriculture 29 29 48 122 240 148 257 164 1.4 1.8
Manufacturing* 1,111 1,266 1,912 3,324 4,337 4,773 5,679 3,919 53.9 38.8
Construction 139 204 238 376 917 987 1,186 650 6.7 8.1
Services 58 97 76 444 718 805 788 617 2.8 5.4
Capital Goods 483 642 906 1,331 3,489 3,803 4,019 2,908 23.4 27.5
Agriculture 34 62 73 96 290 234 204 108 1.6 1.4
Manufacturing* 317 412 560 770 1,760 2,244 2,588 1,858 15.4 17.7
Sen/ices 133 168 273 465 1,439 1,325 1,227 942 6.4 8.4
Total 2,061 2,570 3,737 6,614 11,696 12,766 14,626 10,372 100.0 100.0
* Includes mining
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 2534 (1975), 1356 (1977), 1358 (1979)
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Table 3:43
Value and Distribution of Imports by Main Countries 1973-78*
(million dollars; current prices)
% Shares
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1973 1978
USA 477 1,313 2,316 1,974 2,347 1,508 13.0 14.5
Canada 23 56 84 103 121 57 0.6 0.5
W. Germany 717 1,178 2,033 2,273 2,789 2,142 19.6 20.6
UK 342 508 989 890 1,028 843 9.4 8.1
Italy 137 197 418 735 810 596 3.8 5.7
France 176 241 519 715 661 508 4.8 4.9
Netherlands 88 152 332 443 489 215 2.4 2.0
Belgium 112 172 291 279 348 257 3.0 2.4
Switzerland 71 115 188 227 271 275 1.9 2.6
Sweden 52 79 151 140 192 145 1.4 1.4
Spain 28 35 126 109 140 259 0.8 2.5
Japan 537 993 1,853 2,200 2,321 1,757 14.7 16.9
Australia 51 67 191 172 228 151 1.4 1.4
Turkey 15 38 55 41 40 23 0.4 0.2
India 54 113 435 315 193 94 1.5 0.9
Brazil 52 24 59 66 69 68 1.4 0.6
USSR 209 269 390 289 376 633 5.7 6.1
E. Europe 125 145 316 389 541 651 3.4 6.3
Others 393 848 840 1,146 1,483 190 10.7 1.8
Total Imports 3,659 6,543 11,586 12,506 14,447 10,372 100.0 100.0
* Excludes military-related imports
Source: Kamram Mofid, Iran: Oil Revenues, Development Planning and Industrialisation 
PhD. Thesis (University of Birmingham: 1985), pp. 330 & 333
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Table 3:44
Patterns of Imports and Exports
(billions of rials)
Rates of Growth
1959- 1963- 1973- 
1959 1963 1972 1973 1977 1963 1972 1977
Total Imports
(current prices) 50.8 39.7 266.7 354.7 1488.4 -6.0 23.6 43.1
Consumer Good Imports/
Total Imports 30.2 24.1 12.9 14.9 18.6 -5.5 -6.7 5.7
Intermediate Good
Imports/Total Imports 49.2 55.5 62.1 60.8 54.2 3.1 1.3 -1.3
Capital Good Imports/
Total Imports 20.6 20.3 25.0 24.2 27.2 -0.4 2.3 -3.0
Imports/ GNP
(current prices) 18.0 11.0 21.7 19.4 27.8 -11.6 7.8 9.4
Imports
(constant prices) 50.8 38.9 195.6 216.8 600.9 -6.5 19.7 29.0
Exports
(current prices) 60.2 80.0 308.5 654.9 1815.2 7.4 16.2 12.0
Exports/GNP 21.3 22.2 25.1 35.7 33.9 1.0 1.4 -1.3
Exports
(constant prices) 60.2 75.4 239.7 481.1 743.4 5.8 13.7 11.5
Source: Robert E. Looney, Economic Origins of the Iranian Revolution 
(New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), p.68.
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Table 3:45
Value of Exports, 1971-78*
(million dollars: current prices)
% Share
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1971 1977
Traditional and
Agricultural Goods 256.4 318.0 505.1 385.6 413.7 377.1 443.0 368.9 76.6 70.9
Carpets 75.5 90.6 108.0 119.1 105.6 94.5 82.8 83.9 22.6 13.2
Cotton 67.4 78.9 150.1 85.3 136.2 122.3 96.2 103.0 20.1 15.4
Fresh & Dried Fruit 35.5 57.4 94.6 71.8 74.7 70.3 119.2 74.9 10.6 19.1
Skin & Leather 17.2 28.2 28.8 27.8 28.3 31.9 39.9 39.2 5.1 6.4
Caviar 5.4 8.3 8.0 7.4 7.2 0.5 9.7 7.0 1.6 1.6
Casings 5.6 6.2 8.9 8.8 11.5 10.5 10.6 11.1 1.7 1.7
Gum Tragacanth 4.7 5.3 9.0 6.5 5.4 3.2 7.6 3.4 1.4 1.2
Cumin Seed 2.6 4.0 4.1 6.2 4.4 5.7 6.7 7.6 0.8 1.1
Other 42.5 39.1 93.6 52.7 40.4 38.2 70.3 38.8 12.7 11.2
Minerals & Metal Ores 16.5 19.2 23.9 32.8 32.8 10.2 46.6 10.9 4.9 7.5
Industrial Products 61.7 102.6 105.7 163.1 145.7 152.6 135.6 163.0 18.4 21.7
Detergents & Soap 7.9 15.6 5.8 12.1 22.1 19.3 16.1 9.1 2.4 2.6
Glycerine & Chemicals 4.1 14.8 16.0 22.0 18.5 31.6 17.7 44.5 1.2 2.8
Shoes 8.4 13.0 11.0 7.4 9.6 5.7 8.1 3.8 2.5 1.3
Sweets & Biscuits 5.9 1.8 3.0 3.4 5.0 11.3 11.3 7.7 1.8 1.8
Clothes, Knitwear & 
Textiles 23.6 36.0 28.5 44.2 28.7 26.7 24.3 20.1 7.1 3.9
Cement, Mosaics & 
Building Stones 2.4 5.5 7.6 3.9 1.8 2.4 2.2 0.7 0.7 0.4
Road Motor Vehicles 4.5 2.0 11.7 21.2 28.3 24.2 13.1 9.5 1.3 2.1
Other 4.9 13.9 22.1 48.9 31.7 31.4 42.8 67.6 1.5 6.8
Total 334.6 439.8 634.7 581.5 592.2 539.9 625.2 542.8 100.0 100.0
* Excluding oil and gas
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 
1353 (1974), 1356 (1977), 1360 (1981)
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Table 3:46
Export Structure: Percentage Shares of Main Categories of Exports 
and Selected Commodity Groups, 1965,1970,1974-77
1965 1970 1974 1975 1976 1977
Main Cateaories of ExDort 
All Food Items 3.42 2.57 0.50 0.55 0.43 0.67
Agricultural Raw Materials 4.65 3.57 0.65 0.97 0.81 0.65
Fuels 86.72 88.62 97.33 97.04 97.61 97.60
Ores and Metals 0.79 1.20 0.31 0.25 0.07 0.27
Manufactured Goods 4.40 4.03 1.21 1.18 1.08 0.82
Chemicals (0.57) (0.56) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.13)
Machinery & Equipment (0.02) (0.10) (0.15) (0.21) (0.17) (0.16)
Other Manufactured Goods (3.81) (3.37) (0.88) (0.80) (0.69) (0.53)
Selected Commoditv GrouDS 
Cereals 0.17 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.08
Crude & Manufactured Fertiliser 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Crude Petroleum 68.09 74.85 90.41 91.54 92.64 91.10
Petroleum Products 18.64 13.20 6.34 4.81 4.51 5.47
Medical & Pharmaceutical 
Products 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Textile Fibres, Yarn & Clothing 6.78 5.22 1.17 1.39 1.11 0.79
Metal & Metal Manufactures 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.09 0.08 0.05
Non-electrical Machinery 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.10
Electrical Machinery 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Transport Equipment 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.13 0.05
Total Value 1,303.0 2,445.3 21,574.9 20,114.4 22,579.6 25,943.0
($ millions; current prices)
Source: UN, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1984)
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Table 3:47
Iran's Production, Consumption and Exports of Crude Oil 1967 - 78
Year Production Exports Domestic Average Foreign Exchange
of Crude of Oil Consumption Crude Oil Receipts From 
Oil (Net) of Export Oil
Oil Products Price
(thousand barrels per day) US$ per barrel (million dollars)
1967 2,582 2,134 132
1968 2,840 2,342 148
1969 3,356 2,832 167
1970 3,808 3,291 183 1,268
1971 4,591 4,052 207 2,161
1972 5,223 4,676 226 2.47 2,536
1973 5,882 5,270 276 5.24 5,067
1974 5,904 5,244 318 11.46 18,671
1975 5,263 4,607 378 11.02 18,871
1976 6,019 5,280 443 11.76 20,488
1977 5,586 4,816 509 20,735
1978 4,252 3,455 517 17,867
Source: Calculated from Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 
1350 (1971), 2534 (1975), 2535 (1976), 1356 (1977), 1357 (1978), 
1358 (1979), Bank Markazi, Bulletin (Nos. 75, 92-3)
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Table 3:48
Iranian Ex-Factory and International Prices Comparison, 1971
(rials)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unit Ex-Factory International Ratio (1) Nominal 
Price Price to (2) Protection
(%)
Consumer Goods
Biscuit (ordinary) kgs 40 76 53 52
Biscuit (special) kgs 64 98.5 65 41
Sugar kgs 15.5 8.0 194 152
Canned Fruit & Veg. kgs 38 39 97 300 - 400
Vegatable Oil kgs 51.5 52.9 97 101
Cotton Textiles m2 20 16 125 50-80
Woollen Textiles m2 228.9 234.4 97 137-157
Intermediate Goods
Passenger Car Tyres m2 1,000 950 105 {13-33
Truck Tyres m2 5,278 5,862 90 {
Radiator (auto) m2 1,600 1,472 109
Cement tons 1,400 3,206 44 13
Glass Sheet (2mm) m2 60 83.3 - 90.9 7 2 -66 {190
Glass Sheet (4mm) m2 120 113.6-117.4 106-102 {
Durable & Capital Goods
Refrigerator Type A unit 11,550 14,600 79 {
Refrigerator Type B unit 14,885 11,170 133 {60
Refrigerator Type C unit 7,875 5,175 152 {
Refrigerator Type D unit 5,940 3,900 152 {
Radio unit 4,320 3,604 120 100
Television unit 14,250 13,186 108 100
Space Heater unit 1,800 2,100 86 -
Bulb unit 10.8 5.7 162 30
Transformer unit NA NA 110 15
Telephone unit NA NA 110 -
Car (Hillman) unit 164,742 143,375 115 {225-
(Rambler; model 420) unit 2,501,000 182,400 137 {300
Bus unit 1,290,000 1,218,225 106 20-40
Source: # Columns (1), (2), & (3) from IBRD, International Development Association, 
Industrial Policies and Priorities: Iran, Report No. SA-27a, Annex A,
Table 5 (South Asia Department, 1972); Column (4) from 
P. Sadigh, op. cit., pp. 64-5.
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Table 3:49
Wholesale and Retail Price Increases, 1962-78
Year Wholesale Price Wholesale Price Retail Price Retail Price
Index Increase (%) Index Increase (%)
1962
1959 = 100
103.6 1.4
1970 = 100
0 0.9
1963 104.0 0.4 88 1.0
1964 109.6 5.4 92 4.5
1965 110.6 0.9 92 0.0
1966 110.0 -0.5 93 1.1
1967 110.2 0.2 94 1.1
1968
1970 = 100
94 0.6 95 1.1
1969 97 3.2 98 3.2
1970 100 3.1 100 2.0
1971 107 7.0 105 5.0
1972 113 5.6 112 6.7
1973 128 13.3 125 11.6
1974 150 17.2 144 15.2
1975 158 5.3 158 9.7
1976 179 13.3 184 16.5
1977 205 14.6 231 25.5
1978 224 9.3 254 10.0
Average wholesale price increase Average retail price increase
1962-67: 1.3 per cent 1962-67: 1.4 per cent
1968-72: 3.9 per cent 1968-72: 3.6 per cent
1973-78: 12.2 per cent 1973-78: 14.8 percent
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1349 (1970); 
UN, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1974 and 1978
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Table 3.50 
Real Exchange Rates 1972 to 1978
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Exchange rate 76 69 68 68 70 71
$1 = Rials
Wholesale price 0.66 0.92 1.0 1.03 1.25 1.40
Index for exported 
goods at 1974 prices
Real exchange rate 113 74 68 66 56 50.7
ie index of
competitivness
Source: Kamran Mofid, Iran: Oil Revenues, Development Planning and 
Industrialisation - From Monarchy to Islamic Republic (PhD. Thesis, 
Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, 1985)
70
1.45
48.2
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Table 3:51
Annual Average of the Wholesale Price Index by Major Groups, 1972 - 78
(1974 = 100)
Relative
Weight
1972 1973 1975 1976 1977 1978
Goods Domestically - 
Produced & Consumed 67.91 75.4 84.3 105.9 123.0 142.1 155.4
Imported Goods 29.00 77.9 89.0 104.0 110.7 124.1 137.1
Exported Goods 3.09 66.7 92.4 103.5 125.2 140.5 145.8
General Index
of which:
100.0 75.4 85.5 105.3 119.5 136.9 149.9
Food & Live Animals 37.63 73.3 79.7 103.9 121.1 139.8 158.9
Industrial Raw 
Materials 3.69 78.3 90.4 96.8 123.6 136.5 156.8
Textiles & Clothing 10.86 73.1 95.3 102.9 123.4 138.7 144.5
Building Materials 
Metal
Non-metal*
13.20
(6.93)
(6.27)
64.0
(26.2)
(66.9)
77.9
(77.5)
(78.7)
105.2
(97.9)
(113.3)
120.6
(100.5)
(143.0)
151.3
(117.0)
(189.1)
156.0
(129.3)
(185.7)
Machinery & Transport 
Vehicles 12.97 86.1 94.4 113.3 125.9 140.6 153.3
* These are substantial increases but may be an underestimate. For example,
The UN Statistics Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1983 which would 
otherwise produces very similar figures for index gives the following for 
mineral products:
79.0 118.0 156.0 223.0 213.0
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 2536 (1977), 1360 (1981)
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Table 3:52
Annual Average of the Consumer Price Index by Major Groups, 1972 - 78
(1974= 100)
Relative 1972 1973 1975 1976 1977 1978
Weight
Food
Dairy Products & Eggs 
Bread & Rice 
Meat, Poultry & Fish 
Fresh Fruit & Veg
35.48
(4.28)
(7.75)
(8.13)
(7.00)
77.5
(85.9)
(76.7) 
(65.0)
(76.7)
83.9
(85.8)
(80.6)
(79.5)
(79.4)
105.6
(106.2)
(101.9)
(106.2)
(110.4)
119.2
(115.6)
(116.4)
(121.4)
(132.4)
143.7
(131.4) 
(142.0) 
(147.6)
(165.4)
169.7
(151.1)
(164.1)
(166.2) 
(214.0)
Clothing 12.94 76.6 88.9 108.9 121.1 146.7 163.6
Housing
Housing Rent 
Owners' Expenditure
21.14
(3.66)
(15.68)
71.2 83.7 120.2 163.4 225.2
(165.8)
(252.6)
224.3
(199.3)
(244.0)
House Furnishings 6.92 66.1 84.1 115.9 130.9 150.6 157.2
Transportation & 
Communication 7.78 91.8 95.1 108.3 123.0 162.2 176.6
Medical Care 3.56 84.5 90.4 113.6 122.4 147.0 170.0
Recreation & Education 3.21 91.1 98.2 88.0 82.4 89.2 99.7
Other Goods & Services 8.97 88.3 92.1 107.3 110.9 128.2 -
General Index 100.0 77.9 86.6 109.9 128.1 160.2 176.2
Source: Bank Markazi, Annual Reportand Balance Sheet, 1356 (1977), 1360 (1981)
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Table 3:53
Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1969 -77
1969
Total Revenue 163.2
Oil and Gas* 91.9
Tax on Income &
Wealth 22.1
Import Duties 24.2
Foreign Investment 
Returns
Other Receipts 25.1
Total Expenditure 199.9
Current Expenditure:
Defence 47.6
Economic Services 9.7
Social Services 28.9
Other 20.7
Investment & Loans 
& Advances 93.6
Balance -36.7
* Including monopoly profits, etc.
(billions rials)
1970 1971 1972 1973
184.8 260.8 308.4 484.4
103.4 166.3 203.5 328.9
26.8 31.0 36.8 53.7
27.1 31.7 35.6 61.4
27.4 32.2 32.5 40.4
238.9 315.8 386.9 498.4
58.4 78.6 100.9 134.9
10.0 13.6 16.2 40.2
32.0 38.7 46.2 69.2
27.8 39.8 49.4 41.9
110.8 145.0 174.2 212.2
-54.1 -55.0 -78.5 -14.0
1974 1975 1976
1.418.5 1,617.0 1,832.7
1.228.5 1,273.5 1,442.4
72.8 153.1 162.2
64.0 94.0 118.5
2.6 11.0 18.2
50.5 85.4 91.5
1,250.1 1,761.4 2,002.4
372.6 476.0 566.8
106.3 122.9 142.1
151.8 200.0 271.9
194.6 152.9 177.6
424.7 809.7 843.9
-168.4 -144.4 -169.7
Source: UN, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1978 Bank Markazi,
Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1357 (1978)
1977
2 ,001.2
1.481.6
197.9 
177.7
20.4
123.5
2,316.0
561.1
162.2
349.9 
209.3
1.033.6 
-314.8
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Acronyms
AEOI: Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran
CAPFI: Center for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investments
CENTO: Central Treaty Organisation
CIF: cost, insurance and freight
GDP: gross domestic product
GNP: gross national product
GENMISH: Gendarmerie Military Mission
GNP: gross national product
IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICB: Industrial Credit Bank
ESS: International Institute for Strategic Studies
UPC: Iran Japan Petrochemical Company
IMDBI: Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran
IMF: International Monetary Fund
IS: import-substitution
ISI: import-substitution industrialisation
ISIC: International standard industrial classification
LDC: less developed country
MAAG: Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP: Military Assistance Program
MBD: million barrels a day
MNCs: Multinational corporations
MVA: Manufacturing value added
NIOC: National Iranian Oil Company
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
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OPEC: Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PBO: Plan and Budget Organisation 
PO: Plan Organisation
RCD: Regional Cooperation for Development
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNIDO: United Nations Industrial Development Organization
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